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Part I - The Community economy 
Introduction and summary 
I. The present Annual Economic Report for I 985-86, here 
submitted to the Community institutions in acco rdance with 
regular procedures, 1 builds on the report which the Council 
adopted last year, the principal theme of which was the need 
to achieve a substantial and durable improvement in the 
employment si tuation. Its potential is increased by proposals 
for a coopera ti ve stra tegy calling for ba lanced contributions 
from the Community, governments of Member States as 
well as from the socia l pa rtners. This strategy wi ll be even 
more effective if it can rely on internationa l cooperation . 
2. In 1984/85 the Community countries have achieved some 
progress in respect of economic policy: 
(i) The moderate economic recovery, which has been under 
way fo r 2 Y2 years, is continuing. 
(ii) Considerable progress has been made towards restoring 
price stability. 
(iii) There has been further improvement with respect to the 
budgetary and external imbalances. 
3. These successes a re grounds neither for complacency nor 
for hoping tha t the major problem of the Community -
unemployment - will be resolved if current trends 
continue. Indeed, all medium- and long-term forecasts of 
growth and employment agree that, on the basis of present 
policies and behaviour, there is no prospect in the medium 
term of raising the growth ra te in the Community above 
some 2 Y2 %. This would not lead to a significant decline 
in unemployment in this decade. A disorderly adjustment 
process in the USA. a further rise in rea l interes t ra tes and 
a worsening of the debt problem in developing countries 
could make the out look even more gloomy. 
The apparen t inevitability of the prospect of persistently 
high unemploymen t has led to widespread pessimism with 
rega rd to economic po licy. If the relationship between 
1 T he ommission's proposed A111111al Economic Report is submitted to 
Community institutions in acco rdance with the Council' s 1974 Decision 
fo r a ttai nment of a high degree of convergence of economic policies of 
Member ta les (A rt icle 4 of Decision 74/ 1201 EEC of 18.2.1974. amended 
by Decision 75,787 EEC of 18.12.1975). The Co uncil is required in the 
fo urth quarter of each year on proposa l of the Commission and after 
consult ing Pa rli ament a nd the Economic a nd Socia l Committee - to 
adopt an annual report on the c-conomic situa tion in the Community and 
to set economic poli cy guidelines to be fo llowed by each Member Sta te. 
As in previous yea rs. the se rvices of the Commission a re preparing. as a 
separa te background document. an Anmw l Economic Re1•ie1r which con-
tuins a more detui lcd fac tual a na lysis of economic trends and the out look 
for the year ahead. This second document is fo r the info rmation of the 
ouncil. Parliament and the conomic and Social Committee. 
growth and employment observed in the I 960s still applied, 
medium-term growth rates above 6 % would be necessary 
to achieve the increase in employment (I-I Y2 % per year) 
that is needed in order to bring down unemployment.gradu-
ally but significantly. Such rates of growth are at present 
quite unattainable. Consequently, the unemployment 
problem can only be solved if there is a distinct improvement 
in the relationship between growth and employment. 
4. We should not, however, ignore the fact that the process 
of moderation of real wage increases established since the 
end of the 1970s has already helped to make growth poten-
tially more employment-creating. The growth rates of re-
cent years, however, were not sufficient to permit the necess-
ary rise in employment. It is therefore necessary to 
strengthen growth in Europe further and to make it more 
employment-creating. 
5. In order to achieve this objective, a series of macroecon-
omic and microeconomic conditions need to be fulfilled to 
the greatest possible extent. 
5. I At the macroeconomic level, it depends in particular on 
a higher level of job-creating investment in the coming 
yea rs. This is first of all the task of entrepreneurs. It is, 
however, also necessary that the profitability of job-creating 
investment should continue to improve, and that there is a 
sufficiently strong outlook for demand. Job-creating in-
vestment is mostly capita l-widening investment , requiring 
favourable prospects for demand and the continuation for 
a certain period of moderation of rea l wage increases at a 
Tate lagging behind productivity growth . If wages were to 
rise too fas t, profitability would suffer and rationalization 
(capital-deepening investment) , which destroys jobs, would 
be unnecessarily encouraged. Avoiding such an eventuality 
in no way implies that technological progress should be 
relinquished; job-crea ting investment a lso incorporates 
technological progress. But beca use of the inadequate capi-
tal stock and the high unemployment rate, Europe needs for 
some years a new balance between capi ta l-widening and 
capital-deepening inves tment. 
5.2 The combination of moderate real wage increases and 
safeguarding an appropria te development of demand is also 
an important element in improving profitability, strengthen-
ing growth and making it more employment-
crea ting. Wage moderation alone would not. or only very 
slowly. lead to the required employment e!Tects. Simply 
expanding demand would , given the inadequate level of 
productive capaci ty. run the risk of producing higher in-
na tion and/or public debt without having the desired e!Tect 
on employment. A combination of both is therefore 
necessary. 
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5.3 With respect to the maintenance of moderate real wage 
increases, which has been achieved in many countries in 
recent years, the cooperation of the social partners, and 
in particular of the unions, is required. Moderate wage 
development should continue until there is a clear and lasting 
fall in the unemployment rate, after which real wage in-
creases could again become close to productivity growth. 
5.4 The safeguarding of an adequate level of demand is the 
task of government, to be carried out until the process 
becomes self-sustaining by means of strong investment and 
an appropriate rise in private consumption. 
5.5 What Europe needs is a dual strategy of moderation of 
real wage increases and support for demand. Indeed, the 
accompanying measures to underpin demand hold the key 
to the success of the strategy and social acceptance of wage 
moderation. This is, at any event, true in a transitional 
phase during which consumer purchasing power will, to 
begin with, inevitably grow more slowly and aggregate de-
mand will not rise at a sufficiently rapid pace as a result of 
extra business investment to expand capacity. 
Only if wage moderation is accompanied by a sufficient level 
of aggregate demand can one have confidence that the 
process of improving prr:itability and restructuring demand 
(relatively more investment and relatively less consumption) 
will be rapid enough and not involve drastic deflation that 
would place social consensus under considerable 
strain. Only in this way can wage moderation fulfil its 
employment function. 
5.6 As a result, the long-term tendency for capital pro-
ductivity to decline would also be arrested. Together with 
rising employment. growing demand and mounting confi-
dence in future trends, this would provide the most effective 
stimulus to the propensity to invest. As investment rises. 
more rapid technological progress would at the same time 
be incorporated into the productive apparatus. and this 
would in turn have a beneficial effect on the productivity of 
labour and capital. Profitability and the propensity to in-
vest would therefore continue to increase. This would cre-
ate a 'virtuous circle' of technological progress. capital pro-
ductivity, profitability, investment and renewed embodiment 
of technological progress. 
6. The strategy proposed in this Annual Economic Report, 
however, consists not only of macroeconomic 
elements. Employment-creating growth also depends upon 
important microeconomic conditions. Action, with the aim 
of improving the adaptability of markets, and not only the 
labour market, should be reinforced. With regard to the 
10 
labour market, the extent to which greater wage differen-
tiation and reorganization and reductions of working time, 
without raising costs, could benefit employment should be 
studied in the light of results already achieved. The 
national governments and the Community should also exam-
ine whether existing rules and regulations impede the func-
tioning of markets and the setting up of new, and in particu-
lar small and medium-sized businesses. 
The spirit in which the debate about market adaptability is 
held is important for its success. The objective behind 
efforts to increase flexibility is not to destroy achievements 
made on the social front but to create more jobs. As far 
as at all possible, therefore. economic efficiency should be 
reconciled with the maintenance and further development 
of social achievements. 
7. The central strategy of moderate growth of real wages 
accompanied by the maintenance of an adequate level of 
demand requires the monetary and budgetary policies of the 
Member States to be based on the following principles: 
7.1 Monetary policy must continue to provide the frame-
work for stability. The proposed dual strategy must thus 
not lead to an acceleration of inflation. On the contrary, 
in most Community countries, the rates of inflation need 
to be brought down further. Monetary policy can best 
safeguard this, within the EMS framework, by continuing 
to set a nominal framework which is oriented towards econ-
omic stability. Such a monetary policy offers considerable 
potential for cuts in interest rates in the Community on a 
sound basis, particularly if the dollar falls further. If this 
could be achieved, with the necessary caution and coordi-
nated within the EMS framework, it would add an ad-
ditional, not inconsiderable stimulus to business investment 
and significantly reduce pressure on government 
budgets. This is a positive effect benefiting all countries. 
7.'2 Budgetary policy must underpin the strategy of employ-
ment-creating growth in the following ways: 
Macroeconomically, it must continue to safeguard the con-
solidation objective, i.e. deficits must be further reduced in 
those countries which still have a level of indebtedness which 
is either excessive or rising too fast. At the same time, it 
must sustain demand where there is room for manoeuvre, 
the more so since wage moderation leads temporarily to a 
fall-off in demand. In addition, budgetary policy should 
continue to restructure the expenditure side of the public 
budgets to reduce subsidies more strongly and in a selective 
way and to increase public investment: particularly in respect 
of infrastructure, environmental protection and urban 
renewal, a considerable backlog of needs has built up in 
recent years, which could be met with the spare capacity in 
the construction sector. 
Budgetary policy should also provide for further measures 
to strengthen supply, which generally have an impact on 
demand at the same time, and safeguard the improvement 
in relative factor prices by reducing taxes and social security 
contributions - wherever possible, at the expense of the 
central government budget. In addition, microeconomic 
measures to promote employment (job-creation schemes and 
promotion of vocational training) should be taken wherever 
possible. 
8. The success of the proposed strategy depends on a coordi-
nated application of policies between Member States within 
a Community framework. 
The economic potential of the Community will be consider-
ably reinforced by the accelerated completion of the large 
internal market including the liberalization of national finan-
cial markets and by the promotion of technical progress, 
as the Commission has proposed. The completion of the 
internal market lies at the heart of the Community; by 
generating supply dynamism and by permitting, at the same 
time, a more sustained growth in demand, it ties in directly 
to the cooperative macroeconomic strategy. The pro-
motion of technical progress is essential to safeguard and 
promote the Community's position among the most de-
veloped economies of the world. In addition, in those 
sectors for which the Community is directly responsible, a 
greater weight should be given to the operation of the 
market. In all these areas, the social dimension should be 
taken fully into account. 
The realization of major infrastructure projects in the trans-
port, telecommunications and environmental fields, as well 
as exploitation of technological potential, would substan-
tially improve the functioning of the internal market. The 
accelerated implementation of numerous projects. which arc 
already available and have an adequate social rate of return. 
would reinforce economic dynamism and contribute to the 
success of the proposed strategy. 
Finally. given the importance or a favourable international 
environment for growth and employment. the Community 
should at the same time continue its efforts to improve the 
international trading and monetary systems. It should also. 
together with other countries. attempt to mitigate the debt 
problem of developing countries. and to work towards main-
taining the growth in world trade as the inevitable adjust-
ments in the USA are made. 
The Community economy 
The contributions of the Community referred to here corre-
spond to numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. 
9. Whatever the international environment, the policies set 
out above are necessary. It is evident that the international 
environment would be considerably reinforced by the success 
of the Community strategy. Given a plausible margin of 
uncertainty as far as world developments are concerned, 
such a policy should make possible the achievement of an 
increase in the economic growth rate in the Community 
from its present level of 2 Y2 % to an average of 3-3 Y2 % 
over the next few years, and at the same time make growth 
much more employment-creating. This would produce an 
average annual increase of 1-1 Y2 % in employment, opening 
up the prospect of unemployment being brought down to 
around 7 % by 1990. 
10. Such a development is only possible, however, when 
all concerned - the Community, national governments, 
employers and unions - work fully together to implement 
the proposed strategy. 
JO.I This overall strategy 'offers· governments and the so-
cial partners an opportunity to achieve a joint solution to 
the major problem confronting the Community. namely 
unemployment. However, the strategy provides only a gen-
eral framework within which much of the debate should be 
held with the governments and with and between the social 
partners. This general framework should also incite those 
concerned at least to rencct upon their respective 
pos1t1ons. For the present, there is no political approach 
in sight other than this strategy providing any prospect 
of significantly reducing unemployment by the end of the 
decade. It is therefore an urgent task to proceed via a wide 
debate to the implementation of this cooperative strategy. 
I 0.2 Exploratory discussions which the Commission has 
had with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
and with the Union of Industries of the European Com-
munity (Unice) have been encouraging. They have shown 
that there is interest and a willingness to talk about such an 
approach. This dialogue should be continued. 1 It is evident 
that social dialogue should also be reinforced at national 
level. The more progress is made in such dialogue at all 
levels. the easier it will be for the national governments and 
the Community itself to make their own contributions. 
1 The Commission will thus ask the ETUC and Unice for written opinions 
on the draft Annual Economic Rq,orr. These opinions will he transmit-
ted to the Council. Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee 
so that they can be borne in mind in the future discussion. 
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10.3 The strategy should gradually be transformed into 
reality. This applies to the cooperation in each country 
between governments, unions and employers. Each should 
make their contribution and at yearly intervals the progress 
should be examined in order to determine the next 
steps. This approach should continue over several 
years. This also applies, however, to cooperation between 
the Community countries and at an international 
level. Each partner should act according to their available 
room for manoeuvre. 
11. The coordinated application of the strategy in the Mem-
ber States should engage and foster a mutually reinforcing 
process of supply, demand and employment. In this respect 
an analysis of developments forecast for Germany in 1986 
are of considerable interest. Economic growth could ex-
ceed 3 % and employment could rise by more than I %, so 
that unemployment declines, albeit slowly at first. The 
price outlook continues to be favourable. A considerable 
current account surplus and, despite the tax reform, a further 
significant decline in the government deficit 1s 
expected. Thus, a pcsitive chain reaction is developing 
between price stability, more growth and employment and 
more room for manoeuvre in the fiscal and external 
fields. This room should be used for higher public invest-
ment in 1986 and bringing forward to 1987 the tax reform 
planned for 1988. This appears necessary so that the 
favourable economic development continues in and beyond 
1987. 
Even in Germany it is necessary to have a growth rate of 
some 3,5 % and a rise in employment of about 1,5 % per 
12 
annum for several years in order to achieve a lasting decline 
in unemployment. This is in both the national and the 
Community interest. 
I I. I In the other countries such room for manoeuvre is 
not yet available. In some of the countries, however, it is 
possible that, with a certain time-lag as compared to Ger-
many, a similar positive chain reaction could develop from 
more growth and employment to greater room for ma-
noeuvre on the fiscal and external fronts. Such a develop-
ment seems possible in Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and France. Its speed will depend upon 
how favourably developments proceed in Germany and 
upon appropriate behaviour of the social partners in relation 
to the requirements of the strategy. Every effort should be 
made to extend the positive chain reaction as quickly as 
possible to this group of countries. This would also con-
siderably improve the situation in the third group of 
countries where room for manoeuvre is not yet in view. 
11.2 The differing situations in the Member States naturally 
restrict a rapid implementation of the proposed cooperative 
strategy. In this respect, the Community's contribution 
could provide a certairi compensating factor. This refers 
not only to the accelerated completion of the internal market 
but above all to the large projects of the Community interest 
in the fields of transport and telecommunications infrastruc-
ture and of environmental protection. The stronger the 
commitment of governments and the social partners to the 
implementation of the overall strategy. the greater the 
chance that the Community's contribution will succeed in 
being of significant macroeconomic importance. 
1. Evolution of the economy and convergence 
1.1. The current situation and outlook for 
Europe 
The present European recovery so far has lasted about 
2 Y, years. From a starting point dominated by structural 
imbalances accumulated over a long period as evidenced by 
large budget deficits, high and continuing inflation, poor 
growth performance and a highly unsatisfactory labour mar-
ket situation, policy management has relied heavily on sup-
ply-side considerations. Moreover, the degree of imbalance 
as between member countries has varied greatly across the 
Community. 
By mid-1985 gross domestic product in the EC had risen to 
nearly 5 percentage points above the previous cyclical peak 
of 1980. Industrial production, which suffered a deeper 
recession than the rest of the economy, also returned to the 
1980 peak level in June 1985. The Commission's recent 
forecasts 1 point to a continuation of this trend, with a 
growth rate of about 2 Y, % for the Community as a whole 
being forecast for 1986, which is marginally more than that 
expected for 1985. 
The outlook for growth, therefore, remains one of modest 
proportions. Even so, in a number of respects, there have 
Table I 
Main economic aggregates, EC,~ 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Pri,atc 
current real dcOalOr consump-
r,nccs terms tion 
denator 
----
0lochangc: ~D change % change % change 
1961-70 9,0 4,6 4,2 3.7 
1971-80 13.4 2,9 10.2 10.1 
1981 10.4 -0,2 10.6 11.7 
1982 10.7 0,5 10.1 9.8 
1983 8,9 1,0 7.8 7.6 
1984 8,0 2,2 5.7 6.2 
1985 
Last report (7.5) (2,3) (5,0) (5.2) 
This report I 7.6 2,3 5.1 5.2 
19861 6.7 2.5 4.1 3.9 
I Fom:ast of the C,,mm1~\u:m s.cn1ccs. on the basis ofprncnt pol1c1cs. September 1985. 
! EC a,c:rat?C 1.'JkulatcJ "1th current GDP weights al pun:ha~mg f'M..lwcr panties . 
.I End i.,r ~car tannual llrl'" th rate) 
N1nr ~n."Cntagc ~hanl?("' arc JI\Cn as annual rates 
The Community economy 
been positive signs of progress in some areas. There has 
been a general awareness that, starting from a pos1t1on 
of acute imbalance coupled with a world recession, the 
adjustment necessary would be a slow one. Moreover, the 
degree of imbalance in Member States is by no· means 
the same. The fundamental approach suggested by the 
Commission in the last two annual reports has been to stress 
the need for improvements to supply conditions in member 
countries set within a framework of control over national 
budgets. A component judged necessary in this approach 
has been to ensure that the evolution of real employment 
costs continues to be maintained below the growth of pro-
ductivity. 
Experience across Member States has varied a good deal 
but looking at average Community performance over the 
past year, there are some encouraging signs. To a degree, 
there has been real wage moderation. Of significance is the 
fact that after a decade in which the creation of new jobs 
has been negative, the Community is beginning to experience 
some growth in employment. Table I shows that for 1985 
employment growth is estimated to be 0,4 % with an increase 
to 0,5 % for 1986. 
1 Commission of the EC, European Economy, Supplement A, October 1985. 
Compcn· Current General Money Unemploy- Employment 
sation account of go\·ernmcnt supply ment(% 
per balance of net lending (M2/3)l of labour 
employee payments or borrowing force) 
0 0 change 1% of GDP % of GDP % change % •;. change 
8.8 0.4 -0,4 10,2 2,1 0,2 
13,6 -0.1 -2,8 14.4 4,2 0,2 
12,6 -0,5 -5,4 10.9 7.6 - 1,3 
10,6 -0,6 -5,6 10,7 9,2 -1.4 
8,7 0,1 -5,5 9,7 10,3 -0,5 
6.7 0.1 -5.4 8,7 10,8 0,2 
(6.7) (0.3) (-4,8) (7.2) (11.5) (0,0) 
6,3 0,5 -5.2 8,4 11,1 0,4 
5.4 0.6 -4.8 6,7 I I.I 0,5 
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Table 2 
World imports of goods 
(% incume in wlume) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
EUR -2,9 2,4 2,3 7,1 5,0 5,3 
us 6,6 0,1 11,8 29,9 10,0 6,6 
Japan -2,4 -0,6 0,3 10,7 3,0 4,7 
OPEC 27,4 5,5 -8.2 -9,0 -10,9 -4,0 
Other 
developing 
countries 3,5 -5,2 -1.2 6,0 4,0 4.5 
World 2,5 -0,1 2,2 9.3 4,8 4,8 
Soura· Commission services. 
By far the greater part of this growth, however, has come 
from increases in activity rates, particularly of women, and 
new entrants to the labour force. To begin to have an effect 
on the current and widespread unemployment problem 
therefore, it is necessary that this progress be improved upon 
and continued into the medium term. When appraised in 
such terms, it is clear that the situation reached remains 
fragile and this report ~cknowledges that future progress 
will be difficult if both policy and behaviour are not changed. 
Table 3 
Rate of change of demand components, EC 
1982 198) 1984 1985 1986 
Private consumption 0.5 I. I 1.0 I. 7 2.7 
Public consumption I. I 1.6 1.2 1.2 I.I 
Fixed investment -1.6 0.0 2.3 1.6 3.7 
Contribution to change 
in GDP of: 
Final domestic 
demand'· 2 0,2 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.5 
change in stocks 1 0,5 -0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 
foreign balance' -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.2 
GDP 0,5 1.0 2,2 2.3 2.5 
Exports 1.5 1.9 7.2 6,4 4.6 
Imports 2,6 1.5 6,6 5,0 5,3 
I Change as percentage of GDP of preceding pc:nod. 
2 E:itcluding change in :r;;tocks. 
Soura · Commission services. 
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In some contrast to the relatively subdued growth in Europe, 
the international economy has been undergoing a much 
more marked cyclical development. For the United States, 
I 984 was a year of exceptionally strong output growth 
( + 6,8 %) and even more so of imports ( + 30 %). With 
Japanese imports also growing fast in that year ( + 10,7 %), 
total world trade grew by as much as 9,3 %. For 1985 
world trade growth is estimated to slow to a more normal 
rate (4,8 %) and on present forecasts a similar result is 
expected in I 986. This is subject, however, to a number of 
uncertainties which are discussed briefly in a later 
section. The forecast includes a more moderate but still 
positive rate of output growth in the United States economy 
( + 2,3 % in I 985, + 2,5 % in I 986) and a sustained growth 
rate of 4 -5 % in Japan in both years. 
It may be questioned why the European economy did not 
respond more strongly to the acceleration of world trade 
that occurred in 1984. It is indeed striking that while Com-
munity exports grew by 7,7 % in 1984, imports grew almost 
as much by 7, I % compared to the modest 2 % growth of 
domestic demand. As a result, the net impact of export 
and import trade volume growth was negligible. However. 
special factors such as strikes in the UK coal industry and 
German metal industries, together with a relatively high rate 
of stock building of high import content help to explain why 
this happened. For 1986 the forecasts suggest a continued 
gradual strengthening of domestic demand. 
This view is supported by evidence from surveys of both 
business and consumer opinion. The industrial confidence 
indicator for the EC as a whole has improved only very 
slightly over the I 2 months to September I 985. Confidence 
in the construction sector remains very depressed. Consumer 
confidence recovered only a little in 1983 measured from the 
low-points reached in preceding recession years but since 
then has remained stable. The remaining component of the 
Commission's composite economic sentiment indicator, and 
the only one to have risen at all significantly over the last 
year, is the share price index. 
The rise in the share price index may be associated with 
the welcome rise in private industrial investment. which in 
Europe as a whole is now the fastest growing demand 
component. After three years of decline in I 981 to I 983 a 
recovery began in I 984. with a 7 % volume rise in industrial 
investment. First indications for 1985 from business survey 
sources pointed to a 9 % volume rise. and more recent 
surveys have revised this up to I I %. Within these EC 
average figures there are some examples of a much stronger 
private industrial investment upswing. In Denmark. for ex-
ample, the growth rate is estimated to be nearly 40 % and 
for the Netherlands over 20 % in both I 984 and I 985. In 
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1985 German industrial investment is expected to nse by 
13 % in volume. 
Of considerable significance, however, is the fact that the 
level of investment is still low. In 1985 the volume of invest-
ment is only that attained in 1980. It is still some 14 % 
below the level in 1973. Sustained and substantial rises in 
investment are now required if the economy's potential 
growth rate is to be improved. Additional evidence is pro-
vided by the behaviour of capacity utilization. Despite 
slow output growth. capacity utilization in industry rose to 
82 % in July 1985, which is close to the 84 % level recorded 
at the cyclical peak in 1979-80. Thus in spite of the exist-
ence of high unemployment, the European economy is alre-
ady beginning to experience production capacity constraints. 
As already noted, in the meantime, total employment has 
increased modestly. Indeed, employment growth of over 
I % is expected in 1985 in Denmark and the United King-
dom, but even this is clearly insufficient given the growth 
of labour supply and the high unemployment level at the 
beginning of the recovery. 
After a long period in which Europe has demonstrated a 
remarkable incapacity to create new jobs. these signs are 
indeed welcome. They do, however, underline the need 
to strengthen further those conditions necessary to secure 
sustained growth embodying employment creation. 
The present European recm·ery, so .f<ir o( t11·0-mul-a-hal(years 
duration, is expected to conti1111e through /986 at a grmrth 
rate around 2 Vi %.Although pril-ate industrial ill\'estment is 
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sholl'ing a significant upturn, this is from a very low 
base. More recently employment has also begun to increase. 
Holl'ever, there are indications that in some countries, despite 
the presence of continuing, unacceptably high unemployment, 
the economy is beginning to experience capacity 
constraints. This empha::ises the need for sustained growth 
of investment in ne1r capacity. 
Table 4 
Forecast increase in gross domestic product in 1985 and 1986 
(%) 
1985 1986 
Nominal GDP GDP Nominal GDP GDP 
GDP output price GDP output price 
volume dcflator ,olumc deOator 
B 6,7 1,9 4,7 6,2 1,7 4,4 
DK 6,3 2,3 3,9 5,4 3,2 2,2 
D 4,4 2,3 2,1 5,4 3,5 1,9 
GR 19,3 1,9 17,I 16,8 1.0 15.7 
F 7.0 1,2 5.7 5,8 1.9 3,9 
IRL 8.7 2,5 6.1 7,5 2,3 5.0 
I 11.0 2,7 8,1 9,5 2,7 6,6 
L 6,0 1,7 4,2 6,4 1.3 5,0 
NL 4.5 2,1 2,3 3,0 2.0 1.0 
UK 9,1 3,4 5,5 7.0 2.0 4,8 
EUR 7,6 2.3 5.1 6,7 2.5 4.1 
Sourn·: Commission services. 
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1.2. Imbalances and convergence in the 
EC economy 
The situation in 1985 may be compared with that in 1980, 
a period which conveniently spans a business cycle. In 1980 
as in 1985, a moderate economic recovery had been under 
way for about two-and-a-half years, and capacity utilization 
rates in industry were similar. Some of the more important 
macroeconomic indicators are set out in Table 5. 
In the labour market, the four larger Member States have 
experienced a rise in the rate of unemployment of between 
4 and 6 percentage points. Among the smaller countries 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland have suffered higher 
than average increases. In so far as a convergence process 
is at work here the similarity of the growth in unemployment 
is striking and this development remains wholly unaccept-
able. 
Although employment growth has become positive in the 
last year, in no country except Denmark is the level of 
employment currently higher than it was at the beginning 
of the decade. Thus virtually the whole of the Community 
is facing a Jabour market problem of comparable gravity. 
Table 5 
Indicators of disequilibria and divergence, 1980 and 1985 
Unemployment GDP deOator 
% •;. 
1980 1985 1980 1985 
8 9,1 13,8 3,9 4,7 
DK 6,7 9,1 8,2 3,9 
D 3,3 8.4 4,3 2,1 
GR 8,3 17,7 17,1 
F 6,4 10,7 12,2 5,7 
IRL 8,2 17.1 14,2 6,1 
I 7.1 12,6 20.6 8,1 
L 0,7 1,7 7,8 4,2 
NL 6,2 13,2 5,7 2,3 
UK 6,0 12,0 19,8 5,5 
EUR 10 5,8 11.2 12.6 5,1 
Source: Commission services. 
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As regards price stabilization, on the whole there has been 
a striking and positive convergence process. Germany and 
the Netherlands have reduced their already below-average 
inflation rates to a very low level. The United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Italy have reduced their inflation rates from 
1980 to 1985 by well over I O percentage points, and France 
by over 6 points. Denmark has also made notable progress 
in achieving a measure of price stabilization. Greece has 
not progressed in this respect. 
On the balance of payments the Community as a whole has 
moved from substantial current account deficit in 1980 to a 
surplus in 1985, but divergences in individual performance 
remain considerable. In addition, when seen against the 
very large current account deficit of the United States, 
the Community retains a degree of vulnerability in this 
respect. The most impressive adjustments have been those 
of Belgium and Ireland which improved their current ac-
count positions by 5 % and 9 % of GDP respectively over 
the five-year period, thus eliminating or very much reducing 
their previously alarming deficit levels. France and Italy 
have also made substantial progress in reducing their defi-
cits, even if more recently in the Italian case the deficit has 
begun to grow again. Germany and the Netherlands on 
the other hand have moved into situations of widening 
surplus. 
Currcnl accounl Budget deficit Gross public debt 
%of GDP % of GDP % of GDP 
1980 1985 1980 1985 1980 1985 
-4,5 0,6 -9,9 -8.6 76,1 116.0 
-3,7 -3,4 -3,3 -2,9 33,5 68,6 
-1,8 2,1 -3,1 -1,2 32,6 42,6 
0,3 -5,2 -5,4 -12.5 27,7 54,5 
-1.4 -0,5 0,3 -3,2 25,0 35,9 
-12,0 -3,3 -11,8 -11,5 85,9 124.3 
-2,5 -1.7 -8.4 -13,6 93.9 120.4 
-0,8 2,1 13,6 15,6 
-1.5 4,5 -4,0 -5,9 45.9 72,3 
1.8 I.I -3.4 -3.3 59,7 59,7 
-1,3 0.5 -3,5 -5.2 50,5 64,3 
In spite of the severity of budget consolidation efforts, EC 
government deficits in 1985 are, on average, significantly 
higher than in 1980 (5,2 % of GDP versus 
3,5 %). Moreover, in this area also the degree of diver-
gence continues to be relatively wide. Four countries (Bel-
gium, Greece, Ireland and Italy) have deficits of nearly 10 % 
of GDP or more. Belgium and Ireland despite considerable 
efforts have not been able to reduce substantially the deficit 
level over the five-year period, even if over a more recent 
period some improvement has been made. The Greek and 
Italian deficits have become more serious still. Germany 
has reduced its deficit to 1,2 % of GDP, whilst Luxembourg 
has moved into surplus. France, the UK and Denmark are 
now in an intermediary category with deficits of around 3 % 
of GDP. 
Over the five-year period, virtually all countries have seen a 
substantial build up in their stock of public debt. The levels 
however are very different. The gross stock of public debt 
in Germany, France and the UK appears to be of relatively 
moderate size (40 %, 30 % and 60 % of GDP 
respectively). The debt levels of Belgium, Ireland and Italy 
are much larger (well over 100 % of GDP). and the interest 
rate burden in these countries is now in the region of 20-
25 % of total current public expenditure and some 10 % of 
GDP. 
Virtually 110 country has a1•oided a 1•ery large rise in unemploya 
ment, ll'hich has thus become the most serious imbalance in 
the European economy. As regards the other imbalances: 
( i) Germany has achie1•ed a broadly satisfactory position. 
but is accumulating an increasing current account surplus: 
(ii) France and the United Kingdom have succeeded in reduc-
ing these imbalances to more moderate proportions: 
( iii) Italy has made considerable progress 011 i11flatio11 and 
until recent~\' on the balance <f payments. but still has a 
grave public finance problem to overcome: 
(iv) the other countries are mostly in rather hetereogeneous 
situations. ll'ith success on some scor<'S but problems 
on others. Denmark has the most generally imprm·ed 
situation. Greece has problems on most accounts. 
1.3. Some risk factors in the medium-term 
outlook 
Under the assumption of an approximately stable influence 
from the rest of the world on the European economy. and 
with broadly unchanged policies and economic behaviour 
in the Community. the Commission would expect a rather 
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steady medium-term economic growth rate of about 2 \/2 % 
per annum in the EC, on average, for the rest of the present 
decade. Inflation might stablize at around 4 % on average, 
with nominal GDP therefore growing by nearly 7 % per 
annum. Unemployment would not fall significantly, and 
thus the central employment problem internal to the Euro-
pean economy would remain. There is little hope that it 
could be alleviated by the end of the decade. 
However the assumption of a stable international economy 
may well not hold and before turning to the Community's 
domestic objectives and policies it is necessary to consider 
the sensitivity of the European economy to possible inter-
national events. Indeed the past decade has seen a sequence 
of massive world economic shocks: oil price rises, large 
exchange and interest rate movements. debt crises. For the 
next few years potential external sources of disturbance 
would lie primarily in the manner in which the process of 
correction of the US external deficit and related budget 
deficit and exchange rate imbalance takes place. and a re-
surgence of the debt crisis. A large fall in the price of oil 
would have positive and negative effects. 
Some very approximate orders of magnitude are given in 
Table 6. It should be stressed, however. that in principle. 
a wide range of different estimates could be discussed. de-
Table 6 
Sensitivity of the EC economy to changes in the world economic 
environment 
US budget restriction m three suc-
cessive years of I% of GDP per 
annum. cumulatively 
US exchange rate depreciation of 
20% 1 
US budget restriction and exchange 
rate depreciation combined 
Monetary conditions permitting a 
2% fall m European real interest 
rates 
Fall in oil price of 20% with respect 
to the 1985 level 
1 \\'uh rcspcxt to the Elt· anJ ~en. 
Sour( c Estimates of the Commission ~er\ u..·c, 
lmpai:t on EC. 
cumulati\c total for thrL-c ,cars 
output 
-% 
-114 
-2 
+% 
+'¥., 
on lcvds of: · 
pm.:c~ 
-Y., 
-.2Y., 
-3 
-I 
nominal 
GDP 
-114 
-3% 
-5 
+% 
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pending on assumptions about particular circumstances and 
on different reactions in private markets as well as official 
policies. 
The broad picture which emerges is that, as regards the level 
of output in the EC, there are both negative and positive 
risks inherent in the potential disturbances considered, al-
though the negative risks look on balance to be greater. As 
regards the rate of inflation there are possibilities for signifi-
cant disinflationary impacts but none that appear likely to 
increase inflation significantly. 
The actual position in the United States and what develop-
ments are likely over the medium term remain 
debatable. On this score it must be admitted that the degree 
of uncertainty on such matters as future US growth, its 
budget and external deficits, and the behaviour of interest 
rates and the dollar exchange rate is large. In the absence 
of any firm view, one can only resort to some stylized 
assumptions. Thus for illustrative purposes, what might 
be judged to be a substantial budgetary contraction. or a 
substantial exchange rate depreciation would (in the am-
ounts specified in Table 6) lower the level of output in the 
EC by amounts in the range of 3/. to I Y. percentage points 
for three years taken cumulatively. 
Each element on its 0wn would therefore represent a small 
but not trivial set-back to the European recovery. Taken 
together, however, the impact becomes considerable. 
These estimates already take into account some decoupling 
of European interest rates from-those in the United States 
(in the sense of relatively lower European rates). The mag-
nitude of such changes is hard to judge. However, if one 
supposed that an extra margin of 2 percentage points re-
duction in European interest rates became possible, for 
example as a reaction to a very sharp weakening of the 
dollar, there might be a compensating boost to activity in 
Europe of around two-thirds of a percentage point cumulat-
ively over three years. 
A substantial fall (20 %) in the price of oil would have a 
beneficial impact on conjunctural trends in the EC. (The 
fiscal aspects of such a development are treated in section 
111.1.2.) This is estimated at cumulating to two-thirds of 
I % of GDP over three years. but the margin of uncertainty 
here is wide. Real incomes of companies and households 
would gain on the terms of trade. which would stimulate 
investment and consumption. However, oil and gas pro-
ducers would lose incomes. Western Europe produces a 
substantial part of its own oil and· gas (taking production 
of the UK, the Netherlands and Norway as a share of EC 
and EFTA demand). Exports to OPEC countries would 
surely weaken. 
20 
The disinflationary impact would be considerable in the 
event of a substantial dollar exchange rate fall (2 Y2 % off 
the EC price level after three years with a 20 % depreciation 
against the ECU). The 20 % fall in the price of oil would 
also have a significant but smaller disinflationary impact. 
One of the main issues arising from these scenarios is how 
to judge reactions to a simultaneous weakening in the EC 
of both output and inflation. In some of the hypotheses 
discussed there would remain a significant reduction in ag-
gregate nominal demand. Compensatory policy reactions 
would then need to be considered, especially in countries 
which have already made good progress in reducing inflation 
(see further below in relevant policy sections of this report). 
Potential disturbances in the international economy over the 
foreseeable future ( adjustments in the US. a possible fall in 
the price of oil) point to the possibility of further reductions 
in inflation in the EC. As regards the level of output there 
are different risks arising from negative and positive impacts 
from the rest of the world; the negative risks seem to be 
greater. In the event of external conditions transmitting dis-
inflation and real contractionary influences to the EC at the 
same time, the question of the adequacy of nominal demand 
would arise. 
2. A cooperative strategy for more 
empioyment-creating growth 
2.1. The background and orders of magnitude 
The principal theme of this report is focused on the prime 
necessity of renewed economic growth but of a character 
which will begin to create a significant number of new jobs 
and thus represent a step towards solving the problem of 
unemployment. 1 Initially therefore, it is useful to outline the 
medium-term prospect for Europe in the absence of any 
significant changes to international trends and to existing 
policy and behaviour. In other words how might the out-
put, employment and unemployment situations in Europe 
unfold if, at the broad macroeconomic level. recent trends 
were maintained. Projections of this nature, whilst difficult 
to make, nevertheless are necessary as a means of assisting 
in the policy judgement process. 
Recognizing the well-known limitations of model-based 
scenarios, present policies and trends are represented in the 
1 Apart from the programme for European economic recovery, adopted in 
March 1984. the European Parliament has advocated on manv occasions 
an employment-generating investment effort (see Resolution: OJ C 122/ 
57, 16.4.1985, point 4). 
first column of Table 7 by a 'baseline assumption'. In this 
initial entirely illustrative case GDP growth in the EC as a 
whole is seen to be stabilizing at around 2 Yi % until the 
end of the decade, with inflation decelerating further to a 
little over 4 % and nominal GDP thus growing between 
6 Yi % and 7 % a year. Budget deficits would be further 
reduced, and money supply kept to near its present growth 
rate. Labour productivity might increase by about as much 
as that observed during the last decade, at a little over 2 % 
per year. Real wages might grow a little below 2 %, thus 
allowing for some modest improvement in the share of 
profits in national income. Investment would be growing 
faster than GDP, perhaps 5 % per year, reflecting some 
response to the more recent slowdown in the rate of techno-
logical advance and to the restructuring needs of the 
economy. 
In these conditions the rate of return on invested capital 
would not increase very substantially. In particular the 
cost of labour relative to the rate of return on fixed capital 
Table 7 
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would not change markedly. Employment growth would 
be quite modest, perhaps not quite 0,5 % per year, albeit 
better, however, than the recent record of stagnant or declin-
ing employment. Unemployment might then declinl! only 
very slightly, maybe to 10 Yi % by I 990. 
The characteristics of this assumed baseline projection, al-
though disappointing, are not unreasonable given the fact 
that currently in Europe it remains questionable as to 
whether the unemployment level has stabilized when the 
economic growth rate is around 2 Yi %. What the baseline 
projection underlines is the strong likelihood that it will 
require a set of policy changes and behavioural changes to 
be introduced and maintained if the growth path for output 
and employment is to be improved in a significant way. 
Given the improved situation with respect to budget deficits 
shown in the baseline projection, a more obvious suggestion 
might be to adopt a policy of pronounced budgetary 
expansion. Although this particular course is not the 
Some illustrative orders of magnitude in a baseline scenario and in an employment growth scenario, EC, 1986-90 
GDP, volume growth 
GDP dellator 
GDP, nominal 
Investment 
Employment 
Unemployment rate 1 
Labour productivity 
Real wage cost 
Prolit share in national income 
Budget balance~ 
Rate of interest3 
1 PcrL't'OHlttC of total lahour fon.."C ;.H end of pcno<l. 
: Pcn."'C'OlaJ!?C of GDP oil end of pcno<l 
' Long term rate ,1f interest at end of pcnoJ. 
Sou" t l:sllmatcs llf the Comm1s)1on scrvu."C~-
,\'e1tt 
Baseline 
Sl"Cnario 
2,5 
4,2 
6,7 
5,0 
0,4 
10,4 
2.2 
1,7 
1,1 
-3,8 
10.9 
( annual ai·erage groM·th rates) 
Fiscal Cooperative (EC scenario without 
renation growth international 
scenario Sl."C'nario cooperation) 
3,4 3.5 (3,2) 
5,4 3,7 (4,0) 
8,8 7,2 (7,2) 
5,1 6,6 (5,9) 
0,8 1,1 (1,0) 
8,5 7.0 (7,4) 
2,6 2,4 (2,2) 
2,5 1.0 ( 1,0) 
-0,8 3.8 (3.3) 
-7,1 -4.0 ( -4.4) 
12.5 8.3 (9.4) 
(i) Thr 'h.a.S<'hnc S1.-cnano· surroscs the mamtenan1.-c of present l:,udgctar) omd m,mctary pohcu.~ m the Comm unit). the absence of budgctar)' adJustmcnt in the United States and normal growth 
l'f"orld trade 
(ii) The ·n~al rctlJth.ln ~"t'narh.l' ~" the hud~C't Jclk1t m thC" E( • maea~ hy ilS much as is nccc!\sar~ to reach S ~ 0 0 unc:mpl1..l~ment by I Q90. other ,ariables reacting endogenously: the international 
cn,ironmC"nt 1s thC' same as m the ·t,J~hnC' ~-cnoml,·. 
t1i1)Thc \:Ol'f"('ra11,c ~hl"th S4.-cnario' Cl1mpriscs, for the: Cl1mmumt~ .. 1 lllllJer,lll' }:fl'"th m re.ii "agl'"' until thC'rc 1s ., s1gmftcant fall m the unemployment rate (1988·89). The dc,-elopment of real 
"a~ then mo,~ ttraJu,111) to".m.h th:.11 of pTl'w.iu1..·t1\ll~ per person lX'C'up1c<l. Budgetary and ml1net;:1r) polil."ICs maintain GDP at a le,·cl dose to the baseline scenario; while. outside the EC. 
the l'S n:Ju1..-c~ ns huJge1 Jdi1..·1t. t.1ffsct I:,) c:..pan::.1onJr) action m Japan JnJ some other countncs. the dollar depreciates against the EClJ and, more substantially. against the yen. This scenario 
"e,rl,unC'\J m S«uon II ~ hclo" 
(t\) The ·t·C ~'('n.trh.l "h1t1Jut mternau,m.al cooperation· aS-Sumcs the same economic pohcy ~asurt'5 in the Community as the ·coopcrat1vc growth sccnano· On the other hand. the international 
em1rl,nmcnt rcmJm" thC' "-JntC .ism the 'hasclinc s-..""Cnario' 
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judgement of the Commission or the Council, it is neverthe-
less useful to outline what this kind of policy might imply 
over the medium term. 
The second column of Table 7 illustrates the economic 
effects of a straightforward 'fiscal reflation' option in which 
the target for a significant reduction in the level of unemploy-
ment is set at 8 Y, % by 1990. In this simple case, the 
instrument for achieving this is assumed to be a fiscal expan-
sion with no other constraints observed and the international 
environment as in the baseline projection. 
What the projection shows is that to realize the employment 
target (8 Y, % unemployment), the European economy 
would experience a continuously mounting increase in the 
budg,!t deficit, which, for the EC as a whole. rises from 4.8 % 
of GDP in 1985 to 7,1 % in 1990. Growth is increased, but 
so also is inflation which accelerates from 4,5 % in 1985 to 
7, I % in 1990. The projection period ends therefore with 
a combination of accelerating inflation and public debt 
burdens, after only a rather moderate reduction in 
unemployment. The momentum of accelerating inflation 
and public debt burdens at the end of the period points to 
the prospect of further harmful interaction between the 
two. In short the policy would be unsustainable and have 
to be reversed. The introduction of an accompanying and 
unavoidable stabiliza.ion policy would result in a renewed 
rise in the rate of unemployment. 
These two scenarios can be interpreted as useful reference 
points in the development of a feasible strategy. Neither a 
continuation of the existing state of affairs nor an isolated 
demand-based reflationary policy embody the ingredients 
necessary to secure the improvement in economic perform-
ance desired. 
Model-hased simulations for the medium term confirm that 
neither a scenario based on uncha11ged policies a11d behm·iour 
nor a simple fiscal rt'./latio11 ll'ill lead to a sustai11able acceler-
ation of output groll'th mu/job creatio11. They corroborate the 
results of other analyses 11-/zich show that 11eitlzer a sponta11eous 
development nor budgetary reflation 1rould resofre the 
problem. 
2.2. The need for more employment-
creating growth 
Current demographic trends and participation rates demon-
strate that in order to bring the unemployment rate down 
from its present level of around 11 % to a level of some 7 % 
of the labour force between now and I 990, employment 
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growth rates of between I and 1.5 % a year would be 
necessary. 
Graph 9 provides a simple illustration of the relation be-
tween the growth rates of employment and output in the 
Community and the United States. 
The relationship observed in the Community over the period 
1961-73 (R I) shows that despite rapid economic growth 
averaging 4,6 % per annum, the rise in employment was 
very modest (an average increase of0,2 %). If the relation 
established for this period were still valid at the present time, 
growth rates averaging over 6 % a year would be needed in 
order to achieve the desired increase in employment. Such 
a growth rate would appear to be quite out of reach in 
present circumstances. It should be noted, however, that 
the capital-intensive type of growth of the 1960s suggested 
by the graph was perfectly compatible with the very modest 
growth in the labour force at that time and permitted the 
maintenance of a very low unemployment rate (2 to 2,5 % 
of the labour force). 
After the crisis years of 1974-75 and the recovery in 1976 
- years which were excluded from the estimating periods 
because of the extreme instability which they introduced 
into the results - a new relation was established over the 
period 1977-85 (R2). This shows a shift of the curve 
towards the left. i.e. a given economic growth rate is paral-
leled by a larger increase in employment. However, be-
cause economic growth remained low during this period 
(increasing by an average of 1.8 % a year). no growth in 
employment resulted. The increase in the labour force was 
therefore reflected in an increase in unemployment. If the 
new relation established between growth and employment 
were to prove stable. growth rates of 3.5 to 4.5 % a year 
would be sufficient to obtain the increase in employment 
necessary to reduce unemployment. 
Graph 9 also illustrates the relation between employment 
and growth resulting from the three scenarios presented in 
Table 7. Thus. annual average growth rates of GDP and 
employment over the period 1986-90 are in the case of 
the basic scenario situated virtually on the straight line 
R2. This means that, with no change in policies and behav-
iour, the low economic growth rate associated with a fairly 
modest rate of increase in employment (point D) would be 
entirely consistent with the relation recorded in the last 
few years. The isolated fiscal reflation scenario would be 
reflected in faster economic growth and employment would 
increase more or less according to the relation R 2 (point 
E). Lastly the point corresponding to the cooperative 
growth scenario (point F) would be situated above the 
present relation: it would clearly represent growth which 
was faster and which is more employment creating. This 
third case is treated in more detail in Section 11.5. 
Several elements can contribute to the achievement of 
growth which creates more job : 
(i) a lower increa e in rea l per capita labour costs associated 
with an appropriate growth in demand; 
(ii) a continuing effort to improve the adaptability of all 
markets (labour, goods and service , capita l); 
(iii) on the labour market, changes in working time and 
arrangement for introducing shorter working hours which 
have no effect on production costs; 
(i ) wage differentials which give a more appropriate picture 
of the requirements for labour in different industries and 
region . and with different skills. 
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An adjustment proces guided by these principles is capable 
both of permitting growth which creates more jobs, but also 
of laying the foundations for a more satisfactory growth 
dynamic for the future, to the extent that it restores the 
economic condition of supply. 
Here it hould be stressed that another essential feature is 
markedly more sustained investment growth. The report 
has shown that, while growth performance remained modest, 
the economy was already beginning to run into capacity 
constraints. Irrespective of the inadequacy of the level of 
investment (the investment share fell by 5 percentage points 
between 1970 and 1985), it i probable that , following the 
shocks caused by energy prices, part of the exi ting stock is 
obsolete and less efficient. Hence. if the adjustment process 
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is to create new jobs, it must be based on conditions pro-
pitious to new investment expenditure. 
Lastly, it is at least as important to create and maintain a 
social framework within which the changes deemed necess-
ary are accepted and in which their implementation is 
encouraged. Here, companies, governments, employees 
and their trade unions have an essential role to play. Com-
panies must carry out the job-creating investment which is 
necessary. They will be all the more inclined to invest and 
more generally to spend if they expect their markets to 
expand and to be profitable. The trade unions will on the 
whole be much more receptive to calls for wage moderation 
if they consider that such moderation will permit more 
growth and employment. Governments will be more ready 
to cut taxes if they can see companies and trade unions 
working together to improve productive capacity and hence 
the tax base. 
After the re-examination of these questions in Sections 11.3 
and II .4 of this report, suggestions are made in Section 11.5 
as to how to implement an integrated approach to the 
problems posed. 
Performance in creating jobs in the Community has been 
generally poor for 25 years. Hml'e1•er the model of capita/-
intensive groll'th developed in the 1960s ll'as appropriate for 
that period, because the loll' increase in employment was 
paralleled by the small groll'th. of the labour force, so that 
unemployment could be kept at a loll' level. Times have 
changed and in response to the poor groll'th outlook, it is urgent 
for the unemployment cun•e to be reversed. The problem is 
to achieve economic groll'th ll'hich is both faster and also 
creates more jobs. The main points of the economic policy 
to be implemented in order to attain this objecti1•e hai•e been 
clearly identified. Essentially they combine a moderate 
groll'th of ll'ages ll'ith the right degree c1f support for demand 
and must he accompanied by imprm•ed adaptability on all 
markets. It is therefore the conditions for the cooperatfre 
implementation <~l this policy ll'hich must 1101\' be considered. 
2.3. Labour, capital and technology 
There is now a strong suspicion that the mix of capital and 
labour used in the European productive process has become 
biased too much against the use of labour. The stagnation 
of employment as we have observed is an uncontested fact. 
Evidence has also built up showing an increasingly distorted 
use of capital for labour-saving rather than for capacity 
expansion. Whilst there arc many data problems, it is worth 
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noting that there is a corroboration of evidence from statisti-
cal estimates for the industrial and manufacturing sectors, 
as well as from surveys of industrialists' opinions. The 
argument is also supported in comparisons with the United 
States, where the use of labour and capital has been rather 
more even-handed than in Europe. 
Much of the more conventional analysis of productivity 
appears deceptively comfortable from a European point of 
view. As Graph JO shows, labour productivity in Europe 
has risen much more strongly than in the United 
States. The graph also provides information on the trend in 
capital productivity (output per unit of capital stock). This 
progressed during the 1960s at a moderate rate in the United 
States and weakened thereafter. In Europe capital pro-
ductivity declined markedly all through the period 1960-85. 
In other words capital intensity (i.e. the amount of capital 
used per person employed), appears to have risen steeply in 
Europe alongside the trend in labour productivity, whereas 
both have grown less strongly in the US. Thus a comparison 
of labour cost increases with labour productivity growth will 
be misleading in a period when a major part of labour 
productivity growth is the result of an increasing Jabour-
saving bias in investment. If increased productivity growth 
results from a decline in employment. or an insufficient 
increase in employment with respect to the growth of the 
labour force, the labour force as a whole is not reaping the 
benefits of these apparent productivity gains. 
Increases in capital per employee are regarded naturally as 
a desirable thing and experience through the 1960s suggests 
that the growth of capital per employee did yield a reason-
ably acceptable growth of GDP and output per 
employee. A question which arises,therefore, is why capital 
accumulation in Europe, particularly from the 1970s on-
wards, has not generated more employment. There is little 
doubt that energy price increases reduced the net worth of 
the existing capital stock. Action by governments to control 
inflation with restrictive policies also led to under-utilization 
of capacity. Looked at over the longer term. however. 
another important part of the answer is that these trends 
have been accompanied by a sustained deterioration in the 
profitability of or return to investment and,related to this. 
a marked increase in the real reward to labour relative to 
that of capital (see Graph 11 ). 
Three other factors which may help in an explanation are, 
firstly. the existence of labour market rigidities which may 
have impeded the effective working of the labour market in 
the face of rising employment costs. Secondly. the con-
scious policy on the part of governments to increase taxes 
on labour. particularly social security contributions. Non-
wage costs in the Community have risen by around one half 
of a percentage point per annum over the past two decades. 
Thirdly, the need to exercise control over inflation and the 
necessary non-monetary financing of budget deficits has 
led to a high real interest rate in the Community. Taken 
together, these factors have produced a sustained deterio-
ration in the profitability of investment. Reference to Graphs 
11 and 12 indicates that there is a strong association between 
rates of return and growth of the stock of capital. 
The increased relative real costs of employment and weak-
ened profitability of fixed capital has tended to make labour-
using or capital-widening investment increasingly less at-
tractive relative to the more capital intensive methods of 
production . Overall , the decline in capital productivity and 
fall in ra tes of return in Europe points to a p'ronounced 
decline in the efficiency of its investment, perhaps for some 
considerable time. The implication is that new -investment 
has not provided the contribution to production capacity 
needed . 
In summa ry, the position reached in Europe, therefore, is 
one where there has been too much emphasis on labour-
saving investment; but induced by poor profitability, the 
economy is faced with a shortage of investment for new 
capaci ty. In the low efficiency situation, the gap between 
the margi nal product of capital and the real interest rate is 
too large. 
Since the ea rly 1980s there has been some correction of these 
trends. The trend growth of real wage costs has moderated 
to 1,0 % per annum over the period 1983-85 compared to 
2, I % for 1974-82 and 4,4 % for 1961-73. The rate of 
return on the gross capital stock is estimated to have in-
creased somewhat from its low point at the beginning of the 
1980s following the second oil shock, but this is still a long 
way below the level observed in the 1960s when there was a 
fa ter rate of growth of the capital stock (see Graph 12). 
Investment has begun to pick up in 1984 a nd 1985, but from 
a very low base. As noted , however, the increase in the 
rate of capacity utilization in indu try has continued through 
the la t ( _ month . rising from 79 % in the middle of 
19 4 to _ % in 1985. Given this supply constraint, if the 
potential rate of growth of the European economy is to 
be ignificantly increa ed, there will have to be a major 
inve tment effort and one o riented away from labour saving 
and m re towards capacity ex ten ion . This in turn implies 
that the recent improvement in the relative reward to capital 
as compared to labour will have to be continued for a 
con iderable number of year . uch a trend would. of 
c ur e. be more readily accepted a part ofa ocial consen u 
if the econom , a een to be moving onto a more favour-
able gr , th path and at the ame time creating more 
The Community economy 
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employment. This raises a question of an appropriate de-
mand development which must go on in parallel with small 
increases in rea l wages. 
In this context, the role of technological innovation and the 
growth of technica l progress more generally is particularly 
important. There is some evidence now that the pace of 
technical . advance in Europe weakened during the 
1970s. Contrary to some beliefs, this will have weakened 
rather than helped the employment situation. Whilst the 
process of technical advance necessarily involves the elimin-
ation of obsolete jobs, it also creates new jobs in industries 
that make and use the technologies. Some of the more 
important recent technologica l improvements, information 
technology for example, have a strong capital-saving and 
labour-using dimension. The pace and nature of technical 
progress, however, is not invariant to relative prices in mar-
kets for labour and capital. If real wages rise too much 
relative to the rate of return on fixed capital , this might be 
expected to induce more innovations of a labour-saving 
kind . A more appropriate structure of real employment 
costs and rewards to fixed capital will help to avoid this 
kind of bias. So long as advances in technical knowledge 
improve the efficiency of investment and working methods 
there will be less need to slow down real wage growth in 
order to achieve a given employment objective. 
The structure of the economy has become biased too much in 
favour of capital-deepening and labour-saving investment , so 
that there has been insufficient capacity -expanding 
investment . This seems due in no small measure to inappro-
priate relative factor price trends, with declining profitability 
matching weak overall investment and rising labour costs 
matching stagnant employment . More appropriate relative 
factor prices could see advanced technology help achieve 
higher potential output and employment growth. 
2.4. Pay, profits and jobs 
During the course of the last year, the Economic Policy 
Committee of the E concluded an examination concerned 
with the adequacy of the return on fixed capital in the 
Community.1 
The Committee observed that the ra te of return on invested 
capital, which is the most significant indicator of profita-
1 Economic Policy Commiuee of the EC, 'Profitability and the ra te of 
return in the ommunity' , report to the Council and Commission, (doc. II/ 
02/85-E final) , May 1985. 
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bility, declined in the 1960s and the 1970s in the 
Community. In 1984 the net rate of return on the net 
capital stock in the EC is estimated on average to have been 
4,2 % (see Graph 14), which compares with 11 % in the 
1960s (on the basis of the definitions used in Graph 
14). This decline in the rate of return however appears to 
have been arre ted in the more recent past, as the rate of 
increase of real wages moderated to an annual average 
growth of I % in the period 1983-85 (compared with 2, I % 
in the period 1974-82 and 4,4 % in the period 1961-
73). Nonetheless the recovery of the rate of return , while 
variable across countrie , has on average been very modest 
when compared with the levels observed during period of 
faster growth in Europe. 
The wage share in national income in Europe has fallen 
back closer to the levels observed at the beginning of the 
1970 , and the profits share has increased 
corre pondingly. However, this change in income distri-
bution has merely matched the change in capital-labour 
mix. Thi explain why the rate of return on fixed capital 
has hardly increased, and why therefore there remain a 
problem of in ufficient profitability in Europe. 
While there a re eriou stati tical difficultie in the measure-
ment of profitability of fixed capital. there exi t also other 
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criteria for judging the level of profits and wages, notably 
in the investment and employment performance of the 
economy. High real wage growth through the 1970s has 
contributed to a weak investment performance accompanied 
by an unfavourable investment mix. · 
In the judgt:ment of the Economic Policy Committee, the 
great majority of Member States do still experience a level 
of profitability on fixed capital that is, in most sectors, 
probably too low from the standpoint of fostering sufficient 
investment and employment growth . Sustained moderate 
increases in real wages coupled to adequate demand growth 
would. of course. lead to the desired overall increase in the 
rate of profitability of fixed capital. An example of the very 
positive response of employment and investment to real 
wage moderation and improved profitability is being seen 
currently in Denmark where, in a small open economy, 
the increase in exports has provided the necessary demand 
stimulus. 
The case exists therefore for an adjustment to be sustained 
for several years . Indeed , it may well be necessary for real 
wage growth to remain very modest and below the growth 
of labour productivity, as long as unemployment has not 
fallen significantly. However, this would need to be ac-
compan_ied by an appropriate evolution of demand sustained 
progressively in part by spending on new private investment. 
The issue of wage differentials , and nexibility in real wage 
evolution is a lso relevant in the pursuit of a higher level 
of employment. This issue of course poses considerable 
problems in the context of centralized wage bargaining; the 
· appropriate balance between centralized versus decentrali-
zed negotiation is an important topic of dialogue between 
the social partners. Some evidence on the significance of 
inter-sectoral real wage nexibility for the employment-cre-
ating performance of the_ econom~ is ~uggested_ in a recent 
work. I While interpretation of this kmd of evidence must 
be made with caution, it does appear to be the case that EC 
countries have shown a relatively low real wage nexibility, 
both inter-sectorally and at the macroeconomic level , thi 
running alongside increasing unemployment. 
It is of crucial importance that a greater consensus be 
reached over how these several difficult issues of pay, profits 
and employment performance should be handled in the 
Community in the years ahead . European countries must 
no doubt find solutions which can be adapted to the particu-
lar political and social traditions, whilst taking full notice 
of the ingredients of successful employment performance 
elsewhere. In this connection the role of more novel modes 
' OECD. ' Labour market fl exibility and ex ternal price shocks'. ESD Work-
ing Paper o 24. September 1985. 
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of pay determination could be examined, including for exam-
ple a larger component of profit, bonus or performance-
related pay. In pay systems which embody some of these 
characteristics, employees could have some measure of 
guarantee against excessive swings of the pendulum in favour 
of returns to share-holders. Moreover, the employer would 
be more prepared to recruit extra staff in the knowledge 
that labour costs were more flexible. In view of the need for 
a period of faster investment and higher profitability, it could 
also be helpful to foster a climate of wider participation on 
the part of employees in schemes for capital accumulation. 
Wage moderation in recent years has allowed the decline 
in profitability of fixed capital to be arrested. However. 
profitability is still too loll'for the purpose of achieving higher 
investment and employment growth. Real wage flexibility in 
the EC, both at macroeconomic and sectoral levels, is also 
rather low and apparent(r related to the weak employment 
propensity in the European economy. Therefore real wage 
moderation, of a kind actually witnessed in most Member 
' States in the last four years or so, needs to be sustained for a 
period of years ahead until a substantial and continuing re-
duction of unemployment is achiei•ed. Employers for their part 
must ensure that the necessary im•estment is 
forthcoming. Within a broadframell'ork of concertation be-
/1\'een the social partners there are three particular areas of 
concern: ( i) how governments might formulate the necessary 
demand policies to accompany ll'age moderation agreements: 
( ii) the adjustment of relatfre factor prices and allainment of 
employment objectives: (iii) the scope for nell' modes of ll'age 
determination designed to allain more readily the objectives 
of high employment. 
2.5 A cooperative medium-term 
growth strategy 
The earlier parts of this section of the report have attempted 
to provide what are in effect building blocks for a suggested 
strategy aimed at securing a substantial and employment-
creating growth. Given this earlier discussion, the judgement 
in this report is that the possibility of realizing such an 
outcome will depend heavily on a small number of particu-
larly important conditions but set within a cooperative 
framework. Particular emphasis is placed on the contri-
bution required from the different actors for the purposes 
of improving the profitability of capital, providing aggregate 
demand support and thus generating the investment necess-
ary for growth of a more employment-creating kind. 
Within this cooperative framework, the recent moderation 
in most countries in the rise of real employment costs. after 
a period of strong increases, must be maintained. It is clear 
that those countries which have not yet achieved the degree 
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of moderation required must make efforts to do 
so. Associated with this is the need to encourage a more 
even-handed evolution of the relative rewards to labour and 
capital. Over the medium term, a reduction in the costs of 
employment relative to those of new investment will begin 
to change the investment mix and hence reverse what is now 
thought to be an excessive amount of capital deepening and 
shedding of labour. 
Over the shorter period, a more moderate growth of real 
wages will tend to increase the profitability of 
firms. However, since wage incomes form such a large part 
of total domestic income, to a degree there is likely to be an 
adverse effect on demand. Given the starting point which 
is one where there is some evidence of capacity constraints 
already, the link between expected future profitability of 
investment and spending on new investment for capacity 
expansion is important. To the extent that total demand 
is reduced more by wage moderation than investment is 
increased because of improved profits, it will be necessary 
for some aggregate demand sustaining measures on the part 
of governments to be effected if the desired employment 
response is to be realized. 
The way in which the market for labour is able to respond 
occupies a central place and in this respect the adaptability 
and functioning of labour markets has been identified as a 
problem area in Europe. Factors such as job tenure and 
severance conditions, more flexible use of working time, 
the adequacy of professional training, the relation of wage 
differentials to labour needs in different sectors, regions 
and skills and the growth of non-wage costs should be re-
examined in order to improve market efficiency without 
jeopardizing social protection. 
The elements noted above constitute the essential core of 
the approach, a characteristic of which is that total demand 
has an important supporting role rather than one of leading 
in the growth process. 
It is envisaged that the implementation of a growth strategy 
of the above kind would require an undertaking by both 
employers and trade unions to hold the evolution of real 
wages to the course of moderation witnessed in recent years 
for a further period until a sufficient reduction in unemploy-
ment is achieved. It should be examined in the wage-profit-
investment-employment nexus whether there could be a role 
for wages having a larger flexible and more profit-related 
component. This could help boost employment by making 
labour less of a fixed cost. In present conditions, such an 
initiative would serve also to assist an investment upswing, 
by enabling companies to rely less on external sources of 
finance. 
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GRAPH 13: Some Illustrative orden of magnitude In a baseline assumption and alternative policy stntegies, EC, 1985-90 
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The Community could give a boo t to a cooperative strategy 
by initiating measures to improve the supply side of the 
economy which at the same time have demand 
effects. These could consist of initiatives to accelerate com-
pletion of the internal market, develop a programme of 
European infrastructure and environmental projects , rapid 
advance of the proposed European technological com-
munity, and agreement with other countries to launch the 
new GA TT round of trade liberalization. A rapid run-
down in sector-specific subsidies and intra-Community pro-
tective practices by governments would open up the way 
for reductions in taxes . Employers' organizations would be 
expected to react favourably to these measures. Employer ' 
organizations could also promote support in the private 
sector for a set of important European infrastructural pro-
jects and for an accelerated opening of the European internal 
market. They could give more urgent attention to the adap-
tation of investment and employment plan in the light of 
the expected change in wage-profit relations and the opening 
of market opportunitie . 
As regards demand side policies governments would be 
expected to ensure the maintenance of ufficient demand 
over the medium term in order that the supply side re-
sponses, particularly new job , be realized . In the event of 
a weakening of demand, for example because of the wage 
moderation proposed or international price or demand 
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shocks, governments would be able to exploit room for 
manoeuvre thereby created for economic policy. In 1986 
initiating contributions to a cooperative strategy could take 
the form of advancing public infrastructure programmes 
and tax reductions where possible, leaving further fiscal 
measures open for 1987 and 1988 depending upon progress 
in the overall strategy. 
The macroeconomic effects expected if a policy stance of 
the kind outlined can be ummarized briefly in terms of a 
stylized model-based simulation exercise of the kind de-
scribed in Section II. I. 
A 'cooperative growth scenario' is constructed whereby it 
is assumed that Community countries pur ue jointly a policy 
of sustained wage moderation . In the simulation it is as-
sumed that both monetary and fiscal policy operate so as 
to maintain aggregate nominal demand close to its baseline 
growth path. Declining inflation and wage costs contribute 
to a faster increase in real money stock. Outside of the 
Community, it is assumed that the United State reduces it 
budget deficit with some offsetting expansionary action 
being taken by Japan and the rest of the world. Action in 
the United States makes it possible in particular for Europe 
to reduce nominal and real intere t rate which timulate 
private investment directly and help to reduce public expen-
diture for debt servicing purpo es. In this context, some 
moderate expansion of public investment and reductions in 
taxation are compatible with the desired control of budget 
deficits, largely because of the impact of higher growth on 
budget revenues and the lower interest rates. In the case 
of a less favourable assumption about the international 
environment some additional demand support would be 
necessary to obtain the desired reduction in unemployment. 
The results of a simulation of a cooperative strategy of this 
kind, on an internal and international level, are illustrated 
in the third column of Table 7, and Graph 13. 
The major feature is that the initiatives proposed, if im-
plemented, offer the prospect of a growth rate of 3,5 % 
between 1986 and 1990 being associated with an average 
employment growth of 1,1 %. Indeed, in the final year of 
the projection, output grows by 3 V2 % and employment 
increases by I V2 %. This reduces the unemployment rate 
in 1990 to 7 % . This development could be sustained after 
1990 and therefore opens up the perspective of a further 
substantial reduction in unemployment. 
The assumed policy of wage moderation with demand sup-
port reduces the rate of inflation and increases company 
profitability. This induces a rise in private investment of 
over 6,5 % which, over the simulation period, is sufficient 
to overcome capacity constraints at the macro 
level. Significantly, the public sector deficit measured as. a 
percentage of GDP is on average little different from that 
in the baseline projection. 
It should be noted that the growth rate of 3 V2 % on average 
as simulated is not to be judged as excessive when seen 
against the background of a considerable increase in pro-
ductive capacity during this adjustment phase. 
Labour productivity grows on average only a little faster 
than in the baseline assumption in spite of the much more 
substantial acceleration of growth from 2 V2 % to 
3 V2 %. This is the result of a gradual but widely diffused 
shift in the labour-capital mix in the economy. Faster 
growth and a gradual change in the labour-capital mix 
combine to give the favourable results for employment and 
unemployment. 
The macroeconomic model simulation cannot take account 
of. or describe, the detailed sectoral evolution of 
productivity. However, such productivity growth might be 
expected to have some of the following characteristics. For 
those who are already in employment, one can assume a 
reasonable high skill level, that their productivity perform-
ance will also be high and, when combined with the antici-
pated new investment, may well increase. Of those entering 
employment. the younger entrants will be largely unskilled 
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and require a period of trammg. Over this time, their 
productivity contribution will certainly be low. The same 
will be true for people who have been unemployed for a 
long time. 
In summary, the simulation as constructed implies that a 
fulfillment of the conditions outlined could lead the Euro-
pean economy on to a growth path which has some charac-
teristics of a 'virtuous circle'. Higher profitability and de-
mand support generate the investment and output growth 
sufficient to absorb new jobs on a scale which reduces the 
pool of unemployed. Stronger growth, increased employ-
ment and lower unemployment in turn, improve public sec-
tor deficits by more revenues and less crisis-related expendi-
ture, and this contributes, with increased self-financing of 
enterprises, to produce lower interest rates. 
Even so, there are some factors which are not modelled in 
the scenario and which could generate further improvements 
in the economy's performance. These include various supply 
side improving measures that have been taken in recent 
years in many countries, but which take a long time to 
bear fruit. Improved market adaptability with cost neutral 
reorganization and reduction of working time and the accel-
erated realization of the EC internal market, as now pro-
posed, would add to growth and employment. Lower oil 
prices also (as mentioned in Section 1.3.) could help boost 
activity in the world economy more generally. 
The strategy thus depends heavily on the mutual supporting 
action of the major partners - employers, trade unions 
and governments. There must be a conscious will to both 
·ensure the desired supply response on the one hand, and to 
ensure that the nominal demand is sufficient to absorb this 
supply on the other. 
A policy strategy is suggested, for discussion by the social 
partners and governments, designed to raise employment 
growth and reduce unemployment very substantially over the 
medium term. If pursued, it is conceivable that unemployment 
couldfall to about 7 % by 1990 and, in this event, the gains 
to real output would also be significant. The core elements, 
namely a temporary moderation of real employment costs, 
relative factor price flexibility, and nominal demand support 
are highly interdependent. However, an important contri-
bution will also be provided by extensive improvements in the 
functioning of labour, goods, services and capital markets 
and notably in the EC internal market in many fields. The 
implementation. success and credibility of the adjustment 
strategy rests. lwwe1•er, on a joint willingness by all parties to 
ensure that the necessary conditions are met with a step-by-
step implementation starting in 1986, extending over several 
years. 
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3. Economic policy in the framework of a 
cooperative growth strategy 
3.1 Public finances 
3.1.1 The public sector 
Last year's annual report advocated a reversal of the mount-
ing share of public expenditure and taxation in the gross 
domestic product of the European Community. Recent 
estimates by the Commission suggest that the previous trend 
is now being checked if not reversed. The volume of public 
expenditure is expected to grow by under I % in 
1986. Total public expenditure in the EC as a share of 
GDP is estimated to decline slightly from 51,9 % in 1984 to 
51,5 % in 1985, and then more substantially to 50,8 % in 
1986. Similarly, the total tax burden is estimated to be 
declining, although by a somewhat smaller margin, because 
of budgetary consolidation. Total taxes amounted to 46.4 % 
in 1984, are expected to be 46,3 % in 1985 and 46,0 % in 
1986. 
Given institutional differences in the organization and extent 
of the public sector, such highly aggregated data must be 
used with caution, especially in inter-country 
comparisons. Some summary comparisons between the EC 
and US are shown in Table 8 which point to similarities as 
well as differences between the two economies. Government 
consumption expenditures, for example, stand in both cases 
at about 19 % of GDP. and the weight of direct income 
taxation is also similar at about 13 !/2 % of GDP. The 
higher level of government capital formation in Europe no 
doubt reflects the wider extent of public intervention in 
certain services, for example transport and health. Striking 
differences arise in the magnitude of government current 
transfer payments which reflects the greater involvement of 
government in the provision of health and social 
security. Social security contributions in Europe as a per-
centage of GDP are correspondingly higher than those in 
the US. The EC average tax and social security burden 
however covers a considerable range; in 1985 for example. 
from around 55 % in Denmark and the Netherlands to 
41 % in the United Kingdom and 35 % in Greece. 
The reasons why the scale of both public expenditure and 
taxation can influence economic growth and employment 
over the longer term are extremely complex. However. 
three channels of influence can be identified which create 
the possibility of risks to the achievement of an efficient 
economic performance. 
As the taxation on labour income rises, so also does the 
difference or ·wedge' between what an employee costs to the 
employer, and what the employee receives as net-of-tax 
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income. Higher labour costs tend to reduce the demand 
for labour and therefore private employment. Further, in 
so far as lower net-of-tax incomes induce wage-earners to 
claim higher wages in compensation, this will create in-
flationary pressure and worsen employment prospects again 
when this inflation has to be reversed. Higher taxation on 
wage income helps also to account for the increase in the 
price of labour relative to capital and hence the increase in 
the capital-labour ratio observed in the 1970s, and noted 
earlier in this report. The increase in this taxation 'wedge' 
has been pronounced in most European countries over the 
last two decades, as compared with experience in the United 
States and Japan. For example between 1960 and 1983, 
the difference between gross and net wages expressed as a 
percentage of net wages grew on average in the four larger 
EC countries from 36 to 60 %. In the United States over 
this same period, the increase was from 29 to 37 %. 
A second channel concerns the efficiency and value of public 
services.If wage-earners perceive public services and trans-
fers to be giving good and fair value, there will be a more 
ready consensus over accepting the tax burden 
implied. Inefficient and unduly extensive transfer payment 
systems on the other hand will tend to undermine such 
a consensus and thus lead to higher wage pressure with 
detrimental effects on growth and employment. 
A third channel of influence occurs when public borrowing 
rather than taxation is used to finance current public 
expenditure. Here, given the need to pursue anti-inflation-
ary policies the deficits should not be financed by money 
creation. The impact on performance will thus operate 
primarily through a higher rate of interest. Insofar as this 
reduces private investment it will harm the growth of pro-
ductive potential. 
Although the timing and nature of the final incidence of 
these effects on economic performance are highly uncertain, 
there is a presumption that in Europe the rapid growth of 
public expenditure and changes in its composition together 
with the evolution of the tax burden has had detrimental 
effects on economic performance when measured over the 
longer term. The fact that the Community is beginning to 
reverse some of the trends observed indicates an awareness 
of these possibilities and this is to be encouraged. 
It is highly unlikely that economic performance is im•ariant to 
both the weight and shape of the public sector. Undesirable 
consequences can follow from the dfference between gross 
and net incomes. a weakening of social acceptance of the tax 
burden and the effects of public debt on capital 
formation. There are signs of increasing awareness in the 
Community that these are real problems and the obsen•ed 
tendency to begin a re1•ersa/ of earlier trends is to be welcomed. 
3.1.2 Taxation policy for economic growth 
There are a number of ways in which taxation policy can 
contribute to a strategy aimed at higher growth of a more 
employment-creating nature. 
One question is whether such a strategy could be furthered 
by means of increased incentives and subsidies for 
investment. This has been discussed extensively in the rel-
evant Community bodies during the last year. The pre-
dominant judgement is that the experience of trying to 
stimulate growth through increased specific investment sub-
sidies has been rather disappointing. Although a sustained 
increase in investment spending is needed now as part of a 
growth strategy, it is felt that inducement of this through 
the introduction of specific investment incentives creates the 
risk of worsening any trend in the direction of capital-
deepening and labour-saving activities. Given the present 
condition of the European economy, with its notably poor 
employment record, it may be desirable to create conditions 
which are more even-handed with respect to business 
expansion. Any feasible tax concessions should therefore 
be used primarily to cut labour costs, so improving the 
profitability of private enterprise in order to initiate a more 
balanced mix of labour-using and labour-saving investment. 
A related issue is whether public deficit considerations per-
mitting faster progress in the reduction of both subsidies 
and taxes in various sectors of the economy could be 
made. There are some persuasive reasons for doing 
this. Notably it will help to reallocate resources from the 
more stagnant or declining sectors to the more productive 
and growing sectors of the economy. This is an area of 
policy where the responsibilities of the European Com-
munity itself are considerable, in competition policy in gen-
eral and in some specific sectors (see further below on 
agriculture, steel, and shipbuilding). A mutually reinforcing 
action by the Community and Member States is needed to 
effect a more rapid series of tax cuts and of subsidies. so 
adding a further dynamic element to the economic strategy. 
In the same class of ideas, but this is clearly a matter of 
national competences, is a detectable notion of tax 
reform. Examples are seen currently in the United King-
dom. Denmark and other countries. What is envisaged is 
that a simplification of existing tax systems, through the 
elimination of the numerous tax offsets and advantages for 
special purposes especially in the income taxation of persons 
and companies. will enable basic rates of taxation to be 
reduced within existing revenue constraints. This encour-
ages the market to allocate resources in response to more 
appropriate price signals and thus helps to amid the kind 
of bias which have become all too obvious over the past 
decade. 
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Finally. the possibility of a substantial fall in the price of oil 
raises issues concerned with the taxation of energy. labour 
and capital. The objective of a more employment-creating 
growth is easier to attain in the presence of reductions in 
the taxation of employment income. A pronounced 'fall in 
the price of oil over a few years could endanger progress 
being made towards securing a situation whereby the econ-
omy is less vulnerable to imported price or supply 
shocks. It is, of course, difficult to judge what the long-
term equilibrium price of energy might be. Nevertheless, 
the raising of duties or taxes on oil products would contrib-
ute to budget flexibility and thus provide more room for 
manoeuvre in the job creation, investment strategy proposed 
here. 
There are several 1mys in which taxation policy can contribute 
to a strategy.for higher groll'th and more employment-creating 
groll'th: ( i) a switch in emphasis away from spec((ic .fiscal 
incentil'esfor inl'estment, ll'hich ll'ill help to.foster employment 
and enterprise profitability; (ii) reduction of industry-spec((ic 
subsidies coupled 1rith general tax reductions; (iii) reduction 
of other spec((ic tax o.f.fsets accompanied hy loll'er tax rates; 
and ( i1•) in the e1•ent o.f an energy price fall, the raising of 
duties or taxes on energy could provide room for manoeuvre 
for employment creation. 
3.1.3 The role of public debt 
Fluctuations in budget deficits and public debt can have 
important effects on both supply and demand conditions in 
the economy. However. these are not easy to define in a 
.simple way. Rising public debt burdens tend to increase 
the rate of interest and, other things being equal. depress 
private capital formation. This interest rate effect, how-
ever. need not necessarily be a dominant factor since. under 
certain conditions, budget deficit movements can contribute 
positively to economic growth. If an appropriate policy 
succeeds in raising the potential output of the economy. a 
temporary rise in borrowing may increase demand. in a way 
which matches broadly the increased potential tax base 
of the economy. The structural public debt burden, as 
measured, for example, by the medium-term value of public 
debt as a percentage of GDP. may then not rise. 
What level of the public debt burden might be judged appro-
priate depends very much on specific economic circum-
stances. However. at very high levels of the public debt 
burden. such as around I 00 % of GDP or more. as currently 
is the case in Belgium. Ireland and Italy. the serious econ-
omic problems caused by excessive borrowing and the result-
ing debt burden become quite obvious. Interest payments 
on the public debt can reach 10 % or more of GDP. and 
account for 20 to 25 % of public expenditure. The rate 
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Table 8 
Le-vel and structure of public expenditure, receipts and public debt in the US and the EC 
A. Ge11eral gm•er,1111e1u expe11dit11re. total 
I. General government capital formation 
2. Net capital transfers 
3. Government final consumption expenditure, total 
4. Subsidies 
5. Interest payments 
6. Current transfers 
B. G1•11eral gol't'flllllt'llt receipts. total 
I. Indirect taxes 
2. Direct taxes 
3. Social security contribution~ 
4. Other current receipts 
C. Puhlic deht 
I. Gross public debt 
2. Net public debt 
D. Ge11eral gm•ernment share i11 total employment. % 
E. Ge11aal gm·emme11t fi11a11cial hala11ce ( i11 % of GDP )J 
1 FcdC"ral go\cmmcnl. 
A,erage for ElJR 5 ((). F. I. UK. DK). 
1 ProJ«:led lin•nc,al balance for 1985 for 1he US: -J.7"1• or GDP 
of interest itself is, under conditions of non-innationary 
monetary policy, subject to strong upward pressure. If the 
risk associated with a rise in the debt burden becomes 
important, a country's domestic interest rate eventually will 
incorporate a substantial risk premium. This is a direct 
renection of markets' view of the financial problem. There 
may also develop income distribution problems between 
bond-holders and salary-earners. A combination of argu-
ments, concerned with economic growth. monetary stability 
and income distribution therefore, all plead in favour of 
action to reverse what can easily become an unsustainable 
trend situation. 
As for the adjustment process required. examples show that 
comprehensive stabilization programmes need not necess-
arily be excessively costly or disruptive even in the short 
term. Denmark, in particular, has been reducing its 
government borrowing requirement massively, from 9 % of 
GDP as recently as 1982 (which is comparable or lower than 
the present deficits of Belgium, Gre~ce, Ireland and Italy) 
to under 2 % of GDP forecast for 1986. In the meantime. 
the Danish economy will have grown by 15 % (from 1981 
to 1986), whereas in the same period the EC on average 
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(%or% of GDP) 
us EUR 
1970 19X2 1970 l9X2 1985 
32,8 37,6 37,9 51.2 51,5 
2,5 1,5 4,2 3,0 2,8 
-0,5 -0.3 0,8 1,0 1,1 
19,2 18.7 15.3 19.3 19,2 
0,5 0,5 1.8 2.3 2,4 
2,3 4,5 2.0 4,7 5,3 
8,3 12.4 13.8 20,9 23,1 
31,0 33,6 38.2 45.8 46,3 
9,5 8,5 13.9 13.5 13,8 
13,9 13,6 10.3 13.0 13,2 
4,7 6.8 11.0 15,4 15,5 
2,9 4,7 2.9 3.8 3,8 
1971 1982 1971 1982 1985 
26.1 I 28,5 1 47.8 57,5 64.3 
14.72 26.32 33.4 
18.1 16.7 13.7 17.5 
- 1.8 -3.9 0.3 -5.6 -5.2 
grew only by 8 %. Danish employment growth was also 
much faster than in any other EC economy during this 
period. 
In other EC countries the debt burden currently is not so 
great. The gross public debt burden in Germany presently 
appears to be stabilizing at around 42 Y, % of GDP. That 
of France is currently rising but remains at a lower level of 
36 % of GDP. That of the United Kingdom is higher. 
at 60 % of GDP in 1985. but has been decreasing since 
1983. Thus these countries perhaps have some margin 
within which the evolution of the public debt burden as a 
share of GDP could vary. depending upon their economic 
policy strategy. If some temporary rise in the public debt 
burden were to be accepted in the next few years. great care 
should be taken to ensure that (a) this formed part of a 
combin\!d supply and demand strategy that effectively raised 
the profile of actual and potential production: and (b) re-
mained within the constraints of a sound medium-term 
financial strategy. These conditions should be easier to 
satisfy if the following criteria are observed: 
(i) On the supply side. the counterpart to increased public 
debt where possible. should represent investment in pro-
ductive potential, either in the form of public investments 
offering acceptable social rates of return, or, in the case of 
tax reductions, in a stimulation of private investment which 
will lead to a widening of the future tax base of the 
economy. Such tax reductions might be expected to have 
beneficial incentive effects in the markets for labour and 
capital. In this way a virtuous circle of interrelated move-
ments can be possible. With enhanced productive capacity 
the tax base is increased; thus tax rates can be reduced which 
further stimulates growth, even within the constraint of 
given budget deficit levels. 
(ii) On the demand side. expansionary measures in the 
budget should be justified by the need to correct any inad-
equacy in the growth of demand. In the event of further 
disinnationary effects on the European economy resulting 
from dollar depreciation or falls in commodity prices, it may 
be desirable to sustain demand, in particular to prevent 
excessive denation of the tax base. In these conditions it 
makes little sense to raise taxes or cut expenditure to offset 
such shortfalls. 
(iii) The evolution of wage incomes has important impli-
cations for both supply and demand sides of the 
economy. Starting from a situation of inadequate profita-
bility and high unemployment, wage moderation helps create 
and increase profitable productive capacity. It increases 
the potential tax base, and in a situation where public 
finances are in reasonable balance, justifies tax rate re-
ductions. Wage moderation itself, however, may create a 
transitional problem of demand weakness, and this is an-
other case where accompanying support from demand policy 
is desirable. 
P11blic debt strategy is an important ingredie11t <~( both s11pply 
a11d demand policy. Such a strategy ca1111ot alll'ays be defi11ed 
i11 simple terms. There are cases i11 the Commu11ity ll'here 
the groll'th of the p11blic debt burde11 is clearly alarmi11g a11d 
must 1101\' be put 011to a corrected tre11d ( Italy. Belgium, 
Irela11d). Elsell'here p11blic debt hurde11s are ge11erally loll'er 
a11d, i11 some cases. approximately stahili::ed. Whether there 
is a so1111d case .fi1r usi11g room ji1r mw10e111-re here .fi1r some 
increase i11 the p11hlic debt burdrn duri11g an a<(j11stmrnt period 
to help the economy omo a higher groll'th trajectory. depends 
11po11 a spec((ic set <isupply and dema11d conditions. ~{supply 
potential is improved by ll'age moderatio11 a11d microeconomic 
policies to imprOl'e markt'ls. a11d ((demand is temporari~I' ll'eak 
hecm,se <f. ji1r example. ll'age moderatio11 or international 
i11fl11enet'S, then some transitory increase in the public deht may 
contribute a mluahle elemt·nt to the wider groll'th strategy. 
3.1.4 The European Community budget 
An additional level of public finance is developing in 
Europe. With a revenue or expenditure volume of around 
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I % of Community GDP the Community budget, admit-
tedly, has not a major macroeconomic impact but is playing 
a greater role in structural adaptation. With the enlarge-
ment of the Community the total own resources of the 
budget are being increased, as from 1986, with revision in 
the maximum rate of value-added tax call from 1,0 % to 
1,4 %. At the same time, an increased effort is being made 
to contain the large share of agricultural price support 
expenditure in the Community budget. 
The policy priorities for the enlarged Community budget 
are to facilitate the structural improvement and convergence 
of the Community economy. This comes out clearly in 
Table 9. The 1986 figures are taken from the preliminary 
draft budget. In several of its faster growing functions. the 
budget is contributing aids to compensate for the effects 
of the opening of the Community's markets and. help to 
restructure regions or sectors in difficulty. 
The increase in expenditure in 1986 is partly due to the 
accession of Spain and Portugal. but also renects an increase 
in respect of the other Member States. This is particularly 
true of the Regional Fund which, under the new Regulation 
applicable from 1985, increases the share of expenditure 
going to more selectively defined regions with the most 
severe problems. 
Expenditure on integrated Mediterranean programmes, 
aimed at helping Mediterranean regions adapt to the conse-
quences of the Community's enlargement. becomes signifi-
cant for the first time in 1986. Expenditure on transport 
infrastructure projects, the Social Fund (retraining and job-
creation projects). and R&D and innovation and develop-
ment aid also becomes more important in 1986. About 
50 % of new expenditure in 1986 can be attributed to the 
accession of Spain and Portugal. This part, however, will 
be covered by own resources paid in by the new 
members. The remaining part of the increase takes place 
because of the substantial rise in payments to finance com-
mitments incurred before 1986 and also because of new 
commitments. 
Priorities for the Commu11ity budget. endo1l'ed from /986 
with increased Oll'n resources are ( i) to co11tain agricultural 
expenditures more e.ffectil'ely; a11d (ii) to de rote i11creasing 
resources to structural impro1•eme11t and co11verge11ce of the 
Community economy. 
3.2 Monetary policy and the European 
Monetary System 
In recent years, a consensus has gradually emerged on the 
need to create a stable monetary environment and on the 
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contributory role of monetary policy. This consensus con-
trasts with the marked differences in the management of 
national monetary policies in the 1970s. By imposing ex-
change rate discipline on the participating countries, the 
European Monetary System has shown itself to be an essen-
tial factor in the cohesion of monetary policies with a com-
mon objective of stability. Such consensus is an important 
achievement which must be preserved: monetary stability 
must, for several reasons, be an essential part of any strategy 
which aims at restoring lasting growth. capable of creating 
more jobs. 
Table 9 
First of all, monetary stability creates an environment which 
encourages those involved in the economic process to coop-
erate with each other and in particular reduces the justifi-
cation for indexation mechanisms. Some of these mechan-
isms, a relic of periods of high inflation, both obscured and 
held back the necessary adjustment of relative prices and 
costs and so contributed to present macroeconomic imbal-
ances. 
Secondly, expectations of a permanently low inflation rate 
enable interest rates to play more efficiently their role in 
European Community budget, 1984-86: Preliminary draft proposed b}· the Commission 
Policy Jimctions 
Agriculture ~ Guarantee Section 
Agriculture ~ ·structural' Funds 
Fisheries 
Social Fund 
Regional Fund 
Integrated Mediterranean programmes 
Transport 
Energy and industry 
Research and innovation 
Food aid 
Development aid 
Other expe11di111res including refunds to Member States 
Total 
Rc\·cnuc 
Agriculture levies 
Customs duties 
Value-added tax (VAT) 
Special contributions 
M iscellancous 
Total 
p.m. 
Maximum rate of VAT 
Effective rate of VAT 
Budget total as share of GDP 
1 Includes 471 n111!1on f:('l I or ,rccrnl mc,,~urcs in the L~K Jnd C.crmJn}. 
1 Include, 456 mllhnn ECll or"rccial measure,;; m the l!K and Germany. 
1 Except for Germany 1..11 and UK O.H2. 
So11rci· 19!<4: Management account~. 1'>!<5 Nh. Prl'l,mm,tr) draft hud~ct l9N6 adopted h) the Commission on 14 June 1985 
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1984 
Et.:R 10 
18 126 
667 
87 
I 212 
I 413 
10 
505 1 
6592 
533 
737 
5'27 
2 733 
27 ::!08 
198~ 
EUR 10 
2 435 
7 961 
14 594 
596 
466 
26 052 
1.00 
1.00 
0.94 
1985 
EUR 10 
19 691 
687 
105 
I 410 
I 610 
JO 
36 
130 
570 
772 
531 
2 881 
28 433 
1985 
El'R 10 
2 106 
8 596 
15 1981 
2 247 
286 
28 433 
1.00 
1.00 
0.85 
!million £CU) 
1986 
EUR 12 
20 688 
946 
236 
2 399 
2 600 
151 
74 
105 
673 
954 
697 
5 527 
35 050 
1986 
EL'R 12 
2 699 
9 700 
22 184 
204 
263 
35 050 
1.4 
1.343 
1.10 
establishing the balance between supply and demand on the 
capital market. An artificially low or even negative real cost 
of capital, such as that which obtained in certain countries 
in the 1970s, gives a distorted indication of the scarcity of 
capital, encourages the waste of scarce resources formed 
from savings and leads to a pattern of growth which creates 
fewer jobs. Of course, excessive real interest rates (for exam-
ple, greater than the underlying growth rate of the economy) 
accompanying budget deficits which are too high, have con-
siderable structural consequences. But now the level of real 
interest rates must make it possible to attract the funds 
needed to finance not only public deficits, still excessive in 
certain cases inside and outside the Community, but also 
to finance the required investment drive. Furthermore, an 
essential justification for the policy indicated for certain 
countries of a continued reduction in the public deficit is 
that it contributes to lower real interest rates in the medium 
term . 
Finally, the level of the real return on capital is a key factor 
in the investment decision. Present distortions between the 
cost of capital and the profitability of productive fixed 
capital originate, as illustrated in Graph 14, in the decline 
in profitability which occurred in the 1970s, rather than in 
the more recent rise in real interest rates. Thus, whilst a 
fall in real interest rates of, say, I or 2 percentage points 
from their present level would certainly help to stimulate 
investment, it would come nowhere near to restoring the 
differential which prevailed between real interest rates and 
the profitability of productive capital in the 1960s, a period 
of full employment, and which existed again during part of 
the second half of the 1970s. 
As is evidenced by the downward convergence of inflation 
rates in the Community, considerable progress has been 
made toward the creation in Europe of an internal and 
external zone of monetary stability (see Table 5 of this 
report). Since March 1983 there has been no change in the 
central rates of almost all the currencies participating in the 
EMS. The adju tment of the Italian lira ·s parity, which took 
place in July 1985 by unanimous decision of the partner 
countries, remained limited in scale. The stability of nominal 
and real exchange rates between the currencies participating 
in the EMS exchange rate mechanism provides a striking 
contrast with the often sharp variations recorded before the 
e tablishment of the EMS and those which are today till 
affecting other currencies. This stability is naturally reflected 
in small exchange rate variations between the ECU and its 
chief component currencie . It satisfies a need felt by private 
operators, as can be een from the development of the 
private E U as a borrowing and investment currency and its 
growing use for commercial tran actions. Monetary policies. 
pur uing the common objective of stability. but which have 
to be differently framed to take account of the progress 
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still necessary in each country, are a guarantee that these 
achievements will be consolidated and improved. 
A number of countries - in particular the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom·- are 
pursuing normative targets for the growth of monetary 
aggregates or domestic credit expansion. For countries 
where the inflation rate is still too high. the aim should 
continue to be a progressive reduction in the growth rates 
of monetary aggregates or domestic credit expansion, so as 
to underpin the stabilization process. Where the rate of 
inflation and inflationary expectations are sufficiently low, 
monetary growth should release a margin for real growth in 
line with the medium-term trend of productive capacity 
while preserving what has been achieved in terms of stability. 
This would provide lasting support for economic activity. 
GRAPH 14: Rewards of labour, fixed capital and financial 
capital in the Communityl,2 
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In these countries the setting of the target for monetary 
growth must, however, be largely influenced by the judge-
ment made on the growth of productive potential, notably 
with regard to the effects of supply policies carried out in 
other areas and the increase in capacity utilization rates 
which can be achieved without creating inflationary strains. 
To the extent that supply side policies speed the growth of 
the productive potential, such a strategy goes hand in hand 
with the sound financing of the increase in demand which 
then becomes desirable. 
It is true that the present changes on financial markets, 
especially the spread of financial innovations which are 
tending to make the demand for money more unstable. 
sometimes complicate the implementation of policies based 
on monetary aggregates or credit targets. But experience has 
shown that, where the authorities of the EMS countries 
are determined to pursue a policy which conforms with 
guidelines based on the above criteria. the exchange rate 
mechanism is stabilized and its macroeconomic effects re-
inforced. For EMS countries, the quantitative intermediate 
objectives of monetary policy and the exchange rate objec-
tive thus mutually reinforce one another. Furthermore, the 
United Kingdom authorities are tending to attribute more 
importance to the sterling exchange rate alongside their 
quantitative intermediate objectives. 
In the other EMS countries, which are even more open to 
the outside world, the chief intermediate objective remains 
their currencies' central rates within the system, and the 
domestic intermediate objectives are, perhaps, less binding in 
nature. The authorities must, however. ensure that domestic 
money creation continues to be compatible with price stab-
ility and a sustainable external position. 
A marked fall in the dollar, and the improvement in the 
terms of trade which could result, would ease the monetary 
policy burden in pursuing the final objective of price stab-
ility. With the same rate of monetary growth, a faster fall 
in inflation associated with external factors would in itself 
release an additional real margin for growth. But given the 
present instability of the international monetary system. 
lasting stability can be guaranteed only by the continuing 
control of monetary growth. However, following the recent 
declaration by the Ministers for Finance of the five major 
industrialized countries. it is to be hoped that a solution to 
this instability will be found which, at the same time. will 
help to relax even further the external constraints which may 
stop interest rates from falling in Europe. 
In the convergence process, the stability of bilateral exchange 
rates within the EMS is of prime importance. For one thing. 
in the countries where inflation is highest. such stability 
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reinforces internal efforts to bring down inflation. In these 
countries, because of the greater convergence of inflation 
rates and allowing for the lira parity adjustment in July 
1985, the rise in nominal effective exchange rates weighted 
by inflation differentials against partner countries (real ex-
change rates) is still moderate, but nevertheless illustrates 
the stabilizing effect of an exchange rate mechanism which 
provides for fixed but adjustable parities. Secondly. the 
competitiveness gains obtained by the more stable countries 
help them to acquire a comfortable external position and 
contribute to the release of a real margin for growth. But 
these considerations do not exclude a realignment of central 
rates in the event of fundamental disequilibria. 
In the last few years. the internal cohesiveness of the EMS. 
which admittedly has at certain times also benefited from 
favourable external factors. has above all been guaranteed 
by the stronger consensus on the priorities to be adopted 
and the methods to be used in all areas of economic policy. 
the increased convergence of performances and the close 
coordination of monetary policies both internal and exter-
nal. However, major progress is still necessary to achieve 
a satisfying degree of convergence. In this respect, some 
countries must, in a:1y event. still make substantial efforts 
with regard to budgets and incomes so as to reduce the 
sometimes excessive burden borne by monetary policy in the 
stabilization process. The greater growth is in the Com-
munity. the more rapidly will these efforts be crowned with 
success. 
The room for manoeuvre available to the authorities for 
influencing interest rates is largely determined by interest 
rate levels on international markets and by the pursuit of 
the intermediate and final objectives of monetary policy. As 
regards the external constraint. European short-term interest 
rates did not completely follow the upward movement of 
United States short-term rates in the first six months of 
1984, and then their marked fall in the following I~ months. 
As an average for the Community countries. the fall in 
short-term rates between December 1983 and July 1985 was 
steadier but slightly less marked than in the United States 
(I.I percentage points for Europe compared with I. 7 per-
centage points in the US). The prudent management of 
short-term interest rates in Europe. tailored to the needs 
which still exist as regards internal stabilization and to the 
severity of the external constraint. and a more farnurable 
trend of fundamentals (external and budget deficits) re-
inforces. on this side of the Atlantic. the credibility of the 
policies implemented. This has contributed to a notable fall 
in nominal long-term rates (I. 7 percentage points) which, 
between December 1983 and July 1985. was more marked 
in Europe than in the United States. 
Until March 1985, the strength of the dollar impeded the 
fall of short-term interest rates in Europe, but the situation 
has since changed, and some room for manoeuvre has ap-
peared. It is already being utilized in the Community 
countries with the lowest inflation rates. In Germany, the 
money market rate has thus been cut by around 1,6 percent-
age points since March 1985 and now stands at 4,5 %, its 
lowest level since the end of 1978. A favourable international 
context would make it possible to make even more use of 
this margin. In countries where there is still a major need 
for stabilization. and where monetary policy must go on 
contributing to the convergence process. nominal interest 
rates could, however, continue to fall in line with the re-
duction in the inflation rate. To the extent that this difference 
in managing interest rates, in line with the internal monetary 
policy objectives in the different countries, leads to the 
maintenance of the right interest rate differential within the 
EMS, it also reinforces the stability of the exchange rate 
mechanism and its internal cohesiveness in response to exter-
nal shocks, despite the divergences which still exist in certain 
fundamentals. 
In the Community countries real long-term interest rates. 
measured as a first approximation by the differential be-
tween nominal interest rates and the rate of increase in 
consumer prices, rose by an average of 4,5 percentage points 
between 1981 and 1984. The rise was particularly marked in 
countries where they had been close to zero or even negative 
at the start of the 1980s, while the rise was only some 
2 percentage points in the more stable countries. When 
disinflation is rapid or when the inflation rate is historically 
low, the real interest rate. measured by the differential be-
tween the nominal interest rate and the current rate of price 
increase, is probably overestimated in relation to a measure 
which would take account of the inflation rate expected in 
the medium term. which is probably then higher than current 
inflation. Conversely, in countries where the inflation rate 
is still high but where the disinflation process is well under 
way and credible, the real interest rate expected in the 
medium term is higher than that measured by the current 
inflation rate. In any event. inflationary expectations play 
a key role in the formation of nominal interest rates which 
increases the importance which should be attached to the 
conduct of monetary policies with the lasting and credible 
aim of price stability. Such policies help to bring the cur-
rent inflation rate and the expected inflation rate closer to 
one another and to stabilize them at the lowest level and 
this makes the formation of nominal interest rates more 
rational and creates a suitable environment for their steady 
and lasting reduction. 
Within the Community. the upward convergence of real 
interest rates is evidence of the now common course of 
The Community economy 
monetary policies in a context of generally high public defi-
cits and severe strains on international capital markets, 
particularly in the United States. Their progressive fall, 
which is desirable. will have to be soundly based and will 
depend mainly on both the satisfactory progress and the 
credibility of the disinflation process and on the absorption 
of financial imbalances, particularly of the public deficits 
inside and outside the Community. 
The effective liberalization of capital movements inside the 
Community and, at the same time, efforts towards a greater 
convergence of economic policies for higher growth. will 
make possible the completion of the European Monetary 
System, which is necessary in order to create a European 
monetary and financial area. Liberalization would favour 
the development in Europe of a dynamic and attractive 
financial market and would thus contribute to the better 
allocation of savings. 
Since the establishment of the EMS in March 1979. the 
objective of liberalizing capital movements has become even 
more important. To the extent that the restrictions placed 
on capital movements artificially increase the autonomy of 
monetary policies. they reduce the disciplinary effect of the 
exchange rate mechanism and are thus liable to hold back 
the convergence process. However the convergence of 
monetary policies and the gradual fading of money illusion 
among economic agents mean that this room for manoeuvre 
is not utilized or even non-existent - as can be seen from 
the upward equalization of real interest rates in the 
Community. As and when divergences narrow. the restric-
tions on the freedom of capital movements gradually lose 
their usefulness. This underpins the argument for a pro-
gressive dismantling of the restrictions placed on capital 
movements while not undermining the stability of the ex-
change rate mechanism during the adjustment phase. 
A climate which favours the strengthening of the exchange 
rate system has gradually grown up since the start of 
1984. A variety of factors has contributed: the satisfactory 
convergence of monetary policies. the credibility gained by 
the general process of bringing down inflation. a more open 
and more evenly spread attitude as to the advisability of 
resuming the liberalization of capital movements in the 
interests of the EMS itself and the strength of the parity 
grid agreed in March 1983 in withstanding external currency 
movements. This state of mind was demonstrated by the 
adoption in 1985. by the Council and by the central banks 
of the Community. of preliminary technical measures which 
will slightly widen the use of the ECU in the effective 
operation of the exchange rate system. The possibility has 
even been mentioned of giving third country holders access 
to the ECU in the European Monetary Cooperation Fund. 
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The Community bodies concerned have agreed to keep 
under review the possibilities of fresh progress in the monet-
ary area, and the conditions for achieving this. The Council 
of Finance Ministers has confirmed the ultimate objective 
of economic and monetary union. The development of the 
EMS, reinforcement of which is doubtless an objective in 
itself, must also be seen in this perspective. Of special 
interest here are questions relating to the expansion of the 
international role of the ECU. both in its public and private 
uses, and to the participation. on an equal footing, of the 
component currencies in the exchange rate mechanism. 
The cre(l(ion r~f a :one of monetary stability is an integral 
part of the strategy for lasting groll'th. capable of creating 
mor£' jobs. By reducing uncertainties as to the future real 
l'alue of the currency. <Ill e1i1•iro11ment is created 1rhich encour-
ages those im·ofred in the economic process to cooperate 11·ith 
each other. The stahili:ation <~{ inflation expectations also 
makes the determination of interest rates on capital markers. 
which have an essential role in the optimal allocation ~( 
the scarce resouras formed by sai•ings, more rational. As 
regards stahiliry. achi£,1·eme11rs in recent years hm•e been 
encouraging. Monetary policies. designed to achie1•e the 
common ohjecrii'e ~( srahiliry. hut framed accordingly to take 
account of the progresr still necessary, are the guarantee that 
these achievements 11·ill he consolidated. In some countries 
monetary policy must still underpin the stahili:ation process. 
by reducing the rate of monetary groll"th and hy lml'ering 
short-term interest rates in line 1\'ith the progress made in 
bringing dmrn i11/1atioll. The internal cohesi1·eness of the Euro-
pean Monetary System should. hml'el'er, he strellgthened hy 
additional progress in all areas c~( economic policy in order to 
reduce the. sometimes .Hill exn'ssive, burden home by monet-
ary policy ill the srahi/i:arioll pron•ss. /11 other counrril•s. 
monetary policy should colltinue to use the margin al'ailahle 
J<Jr hrillgillg doll'll interest rates and, ll'hile presen"ing 1\'har 
has heen achi<'l'ed in terms o( stability. pro1·ide the liquidity 
necessary for the c•.1·rah/ishmellt o( a gro1\'th rate ill line ll'ith 
the medium-term imprcJ1•en1<'11t in producrfre capacity. Here 
it is to he hoped that recellt progress in illternatiollal 1110m•tary 
cooperatioll ll"ill .fiirther relax the external collstraillts alld 
thus make a fall ill real illterest rates possible. This 1\'0uld 
encourage im·c.1·tmellt ill fixed capital rather rhall ill financial 
assets. Wirhill Europe the adoption ,>( the ahol'e-melltiolled 
molletary policy guidc•li11e.1· ll'ould. ill addirioll to rei11forcillg 
the Community ·.1· illlernal nwllctary cohesfrelless. increase ill-
terc•.1·1 ill .fiu-ther progress ill the comtrzictioll <!t' the EMS. alld 
in particular in measures to /ihera/i:e capital mm•eme11rs alld 
to de1•elop the role o( the EC U. 
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3.3 Market and sectoral policies 
3.3. I Improving the internal market 
The completion of a large internal market, as has been 
proposed by the Commission in its White Paper of June 
1985, provides strong support for the successful achievement 
of a cooperative growth strategy for more employment in 
so far as it supports a growth in supply, which is both 
profitable and efficient. A wider market provides the op-
portunity for firms to expand production and exploit econ-
omies of scale. The resulting cost reductions lead to lower 
prices and hence demand will be strengthened. A faster 
growth of both demand and output will be reflected in 
productivity growth and this in turn will feed into the exploi-
tation of new investment opportunities and employment 
creation. The benefits of improved efficiency and competi-
tivity will be affected also through an increase in the econ-
omy's longer-term equilibrium exchange rate and more ben-
eficial terms of trade. A lower trend evolution of both 
domestic and import prices will in turn mean that a given 
expansion of nominal demand will result in a higher real 
demand. Again. there will be beneficial effects on output 
and employment. Thus. the economy enters what can be 
called a virtuous circle of economic growth which is not 
unlike Community experience in the 1960s. 
At the same time promoting better competition on markets 
would be ineffective if structural and social inequalities 
prevented the completion of the internal market. If the 
internal market is realized in the context of more dynamic 
and harmonious growth. imbalances at the regional and 
sectoral level will be more easily overcome. This is also 
the best way to take account of the Community ·social 
dimension· and structural problems. In addition. this re-
quires the development of more coherent European-wide 
social policies and the strengthening of existing national and 
Community instruments. the European Social Fund and the 
European Regional Development Fund for example. Success 
in overcoming adjustment problems and in achieving the 
full employment and social benefits of improvement of the 
internal market will require considerable cooperation be-
tween the social partners and governments in the develop-
ment of these actions and in encouraging the attitudes con-
sistent with the growing integration of the European 
economy. 
Consensus on the importance of improving the Community's 
internal market has strengthened greatly at the political 
level and amongst industrialists and trade unionists. At its 
meeting in Brussels in March 1985 the European Council 
called for ·action to achieve a single large market by 1992 
thereby creating a more favourable environment for stimu-
lating enterprise, competition and trade'. The Commission 
responded to this call with publication of a White Paper 
addressed to the European Council meeting in Milan in 
June 1985, entitled 'Completing the internal market'. 1 The 
White Paper sets out a detailed programme, calling for over 
300 legislative acts, most of them before 1990. 
Given the extremely complex and extensive nature of the 
proposals in total, the Commission has given particular 
attention to ways to lighten the administrative and legislative 
burdens of achieving the objective. An integrated and bal-
anced set of proposals made to this end are (i) to maximize 
use of the principle of mutual recognition of national techni-
cal standards and minimize the amount of harmonization 
legislation at the EC level; (ii) to maximize the off-loading 
of technical matters from the Council, by making more use 
of the institutional powers of delegation that exist and; 
(iii) to increase recourse to majority voting in Community 
decision-making processes concerning the internal market. 
Although the various elements interact and should be con-
sidered as a whole, some individual examples serve to illus-
trate the substance of the proposals. 
As regards technical standards for industrial goods, food 
products and construction, it is proposed that legislative 
harmonization (Council directives based on Article I 00 of 
the Treaty of Rome) will in future be restricted to essential 
health and safety requirements. 
Public procurement competition will be enhanced for sectors 
already covered by EC directives by more prior information 
and publication of contracts. Existing restrictions on pub-
lic procurement of services, compared to goods, should be 
removed. Four major sectors - energy, transport, water 
and telecommunications - not yet covered by public pro-
curement directives are to be made the subject of further 
proposals. 
In the transport sector important actions to ensure the 
freedom to provide transport services are proposed. 
Service branches of the more conventional kind such as 
banking and insurance together with newer forms such as 
information and data processing, computerized marketing 
and distribution services, audio-visual services including 
broadcasting by satellite are undergoing unprecedented tech-
nological development. Many of these fastest growing 
1 Commission of the EC. 'Completing the internal market", (COM(85) 
310). June 1985. 
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branches of the economy have little chance of being inter-
nationally competitive without being given a large open 
market in which to develop. 
Turning to financial markets, the improvement of the in-
ternal market for financial services links directly to the policy 
objectives of improving the functioning of domestic financial 
markets, the convergence of macroeconomic policies and 
strengthening of the European Monetary System. In this 
context, in April 1983 the Commission submitted to the 
Council a communication on financial integration2 which 
stressed the need for more freedom of capital movements 
between the Member States and for the creation of a unified 
network of financial services in the areas of credit, insurance, 
and stock exchanges. 
Such integration gives rise to direct and indirect benefits. 
The direct advantages come through a reduction in financial 
costs for borrowers and through helping assure access for 
savers to higher yielding investments. An increase in the 
effective size of the market induced by financial integration 
encourages financial institutions to specialize more, creates 
additional competition and effects a more efficient transfer 
of savings into real investment. 
As regards indirect benefits. the greater liberalization of 
financial markets enhances discipline in the conduct of econ-
omic policies and thus contributes to price stability and to 
the strengthening of the EMS. A second indirect benefit 
would relate to reducing dependence of European economies 
on the US dollar, which is likely to occur if European 
capital markets become more integrated. This would insulate 
·Europe to some extent from external shocks. Thirdly, con-
trols on capital flows interfere to some extent with the free 
movement of goods. services and persons. by increasing the 
cost of related financial transfers whose legality has to be 
checked. Fourthly, the utility of capital controls in terms of 
greater independence of monetary policy has been greatly 
reduced through commitments to monetary policy coordi-
nation implicit in EMS membership. 
Financial integration should be sought in a balanced way 
on four fronts: (i) gradual removal of the remaining capital 
controls: (ii) free flow of financial services: (iii) rationaliza-
tion of domestic financial markets: and (iv) the promotion 
of the ECU in the credit and capital markets. 
At present two Council directives classify capital flows in 
four lists (A to D). Member States are obliged uncon-
ditionally to free transactions contained in list A (including 
~ Commission of the EC. -Communication of 20 April 1983 on financial 
integration', European Economy. No 18. November 1983. 
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direct and real estate investment) and in list B ( operations 
in listed securities). Transactions in list C (including other 
types of portfolio investments and long-term credits) are 
conditionally liberalized. There is no obligation to free trans-
actions in list D (deposits with financial intermediaries and 
other short-term monetary operations). The actual degree 
of capital freedom varies considerably in the Community. 
A number of Member States have liberalized virtually all 
transactions contained in lists C and D. On the other hand. 
three Member States (France, Italy and Ireland) have had 
to make use of ihe protective clauses provided for in the 
Treaty in order to apply restrictions on transactions which 
are unconditionally liberalized. In December 1984 the Com-
mission reviewed these derogations and renewed them for a 
limited scope and period (OJ L 8, I O January 1985). In 
addition, the Commission is studying proposals with the 
Monetary Committee for a new directive which would ex-
tend the obligations of Member States to liberalize certain 
transactions contained at present in list C. 
The creation of an efficient network of financial services in 
the areas of credit. non-life insurance. and stock exchange 
services can be aided through assuring the right of establish-
ment and the provision of financial services on a non-
discriminatory basis across frontiers. 
The rationalization c; domestic financial markets should go 
in parallel with the removal of controls on the circulation 
of capital and services. Although there has been some action 
towards harmonizing national provisions governing the ac-
tivities of financial intermediaries, the regulatory and alloca-
tive aspects of the domestic financial markets should be 
given more attention. 
Community companies and institutions have used the Euro-
markets in order to avoid the disadvantages of narrow 
national markets. More recently, as the risk in the use of 
the dollar has become large. the market has increasingly 
turned to the use of the ECU which exhibits small variability 
1>i.v-a-1·i.1· member currencies and is free of purely national 
controls. It is. therefore. well placed to be a vehicle for 
capital transfers within the Community. 
The Milan European Council in June 1985 1relcomed the 
Commi.uion 's White Paper.f<1r imprOl'ing the internal market. 
and charged the Council to elaborate a 1\'ork programme to 
achie11e the single market ohjectii'e hy /992. Ways ofachiel'ing 
this objective are identified as (i) suppression of physical 
barriers; (ii) the remornl 1!ffisrnl frontiers: (iii) suppression 
of technical harriers ( especially fi1r ·lll'II' technologies): (ii') 
creation o( a free market in j,nancial and transport services; 
( v) complete .fi'eedom of estahlishment for the pr1!fessio11s: 
and ( 1•i) liherali::ation <!( capital mm•ements. The integra-
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tion and modernization of European financial markets should 
be pursued further through rationalization of domestic finan-
cial markets and promotion of the ECU in credit and capital 
markets. This process ,rill befacilitated by the more dynamic 
growth fostered by the overall economic strategy, and thus 
enhance with other more specific measures the social dimen-
sion. 
3.3.2 Infrastructure projects of European interest and 
infrastructure financing 
Improving the internal market needs also the provision of 
an adequate infrastructure. In the programme for 1985, 
the Commission identified the benefits to be obtained from 
a coordinated infrastructure strategy. Such an approach 
would contribute significantly to the aim of unifying the 
internal market, strengthening industrial competitiveness, 
integration of the peripheral regions and stimulating new 
technologies. 1 It could also become, progressively. an im-
portant element in the development of demand and econ-
omic activity. 
In the area of telecommunications. concertation mechanisms 
have been set up between the Commission. Member States. 
industry, and national telecommunications administrations. 
The work and reflection carried out so far have identified the 
common prospects for the evolution of telecommunications 
networks and services and the strategic objectives upon 
which a consensus at Community level could be reached. in 
order to define infrastructure projects of European interest 
in this field. 
This is in particular the case for the establishment of a 
telecommunication transborder backbone network which 
could set up the base of future integrated broadband (IBC) 
communications to be operational by 1995. 
According to available estimates. the total investment related 
to the project could amount to some 3 OOO million 
ECU. Currently. studies are carried out to specify the 
project further. The project will. however. depend on prior 
agreement between the public authorities and the telecom-
munications administrations concerned. 
The Commission will make proposals on the use of the 
ERDF to help improve modernization of telecommuni-
cations networks in the less favoured regions of the Com-
munity. 
1 The nL-cessity for investment in employment-creating infrastructural pro-
jL-cts in transport. telecommunications and environmental protL-ction was 
stressed in Parliamentary n:solutions (OJ C' 122 59. 20.5.1985. point f 
and Doc. B 2-103,85. point la). 
In the area of transport, the Commission's proposed me-
dium-term infrastructure programme already provides a 
framework for the development of three linking networks 
of Community interest: road, rail and inland waterways. 
The investment in question would exceed 20 OOO million 
ECU. This programme contains a range of small and me-
dium-sized projects some of which have already been started 
and receive Community finance from the ERDF and the 
EIB and specific credits for the support of transport infra-
structure of Community interest (line 581) as well as some 
major projects. The financing of these projects will nat-
urally differ according to their relative size and character. 
A large number of smaller projects will have been included 
already in national public investment programmes and will 
have received Community financial support. However, the 
financing of the larger projects has yet to be arranged. 
Two major projects should be added, the Paris-Cologne high 
speed rail link, the cost of which has been put at some 3 OOO 
million ECU. An 'intergovernmental group' has been set 
up to work out the general specification of requirements, 
each party's responsibilities and the possible financial 
package. The final report is expected in March 
1986. Also the fixed Channel link which, depending on the 
type of link. varies widely in cost from 3 OOO to 9 OOO million 
ECU. In April 1985 the French and United Kingdom 
Governments published the guidelines enabling those pro-
moters interested to prepare by 31 October 1985 a proposal 
for financing, executing and exploiting the project. Work 
could thus start by the end of 1986, completion being plan-
ned for 1992-93. 
In the longer term other projects are envisaged in the area 
of road and rail transport, in particular the motorway link 
with the Scandinavian countries through Denmark and the 
Baltic straits, the Venice-Munich link with its passages 
through the Alps. etc. 
In the area of environmental protection, a programme of 
investment is necessary to improve the quality of life and 
protect the basis for future economic growth. The damage 
caused by air pollution can only be reversed by investment 
in large combustion installations. while in many Member 
States investment in etlluent treatment is essential to im-
prove water quality. The treatment of waste and its recycling 
would both improve environmental quality and reduce the 
Community's raw material dependence. Such investment. 
leading to the development of new products. will not only 
improve the quality of life but also create markets for new 
products in third countries. 
Thus all in all. the infrastructure programme which can be 
envisaged in the medium term would represent an investment 
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volume of 30 to 45 OOO million ECU over a period of five 
to seven years. 
All these infrastructure projects are not. of course .. at the 
same stage of development. The Community can facilitate 
the advancement of the larger projects in several different 
ways; by giving its support to the proposals already made, 
easing administration and fiscal conditions, taking the in-
itiative in bringing together interested parties, and by finan-
cing the necessary feasibility studies. 
At the same time the Commission has undertaken to study 
the scope for using or adapting the range of financial instru-
ments at its disposal as well as ways in which the Community 
could improve and simplify the administrative and legal 
framework in which infrastructure projects can be carried 
out. 
Apart from continuing with the traditional types of infra-
structure financing, the use of new financing formulae can be 
envisaged, which aim in particular to reduce the guarantees 
required from the promoters or to base these guarantees on 
the assets of the project rather than on those of the promoter 
(formula of the project financing type or preferential claim 
on receipts). Because the financial package required for 
this type of investment needs to combine in variable pro-
portions, capital formation, bond market flotations and 
bank loans, Community intervention should bring together 
new and traditional financing techniques. 
There exists a considerable economic potential in a number of 
large infrastructure projects of Community interest, notably 
in the areas of cross-frontier transport, telecommunications 
and environmental protection. At the macroeconomic level 
these ll"ould make a modest but nevertheless useful contribution 
to groll"th. The Community shouldfacilitate the advancement 
of the projects. inter alia through the easing of administrative 
and fiscal conditions. through the development of its own 
financial instruments, and thus contribute 01•er the next fi1·e 
years a us£ful dynamic element in the Community's economic 
development. 
3.3.3 Adaptability of the labour market 
Given the urgent need to improve the conditions for employ-
ment growth in the economy. increasing attention is being 
given currently by governments and the social partners to 
the task of making the labour market work more 
efficiently. This involves improving the adaptability of the 
European labour market to structural change. especially to 
the introduction of new technologies and to competition 
from the United States and Japan as well as the newly-
industrialized countries. 
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Table 10 
European Community investment financing through capital market borrowing and on-lending 
Le11di11K h_r i11stit11tio11 or 111eclw11is111: 
European Investment Bank 
Commission 
European Coal and Steel Community 
Euratom 
New Community Instrument 
Total 
Le11di11K hy .l'fftor or policy ohjfftfre: 
Private industrial sector 
of which: global loans to small and medium enterprises 
Infrastructure 
Energy 
Total 
1983 
4 256 
778 
366 
I 212 
6 612 
I 938 
I 263 
2 241 
2 433 
6 612 
(million £CU) 
19114 (1985) 
estimate 
5 013 
825 
186 
I 181 
7 206 7 400-7 700 
2 850 2 700-2 900 
I 860 I 900-2 JOO 
2 344 2 250-2 300 
2 012 2 450-2 500 
7 206 7 400-7 700 
Souru· C'cmmis!i.10n of the EC, 'Report of the Commission to 1hc Council and the European Parliament on the borrov.mg and lending acti\lties of the Community in 1984' (COM(85) :'.!13 final). 
In the last Annual Economic Reporr. the Commission ident-
ified examples of labour market regulations which had tur-
ned out to be designed inefficiently or in ways that serve to 
deter employment. It called for a re-examination of labour 
market regulations in order to ensure both greater equality 
of access to employment and greater efficiency in the use of 
labour within enterprises. 
The Economic Policy Committee is in the process of examin-
ing this question in relation to labour and other markets. In 
addition to the question of wages and non-wage labour costs 
discussed above, the Committee has paid attention also to 
the question of labour market regulations. mobility, training 
and more flexible use of working time. 
In conjunction with the Member States and the social part-
ners. the Commission is currently carrying out a comprehen-
sive review of the legislation and collective agreements in 
these fields. A group of experts is studying also the attitudes 
of social partners and governments to the problem of labour 
market flexibility. A communication will he sent to the 
Council. 
The social partners are principally responsible for the adap-
tability of the labour market. Where government regu-
lations are important, any specific proposals to change them 
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- particularly those concerning job tenure or dismissals -
should be fully discussed with the social 
partners. Governments should also review to what extent 
they themselves are inhibiting the workings of the labour 
market by the complexity of administrative regulations they 
impose on employers. 
Some actions have recently been taken by member govern-
ments with the intention of improving the adaptability of the 
labour market. For example, in Germany. new measures 
allow limited term employment contracts and promote part-
time employment. In France. regulations governing fixed-
term contracts have been relaxed to promote the recruitment 
of the long-term unemployed, and measures have been taken 
to promote part-time employment. In Italy rules restricting 
the choice of employers on whom to recruit have been 
relaxed. 
Another important factor inhibiting adaptability of the lab-
our market are weaknesses in employment and training 
services geared to current and future labour market 
needs. To make good these weaknesses will require the 
cooperation of representatives of governments. and social 
partners at local. regional and national levels. The Com-
mission is currently pursuing a programme of consultations 
designed to promote this kind of forward-looking labour 
market management in the Community. 
For their part, governments should continue to examine 
whether the structure and organization of their employment 
services are adequate to meet the demands of a rapidly-
changing market. 
Improving the adaptability of the Jabour market also en-
compasses the need to reorganize existing work patterns, 
and in particular working time but in ways which would be 
broadly neutral with respect to costs. The reorganization 
and reduction of working hours can be designed to maximize 
employment effects while maintaining competitiveness and 
the basic social rights of the employees. Collectively-agreed 
working time reductions in France, Belgium, Netherlands 
and the Federal Republic of Germany have often been 
accompanied by a rearrangement of working hours so that 
productive equipment, especially advanced machinery in 
high growth markets, is utilized more efficiently. Traditional 
barriers between daily full-time work, shift work in its vari-
ous forms, part-time work over periods of time, overtime 
working, etc., have become Jess pronounced. The tra-
ditional full-time work in a standard working week, which 
continues to apply to the majority of those in work, coexists 
with an increasing number of more differentiated work con-
tracts which can meet both the aspirations of the employees 
and the requirements of production. Such measures in the 
industrial sector have helped to save jobs which would 
otherwise have been lost. In the service sector an increase 
in employment has been reinforced by these measures. -In 
some branches, for example the retail trade, the number of 
employees may rise despite a declining volume of work, due 
to the growing importance of part-time work. 
Within the framework of the collective agreement in the 
German metal-working industry which reduced average 
weekly working hours from 40 to 38,5, about 70 % of the 
companies have reached agreements to maintain operation 
time. The company agreements take various forms. In 
France more than 500 enterprises, usually in the context of 
solidarity contracts, have reorganized working and pro-
duction time in agreement with the unions. These have 
often led to a substantial increase in the utilization of capital 
equipment. In Belgium and the Netherlands innovations 
in working time arrangements have also been numerous. A 
recent survey carried out for the Commission indicated that 
a large proportion of the Jabour force would be prepared to 
consider the possibility of new working time arrangements. 
lmprm·t•d adaptahility cf the labour market is an importallt 
compont'llt ,?( a strategy fcir more employment-creating 
groll'th. This hroad concept has in practice many detailed 
aspects. including the mrious conditions ,!( employment in 
additio11 to pay. the orga11i:atio11 a11d reductio11 o( ll'orki11g 
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time a11d the adaptation of ll'Orking skills and patterns to new-
tecl111ologies. These, however, should be appraised ll'ithin the 
general constraint of avoiding cost increases. While govern-
ments have to consider whether legal regulations inhibit the 
workings of the labour market, the social parmers hai•e often 
the major role in negotiating together conditions that will 
be helpful fer an employment-creating groll'th strategy. The 
general objective must be to seek improvements to thefimction-
ing of the labour market that reconcile to the maximum 
degree the objectives of economic efficiency and an enhanced 
employment propensity with social 1•alues of equity and se-
curity. 
3.3.4 Specific employment programmes 
The process of reducing unemployment by means of macroe-
conomic policy measures will take several years. Thus, in 
the meantime, specific employment measures will still be 
required. The high level of unemployment is particularly 
serious in old industrialized areas of declining employment 
and the under-developed areas which had never achieved 
self-sustaining industrialization. Its effects can also be seen 
in the very high rates of youth unemployment (three times 
the adult rate) and in the increasing number of long-term 
unemployed (39 % of the total unemployed have been unem-
ployed for more than one year). 
The Commission proposed guidelines for temporary work 
measures already in its communication on Jong-term unem-
ployment in 1984. 1 At that time, it stressed the need for 
temporary work programmes to be prepared in collabor-
ation with local and regional governments, and so be suitably 
· adapted to local needs. Temporary work measures of this 
kind need to be publicly funded but often involve the volun-
tary sector or non-profit enterprises as well. The net finan-
cial costs to public budgets is generally small since a high 
proportion of the unemployed who would be engaged on 
temporary employment programmes are already in receipt 
of unemployment benefit or other forms of social support. 
Many Member States have been developing such temporary 
work schemes specifically aimed at particular groups of 
unemployed. For example, in Germany, the public interest 
jobs (ABM -Arheitsbescha/fimgsma~nahmen) for up to one 
year are aimed at 'difficult to place· unemployed who are in 
receipt of unemployment benefit. The government pays 
60-100 % of the cost. In France. young people aged 18-21 
can be given jobs in the 'TUC' schemes (Tram11x c/'Utilite 
Collect ire - jobs of benefit to the Community) and through 
·solidarity contracts· between local authorities and non-
1 Commission of the EC. 'Action to combat long-term unemployment·, 
(COM(84) 484 final). 1984. 
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profit organizations. The jobs include vocational training. 
and the government contributes to the cost. In the United 
Kingdom, the Community programme is aimed at adult 
long-term unemployed. The government pays a wage 
subsidy. These various schemes are in 1985 reaching 
around I 00 OOO people in each of the three countries men-
tioned. 
In general, these types of programmes have several advan-
tages over alternative public job-creation schemes (limited 
substitution effects, more precise demographic and geo-
graphical targeting, lower budgetary costs). Nevertheless, 
as a solution to the problem of unemployment, they can 
only play a relatively minor role. The productivity of these 
jobs may be relatively low, and the slight amount of associ-
ated training does little to enhance the long-term job pros-
pects of participants. 
Another specific measure adopted by a number of Member 
States is the provision of assistance to help the unemployed 
set up their own business. In general, such measures allow 
the unemployed. under certain conditions, to capitalize their 
unemployment benefit into a lump sum, or to continue 
receiving unemployment benefit at the same time as they are 
self-employed, or a combination of the two. In France, for 
example, the government gives a subsidy to unemployed 
people who set up t'1eir own business. In the UK and 
Ireland, a weekly allowance is granted to unemployed per-
sons who can also put up a certain amount of their own 
resources. In the Netherlands, people can receive a loan 
and an income supplement up to the level of social assistance 
during the start-up period. In most cases, eligibility for the 
allowance is conditional upon having been unemployed for 
a certain period or is limited to the maximum period of 
qualification for unemployment benefit (usually 12 months). 
The role of local government and non-government organiz-
ations in the development of small local-level enterprises 
is crucial. In a recent communication, 1 the Commission 
highlights the key role of local support structures which are 
able to offer encouragement. information. guidance and 
assistance to those involved in enterprise and employment 
creation. 
While fundamental solutions to the unemployment problem 
will take many years, quicker solutions hal'e to he found to 
alleviate the heaviest concentrations of unemployment, for 
example among young people and depressed regions. Sereral 
coulllries hai·e de1•eloped schemes for relatil'ely loll'-cost em-
1 Commission of the EC. 'Community action to comoat unemployment 
the contrioution of local employment initiatives·. (COM(83) 662 final). 
1983. 
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ployment on aclll'llles of public interest, targeted on such 
groups and areas. There are also examples of incentive 
schemes for unemployed persons to set up their own 
businesses. Rapid experimentation and del'elopment of such 
schemes is called/or, drall'ing on local organi=ations in both 
public and private ( profit and non-profit) sectors. 
3.3.5 Education, training and technology 
The speed and scale of technological change is creating new 
and urgent needs. particularly for considerable numbers of 
technical specialists, and for the retraining of adults whose 
jobs are affected by technological change. These pressures, 
combined with the demographic bulge in the numbers of 
young people. persistent high unemployment and the con-
tinuing restructuring of industry in the Community, are 
leading already to major changes in the education and train-
ing policies of the Member States. 
For example, a striking development has been the rapid 
expansion in youth trammg prov1s1on in recent 
years. Some 700 OOO apprentice places are now available 
annually under the German 'Dualsystem'; the United King-
dom's Youth Training Scheme has over 300 OOO participants 
at any one time; and in France the number of training 
places supported under the government's special measures is 
approaching 500 OOO. Member States are also making 
major efforts to ensure that young people acquire a basic 
understanding of the new information technologies before 
they leave school. and to improve the vocational relevance 
of the curriculum even in non-technical 
subjects. Policies on the youth employment and training 
problems have been recently reviewed in a Commission 
memorandum.2 
Through its work programme on 'New information technol-
ogies and the school systems·3 the Commission is offering 
technical support in the areas of new information technol-
ogies and the school curriculum. the training of teachers, 
and educational software and hardware. 
A parallel programme is under way in the field of vocational 
training.4 Under the new guidelines for the management of 
~ Commission of the EC. 'International Youth Year". (COM(85) 247 finall. 
July 1985. 
3 Commission of the EC. "New information technologies and the school 
systems in the EC. (COM(84) 722 final). June J 984. 
4 Commission of the EC 'Vocational training and the new inforn1ation 
technology". (COM(85) 167 final). April 1985. 
the European Social Fund issued in April, the Commission 
is giving priority to training programmes linked with the 
introduction of new technologies. 
In July 1985 the Commission published proposals for a 
new Community programme in education and training for 
technology (Comett ).1 This is designed to encourage univer-
sity-i ndustry coopera tion, within a Community framework, 
on advanced training in the new technologies. It will help 
ensure tha t the competitiveness of the Community's indus-
tries is not inhibi ted by shortages of highly skilled man-
power, and encourage economies of scale by facilitating joint 
training programmes in speciali st skills. The programme, 
which is due to sta rt in 1986, includes : (i) funding for a 
Community network of university-industry training partner-
ships; (ii) grants to enable students, academics, managers, 
trade unionists and others to be seconded to universities or 
en terprises in other Member Sta tes; (iii) joint training pro-
jects involving enterpri ses and universities from different 
Member States, designed to meet specific manpower short-
ages; (iv) the feasibility of establishing a European techno-
logica l open universi ty system will also be examined . The 
Commission intends to submit a communica tion , before the 
end of 1985. proposing Community action in the fi eld of 
educa tion technology (especially through the use of infor-
mation technology) in order to improve the access and the 
cost-efficiency of educa ti on and tra ining. 
The speed and scale of technological change is creating nell' 
and urgent needs to de l'elop a u;chnological all'areness am ong 
the ll'orking population at all levels. Combined ll'ith the 
problem of high 1111employme11t . especially among young 
people. major changes are being made in the education and 
training policies of the M ember States . The Comm1111itr 
can add to this process . as illustrated by recent Commissio~1 
proposals for g i1•i11g a Com1111111it1" dimension to 1111iversit)'-
i11d11stry cooperation 011 training i,; 11e 1r technologies. · 
3.3.6 ectoral policies, technology and enterprise 
The adjustment and improvement of industrial structures, 
technological development and the creation of new enter-
prises constitute some of the main objectives of Community 
policies. With regard to sectors suffering from excess ca-
pacity, the Commission has adopted policy proposals in 
cvcra l areas. 
1 Commission ol the EC. 'Communit) programme in ed uca tion and train -
mg for tc'\:hno log) ·. (CO 1(~5) ·B I li nall. July I 'lR5. 
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Agriculture: the problems which occurred in the markets of 
certain agricultural products - especially the problem of 
surplus production - have led to substantial changes of the 
mechanisms of the common agricultural policy (CAP) m 
recent years. 
'Guarantee thresholds' were introduced for main agricul-
tural commodities together with quotas in the milk sector, 
thereby limiting the previously open-ended support 
guarantees. In so far as the decisions on agriculture prices 
for 1985-86 are concerned, the Commission proposed a 
continuation of its restrictive price policy; to a la rge extent 
the Council did not follow these proposals. in particular 
for cereals and rapeseed . The Commission proposed a 
reduction in prices of 3,6 % but the Council did not reach 
an agreement. As a result the Commission has been obliged 
to take special measures for this product under its own 
authority. The new structural policy, which was decided 
upon in 1984 and 1985, avoids encouraging the production 
of surplus products. In line with these measures to adjust 
supply to demand for agricultural goods. the Commission 
has recently published a Green Paper on the perspectives 
for the CAP2 in which it proposes various options and insists 
on the need for a price policy which is more related to 
market conditions. The income-support function which 
has so far been ensured by the price policy could in future 
be met increasingly by production-neutral income aids . 
To support the necessary adaptation of the European agri-
cultural sector, the Green Paper opts for measures to facili-
tate structural adj ustments, to change to efficien t alternative 
productions and to create additional income, or alternative 
· employment for farmers. 
Steel , shipbuilding and energy policies : Community policy 
for steel and shipbuilding is aimed at restructuring in line 
with a more market-oriented approach, together with con-
cern for the social consequences of the rapid decline in size 
that these industries have been experiencing. 
The Commission's recen t decisions bearing on the steel 
industry clearly illustrate this genera l approach.3 Their aim 
is to achieve further cuts in capacity within a much more 
market-oriented framework while increasing the provision 
to handle the socia l effects of restructuring. Thus all invest-
ment and operating aids are to be suspended after the end 
of 1985, the present minimum price system fo r steel products 
1 Commission of the EC. ' Perspectives fo r the common agricultural po licy·. 
(COM (85) 333 fi nal). July 1985. 
3 Commission of the EC. 'The organiza tion of the steel market after 1985 ' , 
(COM(85) 382 fi nal) . July 1985. 
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will be ended, and production quotas will be phased out 
over a three-year period. Special State subsidies will continue 
to be permitted only for environmental protection pro-
grammes, research and development and plant closures. 
At the same time, increased and better coordinated spending 
on regional and social programmes in areas affected by the 
continued rundown of the industry are envisaged. 
In 1985 the Commission published a study of energy pros-
pects to the end of the century. and then followed this by 
proposing new Community energy objectives for the year 
1995. 1 These objectives are designed to ensure that the 
Community's economic performance is not undermined by 
renewed energy problems in the longer term. The Com-
mission also published an analysis of restructuring in the 
Community's oil refining sector which paid particular atten-
tion to the impact of exports of refined products from the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
Technology: Europe has traditionally looked to knowledge-
intensive, high value-added industry as the basis for its 
economic prosperity. But Europe's leadership in many fields 
of technology has been increasingly eroded as new competi-
tors have mar.aged to diffuse many significant innovations 
faster. The share of the Community of Ten in total industrial 
world (OECD) high-tech manufactured exports fell from 
58 % in 1963 to 43 % in 1983; those of the US from 27 % 
to 21 %, while those in Japan rose from 5 % to 23 % during 
this period. 
The organization of a European effort to reverse these 
trends has in the last year been progressively taking shape, 
especially through the definition and implementation of 
Community strategic R&D programmes such as Esprit or 
Brite. In the sector of telecommunications. which is to play 
a major role in the reinforcement of the competitivity in the 
world economy. the Council has approved in July 1985 the 
definition phase of the RACE programme (Research in 
advanced communication for Europe). 
The actions undertaken in the technology field are comp-
lemented by measures aimed at creating the European-wide 
market necessary to recoup the R&D and production invest-
ments required by the high-technology products and services 
(common standards, opening of public procurement, etc.). 
The European Council. meeting in Milan in June 1985. gave 
a new impulse to these efforts. approving a communication 
1 Commission of the EC. "Energy policy objectives for 1995'. (COM(~5) 
245). 1985. 
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of the Commission on the strengthening of technological 
cooperation2 and supporting the Eureka initiative proposed 
by the French Government. 
The Commission's communication to the European Council 
'Towards a European technological community' sketches 
out the range of organizational techniques, as well as the 
possible substantive domains of technological advances, that 
the Community should now pursue. The general objectives 
are to (a) exploit to the maximum the Community dimension 
of a continental market and network of research institutes 
and facilities; (b) promote the greatest possible synergetic 
effects from the interactions of national and Community 
efforts, possibly with an additional Community contribution 
and participation of non-member countries. 
Creation of new enterprises and simplification of existing 
regulations: A number of measures have recently been pro-
posed or adopted in several countries of the Community 
with the intention of reducing regulation and thereby the 
costs imposed on small companies, particularly in their cre-
ation. It is to be noted that the biggest increases in employ-
ment in the Community in recent years have occurred in 
new enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises are 
thus seen to be an important source of new employment 
creation for the future. 
The examination of existing regulations does not mean that 
all rules should necessarily be called into question. It is more 
a question of simplifying existing regulations and ensuring 
that the manner in which they are applied does not constitute 
a handicap for employment. 
At a Community level. the Economic Policy Committee, in 
parallel with its work on flexibility in the labour market. is 
examining the flexibility of product markets. including the 
impact of regulations on companies as well as other aspects 
of government intervention. The Commission intends to 
submit a communication before the end of 1985 on the 
reform of business regulation and the promotion of a dy-
namic small and medium-sized enterprise sector. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises are dependent to an 
important extent on the general conditions in which they 
operate. in particular those relating to taxes and social 
security contributions. For such enterprises the access to 
capital markets is generally narrower than for large public 
companies: their investment plans therefore depend particu-
larly on their capacity for self-financing. In most member 
l Commission of the EC. "Towards a European technological community·. 
(COM(~5) 350 final). June 1985. 
countries the characteristics of small and medium-sized en-
terprises are not given due consideration in income tax 
legislation, which thus tends to impede the setting up of new 
enterprises and to slow the growth of ex1stmg 
enterprises. It is therefore appropriate to examine income 
tax legislation in the Member States for its effects on small 
and medium-sized enterprises, and if necessary change the 
provisions relating to the definition of taxable income and 
the structure of tax rates in order to strengthen the employ-
ment potential of such enterprises. 
As regards the frontiers between private and public sectors, 
one of the interesting consequences of technological advance 
is that, in some sectors, traditional 'natural' monopolies may 
no longer exist. One example is in telecommunications 
networks, where privatization and deregulation have taken 
place in the UK (with parallel or similar developments in 
the USA and Japan) and where discussion is also underway 
on the role of the Bundespost in the telecommunications 
market in Germany. 
The Commission has adopted specific proposals either to re-
duce production capacity in sectors such as steel and shipbuild-
ing, or to reinforce control on production in agriculture. It 
also made proposals for the organization of a 'technological 
community·. Allied to these sectoral objectives are the many 
detailed initiatives which are being undertaken to make the 
European business environment more conducive to the creation 
and expansion of enterprises. 
4. European interests in the 
international economy 
4.1. The world trading system 
The prosperity of the European economy depends greatly 
upon an open world trading system. There is strong evi-
dence, in economic theory and practice, to show that protec-
tionism does not pay as an instrument of general economic 
policy. The protection of limited producer interest groups 
does provide income and employment protection to those 
groups in the short term. However, other adverse effects 
of protectionism are present even in the short term, while 
the negative long-term effects are even more 
disadvantageous. Protection has the effect of increasing 
consumer prices. cutting real incomes and real consumer 
demand and hence output and employment in the economy 
as a whole. Where the protected goods or services are 
inputs into the production of other branches of the economy. 
as is often the case. then those branches themselves lose in 
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competitiveness in world markets. They then lose orders 
and have to cut employment, uniess the exchange rate is 
devalued to compensate. With devaluation standards of 
living are reduced and the problem of inflation is 
worsened. Macroeconomic policy has to become more re-
strictive, thus again weakening real demand and 
output. Alternatively, branches of industry faced with un-
competitive inputs from protected sectors are forced to try 
to evade this disadvantage by substituting these inputs with 
alternatives (e.g. plastic for steel components), or by relocat-
ing their investments in other countries where the inputs are 
competitive (e.g. some EC biotechnology firms are investing 
outside the EC to gain access to cheaper agriculture 
inputs). These general arguments have been set out in 
greater detail in official documents of the EC, 1 as well as 
elsewhere such as the OECD.2 
For these reasons the EC is in favour of a new round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Preliminary discussions 
have been under way in the course of 1985, and the decision 
in principle to begin the negotiation process is expected to 
be taken shortly. 
Trade liberalization and the unwinding of protectionism can 
of course be a difficult process for the industries concerned, 
and for working people when their existing jobs may be 
threatened in the absence of encouraging prospects of alter-
native jobs. Therefore there has to be agreement over a 
balanced set of trade liberalizing measures, otherwise the 
adjustment costs may be unfairly distributed across the 
world trading community. 
The Community's attitude towards a new GA TI multilat-
eral trade round is expressed in the Council's declaration on 
19 March 1985; and it has subsequently set out its ideas on 
the subject matter of such a negotiation and the Com-
munity's principal objectives in a written submission to 
GA TT on 8 July. Commitments undertaken in the OECD 
and GA TT to halt protectionism and roll back protectionist 
measures should be implemented. without waiting for the 
new round. In this regard it is important to note that some 
protectionist measures (e.g. steel products) were taken by 
the United States after the Williamsburg Summit. In 
addition. some disquieting protectionist trends have ap-
peared in Congress. although these have in general been 
opposed by the Administration. Japan could be supportive 
in helping to alleviate protectionist pressures in both the US 
and the EC by rapidly and substantially giving effect to its 
1 Economic Policy Committee of the EC. 'Opinion on protectionism', 
European Economy. No 19. March 1984. 
" OECD. 'Costs of Protectionism·. 1985. 
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declared objective of facilitating access for imports, es-
pecially of manufactured goods. The US deficit and Ja-
panese surplus cannot, however, be sufficiently rectified by 
trade policy measures alone, which is why the Community 
argues in favour of a more concerted approach to exchange 
rate and macroeconomic policy internationally. This point 
of view is reinforced by the outcome of the September 1985 
meeting of the Group of Five ministers for finance and 
central bank governors which underlined the importance of 
maintaining an adequate level of world demand and the 
joint responsibility to reduce world current account imbal-
ances and resist protectionist pressures. 
The Community also favours the participation in a new 
GA TT round of the largest possible number of newly-indus-
trialized countries. Several of these countries have achieved 
impressive penetration of export markets while maintaining 
extremely high protective barriers to their own 
markets. Further liberalization by these countries is a 
necessary counterpart to their expressed desire to see their 
own conditions of access to world markets improved in a 
new round. Finally the EC has indicated its willingness to 
include trade in services in a new round, and is actively 
seeking a basis for agreement on this point with developing 
countries, sorre of whom remain sceptical or even opposed 
to negotiations in GA TT on this subject. 
The Community is strongly in favour of a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. This. together with improve-
ments in the functioning of the international monetary system, 
will offer the most appropriate framework for a global rei•iew 
of trade policy options which must be addressed if the threats 
confronting the multilateral trading system are to be averted. 
4.2 Improving the international monetary 
system 
The international monetary scene has continued to be 
characterized by a high degree of exchange rate 
instability. Both the US dollar and the pound sterling have 
recorded very sharp fluctuations during the first half of this 
year in both nominal and real terms. However, what is 
probably more damaging to the performance of the world 
economy as a whole is the tendency for the exchange rates 
of major currencies to move progressively further out of line 
from what might be considered their 'equilibrium' levels 
over long periods of time. Over the six years from the first 
quarter of 1979 to the first quarter of 1985 the US dollar 
appreciated in real terms on a trade weighted basis by 63 %, 
admittedly from an under-valued starting position. 
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These prolonged shifts have produced a pattern of exchange 
rates which is incompatible with a stable structure of inter-
national trade and capital flo·ws and thus is clearly unsustain-
able over the medium or longer term. Moreover, import 
penetration in the United States, resulting from the overva-
luation of the dollar, is producing a formidable accumulation 
of protectionist pressure, which now threatens seriously to 
undermine the liberal system of international trade that was 
established under the GA TT and promoted further over the 
post-War period. 
Against a background such as this it is regrettable that 
the Group of Ten (leading industrialized countries), which 
received a mandate from the Williamsburg Summit in 1983 
to examine ways of improving the working of the inter-
national monetary system, has been unable to reach agree-
ment on a concrete and more comprehensive programme of 
action designed effectively to tackle the problem of exchange 
rate instability. However, following the agreement of 22 
September between the Group of Five countries, there now 
appears to be some measure of accord concerning both the 
dampening effects of currency misalignments and the scope 
for concerted action to influence exchange rates and other 
key economic variables with a view to correcting major 
imbalances in the world economy. 
The main focus of the Group of Ten's report. published 
in April, I has been on the need to improve multilateral 
surveillance. procedures. with a view to achieving better 
coordination and mutual consistency between the policies 
of the major industrial countries. Whether the procedural 
changes recommended in the group's report will lead to 
significant improvement in this respect remains to be 
seen. The time may not be ripe to establish a regime of 
target zones for exchange rates, entailing an obligation to 
intervene when the limits of such zones are attained. It 
might nevetheless be fruitful to examine seriously the possi-
bility of an intermediate stage. involving indicative zones. 
whereby consultation, rather than central bank intervention. 
would be triggered when the limits were breached. The 
meeting of the Group of Five in September 1985 marked a 
certain advance with agreement for the first time in recent 
years on the desirable direction of movement of the dollar's 
exchange rate and readiness to cooperate to this end when 
this would be helpful. 
The Community for its part has found that the existence of 
an exchange rate constraint, as embodied within the EMS 
rules, has undoubtedly contributed to the achievement of 
1 International Monetary Fund. Supplement on the Group of Ten Deputies 
Report 'The Functioning of the International Monetary System·. /.\IF 
Surl'e_r. July 1985. 
more convergent policies and performance among its 
members. The institutions which are appropriate and effec-
tive within a closely integrated economic region such as the 
European Community are not necessarily applicable to a 
wider and more diversified group of countries. However, 
the Community would welcome more effective multilateral 
surveillance of the exchange rate and of monetary and econ-
omic policies of major countries such as the United States 
and Japan (as well as the Community's own Member States) 
with a view to achieving more compatible policies. As 
noted, there are serious problems created for the world 
trading system due to a major misalignment of exchange 
rates which in turn result from poor internal and inter-
national coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. 
International exchange rate instability and misalignment has 
led to a clearly unsustainable pattern of trade and capital 
flows. The Group of Ten has so far only been able to agree 
011 modest procedural proposals improving the system. It is 
extremely difficult for trade policy alone to absorb the prob-
lems caused by exchange rate disorders. This is why the 
Community is pressing for parallel progress in improving the 
international monetary system alongside the new GA TT round. 
The September 1985 meeting of the Group of Five represents 
a certain a(france in the approach to exchange rate and ma-
croeconomic policy coordination. 
4.3 European economic space 
The EC exports more to the re~t of Western Europe (26 % 
of total EC exports, excluding intra-EC trade) than it does 
to any other region of the world. At the beginning of 1984 
the EC and EFT A completed the removal of all tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions between the two blocs. In April 
of last year they followed this up with a joint declaration 
expressing the political will to extend Community-EFTA 
cooperation 'with the aim of creating a dynamic European 
economic space'. In 1985 a joint communique of the Com-
mission and EFT A countries set out the domains of policy 
which should in the future contribute to developing this 
relationship. The Commission for its part published a com-
munication detailing how, in its view, this might be done. 1 
First priority should be given to abolishing a series of techni-
cal and administrative obstacles to deepen trade relations 
through simplification of border facilities and origin rules, 
reciprocal cooperation in technical standards and rules, mu-
tual recognition of test results and certificates. 
1 Commission of the EC. 'The Community and EFTA countries·. 
(COM(85) 206 linal). May 1985. 
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Other areas where cooperation should be enhanced are in 
research and development, trade in processed agricultural 
products, public procurement, border controls on travellers, 
transport projects and policies, environmental policy and 
economic and monetary consultations. On several of these 
topics the Community has recently taken initiatives. It has, 
for example, been suggested that new programmes to create 
a European technological community should be open for 
other Western European countries to participate. The 
Council is in the process of authorizing the European Monet-
ary Cooperation Fund to designate certain non-Community 
central banks to become holders of official ECU reserves, 
and this arrangement could be used by some EFT A 
countries. Already some of these countries have begun to 
hold privately traded ECU assets as part of their foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Good progress has been made in opening trade between the 
EC and EFT A countries. On both sides it is now agreed to 
build further on these achievements. The Community is seek-
ing, in the light of its own efforts to complete the internal 
market and deepen economic cooperation, to make it possible 
for EFT A countries to participate closely in the European 
economy's integration process. These efforts should of course 
continue to respect the distinct institutional identities and 
objectives of the EC and EFT A. The EFT A countries could 
be invited to contribute to the implementation of the cooperat-
ive growth strategy. Current negotations to adapt the exist-
ing free trade arrangements between the Community and 
EFT A countries, necessary because of the accession of Spain 
and Portugal, aim at a further consolidation and extension of 
the free trade system in Western Europe. 
4.4. International cooperation for world 
economic adjustments 
As already noted, in the medium term the United States 
economy must move into a phase of major correction of its 
still mounting external current account deficit. What is still 
uncertain is the timing and amplitude of this correction, and 
how it will be induced. Contributing to the adjustment 
process there will no doubt be elements of both budgetary 
restriction and cyclical slowdown and of dollar exchange 
rate depreciation. 
The prospect of some adjustment by the United States and 
its possible effects poses important issues for international 
economic cooperation. The objective would clearly be to 
achieve the necessary adjustments with the smallest possible 
cyclical reverse in the United States itself (obviously the 
United States' own interest) and, equally also, in the growth 
of the world economy as a whole. A disorderly adjustment 
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entailing trade restrictions would, of course, be very damag-
ing to the world economy. 
From the United States' point of view a given balance of 
payments correction can be achieved at a higher level of 
internal economic activity, the higher the level of activity in 
the rest of the world economy. For the Community it is 
necessary to achieve more dynamic economic growth and 
the question arises of how to maintain this in the case of an 
adjustment to growth in the United States. If such were 
the case there would also be the question of whether the EC 
would be acting on its own or in concert with a larger 
number of countries. 
In the hypothesis that the European Community alone tried 
to sustain its growth trajectory, while other regions in the 
world passively allowed a US slowdown to depress their 
growth rates, the EC could move into substantial current 
account deficit. To a certain extent the Community can 
afford a reduction in its surplus and even a temporary 
current account deficit. But it cannot aim to have a deficit 
on the scale of that in the US. The US's massive external 
deficit is not an example for the EC to copy. 
There would, on the other hand, be a case for the EC to 
urge that the largest possible number of countries participate 
in a world economic adjustment. In this context Japan is 
in a position of particular importance. It has the largest 
single counterpart to the US deficit, as well as serious prob-
lems of an unbalanced trade structure in relation to the EC. 
An international cooperative action to sustain the world 
business cycle should see an above average contribution 
by Japan as regards both exchange rate appreciation and 
domestic demand expansion. If this contribution were as-
sured, then it might well be possible to extend further a 
world cooperative action. The European Community 
could suggest to EFT A countries that they join the EC's 
1muauve. Japan and the newly-industrializing countries of 
the Pacific region could contribute a useful counterpart to 
the reduction of the US external deficit. The United States 
could most usefully help by actions to lower its interest rates, 
which are a particularly heavy constraint on the growth 
possibilities of the heavily indebted developing countries, 
especially in Latin America. 
Avoiding a situation where the US economic adjustment 
process leads to a pronounced and generalized slowdown in 
world trade is essential to the continuation of an orderly 
adjustment process in the.indebted developing countries, as 
pointed out by the IBRD in its recent World Development 
Report. 1 
1 IBRD. World De1·elopme111 Report /985, July 1985. 
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The IBRD sets out in particular 'High' and 'Low' case 
scenarios for the developing and industrialized countries 
which are quite in line with the conclusions drawn above (in 
Section ll.2) about the potential gains from a cooperative 
growth strategy. Depending upon whether developing 
countries find themselves operating in favourable or un-
favourable conditions as regards the growth of world trade, 
the terms of trade and the level of interest rates, their 
capacity to import is substantially affected. For the years 
1985 to 1990 the annual average growth rate of developing 
countries' imports is projected to range from 9,3 % in the 
'High' case to 2,5 % in the 'Low' case. The debt service 
burden of developing countries would rise in the 'Low' case 
to 28 %; thus the range here is between the debt problem 
being brought under control to it being aggravated to even 
more acute crisis proportions than so far experienced. In 
the latter case the threat to world economic stability would 
be considerable. 
The prospect of an important internal and external adjustment 
by the United States economy for a period of years ahead 
poses the question of how the rest of the world's economy 
will be kept on an adequate growth path. The European 
Community should be prepared to take up its responsibilities as 
a large economic region to sustain its own internally generated 
growth during this period. However, it is equally important 
that Japan lends its support to a wide-scale international 
adjustment of this kind. without which the EC might face 
unacceptable risks as regards its own external 
account. Without an adequate global cooperation the risks 
of upsetting the fragile recovery of the indebted developing 
countries would be very great. 
5. Conclusions: Objective, instruments 
and method 
In the present report, the Commission offers to the Council, 
Parliament and social partners the outline of a cooperative 
growth strategy which aims at a decisive improvement in 
the Community's economic performance between now and 
1990. The application of this strategy is necessary if a re-
duction in unemployment, without a rekindling of inflation, 
is desired. It will produce positive results irrespective of the 
international environment. Clearly, a favourable environ-
ment will facilitate a successful outcome. However, in the 
uncertain conditions which exist today for the world econ-
omy because of the persistent financial imbalances in the 
United States and the critical problem in some large and 
highly indebted developing countries, the signal which would 
emerge from the Community embarking on a cooperative 
growth strategy would be far reaching. The proposals may 
be summarized as follows: 
Objective: The Community should set clear aims for econ-
omic policy. In this report, the Commission proposes a 
cooperative strategy designed to realize a sustainable growth 
rate of 3 '12 % over the period 1986-90. This will make 
possible a growth of employment rising to 1,5 % per annum 
and will provide the means by which unemployment can be 
reduced to 7 % by the final year. The pattern of growth 
will thus become more employment-creating and can take 
place within a framework consistent with stability of na-
tional budgets and the reduction of inflation. Such results 
will only be possible if all participants furnish the contri-
bution required from them by the strategy and if inter-
national cooperation progresses satisfactorily. 
Instruments: No single instrument suffices to achieve this 
objective. However, a number of recent policy initiatives 
fit well into the cooperative growth strategy, but their im-
plementation needs to be accelerated and accompanied by 
a further dynamic element in order to secure a sufficient 
change in the economy's growth trajectory. The main el-
ements may be itemized as follows: 
(i) Monetary policy implemented so as to continue further 
the progress made already in reducing inflation but also 
allowing room for faster real growth. Faster growth will 
be possible also by exploiting opportunities which are likely 
to arise as international monetary conditions serve to accen-
tuate the reduction of European interest rates. 
(ii) Budgetary policies which, at a microeconomic level, 
favour more employment-creating growth. At the macro-
economic level a first aim would be to correct present imbal-
ances but at the same time exploiting, where room exists. 
opportunities for improving supply and demand together 
and moving the European economy on to a ·virtuous circle' 
of investment, output growth and new job creation and 
thereby to a better equilibrium of public finance. Within 
the framework of the cooperative growth strategy, tax-cuts 
and increased infrastructural investment would be some of 
the principal measures envisaged. 
(iii) A moderate increase in real wages to increase the profita-
bility of fixed capital. Together with demand support. this 
will create a climate at the macro level favourable to foster-
ing an upsurge in investment which at the same time will be 
more employment-creating. 
(iv) Initiatives designed to improve labour market adapta-
bility, the reorganization and reduction of working time. 
under cost-neutral conditions. should also contribute to 
making growth richer in terms of employment. 
(v) Improved and integrated market policies designed to 
open up the Community's internal market: liberalize dom-
estic financial markets. and to give a better market orien-
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tation to interventionist policies of the Community with due 
regard to the 'social dimension'. 
(vi) Greater investment in Europe's economic potential in 
the widest sense, ranging from major transport and com-
munication projects of Community interest. through en-
vironmental investment, to the better use of Europe's tech-
nological potential. 
(vii) International policies whereby the Community strives 
to improve continually the GA TT trade system and inter-
national monetary system, and, with other countries, acting 
so as to sustain the growth of world trade and to mitigate 
the LDC debt problem while inevitable adjustments occur 
in the US. 
Method: A step-by-step method is proposed, so as to assure 
sufficiently clear initial commitments to give a credible 
launch to the strategy and establish dialogue between the 
parties involved, while allowing for later steps to be adapted 
in view of an assessment of the results, the evolution of 
economic events and the validity of each parties· contri-
bution. 
Step 1: Before the end of 1985 Community institutions and 
the social partners will seek to achieve consensus on the 
objectives of the cooperative growth strategy and initiating 
action judged to be necessary. 
Step 2: A first set of actions will be put into operation in 
1986, including in particular macroeconomic policy meas-
ures. pledges by the social partners on incomes and labour 
market adjustments, expanded public investment at national 
· and EC level, and proposals for international coordinated 
action in order to reinforce the dynamics of the movement. 
In addition. significant progress in the implementation of 
Commission proposals, contained in its White Paper on the 
internal market, is necessary. 
Step 3: After an appraisal of the results of Step 1. a second 
set of actions will be implemented in 1987 to confirm and 
deepen the employment-creating growth movement. Some 
of these actions will be contingent. however. upon evolution 
of the EC and international economy. and the adequacy of 
contributions on the part of all concerned to the cooperative 
growth strategy. The 1986-87 A111111al Economic Report will 
contain an evaluation of progress in this respect. 
This outline has been deliberately set out in a very schematic 
form and much must remain for discussion between the 
parties involved. However. the principal point is that this 
should provide a basis for reflection on their own positions 
of each of the major actors concerned - governments. 
employers and trade unions. Each actor is. in particular. 
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invited to consider how his existing position might evolve in 
the direction of the common interest if it was evident that 
the other actors were prepared also to adapt their positions. 
The second part of this report contains specific guidelines 
for economic policy in the Member States. As emphasized 
earlier. the strategy cannot be implemented at a stroke 
but should be introduced gradually. To achieve this, close 
cooperation between governments, unions and employers 
will be necessary. 
As far as the demand side aspect of the strategy is concerned, 
the room for manoeuvre in the two main areas of macro-
economic policy differs considerably. The situation regard-
ing monetary policy is relatively satisfactory. Within the 
context of a monetary policy geared towards stability. which 
is largely determined by the EMS, significant potential exists 
for bringing down interest rates, particularly if the dollar 
continues to weaken against the ECU. 
As far as a possible demand support through government 
budgets is concerned. implementing the strategy of employ-
ment-creating growth presents specific problems in individ-
ual Member States. Since the strategy cannot be im-
plemented at a stroke. the recommendations addressed to 
the various cruntries must remain realistic and capable 
of being coordinated. Simultaneously with the moderate 
increase in wages and the widening room for manoeuvre in 
fiscal policy - more growth and employment boosts rev-
enue. while expenditure caused by the crisis is reduced -
demand support should occur step by step, until the process 
becomes self-sustaining through private investment and an 
appropriate development of private consumption. 
In some Community countries (Italy. Belgium, Ireland and 
Greece). the relative level. or the growth, of public debt is 
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such that the consolidation process must be continued at all 
events. Elsewhere, the German case is particularly 
interesting. As is indicated in the forecast presented below 
in the German chapter, growth of 3 '12 % and an increase 
in employment of 1,3 % are expected in 1986. The price 
outlook continues to be favourable. The surplus on the 
balance of payments current account should remain very 
high (2 % of GDP). The budgetary deficit will decline more 
strongly than was earlier expected (from 1,2 % of GDP in 
1985 to 0,8 % of GDP in 1986). In Germany, therefore. a 
positive chain reaction is developing between price stability, 
more growth and employment and expansion of room for 
manoeuvre in the fiscal and external fields. This room for 
manoeuvre should be exploited in order to ensure beyond 
1986 the steady growth (annual average increase of some 
3 '12 %) necessary for a continuing reduction in unemploy-
ment. Such a development is in the interests both of Ger-
many and the Community. By acting in this way, Germany 
would not repeat the ·locomotive policy' experience of 1978. 
Monetary policy would remain geared to stability; the coop-
erative dimension of the strategy between governments and 
social partners. applied in the Community. would facilitate 
the transposition of the positive chain reaction to other 
Member States. 
In the other Member States budgetary and;'or external room 
for manoeuvre has not yet been re-established. In some of 
these countries (Denmark. France. the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) it is possible that a similar positive chain 
reaction to that being experienced in Germany will arise in 
the near future. Such a progress will appear all the more 
rapidly in so far as there is a positive contribution from the 
social partners to the realization of the strategy and as 
developments proceed favourably in Germany. 
Part II - Economic policy in the Member States 
Belgium 
In Belgium, despite the fairly weak private consumption, 
economic activity accelerated slightly in 1985 because of the 
vigorous growth of investment and the greater contribution 
of foreign trade to growth. Inflation continued to slacken. 
The unemployment rate fell somewhat in the course of the 
year and the general government borrowing requirement was 
cut by slightly over one percentage point of gross domestic 
product. The Belgian franc remained firm even though inter-
est rates fell more sharply than in the other EMS countries. 
In 1986, growth is again likely to be modest. The current 
account surplus will probably grow rapidly, mainly because 
of the improvement in the terms of trade but the gain in 
competitivity experienced after the 1982 devaluation will 
continue to diminish. Consumer price rises will again slow 
down under the moderating effect of world prices. In view 
of these prospects, an improvement in unemployment will 
be difficult to achieve. 
Although expansion remains moderate in 1985 and 1986, it 
is encouraging to note that it is based primarily on exports 
and investment: this proves that the two priority objectives 
attained after the first phase of the economic recovery policy 
(the restoration of the economy's competitiveness and of 
company finances) are bearing fruit in terms of growth. 
Nevertheless, given the scale of the imbalances which were 
created in the 1970s, the recovery remains incomplete and 
fragile; efforts cannot be relaxed if existing achievements are 
to be consolidated. 
In the 1970s, a gap between the growth rate of labour 
costs and productivity was accompanied by an important 
destruction of jobs in manufacturing industry. At the end 
of the period. in 1981, the rate of return had plummeted 
from the early 1970s level, the remuneration of capital in 
comparison with that of labour had deteriorated appreciably 
and investment activity had dropped. Since then certain 
profitability indicators point to a recovery. but the remuner-
ation of capital relative to labour has scarcely improved, 
apart from a revival in 1982 and 1983. 
Therefore the conditions underlying a lasting expansion of 
capital-widening investment are not sulliciently satisfied. 
whereas the capacity utilization rate is approaching the 
maximum value of the previous cycle. This is the background 
against which government efforts to increase competitive 
capacity should be assessed. In the social recovery law of 22 
January 1985. the government set a norm. valid for 1985 
and 1986. designed to maintain competitiveness at the 1982-
84 a\'erage le\'el. This norm is based on the remuneration 
per head in a common currency relative to the weighted 
average for Belgium's seven main trading partners. After 
assessing the statutory norm for the first time early in July, 
the government concluded that it was being respected m 
1985. 
Although the merit of setting a norm for the maintenance 
of competitiveness is that an economic policy priority is 
clearly defined, the fact should not be overlooked that this 
reduces the problem of competitiveness to a single measure 
with all its limitations and imperfections. Other approaches, 
which place greater emphasis on the 1985-86 collective agree-
ments or on other indicators, tend to suggest that the com-
petitive advantage achieved in 1982 and 1983 began to be 
eroded in 1984. When the statutory norm is assessed for the 
second time early in 1986, the situation ought to be re-
examined with all the requisite caution, and taking account 
of the progress relating to elements other than the trend of 
compensation per employee achieved or planned by compet-
ing countries, such as the evolution of labour productivity 
and effective exchange rates. 
It is especially important to safeguard competitiveness be-
cause the improvement of employment and public finance 
hinges on this in the immediate future. The new collective 
wage agreements covering 1985 and 1986 were signed in the 
spring. Because the social recovery law, by prohibiting all 
new advantages, has obliged management and labour to 
translate productivity gains into work sharing, these agree-
ments open up the prospect that jobs will be created equiva-
lent to some 1,5 % of the number of wage- and salary-
earners concerned by the agreements. The scope within the 
country for underpinning activity is limited by the con-
·Straints imposed by the still precarious public finance situ-
ation and current efforts to improve it are closely bound up 
with the measures designed to maintain competitiveness. 
The decisions of March 1984. imposing a three-year moder-
ation of disposable incomes by requiring a 2 % slice of 
wages to be paid to the Treasury, introduce a wider split 
between the growth of wages as costs and wages as income 
without alleviating the former. A correction of indirect lab-
our costs. which is likely to prove necessary in order to 
restore competitiveness, would immediately interfere with 
the programme of improving the public finance situation or 
would have a moderating effect on domestic demand because 
of the budget spending cuts necessary to prevent a widening 
of the deficit. Yet, even though the general government net 
borrowing has already been pruned by almost 4 percentage 
points of gross domestic product, from 12,8 % of gross 
domestic product in 1981 to 8,9 % in 1985. it is still too 
high. To measure the fragility of what has been achieved, 
suffice it to say that although non-interest expenditure was 
markedly reduced. it was barely possible to stabilize total 
expenditure because of the debt interest burden which clim-
bed from 7.3 % to 10,9 % of gross domestic product in the 
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same period. It should be stressed that the increase in rev-
enue includes a greater yield from company taxation, al-
though from 1982 on, companies benefited from a variety 
of tax cuts (the top rate of tax on company profits was 
brought down from 48 % to 45 %, the additional ·solidarity' 
tax was abolished, tax exemptions were introduced in ex-
change for investment). 
Despite the efforts made, the vicious circle of deficit-interest 
payments-larger deficit means that the borrowing require-
ment is still too high. Therefore for 1986 the last section of 
the 15 March 1984 programme must be implemented in 
full and all overspending and any fall in revenue, notably as 
a result of the programme for cutting taxation from 1986 to 
1989 which was voted in July, must be offset within the 
budgetary ceiling. If all these conditions are met, and given 
the automatic growth of revenue, the central government 
Treasury financing requirement should be limited to 9,6 % 
of gross domestic product in 1986 compared with I 0,4 % in 
1985. Because of the tax cuts voted, from which disposable 
income will, from 1989, benefit by the equivalent of 1,5 %, 
even tighter management of public finance will be required. 
However, the structure of revenue, and notably the high 
· level of social security charges compared with an average 
level of indirect taxation, gives some margin for cutting the 
cost of labour, provided that the efTect of this change in 
Table 11 
Belgium: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
(;l)p (iDP GDP Pn,atc 
current real JcnJtor con,ump-
prices term\ lion 
dcnator 
111
• change ~ .. change •1. change '• chanttc 
1961-70 8.5 4,9 3,4 3,1 
1971-80 10.5 3.1 7,1 7,1 
1981 4.2 - 1.2 5.4 8,6 
1982 8.3 I. I 7.1 7.6 
1983 6.3 0.4 5.9 7.5 
1984 1 7.0 1.7 5.3 6,2 
19852 6.7 1.9 4.7 4.9 
19862 6.2 1.7 4.4 3,2 
I l:st1ma1c, of the ( ·omn11v .. 1on ,en. 11.:c,. (ktnhcr I QK5 
' 
Forcca,t of the Comm1"1on \Cf\lCC'i. <>ctohcr IQ1"5. on the basis or prcscm polic1c~ 
End of lhe year 
• Euro\tat con1..·cpt: hctwccn parcnlhc,co;.· national L·om·cpl 
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structure is not wiped out by the indexation mechanism. On 
the expenditure side, virtually the only stimulus which the 
public sector can provide in the short term is to shift expendi-
ture more firmly into areas which favour employment. 
Until now, the chief weapon in the fight against unemploy-
ment has been wage moderation as a means of improving 
the economy's competitiveness and company profitability 
and financial structure. It has been supplemented by a re-
vival, from I 984 on, of public-sector programmes to absorb 
unemployment - programmes which employ 2, I % of the 
labour force in 1985 compared with I ,4 % in 1983 - and 
by measures to help people to be taken on in their first job, 
to encourage the unemployed to start their own businesses, 
and to promote work sharing. 
Given the existing measures to reduce taxation and to sup-
port employment directly, and the need to go on trimming 
the public deficit, external trade must provide most opportu-
nities for raising the growth rate and expanding the volume 
of employment. Here, the economic policy priority must 
continue to be the maintenance of the right level of competi-
tiveness. Cooperative action at Community level would also 
help to cut the public sector deficit more quickly and would 
allow the more rapid creation of the room for manoeuvre 
which is now missing. 
l'ompcnsa- Current General Mone, Unemploy- Employment 
tallon trans- go .. crnmcnt suppl) mcnt in 
per actions net lending M:!l labour 
employee account or borrowmg forcc4 
0
o change 0,0GDP %GDP ~1o change .. ~ o change .. 
7.8 0,6 - 1.5 8,6 2.2 0.6 
11.9 -0,2 -5,0 10.3 5,5 0,3 
7.7 -4.5 -12,8 5.8 11.2(10,3) -2,0 
7.9 - 3.4 -11.0 5.7 13.1 (12.1) - 1,3 
6.7 -0.7 - 11.7 7,0 14.4 (13.3) -1.6 
6.2 -0.3 -9,9 6,1 14.5 ( 13.3) 0.4 
5,7 0.6 -8.6 6.0 13.8 (12.4) 0,4 
4.2 2.0 -7.4 5.5 13.4 (12.2) 0.3 
Denmark 
In Denmark economic activity continued to expand during 
1985; estimated real GDP growth was close to 2 1/2 %. 
down from the almost 4 % recorded the year before, but 
corresponding to the average annual medium-term trend. 
Whereas the excellent harvest bolstered total output in 1984 
a number of factors combined to slow the rate of increase 
during 1985. In particular, domestic demand was less buoy-
ant with the sluggish development of private consumption 
and residential construction offsetting the continued rapid 
rise in private business investment. Imports of capital invest-
ment goods as well as specific consumer items remained 
strong. Despite the reinforced industrial competitiveness re-
sulting from tight incomes policies, exports, which triggered 
the present phase of economic expansion, performed less 
strongly against the background of slower growth in the 
country's markets. Consequently, the deficit on the current 
balance of payments, which includes a large amount of 
interest payments abroad, remained large. More positively, 
however. inflation continued to level off as domestic costs 
declined, while private sector employment rose faster than 
total labour force growth so that the unemployment rate 
fell by almost I percentage point. In addition, the general 
government deficit narrowed to some 3 % of GDP as real 
expenditure remained unchanged with current receipts grow-
ing in line with GDP. 
In 1986, gross domestic product is expected to grow by more 
than 3 %. Although domestic demand is due to rise at a 
rate close to that for 1985, changes in the structure of 
demand reinforced by import substitution are likely to pro-
duce a smaller increase in imports. Private consumption 
should grow, underpinned particularly by a rise in employ-
ment, but public consumption will reflect the tight budgetary 
stance pursued by the authorities. The cyclically sensitive 
investment categories should benefit from lower financial 
costs and improved profitability, while discretionary com-
ponents, particularly in the energy area, are expected to 
begin to wind down. The relative fall in domestic costs. 
reflected in lower inflation, should contribute to a further 
gain in market shares for manufactured goods. Unemploy-
ment should show a further improvement compared with 
the year before. 
External constraints and tight budgetary management may 
mean that realized growth in the period 1984-86 will emerge 
at slightly below potential. The economic policy pursued by 
the authorities since 1982 aims at a return to external balance 
and equilibrium on the central government budget by 1988 
and 1990 respectively. and. though the achievement of these 
objectives also depends to a considerable extent on the 
continuation of sufficiently vigorous growth in world de-
Economic policy in the Member States 
mand, appreciable progress has been made. The wage re-
straint pursued in recent years has altered the relative costs 
of labour and capital and strengthened profitability. At the 
same time, tight budgetary control has reduced the general 
government borrowing requirement. Lower inflationary ex-
pectations helped to bring down nominal interest rates. 
Against this background, improved business confidence fa-
voured a rise in the stock of productive capital with private 
employment growing simultaneously. The result has been 
the achievement ofa much improved equilibirum in domestic 
macroeconomic conditions with the external balance still 
lagging however behind the desired objective. 
The incomes policy measures adopted in March imply a rise 
in nominal wages of the order of 2 % per annum. Together 
with a cut in indirect labour costs equivalent to I ~ % of 
the wage bill as from October 1985 and limitations on other 
forms of income increase this should bring about a slowdown 
in inflation and improve profitability. There will also be a 
favourable impact on employment not only as a result of 
greater potential output due to higher industrial investment, 
but also due to an improved mix of capital and labour 
inputs. However. relatively rapid changes in the product mix 
and market conditions require a high degree of adaptability 
in the labour market. It has become increasingly important 
to update skills acquired in the past in view of current 
technological progress and to review labour market regu-
lations in order to remove possible obstacles to the potential 
of the economy to generate jobs. Various measures have 
been taken to reintegrate long-term unemployed and other 
groups hit by unemployment. 
The pressing need for further improvement in the balance 
of payments remains a decisive element for the stance of 
monetary and budgetary policy. Adjustments might be 
necessary if domestic demand, particularly private consump-
tion, should deviate from the trend compatible with im-
proved external equilibirum. Restoration of external equilib-
rium must remain an essential policy objective but the 
authorities' room for manoeuvre in this respect would be 
enlarged if foreign demand was supported through cooperat-
ive Community action. 
The growth in money supply fell during 1984 and continued 
to level off in 1985 as did bank lending. Interest rates 
declined considerably in response both to the anticipated 
slowdown in inflation and to a rise in private capital inflows. 
The differential between domestic and foreign interest rates 
narrowed consequently; this should reduce the propensity 
of industry to contract foreign debt. In order to allow 
a more market-oriented control of domestic liquidity. the 
National Bank modified at mid-year the domestic credit 
monitoring system by establishing a new system of marginal 
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reserve requirement. A more flexible management of liquid-
ity and short-term interest rates based on short-term deposit 
certificates issued by the National Bank and traded only 
among banks was implemented in August replacing the 
existing tranche division of banks' borrowing facilities with 
the National Bank. 
A lower share of public expenditure in gross domestic prod-
uct would help alleviate monetary constraints and stimulate 
the growth potential of the economy. The draft budget for 
1986 remains in line with the medium term strategy adopted 
by the government and corresponds to what appears to be 
an appropriate guideline from the Community point of view. 
The level of expenditure will stabilize at the ceiling fixed for 
1985, whereby it declines as percentage of GDP. whereas 
taxation should grow more or less in proportion to nominal 
GDP. The outcome will therefore be a further reduction in 
Table 12 
Denmark: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Pri\,.atc 
current real dcnator consump-
pricn tcnns lion 
dcflator 
~- changt •o change . • change ~·II change 
1961-70 11,2 4,5 6.4 5.8 
1971-80 12,2 2,3 9.6 10,I 
1981 9,1 -0,9 10.1 12,0 
1982 14,6 3,0 11.3 11.0 
1983 10,3 2,0 8,1 7.1 
1984 9,9 3,9 5,8 6.6 
19851 6,4 2,3 3,9 4.2 
19861 5,4 3.2 2.2 1.7 
I Forecast of the Comm1\sion scrviL·cs, O.·tot,c,r 19HS, on the basis of prrscnt pohc,~. 
l End or lhc )'Car 
I National concept 
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the central government deficit to some 3 % of GDP and 
I % for general government. The relative cutback in total 
expenditure, in terms of GDP, necessitates a continuous 
reappraisal of existing schemes with a view to reallocating 
resources on a priority basis among various expenditure 
categories. It is of particular importance to favour public 
investment and expenditure which fosters economic develop-
ment. Total taxation will remain approximately unchanged 
in relative terms as the cut in indirect labour costs is financed 
by a rise in corporate taxes, which, due to improved competi-
tiveness, should leave profitability unaffected. In addition, 
a reform of income tax is planned for 1987. Its aim is to 
discourage tax-induced dis-economies as marginal rates are 
reduced and the fiscal disincentives to save are diminished. 
In budgetary terms the envisaged changes in taxation should 
balance, but they may very well have an expansionary impact 
on domestic demand. It will be necessary not to Jose sight 
of such likely effects. 
Compen· Current General Monn L:nemploy- Employment 
sauon trans- go\·cmmcnt suppl) mcnt in 
per acuons net lcndmg M2' labour 
employee account or borro~ ing forcc' 
•;. change •, GDP \, GDP . • change . ~ o change ,0 
10,6 -2.2 1.3 10.2 I.I I.I 
11,5 -2,9 0,9 11.3 3.8 0.7 
9,2 -J.O -6.9 9,6 9,2 -1.3 
11.5 -4,1 -9,3 11.8 9,8 0,3 
6.4 -2,2 -7.4 25,5 10.4 0.5 
4,9 -3.2 -4.6 17,0 10.0 2.2 
3,7 -3,4 -2.9 11.0 9,1 2.0 
2.4 -2.7 -0,7 7.5 8.6 1.6 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Economic conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany 
have improved significa ntl y during 1985: economic growth 
strengthened through the year, the rise in consumer prices 
slowed further a nd employment rose more strongly than 
was generally expected . There was another considerable 
reduction in the financial deficit of the territorial authorities 
whi le the surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payments, however, has reached a new record level. 
The rate of growth of gross domestic product in 1985 is 
likely to be only 2 Y.. %, remaining therefore slightly below 
the rate of growth foreca st by the government in its latest 
annual economic report (2 Y.z %). This must be seen, however, 
in the light of the fall in output in the first quarter, mainly 
due to the effect of extremely harsh weather conditions on 
construction activity . From the second quarter onwards, 
rea l GDP has risen appreciably. External demand has con-
tinued to provide expansionary pressure but domestic de-
mand, especially for capital goods, has increasingly contrib-
uted to growth. The expansion in the economy has been 
reflected in the la bour market. According to the latest em-
ployment data, which incorporate substantial upward re-
visions, aggregate employment rose in the year to mid-
1985 by about 155 OOO. The reductions in working time 
con tributed somewhat to this rise. The increase in employ-
ment in industry and services has thus more than compen- · 
sa ted for redundancies in the construction sector. Unem-
ployment, however. rose over the same period by 55 OOO, 
reflecting demographic factors and, above a ll , a renewed rise 
in participation rates; the unemployment rate in 1985 is thus 
at the same high level as in 1984 (8,4 %). 
The slowdown in inflation was due to competition and, to 
a considerable extent , to a favourable development of unit 
labour costs ; the moderate increase more than offset the 
inflat ionary pressure re ulting from higher import prices in 
the opening months of the year. The rise in consumer prices 
in 19 5 (annual average) is expected to measure some 2 %, 
compared to 2.5 % in 1984. 
The surplus on the current account of the balance of pay-
ments in 1985 is e timated at 2.1 % of GDP, more than 
twice as high as in 1984. reflecting a much higher trade 
urplu and a broadly unchanged deficit on services and 
transfer . 
In 1986 the momentum of economic expansion should con-
tinue and real GDP growth is expected to reach 3 Y.z %. This 
year-on-year gr wth rate - relatively high by European 
tandard - i . however. trongly influenced by the expected 
rapid re very in activity during the econd half of 1985. 
Economic policy in the Member States 
Indeed, GDP growth between the fourth quarters of 1985 
and 1986 is not expected to be more than 2 Y.z % . 
Growth in 1986 will result mainly from the increase in 
domestic demand, where private consumption will pla'y an 
essential role. Real disposable income is expected to rise 
appreciably in 1986 in view of a further reduction in inflation 
due principally to falling OM import prices. Moreover, the 
introduction on I January 1986 of the first stage of the 
tax cuts, which should benefit families with children in 
particular, will contribute substantially to improving the 
financial position of households . Finally, disposable income 
is expected to be boosted by a rise in employment in 1986, 
estimated at 330 OOO persons, compared with the average 
for 1985. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate will fall only 
slightly, from 8,4 % to 8.0 % . 
Investment in equipment in 1986 is likely to lose only a little 
of its momentum (growing by almost 9 %, as compared to 
11 % in 1985). After the downturn in housing in 1985, 
investment in construction should again show a slight real 
increase in 1986. Total fixed investment is thus expected to 
rise by almost 5 %, following a decline by more than I % 
in 1985. 
The growth of exports is expected to slow down in 1986. On 
account of the present favourable competitive position, in 
terms of prices and technology, the volume of German 
exports is nevertheless expected to continue rising somewhat 
faster than the increase in world trade . Imports, however, 
are likely to rise much more strongly. The faster economic 
growth rate expected in the Federal Republic indicates that 
there is a widening difference in the relative cyclical position 
as compared to other Member States, and to the USA. 
Experience from earlier cycles suggests that, with a relatively 
short lag, this will lead to a strong upturn in German 
imports. The Federal Republic would thus also provide 
an appreciable contribution to growth in other countries. 
Nevertheless, the current account surplus will remain almost 
unchanged , at around 2 % of GDP. 
During the last three years, considerable progress has been 
made in the consolidation of the public finances. The deficit 
of the territoria l authorities, which amounted to about OM 
60 OOO million in 1982 ( on national accounts definitions), 
will probably be le s than half that figure in 1985. It is 
true that, initially, consolidation had a negative impact on 
demand: expectations were stabilized, however, and the posi-
tive effects of the strategy have subsequently come to the 
fore . Restraint on public expenditure and borrowing has 
opened up wider scope for reducing taxes and interest rates 
than would otherwise have been the case. This room for 
manoeuvre hould now be u ed. The introduction in 1986 
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of the first stage of the tax reductions, corresponding to 
about 0,5 % of GDP, is thus to be welcomed. Despite these 
tax cuts, the increase in tax revenue in 1986 is expected to 
be only marginally slower than in l 985. Total revenue of 
general government will grow even somewhat faster than in 
1985 because of a significant rise in social security contri-
butions resulting mainly from the increase in employment. 
The government deficit is thus falling more quickly than was 
earlier expected. In the Commission's current forecast the 
budget deficit is estimated to narrow, despite the tax reform, 
from 1,2 % of GDP in 1985 to 0,8 % in 1986. In the 
absence of additional expenditure, the outturn for the central 
government (federation and Liinder) deficit in 1986 is likely 
to be several thousand million marks below the level of some 
DM 40 OOO million considered to be appropriate by the 
Commission. 
The stronger growth and rising employment are opening up 
room for manoeuvre at the level of general government 
which in 1986 should be used essentially to raise public 
investment. The improved depreciation provisions for indus-
trial buildings already decided upon by the government 
represents an initial step in this direction. In addition. the 
urban renewal programme, for which federal assistance has 
already been increased from DM 300 million to DM I OOO 
million in both 1986 and fQ87, might be further extended. 
Liinder and local authorities should also increase their finan-
cial contributions to this programme. There is evidence that 
there are a large number of worthwhile projects in the field 
of environmental improvement and urban renewal on which 
decisions could now be taken. As such funds are provided in 
the form of partial grants, their overall effect is considerably 
greater. There is also scope for graduating the grants from 
the point of view of structural and regional policy (e.g. 
according to regional unemployment rates) so as to achieve 
greater employment effects in problem areas. A further 
increase in ERP funds in order to encourage investment in 
environmental protection (e.g. sewage works) also seems 
advisable in 1987. These specific measures to create employ-
ment and to support the building industry seem appropriate 
in a wider macroeconomic context, since they would help to 
meet needs which have been neglected in recent years. but 
which are important both for the present and for the future. 
Because of existing spare capacity in the building industry, 
there is no danger that such measures would impede the 
process of structural adjustment in this industry. A restruc-
turing of resources away from the declining sector of new 
house-building into the direction indicated above therefore 
also appears justified from a medium-term viewpoint. 
In addition. already in 1986, supply conditions should be 
improved through specific changes in the tax system. This 
should also cover taxes which. while contributing insignifi-
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cantly to total government revenue, restrict the efficiency of 
the capital market, such as taxes relating to share trans-
actions and issues (Borsenumsatzsteuer and Gesel/schafts-
steuer - together contributing barely 0,5 % of the feder-
ation's total tax revenue). The Commission has already 
submitted proposals in this respect. 
The increasing room for manoeuvre also permits the second 
stage of the tax reform to be brought forward from 1988 
to 1987, without endangering the consolidation process. It 
appears necessary to relax taxation sooner than originally 
planned in order to sustain growth and provide the basis 
for a significant decline in unemployment in the medium 
term. 
Supply conditions could furthermore be improved, and the 
fiscal room for manoeuvre could simultaneously be widened, 
if selected subsidies were to be reduced more quickly and 
fairly. A start on reducing certain forms of savings pro-
motion could be made already in 1986, since this measure 
no longer appears necessary. 
Finally, the major programme of tax reform planned for the 
next legislative period should be presented in outline in 1986 
with a view to a binding decision on its implementation in 
1989. This would also help to underpin expectations of 
enterprises and consumers. 
The development of the public finances is an impressive 
example of a positive chain reaction resulting from more 
growth and employment. The interlocking effects of faster 
growth and greater room for manoeuvre for financial policy 
provide the basis for a virtuous circle which will eventually 
bring the economy on to a steady growth path with rising 
employment. 
Over the last three years monetary policy has managed to 
achieve a marked reduction in the inflation rate and - what 
is equally important - in inflationary expectations. The 
confidence which this has created in the German mark has 
made it possible to decouple interest rates to a considerable 
extent from US levels. Since the spring of 1985. the room 
for manoeuvre in monetary policy has grown even further, 
since the dollar has been falling since then. albeit irregularly. 
Monetary policy should continue to exploit fully the de-
veloping potential for interest rate reductions in the frame-
work of the price stability objective. To the extent that 
growth potential rises as a result of higher investment and 
more flexible use of the capital stock. additional scope will 
develop for monetary growth which is still consistent with 
price stability. 
The dynamic recovery in investment must continue. As the 
capital stock in many areas is obsolete. gross fixed invest-
ment must expand appreciably in real terms for a number 
of years in order to permit both adequate modernization 
and the extension of the capital stock necessary to generate 
additional jobs. The growing need for capital-widening in-
vestment is demonstrated by the high level of capacity util-
ization recorded in mid-1985; the level of utilization in 
industry was only one percentage point lower than at the 
previous cyclical peak at the beginning of 1980. 
In recent years wage moderation has made a considerable 
contribution to the recovery of companies' financial situ-
ation. While the profit share in value-added has again 
reached the level of the early 1970s, the yield on physical 
capital in many areas is, however, still too low. This under-
lines the need to use the capital stock more efficiently and 
in such a way as to generate more employment. 
Now that productivity is again rising more strongly, real 
wage increases are clearly possible in 1986. The increase in 
real per capita incomes should however continue to lie below 
overall productivity growth. Thanks to the first stage of the 
tax reform and to the further success in combating inOation 
(achieved mainly through a fall in import prices in 1985), 
there will be a further appreciable improvement in real 
incomes despite a moderate wage round. Given the economic 
situation in 1986. a rise in real per capita income is not 
only possible but within limits also desirable, since private 
consumption should compensate for the slow growth of 
exports in order to support the overall level of activity, as 
long as it does not impede investment growth. 
In negotiations between employers and unions in 1986 it 
might be considered whether, as a direct counterpart to 
continued moderation of wage settlements, additional jobs 
could be created. This form of arrangement could signal an 
increase in employment. 
More employment-creating growth could also be promoted 
if working hours were made more nexible than is currently 
the case in most firms. This would also facilitate reductions 
in working hours. The experience gained so far in the metal 
and printing industries, where employers and unions last 
year agreed on a cut in working time combined with more 
nexible arrangement of the hours worked, is certainly en-
couraging. A recent survey carried out on behalf of 
the Commission among a representative cross-section of 
European employees has shown that there is a high degree 
of readiness in the Federal Republic of Germany (and in 
most other member countries) to accept new working 
time arrangements. For example, a third of the em-
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ployees surveyed favour working irregular and, in some 
cases, inconvenient hours (e.g. in the evening until 22.00 and 
once a month on a Saturday) if this is matched by a reduction 
of some 5 % in annual working hours. Furthermore, ap-
proximately one in every six of those currently employed on 
a full-time basis would welcome a working week reduced to 
some 30 hours on the same hourly wage. These preferences 
regarding working hours can generally be reconciled with 
business reality only if the whole pattern of working is made 
more Oexible. Only in this way could shorter working hours 
for the individual be consistent with the current length, or 
even an extension, of operating hours, while at the same 
time creating additional employment opportunities. The new 
legislation governing limited-period contracts and part-time 
working should be used more actively by employers and 
workers so that the evident large potential for nexibility 
among workers can be better exploited for the benefit of 
both sides. In the services sector in particular, a considerable 
increase in employment might be achieved if more Oexible 
working hours were accompanied by changes in operating 
hours. Such measures are no less appropriate for the fact that 
more attractive working hours have the effect of bringing 
persons from outside the labour force onto the labour mar-
ket and that the number of registered unemployed falls less 
sharply as a result. 
A particularly important task in the next few years is to 
further improve the vocational training opportunities for 
school-leavers and to guarantee them employment after their 
training, even if this initially has to be in some form of part-
time working. One way of doing this is to make early 
retirement more attractive financially- at least for a limited 
period up to 1988 - in order to boost the numbers opting 
for early retirement during the next few years, which will 
still see an appreciable increase in the potential labour force. 
The economic outlook for 1986 is generally favourable. 
Nevertheless. there are still two appreciable imbalances, the 
current account surplus and, above all, unemployment. The 
regained room for manoeuvre for financial policy should be 
fully used. not only to counteract in time a possible cyclical 
weakening of the economy in 1987, but also to maintain the 
momentum of the positive chain reaction between growth, 
employment and the room for manoeuvre. A medium-term 
growth rate similar to that expected for 1986 and an increase 
in employment of about I ~ % per year are preconditions 
for a significant reduction in unemployment. Because of the 
resulting higher import requirement, the Federal Republic 
would also help to ease the employment problem in its 
partner countries. 
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Table 13 
FR of Germany: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Pri,:atc Campen- Current General Money Unemploy- Employment 
current real denator consump- sauon balance government supply ment in 
pnccs lcrms lion per net lending M3' labour 
dcnator employee or borrowing force 
----
% change •1. change . o change % change 0/o change 01DGDP %GDP % change %, ~o change 
1961-70 8,4 4,5 3,7 2,7 8,5 0,7 0.4 10.4 0,8 0,2 
1971-80 8,2 2,7 5,3 5.1 8,5 0,6 2,0 9,8 2,7 -0,1 
1981 4,2 0,2 4,0 6.2 5,2 -1,0 -3,7 5,0 4,7 -0,7 
1982 3,7 -0,6 4.4 4,8 4,2 0,5 -3,3 7,1 6,8 -1,7 
1983 4,6 1.2 3,3 3.2 3,9 0,7 -2,5 5,3 8,4 -1,5 
1984 4,5 2,6 1,9 2.5 3,2 1,0 -1,9 4,7 8,4 0,0 
1985 1 4,4 2.3 2.1 2.1 3,2 2.1 -1,2 5,0 8,4 0,6 
19862 5,4 3.5 1,9 1.5 3.8 2,0 -0,8 4.8 8.0 1,3 
Estimates of the Commission services, October 1985 
Forecast of the Commission services. October l98S, on the ha.sis of present policies. 
l End of the year. 
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Greece 
In Greece domestic demand in 1985 has continued to be 
sustained by the still vigorous expansion of public expendi-
ture and by a further increase in the number of tourists. 
However, the contribution of the real foreign trade balance 
has deteriorated sharply due to the combined effects of a 
marked slowdown in the rate of growth of exports (excep-
tionally high in 1984) and an appreciable upturn in imports. 
The growth rate for 1985 is thus likely to fall to around 
2 %. Moreover, major disequilibria have continued to affect 
the economy. The rise in consumer prices has slowed down 
only temporarily and, on a year-on-year basis, could climb 
to over 19 % again. Business investment has continued at a 
very low level, showing no tendency to recover. Lastly, the 
sharp increase in the tourism surplus has not been sufficient 
to offset the deterioration in other current account items; 
the deficit on current account (on Bank of Greece defi-
nitions) could be as much as 8,5 % of gross domestic 
product. 
Faced by these developments, which represented a lasting 
change in the competitiveness of the economy, the authori-
ties decided on 11 October 1985 to devalue the drachma by 
15 % and to introduce a compulsory deposit on a large 
proportion of imports. At the same time a series of comp-
lementary measures was announced, which demonstrates a 
will to get the economy onto the adjustment path necessary 
for the recovery of growth on a sounder basis. The fact that 
external indebtedness was continuing to increase rapidly, 
whereas the share of business investment in domestic de-
mand was declining steadily, was, among other factors. 
particularly disturbing. The economy was in effect tending 
to become trapped in a vicious circle, so that it was liable 
to become increasingly difficult to restore external equilib-
rium as a result of inadequate investment to increase pro-
duction capacity and to improve competitiveness. The pri-
ority aim of economic policy had therefore to be to break 
this circle as soon as possible. This means not only gradually 
adjusting domestic demand as a whole to the external con-
straint, but also increasing as rapidly as possible the share 
of productive investment in domestic demand. in order to 
bring it to the level required to ensure growth in the future. 
The precondition for attaining these results was to bring 
about as quickly as possible a disintlation of the economy. 
The lasting re-establishment of competitiveness depends on 
this. and so does the return to normal of investment and 
savings behaviour. Fulfilling this objective implied major 
efforts - on which the authorities have now decided as 
shown by the measures announced - to curb spiralling 
costs and the public deficit. the two essential factors which 
perpetuate intlation. 
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The first step was to seek to obtain a substantial moderation 
in the nominal increase in earnings, as compared with the 
rate of 20 % or so still evident in 1985. This aim was 
not compatible with the continuation of the old system of 
indexation, which had the disadvantages not only of feeding 
automatically into costs, whether directly or indirectly, a 
large proportion of earlier price rises and of thus permitting 
only very slow disinflation, but also of making wage adjust-
ment too independent of changes in productivity in the 
various sectors of the economy. It has been decided to 
make a fundamental change to this system, by linking wage 
increases from now on to the targetted, rather than the 
observed, rate of inflation, excluding the impact of import 
price rises. It has also been decided to freeze incomes above 
a certain level for a period of four months. These decisions 
should make possible a faster deceleration of prices, as well 
as a start in the process of improving the substantially 
deteriorated financial position of enterprises. The reduction 
in inflation and the recovery of business profitability aimed 
for by these measures are an essential condition for the re-
establishment of balanced growth. 
A start should also be made on reducing the public deficit, 
which, partly because of the insufficient yield from the tax 
system. will in 1985 again have overshot the very high level 
of previous years. The effort to be made should help, in 
1986, to reduce public sector net borrowing by 4 % of GDP 
and to bring the central government budget deficit down to 
9-10 % of GDP. Given the momentum of interest charges 
- which will however be held back by the decline in inflation 
- and the need to maintain adequate investment in the 
public sector, these aims imply very rigorous management 
of administrative expenditure, including wages, and a con-
siderable reduction in the burden of subsidies. This re-
duction, among other things, will require an appropriate 
adjustment of public utility charges and other administered 
prices, which have been kept at artificially low levels relative 
to the rise in the general price level. To this end, an initial 
series of measures has already been taken. It will be no less 
necessary, as foreseen in the Government programme, to 
increase the pressure of taxation not only. by means of the 
steps taken to intensify the fight against evasion. but also 
by deliberate tax increases. which appear unavoidable. 
This two-pronged effort to reduce inflation should consider-
ably reduce the pace at which the demand for credit in-
creases; yet. monetary policy will still have to exercise restric-
tive action, confirming the current trend for positive real 
interest rates, with a view to encouraging the development 
of a stable pattern of saving and, in particular. to extend 
the public placement of government securities which was 
started in 1985. 
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These measures should make it possible to point the econ-
omy more resolutely in the direction of sounder management 
which is essential for its subsequent recovery. It will never-
theless be necessary to supplement them by new measures 
designed to hasten the recovery of business investment. Inter 
alia, prices policy will have to contribute by becoming more 
flexible, provided that there is no danger of vigilance being 
relaxed with regard to dominant positions. 
As early as 1986, the policy described above could begin 
to bear fruit. Domestic demand should slow down to the 
advantage of the external account but, on balance, it will 
not be possible to avoid an appreciable check on in growth. 
Private investment should also pick up; this is likely to be 
reflected in a gradual climb in the share of investment in 
domestic demand. The year-on-year increase in consumer 
Table 14 
Greece: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Pn,atc 
currrnt real dcflaaor consump-
pnccs terms uon 
dcflator 
•1. change •o change •. chan~ •,. change 
1961-70 11,0 7.6 3,1 2.5 
1971-80 19,1 4.7 13,8 13,6 
1981 18,9 -0,3 19.3 23.4 
1982 24,4 -0.1 24.6 20.5 
1983 20,2 0.3 19.8 19.5 
1984 23,0 2.6 19,9 18,I 
1985 1 20,9 1.7 18,9 19,1 
19862 18,I 0.1 18.0 21.5 
I E111ma1n or the Comm1ss1on services. October I 9KS. 
J 
Forccut or the Comm1ss1on \Cn1cc~. October 198~. on 1hc haM!rio of JUCM:nt polictcs. 
End of the year. Up to I 9HO: M2 
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prices could be around 21 %, which would mean a rate 
through the year much lower than this figure. Lastly, given 
favourable prospects for the international environment, the 
balance of payments on current account, expressed as a 
percentage of gross domestic product, should show a marked 
recovery. These results however are merely a first step 
towards the necessary adjustments. They will imply the 
maintenance of a policy of consolidation for several years, 
which should contribute after an unavoidable phase of 
slower growth to more rapid expansion. 
This outlook does not hold out any hope of a rapid improve-
ment in the employment situation. Long-term recovery on 
this front will depend on the gradual strengthening of the 
upturn in investment, the primary condition for which is the 
maintenance of the policy of consolidation. 
Compcn· Current General Money Unrmploy• Employment 
sat1on trans- go,·cmmcnt supply mcntm 
per actions net lending M23 labour 
employee account or borrowng force 
~• change %GDP •;;.GDP ~ 1• change ,,, 0111 change 
9,8 -3.1 17,6 -0,7 
18,3 -2.7 23.8 0,6 
21,8 -0,2 -11,I 34,3 4,1 4.8 
26,8 -3.9 -8,5 29,1 5,8 -1,0 
19,7 -4.7 -8,9 20,3 7,9 -1,0 
21,3 -4,0 -9,9 29.4 8,1 -0,2 
20,0 -6,6 -13.4 27,0 8,3 0,8 
13,8 -4.5 -11.0 20.0 9.3 -0,1 
France 
In France, domestic demand has been kept under strict 
control in 1985; even though it has accelerated slightly during 
the year, it will have grown nearly as slowly as in 1984. 
Private consumption has been slightly more buoyant overall, 
while there has been evidence of a vigorous upturn in indus-
trial investment, which after several years of uninterrupted 
decline, has been sufficient to bring about a positive, though 
tiny, change in aggregate investment. Export growth remains 
buoyant, though distinctly slower than in 1984 because of 
the less strong expansion of world trade, while imports 
remain on a very moderate upward trend. This has produced 
a further slight improvement in the real foreign trade balance 
and gross domestic product growth in the region of I %, 
despite a zero, or even slightly negative, contribution from 
agricultural production. The trade deficit is likely to narrow 
further helped by the weakness of energy and imported raw 
material prices and the reversal of the upward trend of the 
dollar from the second quarter on. The current account 
should thus be roughly in balance, despite the smaller surplus 
on invisible transactions. Lastly, the rise in consumer prices 
has started to slow again after an interruption in the early 
part of the year, and the annual average should be under 
6%. 
Thanks to the pursuit since 1983 of efforts to achieve 
sounder economic management, the economy has made 
further progress in returning to balance. This progress, how-
ever, still needs to be consolidated. It is indeed necessary to 
go further than simply eliminating the inflation differential 
between France and the average of her trading partners, 
which is about to be achieved, and to obtain a lasting 
significant current account surplus which allow the gradual 
reduction of external indebtedness. Moreover, in the case of 
manufactures, the rapid rise in import penetration and the 
renewed contraction in export market shares, after the im-
provement of 1983-84, are indeed clear signs that the econ-
omy's competitive position is still weak. Restraint must 
therefore continue to be the watchword of economic policy. 
It is also the prerequisite for a return to the more sustained 
growth rate which is the aim of the Community strategy, 
since the effort now being made to improve the health of the 
economy is also directed towards the lasting improvement of 
its competitiveness by stimulating the recovery of investment 
through a return to profitability. This is a long-term strategy. 
in which economic policy has been involved since 1983. It 
implies not only appropriate wage developments. but also 
sometimes major adjustments in manning levels. Neverthe-
less. as the rate of capital formation gradually becomes more 
sustained again, the time is probably approaching when a 
reversal of the downward trend of employment will begin. 
The strategy has in any case already brought some results 
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in that a significant recovery in the trend of investment has 
occurred right in the crucial area of competitive industry. 
Under the strategy, any stimulation of private consumer 
demand is of course out of the question so long as pro-
duction capacity has not been reinforced to the point of 
being able to cope with this acceleration without damaging 
the balance of payments. Caution is all the more essential 
here because the upturn in industrial investment is liable to 
boost import penetration, at least temporarily. 
Persistence with a pay policy based both on economic stab-
ility and on employment creation is therefore the first re-
quirement of the continued emphasis on restraint. This 
means that the increase in per capita earnings must still not 
exceed the target inflation rate by the end of the year, and 
must therefore be well below I % a quarter. Based on the 
experience of the last two years, this norm will probably 
be respected in both the public and private sectors. Such 
moderation seems all the more reasonable because price 
rises will have decelerated sharply by the time the 1986 pay 
round opens at the end of 1985. As the pressure of costs, 
and with it inflationary expectations, gradually slackens, it 
should also be possible to contemplate further relaxation of 
the prices code, but without jeopardizing the objective of 
reducing inflation. Relaxation could go at least as far as the 
complete de-control of industrial prices, which are suf-
ficiently constrained by external competition for them to be 
in no danger of moving out of line. 
Public finance will have to be kept within the strict frame-
work laid down in 1983 in order to a void excess pressure 
from the deficit on the financial markets. As provided in the 
draft budget for 1986. adopted on 18 September 1985, the 
net balance to be financed in the central government budget 
and the general government net borrowing must still be kept 
very close to 3 % of gross domestic product. The danger is, 
however. that there will be some difficulty in combining this 
constraint of keeping borrowing stable with the reduction, 
however limited, in the level of tax and social security deduct-
ions implied by the newly announced cuts in personal income 
tax. There is an essential need for balance in the social 
security system, in which certain schemes, particularly for 
retirement and unemployment insurance. are affected by the 
progressive change in the ratio of beneficiaries to contribu-
tors. It is therefore not certain that social security contri-
butions will not have to be increased sooner or later to 
prevent these schemes from again moving into deficit. In 
any event, extremely tight control of expenditure must be 
continued at all levels in order to keep the volume increase 
of total expenditure slightly below the real growth rate, 
even though interest charges and the cost of social transfer 
payments are bound to increase much more sharply. Conse-
quently. the management of central government spending 
65 
Annual Economic Report 1985-86 
must leave no room for a real increase in expenditure exclus-
ive of debt interest. This means that the growth margin 
required in order to press ahead with the priority measures 
in the fields of security, employment, training and research 
must be obtained by diminishing the real burden of the other 
spending areas. It also means that overall public service 
manning levels should stop rising and that, taking all the 
components of increases together, pay rises cannot accom-
modate any improvement in purchasing power. 
Lastly, if the rise in earnings and the public sector deficit 
are kept within the projected limits, monetary policy can 
continue to reinforce the reduction of inflation in the econ-
omy by lowering interest rates as progress is achieved and 
by aiming at an increase in the money supply M2 in 1986 
below that of 1985. 
In these circumstances, domestic demand might well be able 
to grow slightly more, pushing the growth of gross domestic 
product above 1,5 %, despite the expected smaller contri-
bution of the real foreign balance resulting from the probable 
acceleration of imports. The terms of trade should, however, 
move favourably, so that the trade balance is likely to 
return to equilibrium and the current account should remain 
roughly in balance. At the same time, consumer price in-
creases are again likely to slow down. helped by the weaken-
ing of the dollar exchange r ... te, and should average slightly 
over 4 % for the year. 
The inevitable counterpart of this effort to achieve sounder 
economic management is the temporary persistence of a 
Table 15 
France: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP CiDP CiDP Pn\alc 
current real Jcna1or L·omumr-
pncc, terms t1on 
dcOator 
~ II change 0 11 change •;. chansc ~/o change 
1961-70 10.2 5.6 4.4 4.3 
1971-80 13.4 3.6 9,5 9,5 
1981 12.1 0.2 11.9 12.9 
1982 14,8 1.8 12.8 10,9 
1983 10.9 1.0 9,8 9.4 
1984 8,7 1.6 7.0 7.3 
19851 7.0 1.2 5,7 5.8 
19862 5.8 1.9 3.9 4,0 
Estimates of the Comm1s,1on \Cnu.:c\, (ktohl:r lqN5. 
J 
Forecast of the Comm1,s1on services. October 1985, on the basis of present rohc1cs. 
End of the year. Up to 1980. M2 . 
• Eurostat definition in p.ircnthc"cs. 
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downward trend in employment and of an accompanying 
slight increase in unemployment. This problem could, how-
ever, start to ease in 1986 with the completion of the principal 
industrial restructuring operations, the progress achieved in 
real wage adjustment, the upturn in investment and the 
simultaneous slowdown in the increase in the labour force. 
In fact, the rate of increase in unemployment has already 
fallen significantly in 1985, for reasons due partly, it is true, 
to the success encountered by the part-time work programme 
mounted by the local authorities and other public agencies, 
as part of the public authority drive to promote employment, 
notably among young people. The introduction of com-
munity work schemes marks the last stage in this drive and 
might also be the starting point for a more general trend 
towards the easing of conditions for integrating the young 
into working life. More generally still. employment as a 
whole should benefit from the new initiatives agreed in the 
area of training as well as from certain proposed changes in 
labour legislation and working hours. 
Economic policy must continue to give priority to restoring 
the conditions making for balanced growth. and endeavour 
to mitigate, by specific measures. the temporarily adverse 
consequences for employment of this necessary approach: 
in so doing it will best be able to fulfil the objectives of the 
cooperative strategy for growth devised for the Community 
as a whole. If the international environment continues to 
develop favourably domestic demand should again be given 
a larger margin for growth from 1987 on. Nevertheless 
the bulk of this margin should be utilized by corporate 
investment, which still has much ground to make up. 
Cnmr,cnsa- Current GcnC"ral Mone) Unemploy· Emplo)ment 
tatmn trans- go\cmmcnt supply ment in 
""' 
actions net lending M23 labour 
employee account or borrowing force' 
0 
o change 0 'oGDP 0 ,0 GDP ' o change ,., 0 o change 
9.4 0.2 0.4 12.7 0.9 0.6 
13.8 -0.4 -0.1 14.8 3,8 0.4 
14.5 - 1.4 -1.8 11.4 7,8 -0.7 
14.5 -2.9 -2.7 10,8 8,7 (8,8) -0.8 
10,9 - 1.7 -3.1 11.2 8.8 (9.0) -0.6 
8.1 -0.7 -2.8 8.3 9.9 (9.9) - 1.0 
5.9 -0.5 -3.2 5.8 10.7 (10.7) - 1.0 
4.5 -0.3 -3.3 4.9 11.0 (10.9) -0.7 
Ireland 
In Ireland the pattern of vivid contrasts, which has character-
ized macroeconomic performance since recovery began in 
I 983, remained marked in 1985. Exports continued to ex-
pand vigorously despite slower growth in external markets; 
domestic demand, on the other hand, remained at a low 
level, renecting factors whose cumulative influence is likely 
to dampen aggregate activity for some time to come -
in particular, a still relatively modest amount of domestic 
sourcing for important export categories, the implications 
of further fiscal adjustment, and the impact on global invest-
ment as work on major projects in the public sector comes 
to an end, offsetting the strong resurgence in private invest-
ment in capital goods. The benefits of rapid export expansion 
are also weakened by the high level of net factor income 
outOows, 11 % of GDP in 1985, mainly attributable to 
interest charges on the external public debt and profit re-
patriations by Irish branches of foreign-owned firms. As a 
consequence, growth in real GNP, the appropriate measure 
of the resources actually available to the economy, is a 
full percentage point below the comparative GDP figure, 
estimated at about 2 Y.z %. Against this background, unem-
ployment continued to rise during the year to the unpre-
cedented rate of I 7 %. In other respects however, adjust-
ment has proceeded much faster. A significant degree of 
wage moderation has been achieved. The rate of inOation 
(CPI), as high as 20 % in I 98 I, is expected to come dowri 
to almost 5 % in I 985. The deficit on the current account 
of the balance of payments as a percentage of GDP has also 
been reduced dramatically by ~an estimated I I percentage 
points in the same period. Indeed, the trade balance has 
moved into modest surplus for the first time in many years. 
The small overrun expected on the planned budgetary target 
of I I Y.z % of GDP for the Exchequer Borrowing Require-
ment (EBR) should be seen in the light of the approximately 
equivalent saving recorded in the previous year. However, 
fiscal adjustment has effectively marked time for the past 
two years so that the size of the national debt continues to 
grow by further substantial annual increments and may 
indeed approach 120 % of GDP by end-year of which close 
to half will be owed abroad. Moreover. the deficit on the 
current balance of payments is still rather high in view of 
the relatively low level of domestic demand. 
Growth prospects for 1986. with real GDP expected to rise 
by nearly 2 Y.z % on the assumption that progress in fiscal 
adjustment will resume as provided for in the government's 
medium-term economic plan 'Building on Reality', arc simi-
lar to those in the current year although the balance of 
growth should shift somewhat towards stronger domestic 
demand. Nonetheless. some further reduction is likely in 
the deficit on the current balance of payments while the 
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underlying rate of inflation should continue to improve. 
Employment is likely to grow at a modest pace but unem-
ployment will probably remain at around I 7 % during the 
year. 
The considerable success achieved by the authorities in some 
areas of the economy throws into sharper focus the relatively 
slow progress being made in improving labour market con-
ditions. In Ireland, particular demographic influences have 
been superimposed on more commonly experienced cyclical 
and structural factors. The labour supply is likely to increase 
by about I % per annum in the next few years even allowing 
for significant net emigration. The problem therefore, if any 
inroad into the level of unemployment is to be made, is to 
raise employment by a much faster rate each year. To this 
effect, the authorities should endeavour to make simul-
taneous progress in three areas, namely, restoring order to 
the public finances, improving labour market management 
and making industrial policy more effective in terms of 
retaining more value-added in the economy and generating 
more employment. 
The persistence of high public deficits entailed not only a 
rapid accumulation of external debt (almost 50 % of GDP 
at end-1984) and resultant interest charges ( 1981, 2 % of 
GDP; 1985, 4%%) but also, bearing in mind the relatively 
narrow tax base, exceptionally high levels of personal tax-
ation. Over 40 % of income tax payers fall into the two 
higher tax bands (48 % and 60 %). 'Building on Reality' 
proposes to reduce the EBR and current budget deficit 
(CBD) to 9,8 % and 5 % of GNP respectively by I 987 (that 
is, a reduction of over 3 percentage points in each relative 
to 1985) while holding taxation constant as a percentage of 
GNP, at the 1984 level. Substantial imbalances will thus 
persist in the period after 1987. 
These targets must be regarded as a mm1mum. Conse-
quently, in 1986 the authorities should reduce the EBR and 
CBD by at least 1,5 percentage points of GDP respectively, 
by reference to the probable outturn for 1985, constituting 
a half-way step towards 1987. While the expected moder-
ation of international interest rates and the dollar exchange 
rate will ease the debt interest burden somewhat in I 986, 
this order of reduction in the deficits will be feasible only if 
there is severe restraint on non-interest expenditure includ-
ing the maintenance of strict limits on the rise in public 
service pay and the second and final phase of the abolition 
of consumer subsidies. It would be appropriate to continue 
the reform of the tax system initiated in the January 1985 
budget with a view to promoting incentive and enterprise. 
While more emphasis on reducing the income tax burden 
would appear desirable. progress in this direction must de-
pend on how far expenditure can be reduced. Resources 
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could be freed by restructuring the system of transfers to 
households so as to reflect priorities and direct expenditure 
to areas of real need. It is questionable, in the context of 
overall budgetary targets, whether the real value of social 
transfers can be maintained - these have risen by as much 
as 4 percentage points since 1981 to an estimated 19 % of 
GNP in 1985. 
Monetary policy will have to m1t1gate the strains ansmg 
from the pressures exerted by large public deficits. The 
improvement in the external current account deficit is reduc-
ing the role played by external financing of the public sector. 
Despite subdued demand for private sector credit, which 
has facilitated the recent reduction in the role of quantitative 
credit controls, the continuance of Exchequer external bor-
rowing at the high level of 1985 could contribute to excess-
ively fast growth in the money supply. In regard to interest 
rate policy, the authorities must strike a balance between 
ensuring that the economy benefits proportionately from 
the easing in international rates and maintaining a strong 
flow of savings from the non-bank public to the Exchequer. 
Avoidance of short-run volatility in domestic interest rates 
is obviously essential. 
The prospect of high levels of unemployment over the me-
dium term has been the main stimulus behind initiatives 
taken by the authorities in labour market management. 
Training schemes, particularly for young people, are now 
being greatly expanded. A social employment scheme has 
been introduced. offering 10 OOO longer-term unemployed 
part-time work for one year mainly on local authority pro-
jects. The scope for this type of scheme is limited however, 
both by the cost. and by the rather slow take-up of job 
opportunities linked partly to limited trade union accept-
ance. However, the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, designed 
to help unemployed persons start their own business. has 
been much more successful in terms of demand for the 
scheme combined with a relatively low degree of initial 
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failure. The Employment Incentive Scheme, which subsidizes 
incremental employment, is also attracting growing demand, 
but to evaluate its success is more difficult because some 
employers may have hired more labour anyway. Overall, 
there is now need for greater coordination in administering 
manpower policy, given the recent rapid expansion of 
schemes and the number of bodies involved. 
An important development to date in promoting labour 
market adaptability has been the increasing dispersion, in 
terms of timing and size, of wage settlements. In regard to 
the replacement ratio (level of unemployment benefit relative 
to net income after tax), a more emphatic stress on reducing 
personal taxation, particularly for those on lower incomes, 
could encourage a greater take-up of less well paid job 
opportunities especially since there is little scope for increas-
ing the value of social transfers. The correction of the longer-
term trend towards excessive capital deepening is more prob-
lematic but there is evidence that generous levels of invest-
ment incentives, which have attracted many capital intensive 
production operations, have had an important effect. Since 
Ireland is likely to require foreign inward investment for 
some time to come, it may be difficult to reduce the level of 
these incentives, but, in line with the White Paper on indus-
trial policy, they can be used more selectively to ensure the 
creation of more jobs. At present, it makes sense to put a 
strong emphasis in industrial policy on improving supply 
linkages between the foreign and domestic sectors in manu-
facturing. Ultimately however, the best prospects for a wider 
basis of output and employment growth in manufacturing 
lie with the recovery and expansion of domestic firms; this 
will not come about in the absence of sustained wage moder-
ation, to generate profits and investment and protect com-
petitiveness, and of an appropriate business climate in terms 
of taxation and interest rate levels. Wage moderation, in 
combination with budgetary restraint, is not only imperative 
solely from the point of view of Ireland, but would be in 
harmony with a consistent, more employment intensive, 
growth strategy in the Community as a whole. 
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Table 16 
Ireland: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Private Compen- Current General Money Uncmploy- Employment 
current real dcOator consump- sation balance government supply mcnt in 
prices terms tion per net lending M31 labour 
deOator cmploya: or borrowing force 
% change % change 0,0 change % change % change %GDP %GDP % change O/o '% change 
1961-70 9,9 4,2 5,5 4,6 9,9 -2,3 -2,7 10,4 4,5 0,0 
1971-80 19,5 4,6 14,2 13,8 18,0 -4,6 -8,1 18,5 7,4 1,0 
1981 21,2 2,6 18,2 21,2 19,6 -14,1 -13,2 21,5 10,6 -0,9 
1982 16,9 0.0 15,9 15,9 15,7 -9,9 -13,8 13,5 12,8 0,2 
1983 10,4 0,8 10,4 8,3 9,3 -6,3 -11,8 5,6 14,6 -2,0 
1984 11,3 4,4 6,6 8,5 9,6 -5,l -10,1 10,1 16,1 -0,9 
1985' 8,7 2,5 6,1 5,7 7,0 -3,3 -11.5 6.6 17.1 -0,3 
19862 7,5 2,3 5,0 5,3 5,7 -2,0 -10,4 9,8 17,4 0,6 
Estimates of the Commission services. October 1985. 
) 
Forecast of the Commission services, October 1985. on the basis of present policies. 
End of the year. 
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Italy 
In Italy, the absence of arrangements for containing the in-
built momentum of earnings, the insufficient control of the 
public deficit and the consequent accelerated growth in the 
monetary aggregates in the early part of the year have 
provided a further boost to private consumer demand in 
1985 while business demand, still stimulated by the favour-
able trend of profits in 1984, has remained very buoyant. 
This momentum, coupled with worsening competitiveness, 
has tended to pull in appreciably more imports and to curb 
the rise in exports, which has nevertheless remained strong. 
Despite the strongly negative influence of the real balance 
of foreign trade, the growth of gross domestic product will, 
however, be similar to that in 1984. But the pressure of 
demand on domestic supply and the rise in the dollar in the 
first half of the year temporarily interrupted the slowdown 
in the inflation rate, which should settle at about 9% on 
average in 1985. Above all, no favourable factor reduced 
the impact on the current account of the deterioration in 
the real external balance: the current account deficit for the 
year is therefore likely to reach 1,7 % of GDP. Following 
two successive slides in the exchange rate of the lira, in 
February-March, and again in July. the new downward 
adjustment of its central rate within the European Monetary 
System on 20 July was thr consequence of these major 
imbalances. 
However, the tendency for the balance of payments to de-
teriorate will not be lastingly reversed as a result of Italy's 
improved competitiveness vis-a-l'is the countries of the Euro-
pean Monetary System, and the simultaneous improvement 
in her terms of trade linked with the decline of both the 
dollar and the oil price, unless the causes of the present 
disequilibrium are corrected rapidly. There is even the 
danger that the persistence of relatively high inflation will 
wipe out the exchange rate advantage obtained before it can 
be fully exploited in respect of real flows. Fundamental 
measures must therefore be taken not only to curb domestic 
demand to the appropriate extent but also to break the 
inflationary spiral itself. which tends to perpetuate economic 
instability and, by so doing, impede the expansion of pro-
ductive capacity. Over and above the chronic precariousness 
of external equilibrium, the most serious consequence of this 
situation has been the decline in the rate of formation of 
productive capital connected with the fall in its profitability 
and the resultant severe crowding out of labour in the sectors 
exposed to competition. It is therefore essential for economic 
policy to attack the very roots of this prob,lem by calling into 
question certain automatic institutional procedures which 
deprive labour costs and public expenditure of the flexibility 
needed to restore the key equilibria on a lasting basis. Unless 
there is resolute action along these lines. the monetary autho-
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rities will inevitably be faced with contradictory policy op-
tions, permitting neither the necessary progress towards re-
establishing equilibrium, nor a lasting return of productive 
investment to a level compatible with a gradual reduction 
in unemployment. 
In this context, the revision of wage adjustment procedures 
is of key importance: on it depends the control not only of 
the evolution of costs in the competitive sector but also to 
a large extent that of public expenditure. Even when it was 
alleviated down in 1983, the undifferentiated indexation 
system introduced in 1975 retained most of its disadvan-
tages: it impedes disinflation by automatically feeding into 
the wage bill much of the impact of any past rise in prices; 
its effects of squeezing wage differentials is bound to be 
offset by differentiated pay increases, the addition of which 
is incompatible with the desirable slowing down of nominal 
pay rises; and in the end it implies a trend of real wage 
increases which is higher than that of productivity growth. 
Management and unions seem to be working out an agree-
ment to abandon this mechanism, already rejected by private 
industry employers, with effect from the start of 1986, al-
though there is no questior: of abandoning all idea of auto-
matically protecting wages against the decline in the value 
of money. It might thus be possible to move towards a 
method of wage-fixing which would retain some indexation, 
but in the diluted form of a half-yearly adjustment of an 
amount of salary limited to a level far lower than the current 
rate of coverage, with the other elements of the increase 
being no longer determined at branch and company level 
three years at a time, but for shorter periods. This might go 
a Jong way towards reducing the rigidities of the former 
system and should do away with most of its disadvantages. 
As a result, it should be possible to make much faster 
progress in reducing inflation and also to remove. by nego-
tiation, the possibility of rises in real wages beyond the 
increase of productivity. The system might be used to make 
appropriate corrections to the distortions which occurred in 
the past. 
But the expected results will not be achieved unless the shift 
in the system of wage formation is matched by an extremely 
energetic effort to reduce. and not just contain. the enormous 
inflationary pressure emanating from public finance. Con-
trary to the initial forecasts. the Treasury deficit shows no 
sign of falling in 1985. Its underlying trend is even tending 
to rise from levels which already imply a rapid increase 
in the burden of indebtedness. already close to I 00 % of 
GNP.The strategy necessary has been outlined in a plan for 
the reform of public finance to 1990 published by the Minis-
ter for the Treasury on 22 May 1985. The twin objectives. 
justified by the need for the gradual reduction of the public 
finance burden on the productive system, are to stabilize 
overall government receipts as a percentage of GDP as well 
as the real share of current expenditure, excluding debt 
interest, at levels very close to their present ones. If these 
two objectives were achieved, and assuming that growth 
averages close on 3 % a year until the end of the decade, 
and that inflation tends rapidly towards an annual rate of 
4 %, general government net borrowing, expressed as a 
proportion of gross domestic product, could be cut from 
13,5 % in 1985 to around 7 % in I 990. 
The major difficulty of this strategy is the stabilization of 
the growth in real terms of current expenditure excluding 
debt interest, especially since much of this expenditure is 
controlled by decentralized departments. The objective 
means that the volume of total public service pay must be 
lastingly stabilized, i.e. that the mechanism for its adjustment 
- notably indexation and automatic career increases - be 
amended accordingly, and that the numbers employed in 
government and public departments should only be in-
creased when strictly necessary. It also means that in order 
to compensate for the inevitable increase in the real cost of 
pensions, the costs to the budget of public services must be 
reduced by an appropriate increase in the user contribution 
to their operating costs. Lastly it requires the introduction 
of provisions designed to limit the increase in the burden of 
pensions as much as possible. The 1986 budget proposal, 
presented to the parliament on 30 September 1985, includes 
a collection of fundamental changes which already seem to 
meet some of these requirements and to move towards the 
goal of stabilizing real non-interest expenditure, but without 
being able to achieve this by 1986. 
The revenue measures adopted in the budget proposal pro-
vide for a reduction in personal income tax, adjusting the 
tax bands so as to neutralize inflation effects, for the re-
duction with effect from 1987 of the tax on invested profits, 
and also a reduction in the taxation of inheritances. They 
also comprise, on the other hand, substantial increases in 
social security contributions. In total, revenue as a percent-
age of GDP should be broadly maintained at its 1985 level, 
which is unlikely to be sufficient to keep the Treasury deficit 
for 1986 within the limit set earlier of LIT 110 million 
million ( 14,8 % of GDP). This target figure, which shows an 
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improvement of I percentage point compared to the prob-
able 1985 outturn, should be considered as a ceiling, taking 
into account the absolute need to stabilize the relative level 
of the debt by 1990. It is essential, in these circumstances, 
to ensure that it is not exceeded, either by making additional 
cuts in spending or, unless there is a spontaneous rise in tax 
yields, by appropriate tax increases. 
These guidelines with respect to pay and fiscal policy should 
be coupled with a monetary policy strict enough to stabilize 
the economy's M2 liquidity ratio by the end of 1986, after 
its rise in 1985. This measure would produce some slowdown 
in domestic demand, which should bear more heavily on 
consumption than on investment. The continuation of the 
real external balance would become positive again permit-
ting gross domestic product growth for the year of the order 
of 2,5 %, and the current account could begin to improve 
helped by the favourable movement of the terms of trade. 
At the same time, the rise in consumer prices should slow 
down very sharply to settle at an annual average of around 
6,5 %, approaching the Community average by the end of 
the year. 
If pursued with sufficient vigour, the twofold drive to control 
costs and the public deficit, on which substantially depends 
the ultimate return to more stable growth, leading to an 
expansion of productive capacity which would allow em-
ployment to increase, is likely to be fully in keeping with a 
cooperative strategy for growth. In order to fulfil its objec-
tives completely, this drive must nevertheless, and as far as 
possible, be supplemented by direct and immediate measures 
to bring down unemployment. Even if the problem is today 
no longer growing appreciably worse, because the increase 
in the labour force is tending to slow down, it is sufficiently 
worrying to require intensification in scale of the specific 
efforts undertaken to reduce it, be they to increase labour 
market adaptability, to adjust vocational training and re-
training schemes, or to promote directly jobs in the southern 
regions. As far as budgetary constraints permit, these efforts 
must also be extended to include measures to stimulate 
research. technological advance and the redeployment of 
energy so as to improve production structures and conse-
quently growth and employment prospects in the medium 
term. 
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Table 17 
Italy: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Private Compcnsa- Current General Money Unemploy- Employment 
current real dcflator consump- tauon trans- government supply mcntin 
prices terms tion per actions net lending M23 labour 
deflator employee account or borrowing force' 
· •;. change •;. change % change % change % change %GDP %GDP % change % % change 
1961-70 10,5 5,7 4,5 3,8 10,7 1,8 -2,3 13,3 5,2 -0,4 
1971-80 18,3 3,1 14,7 14,6 18,4 -0,2 -8,0 19,5 6,0 0,5 
1981 18,5 0,2 18,3 19,2 21,9 -2,3 -11,7 10,0 8,8 0,5 
1982 17,2 -0,5 17,8 17,1 17,3 -1,6 -12,7 18,0 8,7 (10,5) -0,2 
1983 13,6 -1,2 15,0 14,9 16,0 0,2 -12.4 12,3 9,9 (10,8) 0,1 
1984 13,6 2,6 10,7 11,1 12.1 -0,9 - 13,5 12,1 10,4 (12,0) 0,4 
1985 1 11,0 2,7 8,1 8,6 10,2 -1,7 -13,6 12,1 10,9 (12,6) 0,2 
19862 9,5 2,7 6,6 6.5 7,6 -1,1 -12,8 8,5 11,2 (13,1) 0,3 
Estimates of the Commission services. October 1985. 
Forecast of the Comminron services, October 1985. on the bu1s of present policies. 
J End of the year 
• Eurostat dcliniuon in purcnthcscs 
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Luxembourg 
In Luxembourg, economic activity contracted in 1985, be-
cause of the slowdown of steel production after the very 
sharp increase recorded last year. Nevertheless, because de-
mand for other products remained buoyant, total exports 
again advanced slightly. Domestic demand improved mark-
edly as a result of the upturn in private consumption and 
business investment, but investment by the public sector and 
in housing fell in real terms. Overall, gross domestic product 
will grow by around I, 7 % . The rise in consumer prices ( of 
3,2 % on average) weakened perceptibly. 
In 1986, the growth of gross domestic product is likely to 
remain fairly modest and should not go much above 1,5 %. 
A stabilization of activity in the steel industry is likely to be 
more than offset by the continuing vigorous advance in the 
other sectors. The greater dynamism of private consumption 
and the continuing buoyancy of investment, mainly by com-
panies, is likely to underpin domestic demand so that its 
growth rate will compare with this year's. The rate of in-
crease of consumer prices is likely to weaken further during 
the year. 
The financial position of steel enterprises has improved at 
the end of three years of considerable efforts. Consolidation 
of profitability in this sector is likely to involve further 
substantial costs for the central government budget in 1986, 
but this is not likely to hold back efforts to diversify the 
Luxembourg economy by developing and modernizing exist-
ing enterprises and introducing new industries. 
Restructuring must take place in an economic climate which 
favours investment. and this implies adequate corporate 
profitability. In this context, the wages trend plays a key 
role. The ending of specific measures to hold down wages 
in the steel industry. the restoration of indexation and the 
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granting of benefits outside the collecti~: agre:ments ~ould 
have an effect in other sectors very sens1t1ve to mternat1onal 
competition, reducing the country's attractiveness for new 
enterprises and impeding industrial diversi_ficatioi:i, . es-
pecially since wage moderation will continue m the neigh-
bouring countries. If the efforts made so far in the Grand 
Duchy were relaxed, the competitive position of companies 
would suffer. Participation in a cooperative strategy for 
growth and income moderation would, by contrast, have 
favourable effects on export prospects. 
In comparison with the other Community countries, unem-
ployment has remained relatively limited owing among other 
things to specific programmes to provide employment for 
workers in the steel industry. However, imbalances persist 
in relation to the qualifications of manual workers, and 
these could be remedied by looking for suitable methods of 
youth guidance and vocational training. By inc~ea_sing the 
attractiveness of various training arrangements m industry 
and by making working hours more flexible, company re-
quirements could also be better served. 
As a result of the spontaneous increase in revenue, combined 
with a continuing strict hold on central government expendi-
ture, it should be possible to keep the 1986 net budget 
surplus at the 1985 level (2 % of GDP). If this budget 
guideline is respected in 1986, it will again give some room 
for manoeuvre which would permit the rebuilding of invest-
ment fund reserves and, over the next few years, a further 
reduction in the burden of taxation and parafiscal charges 
on top of those proposed in the draft budget for 1986. It 
would also immediately give the authorities the finance 
needed for the planned capital expenditure, notably on roads 
and telecommunications infrastructure. Apart from the in-
trinsic advantages of such investment, in particular for the 
industrial restructuring policy, execution of these pro-
grammes would give appreciable support to the construction 
industry which is now facing a contraction in demand. 
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Table 18 
Luxembourg: Main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Private Compcn- Current General Mone) Uncmploy- Employment 
current real deflator consump- sation trans- government supply mcnt in 
prices terms uon per actions net lending M2 3 labour 
deflator employee account or borrowing force' 
% change •;. change •;. change 0/o change 0/o change %GDP %GDP % change %, % change 
1961-70 7,6 3,6 3,8 2.5 6,7 7,4 1.8 0,1 0.6 
1971-80 9,6 3.1 6.3 6,7 10,5 21.5 2.2 0,3 1,3 
1981 4,2 -2.6 7,0 7,8 9,0 32,0 -2.3 1,0 -0.6 
1982 9,9 0.3 9,6 10,5 6,0 40,8 -1,4 1,2 0,6 
1983 6,1 -2.2 8,5 9,1 6,6 31,0 0,0 1,5 -0,3 
1984' 9,2 3,2 5,8 6,7 4,2 33,2 1,5 1,7 0,5 
19852 6,0 1.7 4.2 3,7 4,9 32.1 2,1 1,7 0,6 
19862 6.4 1.3 5.0 3.5 5.6 30,8 1,9 1.6 0.4 
Estimates of the Commission services. October 1985. 
Forecast of the Commission services. October 1985. on the basis of present policies. 
End of the year. 
' 
Eurostat concq,t. 
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The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the rate of increase of economic activity 
in 1985 was comparable with that in 1984. Real gross dom-
estic product grew by around 2 %, mainly due to the fairly 
buoyant expansion of exports. However, despite the upturn 
in private consumption, domestic demand grew less sharply, 
mainly because of the weakness of demand for housing and 
the decline in public-sector investment. The moderation of 
labour costs in earlier years made it possible to improve the 
level of corporate profits. This was a favourable influence 
on the sharp upturn in corporate investment in plant and 
machinery, which started early in 1984; but the increase in 
building investment is still small. Overall, corporate invest-
ment remains below the late 1970s level, expressed as a 
percentage of gross domestic product ( I 0,0 % in 1983-85 
compared with 11,3 % in 1977-79). The number of unem-
ployed fell, as an annual average, and the unemployment 
rate declined from 14,2 % of the labour force in 1984 to 
13,5 %. Consumer price rises remained very moderate. The 
current account surplus increased further, to 4,4 % of gross 
domestic product. The resultant increase in the liquidity 
ratio has not been entirely offset by monetary policy, given 
the low inflation rate, and the still high general government 
borrowing requirement - 8 % of net national income. 
In 1986, the rate of increase of gross domestic product is 
not likely to accelerate greatly and will probably reach 
almost 2 %. Exports will go on expanding but at a somewhat 
lower rate. Domestic demand will, on the whole, become 
more buoyant. Private consumption will be boosted slightly 
by the rise in wages resulting from the new collective agree-
ments and the increase in employment. The improvement in 
company profitability and the higher capacity utilization are 
likely to favour the expansion of capital widening invest-
ment. particularly by companies in the exporting industries. 
But residential construction and public investment will again 
dip slightly. Inflation will fall to a very low rate, with lower 
import prices largely offsetting the effect of the somewhat 
faster rise in unit labour costs. The favourable movement 
of the terms of trade will produce a sharp rise in the current 
account surplus which could exceed 5 % of gross domestic 
product in 1986. Employment in manufacturing industry 
could well increase slightly for the second year in succession. 
In recent years. economic policy has chiefly concentrated on 
reducing the budget deficit and the level of taxation and 
social security contributions. improving company profita-
bility and making changes in working hours and employ-
ment opportunities: but the results obtained so far are still 
insutlicient in view of the seriousness of the problems. 
Economic policy in the Member States 
Industrial companies have been able to increase their profita-
bility appreciably, and subsequently, their investment. Com-
pany finances and competitiveness were improved by hold-
ing down the rise in labour costs, partly as a resul.t of a 
cut in social security contributions. However, the level of 
profitability now reached is still an argument in favour of a 
moderate increase in real wages. 
The prospects for 1986 are fairly encouraging in this respect. 
The 1982 agreements between labour and management se-
verely limited the rise in earnings, but the current decentrali-
zed negotiations at industry and company level will bring 
about a more substantial rise in wages overall. A general 
consensus should be sought and maintained on the priorities 
of collective agreements, in order to prevent them from 
deviating too sharply from productivity gains and so becom-
ing incompatible with the maintenance of competitiveness. 
The result of decentralizing wage negotiations is likely to be 
greater pay differentiation between sectors, and this could 
promote greater labour mobility, which would favour even 
more the wages structure and would curb the tendency for 
excessive rationalization investment. In the 1980s, many 
selective measures have been taken with the view to hold 
back the rise in unemployment: lower minimum wages, 
reduced parafiscal pressure, restricted unemployment com-
pensation, more part-time jobs, shorter working hours. and 
compensatory recruitment with no increase in labour costs. 
The greater flexibility of demand on the labour market. and 
the wage differentiation which may become possible under 
negotiations at industry and company level, are further 
improving the favourable recruitment climate. Until recently 
this policy had not had the expected effects on the level of 
employment, but there are signs of an improvement in 1985. 
Because of the upturn in activity and all the measures men-
tioned. employment has risen sufficiently to reduce unem-
ployment in 1985 somewhat. However. programmes to pro-
vide employment for young people should be expanded so 
as to give them easier access to the labour market from 
which they are often debarred by inadequate vocational 
training. 
Progress has been made in achieving a healthier public 
finance situation: the size of the public sector has been 
reduced markedly between 1982 and 1985 and the general 
government net cash deficit was cut from I O % to 8 % of 
net national income. In the same period the burden of taxes 
and social security contributions was reduced by some I % 
of net national income. The reduction of the deficit is not 
only due to the major effort in controlling expenditure. 
partly nullified. moreover. by overshoots on social security 
costs and debt interest charges but it stems also from the 
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rise in natural gas revenue. The marked drop forecast in gas 
revenue from 1986 on is likely to make it even more difficult 
to trim the budget deficit. So even by making the savings 
provided for by the government agreement, there is limited 
room in the draft 1986 budget for any further appreciable 
reduction in the borrowing requirement, although, care 
should be taken to bring the general government cash deficit 
down to under 8 % of net national income in 1986. Never-
theless, a temporary slowdown in the rate of reducing the 
general government borrowing requirement, is in present 
circumstances advisable in order to avoid the necessity of a 
deliberate increase in the tax burden or the introduction of 
Table 19 
The Netherlands: main economic aggregates. 1961-86 
GDP GDP GDP Pnvatc 
current real dcnator consump-
prices terms lion 
dcflator 
•,o change ~,. change •;. change •;. change 
1961-70 10,6 5.2 5,2 4,1 
1971-80 10.8 2,9 7,7 7,8 
1981 4,8 -0,6 5.4 6,3 
1982 4,5. -1.8 6,5 5,3 
1983 2,5 0,6 1,9 2,8 
19841 4,3 1.7 2,6 2,6 
19852 4,5 2.1 2,3 2.4 
19862 3.0 2,0 1.0 I. I 
Estomates of the Commossoon service,. October 1985. 
l 
Forecast or the C'omm1u1on ~rviccs. October 198S, on the hasts of prncnt pohc1cs. 
End of the year . 
• Eurostat concept. 
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additional measures which might hamper the recovery of 
corporate investment and private consumption. Faster 
growth stemming from the improved investment and export 
performance appears to be a necessary condition to create 
the financial room for manoeuvre so that purchasing power 
of the private households could be increased, notably by 
reducing social security contributions or direct taxes, with-
out in the long run jeopardizing the desirable stabilization 
of the rapidly increasing debt interest charges. This could 
provide a solution to the external surplus dilemma which 
cannot be solved in the present circumstances by simply 
relaxing the management of public finance. 
Compcnsa· Current General Money Unemploy- Employment 
uon trans- government supply mcntin 
per actions net lending M23 labour 
employee account or borrowing fortt' 
•10 change %GDP 0/, GDP •;. change •10 •;. change 
10,6 0,0 -0,8 9,1 1,0 1,2 
10,7 1,3 -1,5 10,8 4,5 0,2 
3,6 2,1 -5,5 5,3 8,8 -1,5 
5,6 2,8 -7,1 7,6 11,7 -2,5 
3.4 2,9 -6,5 10,5 14,0 -2,0 
0,6 4,1 -6,3 7.7 14,2 -0,5 
1,4 4,5 -5,9 8,0 13,2 0.4 
2.5 4,5 -6,5 6.5 13.0 0,6 
United Kingdom 
The upturn in the United Kingdom economy, which started 
in 1981, has lasted longer and been somewhat stronger than 
in the rest of the Community. Economic expansion has been 
accompanied since early 1983 by a rise in employment, but 
this has not been sufficient to allow any decline in the 
number of unemployed. The annual inflation rate appeared 
to have stabilized at around 5 % in 1983 and I 984, but 
inflation performance was threatened at the beginning of 
1985 by a steep depreciation in the sterling exchange rate 
(caused mainly by worries about the miners' strike, about 
oil prices and about the government's resolve to contain 
public spending and borrowing). The authorities reacted by 
raising interest rates sharply and by reaffirming a tight 
budgetary stance. Sterling subsequently strengthened, and 
the outlook for inflation over the next year is now improved. 
The higher sterling exchange rate, however, especially 
against other European currencies, together with unit wage 
costs rising noticeably faster in the United Kingdom than 
in the main competitor countries, has led to a deterioration 
in the international competitiveness of UK manufacturers, 
worsening prospects for exports in I 986. This factor contrib-
utes to the slower growth in real GDP expected for 1986, 
when the pattern of growth is likely to be strongly weighted 
towards private consumption. 
A rise in real GDP of almost 3 Y.z % is likely to be recorded 
for 1985, but adjusted for the distortions caused by the coal 
strike, which ended in March of this year. the growth rate 
is close to 2 Y.z %. Fuel imports have fallen back since the 
end of the strike and other imports have also grown at a 
slower rate than in I 984, while exports have gained market 
share in buoyant world trade, so that the external balance 
has contributed strongly to GDP growth. While real dispos-
able incomes have been growing fairly fast, as a result of a 
sustained increase in average earnings and boosted by tax 
cuts in the March 1985 budget and the recovery of miners' 
earnings. growth of private consumption has been moder-
ated hy a higher saving ratio probably induced by somewhat 
faster inflation and higher interest rates. In spite of con-
tinued strength in investment hy the enterprise sector (par-
ticularly in the first quarter. as some expenditure was 
brought forward to take advantage of tax arrangements), 
lower capital expenditure by the public sector and for resi-
dential purposes is likely to result in the slowest expansion 
of total fixed investment since the 1980-81 recession. Em-
ployment has continued to rise. hut this has led only to a 
slowing in the increase of unemployment. because many of 
those entering new jobs were not previously recorded as 
unemployed. 
Economic policy in the Member States 
In 1986 there is likely to be a significant shift in the pattern 
of demand from net exports towards private consumption. 
With average earnings in nominal terms likely to continue 
rising appreciably (by some 7 %), the slowing expected in 
consumer prices, mainly as a result of weak import prices 
following the appreciation this year of the sterling exchange 
rate, will boost real household incomes and, together with 
a possible fall in the saving ratio, will lead to faster growth 
of private consumers' expenditure in real terms. This could 
be further reinforced by a cut in personal taxation, as the 
outlook for the public finances suggests that, on the basis 
of the latest version of the medium-term financial strategy 
(MTFS), there will be some room for easing of taxation or 
increase in public expenditure ('fiscal adjustment'). Stronger 
consumer demand is likely to be offset, however, by weak 
public consumption and slower growth of exports resulting 
from the loss of competitiveness. Overall real GDP growth 
is expected to slow to a rate of about 2 %. There may be 
some slight improvement in the outlook for the unemploy-
ment count, particularly in view of measures already an-
nounced in the 1985 budget to extend youth training and 
community work for the long-term unemployed. 
Budgetary policy is aiming to bring general government 
expenditure and the public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR) back on to declining paths in relation to GDP, after 
the overshooting in 1984/85 mainly caused by the extra costs 
associated with the miners' strike. There are certain risks to 
the MTFS objectives in the form of upward pressure on 
spending from public sector pay awards and from increases 
in social security benefits and of a possible shortfall on 
revenue associated with North Sea oil output. These risks 
appear at present, however, to be largely covered for the 
current and next financial years by the contingency reserves, 
the level of which was increased in the 1985 budget. On 
balance it is still expected that the official projection for the 
PSBR of UKL 7 500 million in 1986/87 will allow some 
room for a fiscal adjustment to be introduced in the budget 
next spring, though the size of this adjustment is uncertain 
and could be well below the latest official estimate of UKL 
3 500 million. 
In view of the emerging weaker export and investment 
trends, which may well be prolonged, particularly if expan-
sion of the world economy slows down. there is a danger 
that slower growth could persist in the UK for two or three 
years. making any significant reduction of unemployment 
unlikely. In these circumstances. any margin of manoeuvre 
for supporting the economy via fiscal and interest rate policy 
should he fully used. In this respect it is important to note 
that the overall budgetary and public debt position of the 
UK now appears to be very robust. However. the extent to 
which fiscal policy can be used to strengthen activity depends 
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also on inflation performance. The acceleration of retail 
prices in the early months of this year was a temporary 
movement, resulting from a weakening of the exchange rate 
and the associated rise of interest rates, and has since been 
clearly reversed. Although the outlook is for an improved 
inflation performance in 1986, helped by falling import 
prices, domestic cost pressures are such that, in the absence 
of wage moderation bringing the increase in average earnings 
down from its present rate of 7-8 %, it will be difficult to 
bring the annual inflation rate below 5 % (the average rate 
since 1983) on a lasting basis. 
In using the available room for manoeuvre afforded for 
fiscal policy, priority should be given to those measures 
which are most beneficial to the supply side of the economy 
and the creation of employment. The main emphasis of the 
present government in respect of fiscal changes has been to 
lower the burden of personal income tax in order to increase 
incentives to work and for enterprise. While reflecting a 
long-term approach, this may already be in part responsible 
for the increase in employment since 1983. much of which 
has been accounted for by people newly entering or re-
entering the labour force. A further easing of income tax 
would be welcome. particularly if it were again used to raise 
substantially the tax threshold. since the provisions of the 
tax and social security systems still combine in some circum-
stances to set high effect;·,e marginal tax rates for those on 
low incomes. It is to be hoped that such anomalies will be 
eliminated in the reform of the social security system which 
is under discussion. Proposals for wide-ranging reform. pub-
lished in a Green Paper in June this year. emphasized the 
need to integrate the different social benefits and to concen-
trate benefits on those most in need. 
In 1986. when private consumption is in any case likely to 
be growing at a rapid rate (3-4 %). it would as usual be 
appropriate to consider other ways. in addition to income 
tax reduction, of using the fiscal room for manoeuvre. For 
instance. there would also be direct benefits to employment 
and inflation from reducing the cost of employment to 
enterprises. by lowering social contributions. There is also 
increasing evidence to support the argument that some of 
the room for manoeuvre should be used to finance public 
sector infrastructure investment, which is relatively labour-
intensive. The state of some of the infrastructure was de-
scribed earlier this year in a series of reports submitted by 
government departments for discussion in the framework of 
the National Economic Development Council. In view of 
these apparent deficiencies the situation should be carefully 
reviewed when spending plans are reformulated. 
Monetary developments over the last year have been a 
source of some concern. The various indicators of monetary 
conditions, in particular the monetary aggregates and the 
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exchange rate have often provided divergent information. 
In January, at a time when monetary growth was largely 
satisfactory, the sterling exchange rate came under consider-
able pressure and bank base rates which had fallen to below 
10 % in late 1984 were raised to 14 %. In recent months, 
however, despite high (nominal and real) interest rates, the 
rate of growth of the broad measure of money supply, 
sterling M3, has been well above the 5-9 % target range for 
1985/86 set out in the latest MTFS. Since March interest 
rates have declined slightly, but it is to be hoped that further 
reductions consistent with the monetary targets can be 
achieved in order to give support to economic activity. 
In spite of the downward movement in interest rates during 
1985, differentials with other countries have remained high 
and movements in sterling have at times been volatile. 
Within a period of 12 months from July 1984. the composite 
sterling exchange rate index first fell by more than I O % 
and subsequently appreciated by more than 15 %. Such 
movements can have undesirable effects on prices and re-
source allocation and generate uncertainties. In both the 
previous and current financial years, this has been particu-
larly evident with respect to the level of tax revenue linked 
to oil output, which depends upon both the dollar price of 
oil and the sterling-dollar exchange rate. Such experience 
illustrates the potential benefits of avoiding exchange rate 
overshooting that might be gained from full participation in 
the EMS. Given the greater convergence now existing in the 
economic policies of member countries. such a step should 
be given renewed consideration. 
1985 and 1986 are thought to be the years of peak output 
of North Sea oil and gas, this sector accounting for some 6-
7 % of total GDP and more than 20 % of visible exports. 
Even though the decline of oil output will occur at a much 
slower pace than its expansion ( I O years ago. output was 
negligible). the economy will have to adapt to this important 
change. The most direct impact on economic policy may be 
with respect to tax revenue associated with oil. which is 
estimated to account for 9 % of general government receipts 
in the present financial year. Offical projections indicate that 
this share will be roughly halved by 1988;89. The decline of 
the oil surplus in the balance of payments will also need to 
be offset by improvements in other areas. The continuing 
strengthening of the invisible account will contribute 
towards this. but any further worsening of the non-oil trade 
account (which has moved from small surplus in 1981 to 
sizeable deficit in 1985, estimated at almost 3 % of GDP) 
could lead to considerable imbalance. It is therefore essential 
that the performance of the non-oil economy, which has 
been growing since the recovery began in 1981 by less than 
2 Y.z % per annum on average. should strengthen. 
An improvement in the relations between the social partners 
could open the way to a significant reduction in the unem-
ployment level in the medium-term. The series of supply side 
measures taken in recent years, such as the changes relating 
to personal taxation have, together with the improved 
growth performance, contributed to the substantial increase 
in the employed labour force (by more than 600 OOO, or 
almost 3 %, from the first quarter of 1983 to the first quarter 
of 1985). Further measures with regard to the labour market 
are being prepared. It is to be hoped that, if employment 
growth can be maintained, jobs will be filled increasingly 
from the pool of unemployed and to a lesser extent than has 
so far been the case from new entrants to the labour force. 
Table 20 
United Kingdom: main economic aggregates, 1961-86 
<,l)p GDP liDP Pn\'atc 
current real dcflator consump-
prices' tcrms·1 tion 
dcflator 
0 O change o,~ change 0/o changc % change 
1961-70 7.1 2.8 4,2 3.9 
1971-80 16,2 1.9 14,0 13.3 
1981 10.4 - I.I 11. 7 11.2 
1982 9,1 1.9 7,1 8.3 
1983 8,6 3,3 5,1 5.1 
1984 6.2 1,8 4.4 5.1 
1985' 9.1 3.4 5.5 5.3 
19862 7,0 2,0 4,8 4,3 
I Es1tmatcs of the Commission scrvil"CS. October 1 l)S5 
' 
Ft.lrt."C.lSl of the C'omnu!l.s1on scn 11.·cs. October IQS5. on the has1s of present pol11.:u..-~. 
L,Jl('ndllurc measure at marlct pnl·cs . 
• Stcrhn1t MJ. end of the ~c.n 
I Euwstat dcfimuon 
Economic policy in the Member States 
The substantial productivity gains of the early 1980s have 
now slowed down. leading to an acceleration of unit labour 
costs, which is weakening the international competitive pos-
ition of enterprises and threatening to reverse the improving 
trend of company profitability. In order to sustain the 
growth of investment and thus expand the capacity of the 
economy (particularly as the role of oil declines), and hence 
potential employment, a further shift in relative factor re-
muneration towards returns on capital is needed. In conse-
quence, the growth of real wages, which for several years 
has been notably stronger than in other Member States. now 
needs to become much slower. 
Compcn- Current General Monc.·v l 'n<mploy- Employment 
sation balance gll\·Crnmcnt suppl)~ mcnt in 
per net lending labour 
employee or borrowing forcc5 
% change 0,0 GDP ', (il)p ' o change 
' 
~o change 
7.1 0,0 -0.6 5.9 1.9 0,2 
16,0 -0.6 -3,1 14.5 4.0 0.2 
13.5 2.7 -3,1 14.6 9.2 -3,9 
8,8 1.7 -2.3 10.6 10.6 -1.4 
8,8 I.I -3,6 10.3 11.6 -0.8 
5.5 0.3 -3,8 9,6 11.8 1.5 
7.7 I. I -3,3 I 1.3 12.0 I .I 
7.1 0.9 -2.8 8,6 11.7 0.9 
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1. The economic situation and short-term prospects 
1985 saw a marked slowdo11'n in world economic activity as the expansion decelerated in 
the USA and the recovery in other parts of the world was not strong enough to maintain 
the rate of growth of world trade achieved in 1984. Growth in industrial countries outside 
the USA as well as in developing countries was fairly stable and is forecast to remain so in 
1986. World trade is therefore expected to expand at approximately the same pace next 
year. In the Community a fa ll in the contribution to groll'th from external demand is likely 
to be compensated by a strengthening of domestic demand in 1986. The world recovery of 
the last few years has been accompanied by drastic changes in the balance of payments 
positions of important countries or regions, as well as by a further reduction of world 
inflation. Convergence of inflation rates in the Community has been further improved. 
1.1. Economic growth and the business cycle 
In 1985 growth has been regiona ll y more even although 
weaker than the year before. Following the boom of 1984 
economic activity slowed down in the USA, as generally 
expected, whereas it remained rather buoyant in other indus-
trialized countries. At the same time, developing countries 
as a whole have managed to pursue their recovery. The 
expansion of world trade , wh ile significantly slower than in 
1984, has been sustained by developments outside the USA . 
Similarly, the decline in interest rates has tended to mitigate 
the effects of the slowdown in the USA . 
The changes in the growth rate of wo rld ou tput over the 
last business cycle have been accompanied by significantly 
stronger fluctua tions in world trade (Graph 1. 1 ). The volume 
o f world trade actually declined in 1982, recovered sharp ly 
afterwards a nd slowed down aga in in 1985, when it is likely 
to have grown by 4 % % . A similar rate of expansion is 
forecast for 1986 (Table I. I). 
The gross na tio na l product of the industri a li zed countries 
including the Community is estimated to have grown in real 
terms by 4 % % in 1984 (Table 1.2). This performance -
the most fav urable since 1978 - is in part a reflection of 
the boom in economic acti vity in the U A a nd the rela ted 
export-led expansion in Japan a nd in Canada. Not surpri s-
ingly , growth in the industriali zed world dropped in 1985. 
For the group as a whole however thi s decelera tion was not 
ery ubstantial. being of the order of I % percentage points. 
In the U . the upswing which had sta rted in late 19 2 
peaked in the first ha lf of 1984. In the second half of that 
yea r output growth decelerated to 3 % % measured a t an 
annuai rate and slowed down further to about 1,5 % in the 
fir t ha lf of 1985. For the whole year 1985 therefore. a 
gr wth ra te of lightly above 2 % seems realistic. which 
implies some strengthening of economic activity in the e-
cond half of 1985. This trend is expected to continue in 1986 
and if reali zed , would result in an average GDP increase of 
2 % % next year. 
The deceleration of US growth is a reflection of the lessening 
st rength of the factors o n which the strong upturn was built. 
The effect of expansionary fiscal policy on domestic demand 
has increasingly leaked into imports, especially as a restric-
tive monetary policy through most of 1984 helped push the 
GRAPH 1.1 : World trade and output 
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dollar to a very high value. The effect of the I 98 I tax cuts 
on investment, which were largely delayed until 1984. when 
real business fixed investment grew 20 %. left little room in 
1985 for further substantial increases. The effects of earlier 
cuts in marginal tax rates on personal incomes are unlikely 
to provide an acceleration of the growth rate in 1985. 
Worries about the economic effects nf the federal budget 
deficit have given rise to a Congressional : v·'iet resolution 
that is expected to reduce it by about I % (,f GNP in fiscal 
Table I.I 
World imports of goods 
OECD 
of which 
EUR 
USA 
JAPAN 
Other OECD 
OPEC 
Developing countries 
excluding OPEC 
World 
Sourer: Commiu1on scr.'1cn. 
Table 1.2 
World output 1 
OECD 
of which 
EUR 
USA 
JAPAN 
Other OECD 
OPEC 
Developing countries 
excluding OPEC 
Other countries 
I GOP/GNP at constant prices. 
Sourer· Commission services. 
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1986. Fiscal policy will be less expansionary. Jn a reversal 
of the situation in the last few years. monetary policy has 
become cautiously expansionary and the narrower measures 
of money supply have recently increased beyond the upper 
limit of their target zones. This change of policy has led to 
lower interest rates and a weakening of the dollar exchange 
rate. 
In Japan the export-led recovery registered in 1984 is likely 
to persist in 1985. In 1986. the appreciation of the yen 
fH.''' t'nluge dumge o,·a preriow _reur at c·unstunt prius) 
198 I l9H:! 1983 1984 1985 1986 
-1.2 
--0.4 4,1 12.9 6.4 5,4 
-2,9 2.4 2.2 7.1 5.0 5,3 
2,5 -5.0 11,8 29.9 10.0 6,6 
-2.2 -0.5 0,3 10.7 3,0 4.7 
-0.2 1,1 -0,) 7.2 6.3 4.2 
27.4 5.5 -8,2 -9.0 -10.9 -4.0 
4,3 -6.1 -0.3 6.0 4.0 4.5 
1.8 - 1.0 ., ., 9.3 4.8 4.8 
( pern:ntaxe change m·er pre,·iow year at constant prias 1 
19SI 198~ 1983 1984 1985 1986 
1,6 -0.2 2,6 4,5 2.8 2.7 
-0,2 0.5 1.0 2,2 2.3 2.5 
3.4 -3.0 2.9 6.8 2.3 2.5 
4,2 3.0 3.0 5.7 5,0 4.2 
1,6 0,9 1,6 3.3 2.6 2,5 
-3,5 -4,0 -2.5 1.4 2,0 2,0 
3,0 0.9 0.8 3.9 2.9 3.8 
2.3 ., ., 3.1 3.9 3.6 3.7 
underway at the moment will probably reduce the competi-
tivity of Japanese exports. In spite of a significant expansion 
of private investment since 1983. the growth rate of internal 
demand was modest in 1985 and will remain so in 1986. 
This is partly a result of the strict fiscal policy stance adopted 
by the Japanese authorities in order to reduce, in the medium 
term, an already high level of indebtedness; at the same time 
private consumption has not accelerated and will probably 
remain sluggish with no significant reduction of the savings 
ratio. Recently the Japanese Government has adopted a 
number of measures to sustain internal demand; but this 
programme will not be sufficient to reduce significantly the 
surplus on the current balance of payments. This surplus 
which amounted to USD 35 OOO million in 1984 and is 
expected to reach almost USD 50 OOO million in 1985 could 
grow to approximatively USD 60 OOO million in 1986. 
The output of the developing countries (excluding OPEC) 
is forecast to grow by 3 % in 1985 and by 3 % % in 1986. 
Although still modest by historical standards - their growth 
rate averaged around 5 % % from the middle of the 1960s 
to the end of the 1970s - developing countries as a whole 
seem to have overcome the difficult period of the early 
1980s, when output per head was declining. They are now 
benefiting from the recovery in the industrialized countries, 
as well as from an improved financial position after severe 
Table 1.3 
Main components of demand, EUR 10 
1981 1982 198.1 
The economic situation and short-term prospects 
internal adjustments. The acceleration of output growth is 
concentrated in regions where the crisis was deepest. namely 
Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the newly 
industrialized countries of South-East Asia will cont.inue to 
enjoy distinctly faster growth than the rest. even allowing 
for the fact that their exports are particularly sensitive to 
the less bright prospects on the US market. 
In the Community, real gross domestic product has been 
growing since the first half of 1984 at an annual underlying 
rate of between 2 % and 2 % %, and is not forecast to move 
in a more expansionary way throughout 1986 (Table I .3). 
These prospects for 1986 imply an acceleration of private 
consumption ( + 2,7 %), which should benefit from faster 
growth of real disposable income of households ( + 2,3 % 
as against + 1,5 % in 1985). The slowdown of inflation is a 
major factor here, but substantial tax cuts announced in 
some countries will also tend to stimulate household spend-
ing in 1986. Real fixed investment as a whole is likely to 
accelerate ( + 3 % % after I % % in 1985), mainly because 
construction activity is likely to stabilize after the decline in 
1985. even though the prospects in the construction sector 
remain gloomy. It is expected that those factors which have 
stimulated investment in equipment since the start of the 
recovery should continue to operate much as before. 
1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 
II II II 
Percentage change over previous period at annual rate 
Private consumption 0.4 0,6 I.I 1.0 1.7 2.7 1.0 0.7 2.0 
Government consumption 1.6 I.I 1.6 1.2 1.2 I.I u 1.7 0,6 
Gross fixed capital formation -4.6 -1,6 0.0 :u 1.6 3,7 I.I 3.5 -1.4 
Stockhuilding (as% of GDP) -0.2 0,3 0.1 0.6 0,8 0.8 0,5 0.6 0.7 
Domestic demand -1.8 0,8 0,9 1.8 1.8 2.7 1.8 1.6 1.2 
Exports (goods and services) 3,8 1,5 1.9 7.2 6.4 4,6 7,6 7.9 6.7 
Imports (goods and services) -- 2.0 2,6 1.5 6,6 5.0 5.3 7.1 6.2 5.5 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices -0.2 0,5 1,0 'l 'l 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.3 1.7 
Contributions to percentage change of GDP1 
Domestic demand -0.5 0,2 1.0 u 
Change in stocks -1.4 0,6 -0.1 0.5 
Balance of trades in goods and services 1.7 -0,3 0.1 0.2 
1 l>...,cs nol nC'\.~"-lnl~ aJJ up 10 GOP ~.ro"th Jlh:' Ill aggrc~.atton of nallonal data wHh J11Tcrcnt hJsc ~cars_ 
s.,.,,n. (\,mm1ss1,1n scr,h.'\."S_ 
1.6 2.5 1,1 1.4 1.0 
0.2 0.1 0,7 0.2 0.2 
0.4 -0.2 0,1 0.5 0.4 
2.2 2,9 2.6 
2.1 0,8 0,7 
6,0 3.0 2.7 
0,7 0,8 0,9 
3,0 2,6 2.6 
4,2 4,8 4,6 
2,8 6,1 6,1 
3,4 2,2 2,0 
2.9 2,5 2.3 
0.1 0,0 0.3 
0.5 -0.3 -0.4 
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GRAPH 1.2: Compariloa ofreceatreco .y (-) widl pnriollloae(- -) 
88 
110 
tell 
106 
104 
102 
100 
106 
104 
102 
100 
112 
110 
108 
106 
104 
102 
100 
Orou domeltic product 
,'\ 
- 1982111 , ... _ ....
•• 1mn 
,/ 
I 
I 
_.1 
/ 
,-
,I 
ll 18 24 lO 36 42 48 
.... c=apilal expenditures I 
_ 19851 I 
--11n81 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_, 
- 6 0 6 12 18 
-6 6 12 18 '24 40 36 42 48 
"'' ............. ,---·--· __ ,_, _,_,_, __ ,_,_, 
82 84 85 86 
110 
108 
106 
104 
102 
100 
120 
115 
110 
105 
100 
115 
110 
105 
100 
6 
-6 0 Cl 
I I 
82 
Imports /' 
- 1983W , 
--19781 I I 
I 
I 
/~ 
,_ 
With export performance of the Community probably de-
clining and with stronger domestic demand inducing more 
imports, only a slight contribution to growth is to be ex-
pected from the net foreign balance in 1986. In total, growth 
in the EC is forecast to shift from external sources to internal 
demand in 1986. 
This is confirmed by the latest consumer and business survey 
results. Consumer confidence improved in most member 
countries after a rather subdued development in the first half 
of the year. In industry the assessment of total orderbooks 
continued to improve while the export expectations deterio-
rated somewhat. The recent survey results in construction 
also draw a less gloomy picture. 
This recovery in the Community has been lasting for nearly 
three years and in terms of previous experience the cycle 
would appear to have reached a mature stage. This raises 
the question of how long it is likely to continue. 
The present economic upturn in real gross domestic product 
until now has been significantly less buoyant than the pre-
vious one which began in the first quarter of 1977 (Graph 
1.2). On the other hand, several arguments support the 
view that the present upswing will go on longer than its 
predecessor, which was heavily influenced by the second oil 
shock. 
In the early quarters of the present upswing in total economic 
activity, the investment trend was still downwards. A con-
tinued decrease in real capital expenditure for more than 
two years, as has been the case in 1982 and 1983, is something 
which has never been observed in previous business cycles 
in the post-war period. In 1984 this downward trend finally 
came to a halt. Investment recovered further in 1985: its rate 
of growth of about 3 % has been rather modest, however, 
mainly because of the structural weakness of demand in the 
construction sector. 
This positive trend in total investment is likely to continue 
in 1986 and could also be a feature of the remaining years 
of the 1980s. Many of the basic conditions for a long-lasting 
expansionary phase of investment, particularly investment 
in equipment, are more favourable than they have been for 
a long time. 
First, inflationary tensions are not expected to increase in 
the near future: raw material and crude oil prices will prob-
ably be fairly weak. and the dollar less firm. thus dampening 
the trend of import prices. This environment will offer scope 
for bringing interest rates down further. Central banks in 
most Member States will not be confronted with increasing 
inflationary pressures - as had been the case in the third 
The economic situation and short-term prospects 
year of the previous two upswings - and will thus not be 
inclined to tighten monetary policy on this count. 
Second, profits have increased in most European companies 
in the course of the past couple of years. This positive trend 
is likely to continue because of relatively low cost pressures 
- thanks to the moderate wage increases and weak raw 
material prices which are expected. 
Third, the economic confidence of the business sector could 
thus further improve, which reinforces the argument for a 
continuation of an induced investment growth process. 
Fourth, there are also signs that new technologies (e.g. 
telecommunications, robotics, microelectronics. etc.) are in-
creasingly providing a stimulus to growth. A growing num-
ber of companies in Europe are perceiving the need to step 
up investment in these new technologies if they are not to 
run the risk of losing market shares. The increasing pro-
portion of this type of investment is a main feature of the 
latest investment survey results in European industry. 
All these considerations point to a phase of cyclical recovery 
in real investment which will be significantly longer-lasting 
than in the two previous upswings. particularly the one 
starting in 1977. The performance of investment is more 
likely to resemble that in the recovery period at the beginning 
of the 1970s, provided that the expected strength of private 
investment is not accompanied by a decrease in real public 
investment. 
-Real private consumption at present remains below the level 
that would have been implied if the path of previous cyclical 
upswings had been reproduced. The weak but accelerating 
increase in real disposable income will possibly give some 
boost to consumption beyond 1986. The current and ex-
pected improvement in real income. unlike that in the 1970s. 
is being brought about mainly by a decrease in the inflation 
rate and by tax cuts, rather than increases in wages and 
social transfers. As pointed out above. this implies that the 
upswing phase will not need to be cut short by a more 
restrictive future turn of economic policy. Even though 
private consumption will probably not pick up as strongly 
as in the 1977-79 upswing period. the cyclical pattern of 
previous upturns points to a significantly more buoyant 
development of private consumption in the next two years 
than in 1984 and 1985. 
Real exports are the only demand component which have 
so far increased more strongly in the present upswing than in 
the previous recovery. Even if export performance becomes 
somewhat weaker in 1986 it will still contribute to overall 
growth and should remain above the cyclical trend of the 
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previous recovery. This forecast relies on the assumption, 
however, that growth continues in the United States at a 
rate close to 2,5 % in real terms. 
The cyclical development of real public consumption has 
until now been significantly less strong than in the period 
1978/79; this will continue to be the case throughout 1986, 
according to Commission forecasts. 
To sum up, the present recovery has, in terms of the increase 
in aggregate economic activity, been less dynamic than the 
previous one. This gap will continue in 1986, but will narrow. 
However, the expected contribution of private investment 
as well as a more solid base for private consumption could 
help to extend the length of the present economic upswing 
beyond that of the previous recovery. 
A stable growth rate for the Community as a whole seems 
to be one of the characteristics of present trends. It is in fact 
difficult to find in the Community's history a three-year 
period with a comparable constancy of growth rates. The 
lack of marked nuctuations raises the question of how these 
actual growth rates compare to potential growth. Estimates 
of long-term potential growth in the Community indeed 
point to a rate of no more than 2 % % and possibly even 
less than that. Moreover, the rate of capacity utilization in 
industry is very close to tlie peak reached during the previous 
upswing (82,5 % in June compared with 84 % at the cyclical 
peak of 1979/80). This reinforces the argument that moder-
ation of the growth of real labour costs per capita and a 
strong increase in investment over a number of years are 
necessary if there is to be sufficient capacity for the Com-
munity economy to grow for a time at a rate substantially 
above the long-term potential rate so as to reduce unemploy-
ment significantly. 
Table 1.4 
World current external balances (including official transfers) 
1980 
Industrial countries 
of which 
EUR 
USA 
Japan 
OPEC 
Developing countries excluding OPEC 
Errors and omissions 
Sourn·. IMF and cstimatc'i ofC'ommission scrvu.."Cs. 
90 
-39 
-36 
7 
-10 
100 
23 
-19 
1.2. Changing pattern of external balances 
The recovery in world activity after the recession of the early 
1980s has been accompanied by - and was in fact to a large 
extent dependent on - unprecedented changes in balance 
of payments positions throughout the world. 
The accumulation of current account deficits or the disap-
pearance of surpluses in the first half of the 1980s was 
concentrated on the USA and the OPEC countries (Table 
1.4) The corresponding improvements are mainly renected 
in the balances of Japan, the non-oil developing countries 
and the Community. 
Various factors have been at the root of the newly emerging 
world balance of payments structure. They are related to 
long-term economic trends, cyclical developments, economic 
policy and developments in individual markets. They may 
be summarized as follows. 
(i) The assessment of prospects for economic growth in 
different parts of the world has been changing, inducing a 
stronger demand for investment in physical assets in some 
parts than in others. This is possibly one of the factors 
behind the growth of the US external deficit. 
(ii) The enormous increase in the US budget deficit had to 
be financed mainly by external resources - which up to a 
point proved to be rather easy, given the confidence of 
foreign investors in the US dollar and interest differentials 
favourable to the dollar. 
(iii) Differences in the timing of the growth cycle among 
industrialized countries have tended to raise external deficits 
( in USD 'OOO million) 
1981 1981 198J 19!4 1985 1986 
3 2 -65 -70 -55 
-12 -9 2 3 12 18 
11 -4 -36 - 102 -126 -131 
6 8 22 35 49 59 
35 -23 -17 -6 -12 -27 
-91 -76 -54 -20 -25 -30 
-56 -96 -64 -66 -78 -81 
in the leading countries and to create surpluses in the lagging 
ones. This e!Tect has also contributed to the US deficit. 
(iv) Related to this, desynchronized adjustment policies have 
enforced improvements of the balance of payments in some 
parts of the world, while necessarily affecting the rest in-
versely. This factor played a major role in the improvement 
of developing countries' external accounts. It has also been 
at the root of the swing in the Community's balance from 
an important deficit in the early 1980s to a moderate surplus. 
(v) Changes in relative prices and shifts in demand - notably 
for oil - have particularly worsened the external position 
of OPEC countries, with corresponding improvements in 
the position of Japan, Europe and the non-oil developing 
countries. 
A major part of the shifts in the external balances called for 
by the factors listed above has been achieved through 
changes in exchange rates, which in turn led to substantial 
modifications in the price competitiveness of individual 
countries or groups of countries. The pattern of external 
balances which has emerged from these trends presents the 
following picture for the various countries. 
The US deficit on current account is likely to be about USO 
126 OOO million in 1985 and will not decline in 1986 according 
to the forecast ( USO 130 OOO million). The appreciation of 
the US dollar in real terms against the yen, the ECU and 
other currencies since ! 980 has led to a sharp deterioration 
in US price competitiveness. As a consequence, the export 
performance of the USA has been poor. In 1984 and 1985 
taken together, American exports of goods probably grew 
by 10 percentage points less than average imports of US 
customers (weighted by their shares in US exports, Table 
1.5). In 1986, when the competitive position of the USA 
will start to improve somewhat on given exchange rate 
assumptions. the USA may start to regain some of the 
lost market share. The geographical pattern of US export 
markets has also been detrimental to US exports. A large 
part about 20 % -- of US exports is directed towards 
Latin America. which suffered from the rigorous policies of 
retrenchment being applied in a number of countries in that 
region. Apart from the weak export performance. American 
import ,·olumes have increased roughly three times as fast 
as n:al domestic demand both in 1984 and 1985. 
The swing in the OPEC current account of over USO 
100 OOO millil)n since 1980. producing a delicit. resulted 
from a decline or a fl)ughly comparable magnitude in these 
countries· oil export earnings. This large drop in oil revenues 
was due not l)n)y to the fall in world oil consumption and 
the associated downward adjustment in oil prices but also 
The economic situation and short-term prospects 
to continued increases m the market shares of other oil 
exporting countries. 
A salient feature of balance of payments developm~nts in 
the past three years has been the marked improvement in 
the current account position of the developing countries 
excluding OPEC. Over a period of only four years ( 1981-
84) the three largest debtor countries -- Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico - succeeded in reducing their combined current 
account deficit by USO 30 OOO million. This adjustment was 
mainly achieved by a substantial reduction of imports. Also 
important, however, is the fact that non-oil developing 
countries taken as a group managed to strengthen their 
export earnings. Indeed, the combination of expanding im-
port demand in industrial countries - in particular in the 
USA - and the temporary upward movement in non-oil 
commodity prices resulted in a signific,u11 increase in their 
earnings. All in all, non-oil developing countries thus suc-
ceeded in reducing their current account deficit as a percent-
age of gross national product (GNP) from a peak of 5,1 % 
in 1981 to 2,2 % in 1984 (World Bank figures). However, 
the differences between individual countries and regions 
remain substantial, and the corresponding figure for Africa 
is as high as 9,4 % for 1984. 
The reduction of the current account deficits of developing 
countries has eased the debt crisis. but not prevented a 
further, albeit slower, rise of overall external debt, which 
amounted to almost USO 900 OOO million or 34 % of GNP 
in 1984 for all developing countries taken together. On 
average. about 20 % of export earnings have been used for 
debt servicing in the period 1982 to 1984 - significantly 
more than in the 1970s. The recent decline of US interest 
rates is likely to have lowered this ratio somewhat. 
The Community's current account, which was practically 
balanced in 1983 and 1984. is forecast to show a surplus of 
around USO 12 OOO million in 1985 and to improve further 
next year. 
The improvement of the Community's current balance is 
attributable in part to the slow growth of import volume 
and the fall in the dollar price of oil (Graph 1.3). The 
quantity of imported oil fell by around 20 %. and the oil 
import bill from around USO 120 OOO million in 1980 to 
USO 80 OOO million in 1985 (in ECU terms the oil bill 
actually showed a rise over this period). 
The Community's overall export performance presents a 
mixed picture. The gains in market share seem modest com-
pared with the favourable price situation for the Com-
munity's exports. In fact. between 1981 and 1984 the Com-
munity's average index of producer and wholesale pnces. 
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expressed in a common currency, rose by 4 percentage points 
per year less than the average of the corresponding price 
index of the Community's competitors on world markets 
and some further improvement has occurred in 1985. Yet 
gains in market share were limited to around I % in 1984 
and 1985 (Table 1.5). One reason behind this relatively 
poor performance may be the pricing policies of European 
exporters when competitiveness was improving. The avail-
able evidence - inter alia relatively strong rises in export 
prices in ECU terms - suggests that exporters rather than 
expanding their sales in volume terms preferred to restore 
their profit margins, perhaps partly because they did not 
expect the favourable si tuation to last long enough to justify 
the efforts associated with the establishment of a durable 
increa e in market shares. 
The relative weights of the factor which have contributed 
to the improvement of the Community's external balance 
over the last couple of years are now likely to change. The 
cyclical impact of slow growth in Europe compared with 
North America and Japan, which was particularly important 
in I 983 and I 984, is weakening. As a result, for the first 
time since I 982 the volume changes of exports and imports 
will in 1986 probably make no positive contribution to the 
overall balance. The expected further increase in the surplus 
will instead be accountrd for by improving terms of trade, 
reflecting partly both a decline in oil prices in dollar terms 
and the as5umed decline of the dollar exchange rate against 
the ECU . 
All in all, the Community's overall external balance has 
improved significantly during the recovery and is likely to 
con tinue to do so in 1986. However, the position of some 
individual member countries remains vulnerable . 
Table 1.5 
Export markets and ex ports of goods 
EUR 1 
USA 
Japan 
OPEC 
Developing countries excluding OPEC 
1 Intra .ind extra EC. 
Soun t omm1ss1on services. 
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1984 
6,8 
8.1 
12.8 
5,2 
9.9 
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1.3. Continuing disinflation 
The recovery of the world economy in the last couple of years 
has been accompanied by a general process of disinflation in 
the industrialized countries. The fact that price increases are 
continuing to slow down even after the recovery has been 
( percrntagr change o ,·u pre,·iou.s year at con.Jtant prices ) 
c,port marlcts exports 
1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 
5,0 5, 1 7.7 6,4 4,8 
4,9 5.2 5.2 -1,9 8,6 
7.7 6.0 15.4 7.5 5,1 
1.0 2,8 1.9 - 8,9 -6,1 
4.7 5.1 11.3 5.5 4,5 
underway for nearly three years is one of the characteristics 
of the present business cycle. Average inflation, as measured 
by the deflator of private consumption, has fallen in the 
industrialized countries from 12 % in 1980, the previous 
peak, to around 4 % in 1985. By contrast, the general price 
level is still rising fast in developing countries as a group. 
Due to hyperinflation in some Latin American countries the 
average annual rate even increased, from 27 % to 35 % in 
this period, according to IMF sources. 
The fall in inflation since I 980 is common to all the major 
industrial countries. The extent of this slowdown, expressed 
as the reduction in inflation in percentage points, was great-
est in the countries with the highest inflation five years ago. 
Consequently, convergence has improved not only within 
the Community, but also worldwide. Two principal common 
factors may be identified behind this parallelism: oil prices 
expressed in USO have dropped substantially since 1981, 
and, more fundamentally, monetary policy in industrialized 
countries has followed a course orientated towards price 
stability. 
Consumer price inflation in the USA declined from 10,3 % 
to 3 % % between 1980 and 1985, and in the Community 
from 12,8 % to 5,2 % (Table 1.6). While this is a decline of 
Table 1.6 
Consumer prices I 
1973/60 
B 3,7 
DK 6,1 
D 3,6 
GR 3,5 
F 4,7 
IRL 6.3 
I 4.8 
L 3.0 
NL 5,8 
UK 4,8 
EUR 4.5 
Memo: 
EUR-standard 
deviationl 1.3 
USA 3.1 
Japan3 5.9 
I Dcnator or pn,atc consumption. 
l Wciahtcd. 
) 1973i6S. 
Sc>t1r1v: Commission services. 
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similar size, the circumstances in which it has been achieved 
differ in one important respect: European currencies de-
preciated effectively by 8 % per annum over this period, 
while the dollar's effective exchange rate rose by the same 
average annual rate. The EC thus managed to redu'ce in-
flation despite continuous upward pressure on import prices. 
This aspect will be further discussed later. 
The rate of consumer price increases in the USA stabilized 
at some 3 % in 1984; it is expected to accelerate somewhat 
in I 986. In the Community the slowdown is still going on 
this year and probably next, when the rate of increase is 
forecast to be 3,9 % . In each of the six years from 1981 to 
1986 the average inflation rate in the Community will thus 
have fallen by between one and two percentage points and 
is expected to be lower in 1986 than the US rate. 
The basic factor behind this achievement. as mentioned. has 
to be seen in the stance of monetary policies. The increase 
in the money supply on the wider definition slowed down 
from an annual average of 12 Y.z % in 1975/80 to 9 % in 
1980/85, and is decelerating further. The decline of oil prices 
has to some extent to be attributed to microeconomic factors 
like the dismantling of monopolistic power on the supply 
side or to the efforts of consumers to economize in oil 
( pt•rccnlagt• change m·t•r praiaus .l'('ar) 
19SI 7J 1982 19SJ 1984 198~ 1986 
7.8 7.5 7,0 6,2 4.9 3.2 
10.7 11.0 7,2 6,6 4.2 I. 7 
5.0 4,8 2,9 2.5 2.1 1.5 
16,8 21.1 19,5 18.1 18.0 16.0 
11.1 11.2 9.4 7.3 5.8 4.0 
16.1 16.0 9,7 8.5 5.7 5.3 
17.8 17,1 14.9 11.1 8.6 6,5 
7,5 9.7 8.4 6.7 3.7 3.5 
6.3 5.4 2.9 2,6 2.4 I. I 
15.1 8,3 5.1 5,1 5.3 4.3 
11.3 9.8 7,6 6,2 5.2 3.9 
4.4 4.6 4.6 3.4 2.8 2.5 
8.0 5,9 3.7 3,2 3.2 4.4 
8.5 2.8 1.6 2.1 1.9 1.4 
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consumption; however, these structural changes on the oil 
markets would probably not have been brought about with-
out adequate macroeconomic policies. 
Most of the decline of oil prices from the peak reached in 
I 980/8 I has taken place in several steps of sharp falls within 
a few months; the last of these steps can be located in the 
summer of I 985, with the oil import prices paid by the 
Community reaching less than USO 27 in the autumn of 
I 985 (Graph I .4). Prices on the spot market, although under-
going stronger fluctuations, show a similar trend. Given 
the appreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis the Community 
currencies, oil has nevertheless become considerably more 
expensive in Europe over the last two years . The Com-
munity's import price in ECU has risen at an annual rate 
of 9 % between the summer of I 983 and the autumn of 1985. 
This compares to an annual increase in ECU of Community 
export prices of manufactures over the same period of ap-
proximately 6 Y.z %, which implies a significant terms-of-
trade improvement for oil producers in their trade with 
Europe. Non-oil commodity prices in USO rose throughout 
1983, but much of this increase was later reversed in 1984 
and 1985. However, the annual increase of non-oil com-
modity prices in ECU between end 1982 and the autumn of 
1985 - some 8 % - is similar to the increase in oil-prices. 
Even in 1984 when world economic activity was buoyant, 
oil consumption increased very moderately. Given that econ-
omic growth in the industrialized countries will be lower 
in I 985 and 1986 and assuming that the trend towards a 
decreasing proportion of oil consumption to GDP continues, 
world oil demand is expected- to decline further this year 
and next. With monopolistic quantity re trictions on the 
supply side possibly further weakening, oil price in USO 
are likely to decline further . By contra t, non-oil commodity 
price in USO may show some hardening next year, partly 
due to foreseeable reduction in upplie of ome agricultural 
commodities, but also a a reaction to the assumed weaken-
ing of the US dollar. 
Significant change in relative prices were not confined to 
the prices of oil or other raw material but have been a 
general feature of the disinflation proce s, affecting not only 
market for goods and ervice but also those for labour and 
capital. Domestically, the relative prices of the productive 
services supplied by the different factors of production have 
undergone noticeable change , entailing important adjust-
ments in the distribution of incomes. In fact , the deflater of 
GDP, which measures the price of total value-added in the 
economy, has, in every year since I 980, risen more trongly 
than unit labour costs (Table 1.7). This process will probably 
continue next year . Domestic co t pressure thu are unlikely 
to stop the disinflation process in the Community in the 
near future . 
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Table 1.7 
Deflator of GDP, of imports and unit labour costs 
(% change 011 prei•ious year, £UR'. /973-86 ) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
De!lator of GDP 10,6 10,1 7,8 5,7 5.1 4,1 
De!lator of Imports (G + S) 15,5 7,8 4,8 8,4 4.9 - 0,4 
Unit Labour Costs (whole economy) 11.3 9,0 7,1 4.7 4.2 3.4 
Sourer : Commission services. 
Table 1.8 
Origin of increases in final expenditure prices, EUR and USA 
(Co11tributio11 i11 percentage points to total increase ) 
lmports 1 Unit Indirect Other Toto! 
labour taxes factors 
Total of which 2 of which costs nf a·h1ch 
export nominal real domestic 
pnccs clTcctivc exchange factors 3 
of exchange rat.c 
suppliers rate 
( I ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EU R-10 
198 1-83 0,9 - 0,3 1,2 1,1 3,6 0.9 2.5 7.9 7.1 
1984 1.1 0,0 1,1 0.9 1.6 0.5 2.1 5,3 4.4 
1985 0,6 0,3 0,3 0.3 1,6 0,4 1.9 4.5 3.9 
1986 - 0.3 0.6 - 0,9 - 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.2 2.5 2.7 
USA 
1981-83 - OJ 0.6 - 0.9 -0,9 3.5 0.5 2. 1 5,8 6.1 
1984 - 0.2 0.4 - 0,7 -0.6 1.2 0.1 2.1 2.6 2.8 
1985 0.5 - 0,1 - 0.5 - 0.5 2.3 0.4 0,8 2,6 3.2 
1986 0.5 - 0.4 0,9 0.9 1.9 0.4 1,6 4, 1 3.6 
I E,cludmg mtra•Commumty trade. 
l The brcaldown of the total import pncc into Its components 1s based on geomctnc rather than anthmct1c ,.-.c~1ghts . The elements therefore do not nactl) sum to the total import contnbullon. 
I Total. c,clud1ng the effect of export pnccs of suppliers and real c,changc rate change . The factors ~ere regarded as addlll\C 
Sourrts Eurostat and Comm1ss1on service For methods uSC'd, sec technical anne, o/ Euro{N'an Economy. o 18 . November 1983 
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On the external side, the prospects for a reduction in in-
nation are improving. Community import prices for goods 
and services are forecast to decline by Y.i % in ECU terms 
in 1986. This outlook is based on the assumption of a 
weakening US dollar and on the development of oil markets 
described above. 
The relative inOation performance of the Community and 
the USA in recent years can to a large extent be ascribed to 
movements of exchange rates. To analyse in more detail the 
origins of price increases, it is convenient to concentrate on 
the deOator of total final expenditure at market prices (the 
sum of GDP at market prices and imports of goods and 
services). This deOator is estimated to have risen by 4,5 % 
in 1985 for the Community as a whole (Table 1.8, column 
8). Of this increase, 0,6 percentage points are accounted for 
by increases in import prices (column I). and the rest by 
the internal cost elements which are reOected in the GDP 
deOator: unit labour costs contributed 1.6 points, indirect 
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taxes 0,4 points, and other factors, including profits and 
income from property, 1,9 points. In contrast to the USA, 
the contribution to price increases from imports has been 
positive in the Community in every year since 1981. 
A change in import prices is either due to higher export 
prices of suppliers at given exchange rates, or to a change 
in the exchange rate at given export prices, or to a combi-
nation of both. The relevant point in the present context is 
the contribution to price increases from movements in real-
exchange rates, which for the Community on average added 
about I percentage point per year to the increase in the 
total final expenditure deflator in the first half of the 1980s 
(column 4). The reverse holds for the USA. The change in 
the total final expenditure deflator less the estimated impact 
of the change in the real effective exchange rate yields the 
'true' impact from domestic cost factors. The latter has, in 
fact, been much more similar for the EC and the USA than 
has the change in the total expenditure deflator (column 9). 
2. The labour market 
A fa vourable characteristic of the Community labour market in 1985 has been the increase, 
albeit modest, in the demand fo r labour. However, the accompany ing increase in the supply 
of labour has prevented any substantial improvement in the unemployment rate, which has 
again increased slightly and is unlikely to stabili:e until next year. The position of young 
people and women appears to have deteriorated furth er. and long-term unemployment' seems 
to be on the increase. The recent sloll'down in real wages growth has been maintained and 
is likely to continue in 1986. As a result , wages and salaries have again fallen slightly as a 
proportion of GDP. If a longer-term view is taken , however, the improvement in the profits 
trend seems to be due to the capital-deepening process brought about by distortions in f actor 
prices. A number of fa ctors suggest that unemployment in Europe is to a large extent the 
result of an excessive increase in real 11•ages and salaries and has been aggravated by a lack 
of adaptability on the labour market. As the process of reducing unemployment is necessarily 
long, governments are compelled to pursue a two-pronged strategy : ll'age moderation and 
the pursuit of greater flexibility accompanied by special shorter-term measures aimed at 
specifh· categories of the unemployed. 
2.1. Labour-market trends and prospects 
T he employme nt trend in 1984 a nd 1985 has exceeded the 
es tima tes given in the las t a nnua l economic review : dema nd 
fo r la bo ur increased by 0,3 % in 1984 and should increase 
by 0.4 % thi s yea r (T a ble 2. 1 ). An even greater improvement 
is likely in 1986, when employment is expected to increase 
by 0.5 %. This improvement contrasts with the job losses 
reco rded during the period from 1973 to 1983 (0 ,2 % on 
average per yea r), a nd in pa rtic ul a r a t the beginning o f this 
decade. a ltho ugh it still renec ts a low elas ticit y o f employ-
ment with respec t to GDP. M os t member co untries have 
expe rienced a be tter tha n ex pec ted employment trend in 
1984 a nd 1985 . a ltho ugh o nl y Denma rk and the United 
Kingdo m have reco rded a n appreciable growth in employ-
ment , which is likely to continue in 1986. In most Member 
Sta tes. the im provement is ren ected ma inly in a reve rsa l of 
trend. wi th the losses o f recent yea rs giving way to modera te 
grow th . In 1986. o nl y F rance is likely to sec a further 
cont rac tion of employment. 
T he upturn in econo mic ac t1 v1ty has led to a ri se in the 
labo ur fo rce. wh ich has a lso exceeded the es timates made a 
year ago (Table 2.2). T he la bo ur supply has shown a rela-
tively high cyclica l elast icit y : while. a t the beginn ing of th is 
decade. the com bined effec t of 'discouraged workers· a nd 
po licies for reg ulati ng supply bro ught abo ut a dec line in the 
labou r force and a fa ll in ac tiv ity rates . the eco no mic upt urn 
seems t have pu t an end to tha t process. In 1985 the 
labour fo rce should increase at a sligh tly fas ter ra te tha n the 
population or working age at Commu nity level. A particu-
larly marked rise in the activity rate is expected in Denmark 
and the United Kingdom ; F ra nce sho uld be the o nl y country 
in which the acti vit y ra te will continue to fa ll. 
As a result o f the simulta neous upturn in dema nd fo r a nd 
the suppl y o f labour, the unemployment rate is no t showing 
any rea l improvement (T a ble 2.3 ). Despite a fa ll in the 
leve l due mainly to revi sed s ta ti stica l da ta (in Belgium . the 
etherla nds, Italy and F ra nce), the unemployment ra te is 
Table 2.1 
Employment in the Communit)' 
Occup1.:tl popu\;1tion 
Chang.: a::, 0 o 
19s, n 1984 1985 1 1986l 
{avcr.igc) 
B - 0.4 0.4 0.4 0,3 
DK 0.2 2.2 "2.0 1.6 
D - 0.7 0.0 0.6 1,3 
GR 0.3 - 0.2 0.8 0. 1 
F 0.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 - 0.7 
IR L 0.6 - 0.9 - 0.3 0.6 
I 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 
L 0.5 0.5 0.6 0,4 
L - 0.4 - 0.5 0.4 0,6 
UK - 0.5 1.5 I. I 0.9 
EU R 10 - 0.2 O.J 0.4 0.5 
I E~t1m.1lt.:'!> 
FtH\."\.:,1,1, 
Sour,, ·\ Fuflht.ll .inJ (\,mm1,,1on ":n11..·i:, 
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Table 2.2 
Labour force and population of working age in the Community 
Cn·ilian labour force 
198311973 1984 1985 1 
B 0,7 0.2 0.4 
DK3 1,2 1,9 1.0 
D 0,1 -0.1 0,7 
GR 1,6 0.1 1,0 
F 0,8 0,6 -0,1 
IRL 1,5 0.4 1,0 
I 1,1 0,9 0,8 
L 0,6 0,5 0,6 
NL 1,7 0.8 0.1 
UK 0,4 1,6 1.4 
EUR 10 0.7 0.7 0.7 
I F.,umalcs 
' 
Forecasts. 
l Tolal labour force. 
Sourcl' Eurm,tat "'"d Comm1\s10n scrvu:cs. 
likely to increase further between 1984 and 1985, from 
10,9 % to 11, I %. It should then stabilize at that level and 
remain unchanged in 1986. As in recent years. the relative 
position of the Jess-favoured categories has again deterio-
rated. According to the latest estimates, the unemployment 
rate for women in 1985 will have increased more rapidly 
than that for men and is likely to exceed 12 % on average 
for the year. Similarly, the gap between the unemployment 
rate for the young and that for adults is likely to continue 
to widen. Finally, long-term unemployment is continuing to 
increase as a proportion of total un~mployment. Although 
the data on this subject are not recent. they indicate a trend 
which will be very difficult to reverse. Between 1981 and 
1983, the number of persons out of work for more than a 
year increased from 33 % to 47 % of the total. while more 
recent information covering a number of countries confirms 
that this trend is intensifying. 
Denmark is the only member country likely to sec a fall in 
its unemployment rate in 1985. In Belgium and the Nether-
lands the unemployment rate should also drop, but changes 
in statistics make comparisons with previous years difficult. 
In the other countries the improved economic climate will 
be reflected in 1985 in a slowdown-varying from one coun-
try to another-in the rise in unemployment. In 1986, how-
ever, unemployment is likely to fall in Denmark, Belgium, 
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( Change as % ) 
Population of working age 
1986' 1983/1973 1984 1985 1 19862 
0,3 0,6 0.2 0,2 0,2 
),0 0,5 0.4 0,4 0,4 
0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,5 
0,9 1,1 1,2 0,8 0,8 
-0,3 0,9 1,0 0,7 0,4 
),0 (1,6) 
0,8 0,7 1,4 0,8 0,6 
0,3 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 
1,2 1,3 1.2 J,O 0,7 
0,6 0,5 0.5 0.0 0,1 
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.5 0,4 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. 
Table 2.3 
Unemployment rates3 
197.1 19S, 1984 1985 1 1986' 
B (2.8) 14.3 14.5 13.84 13.4 
DK (0.8) 10.2 9.8 9.1 8.6 
D 1.0 8.4 8.4 8.4 8,0 
GR 7.9 8.1 8.3 9.0 
F 1.8 8.8 9.9 10.7 10.9 
IRL 5.6 14.9 16.3 17.1 17.4 
I 4.9 10,9 11.9 12.6 13.1 
L 0.0 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 
NL 3.1 14.3 14,2 13.24 13.0 
UK (2.2) 11.6 11.8 12.0 11.7 
EUR 10 2.4 10.4 10.9 I I.I II.! 
1 Estimates. 
Forecasts. 
1 Unemployed population as %, of civilian labour fon."C: Eurostal definition (for Greece. 
national defin1t1on and Commission staff csumall.~l. 
" Owing to a chungc in 1hc definition of registered unemployed. 1985 and 1984 figures are 
not comparahlc-
Sc•urn• Eunl\lat and Commission scr\'iccs. 
2.2. Wage costs and income distribution 
The wage moderation already observed during 1984 should 
continue in 1985 and 1986 (Table 2.4). Thus, as was the case 
in 1984, a growth in real wages less than that of productivity 
should result in a slight reduction in the wage share in GDP; 
thus bringing it down to a level close to that of 1973. 
Developments estimated for 1985, as well as those expected 
for 1986, show several positive signs: a certain amount of 
wage moderation, a slight increase in employment and in 
the share of profits in GDP. Nevertheless this progress is 
quite modest when compared with the opposite movements 
registered during the previous decade. 
As is shown in Table 2.4 the period which followed the 
first oil crisis showed the following trends : a rise in labour 
Table 2.4 
Wage costs, productivity and incon\e distribution 1 
1983/197)2 1984 
s w Q E s w 
B 0,9 3,0 2, 1 - 0,4 - 0.4 0,9 
DK - 0,3 1,0 1,4 0,2 -2.4 - 0.8 
D - 0,4 1,9 2,3 - 0,7 - 1,2 1,3 
GR 1,5 3,5 2,0 0.3 - 1,6 1,2 
F 0,7 3,0 2,3 0,0 - 1,5 1,0 
IRL 0.1 3,0 3,0 0,6 -2,4 2,8 
1 0,7 1,9 1,2 0,6 - 0,8 1,3 
L 2,0 2,0 - 0,1 0,5 - 4,1 - 1,5 
NL - 0,5 1,4 1,8 - 0,4 - 4,1 - 1,9 
UK - 0,4 1,2 1,6 - 0,5 0,7 1,0 
EU R 10 0,1 2.0 1,9 - 0,2 - 1.0 0,9 
I Key : 
s • adjusted share of labour income 
W • real wages (dcna,or: GDP prices) 
Q • labour produc1ivi1y (GDP al consl:l nl nrnrkcl prices per person employed) 
E • employment. 
Average annuul change. 
SourC'f' · ommission services. 
However, a rever al of this trend seems to have begun since 
1982 principally due to the wage moderation shown since 
then . Job losse were first limited and have been replaced, 
in 1984 and 1985 by a slight increase in employment, pro-
ductivity has grown faster than real wages, the share of 
profits has increased in parallel with a recovery, a lbeit very 
mode t, in the rate of return . There is reason to believe that 
thi development is common to all Community countries. 
although with ertain time-lags, in particular in ofar a 
The labour market 
productivity somewhat below the growth in real wages, a 
slight slide in the share of profits in GDP, and a reduction 
in employment. · Studies have additionally shown that these 
trends have been accompanied by increases in the capital/ 
labour ratio in the production process. 1 The interconnection 
of these elements reveals the underlying process: a too rapid 
development of real wages has encouraged investment in 
rationalization. Thus the stock of capital per person has 
grown, as well as labour productivity, but the gains in 
productivity have been obtained from the suppression of 
jobs. At the same time profitability has declined, influencing 
negatively the rate of investment and growth . In this context 
the modest nature of the fall in the share of profits in GDP 
was mainly due to greater capital productivity and went 
hand in hand with a substantial fall in the rate of return on 
investment. 
Changl.' as% 
1985 1986 
Q E s w Q E s w Q E 
1.3 0,4 - 0,5 1.0 1.5 0.4 - 1,6 - 0.2 1.4 0,3 
1.6 2,2 - 0.6 - 0,2 0,3 2,0 - 1,3 0.2 1,6 1,6 
2.6 0,0 - 0,6 1,1 1,6 0,6 - 0,2 1.9 2,1 1,3 
2.9 - 0,2 0,5 1.6 1,1 0,8 :.... 3,5 -2,7 0,8 0,1 
2.6 - 1,0 -2,0 0,1 2,2 - 1,0 - 1,9 0,6 2,6 -0,7 
5.3 - 0,9 - 1.8 0,9 2,7 - 0.3 - 1,0 0.6 1,7 0,6 
2. 1 0.4 - 0,6 1.9 2,4 0.2 - 1.5 0,9 2.4 0.3 
2.7 0.5 - 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.6 - 0.3 0.7 1,0 0,4 
2.3 - 0.5 -2.6 - 0.9 1.7 0.4 0. 1 1.4 1.3 0.6 
0.3 1.5 - 0.1 2. 1 2.2 I. I 1.0 2.1 I. I 0.9 
1.9 0.3 - 0.9 1.0 1.9 0.4 - 0.7 1.2 1.9 0,5 
commitment to the adjustment process is concerned. Thus 
in 1985 two countries - France and Ireland - should sti ll 
register a fall in employment and obtain thereby an ex post 
increase in productivity and the majority of other Member 
States will only record very limited rises in employment. 
Indeed, only in Denmark have wage developments been such 
1 Sec E11ropea11 Eco110111y o 20. July I 984. 
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a to permit. in the context of the recovery in activity, the 
achievement of an appreciable and simultaneous increase in 
the share of profits. of productivity and employment. It 
appears in consequence that in the other countrie the adjust-
ment which has begun should be continued and intensified 
for several years . 
2.3. The nature of the di equilibrium on the labour 
market 
The rise in the capital/ labour ratio in conjunction with a fall 
in employment has made it necessary to look at the trend 
of relative factor prices and its role in the di equilibrium on 
the labour market. Although the data in this field should be 
interpreted with some caution. exi ting studie are unani-
mous in recording an increase in the relative price of Jabour 
in a number of European countries during the 1970s. Even 
on the basis or the most conservative hypotheses concerning 
the elasticity of substitu tion. there wou ld seem to be no 
doubt that such a trend ha contributed to the proces of 
factor substitution by promoting rationalization. 
This is confirmed by the strains affecting production ca-
pacity. As Graph 2.2 shows. despite the high and growing 
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rate of unemployment and a still modest economic upturn, 
the level of capacity utilization in manufacturing industry is 
continuing to rise and to approach the maximum rate of 
operation currently possible. This may of course be ex-
plained partly by the rapid retirement of capital s tock, but 
it is also due to types of investment which are increasing 
capital intensity at the expense of an expansion of pro-
duction capactiy. 
While the divergence of factor costs has been accentuated 
by the fairly widespread post-war tendency to subsidize 
investment, a growth in wages and salaries which has been 
too rapid has undoubtedly played a part too. Graph 2.3 
seems to suggest that those Member States which have been 
most successful in controlling the rise in real wages are also 
those which have recorded the lowest rise in unemployment. 
There seems to be a close correlation between the growth in 
the average rate of unemployment between 1973 and 1985 
(shown along the x axis) and the slowdown in the rise in 
real wages per employee during the same period (shown 
along they axis and defined as the difTerence in their average 
growth in the periods 1960-73 and 1974-85). Clearly, this 
approach may have limited validi ty owing to its partial 
nature, and final conclusions cannot therefore be drawn 
from it. evertheless, it makes it possible to build up a 
picture in which the va rious elements form a coherent whole. 
It is also interesting to note tha t the rela tive positions of the 
countries in the graph correspond very la rgely to the findings 
of a number of empirica l studies on the rigidity of real wages 
in Europe and the United Sta tes.2 
It should be added that other research carrried out by the 
Commission staff with a view to establishing a model for 
economic rela tionships (Compact model, see Chapter 6) 
seems to confirm tha t a major component of unemployment 
in Europe is due to the rea l wage gap . This modelling exercise 
introduces the concept of potentia l employment, which is 
defined as the maximum level of employment which firms 
are prepared to absorb assuming full use of existing capacity 
at the given rela tive factor prices. The model estimates show 
a considerable widening since 1973 in the gap between the 
labour fo rce and potential employment and , therefore, an 
apprecia ble increase in the proportion of unemployment 
which is likely to persist even under boom conditions. (This 
ca tegory of unemployment is frequently referred to as 'classi-
ca l' unemployment as opposed to cyclica l or ' Keynesian' 
unemployment , which renects the difference between poten-
ti al and actual employment) .3 
A number of studies in this fi eld all conclude tha t a substan-
tia l proportion of European unemployment is due to a too 
rapid growth in rea l wages and sa la ries, to reduced capita l 
accumula tion ca used by the fa ll in profitability and to grea ter 
capital intensity. While the recent and anticipated trend in 
rea l wages, as shown in Table 2.4, points to an improved 
outlook. it would seem clea r that wage modera tion must be 
maintained for a number of yea rs if the trend which has 
persisted fo r a decade is to be reversed. 
A final point should be made concerning rea l wages and 
sa la ries. T his rela tes to the impac t of non-wage labour costs, 
which have tended to increase in practi ca lly a ll Member 
States and which now stand a t between 20 % and 40 % of 
Sec. fo r example. J . Sachs. A Report 011 Real Wages 1111d U11e111ploy111e11t 
i11 the OECD. Brookings Paper on Economic Activity. l. 1983: J .R . 
Artus. A11 Empirical Eral1111tio11 of the Diseq11ilihri11111 Real Wage Hypoth-
esis. tM F ta IT Papers. I:! . 1984. 
1 The result s of the Compact model on the extension of Keynesian and 
classical unemployment arc as follows: 
nemployment rate% of the civilian labour force 
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 8.1 84 85 
las.s1cnl uncm-
plO)Ol<nl 
(includ ing fnc-
llonal) 1.3 2.6 .1.4 4.4 4.5 4.8 5 . .1 5.8 6.0 7.4 8. 1 8.5 9.0 
Kt', nc\rnn uncm-
pJO.)OlCOl 0.1 0 . .1 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.6 O,::! 0 . .1 1.9 ::!.::! :!.::! ::! • .l :!.I 
SouriC' Comm1ss1on Scr,u..'C's 
The Jabour market 
gross wage costs: This trend, like the taxa tion of income 
from employment , has created a growing gap between gross 
and net wages and is making wage negotiations more diffi-
cult. 
GRAPH 2.3: Uaemployment and real waps 
Deceleration 
The strictly macroeconomic view, which describes unem-
ployment as 'classica l' and/or ' Keynesian' , does no t, how-
ever, provide an explana tion fo r certain aspects of the 
phenomenon which are no t connected with rea l wages or 
wi th the trend of demand . The steady and uninterrupted 
increase in unemployment since the first oil shock , which 
contrasts sharply wi th the rela tive stability of the previous 
decade, also renects the di ffic ult y encountered by the Euro-
pean labour market in adapt ing, a t microeconomic level, to 
the changes required by technological progress, to change 
in the demographic pro fi le of labour supply and to the 
constraints impo ed by slackening growth on Sta te action 
in the socia l fie ld . Over the last I O yea r . the rise in unem-
ployment has thus been rei nforced by other fac tors. such as 
deficiencies in respect of training and conversion, lack of 
mobility. the existence of barriers to en try. limita tions on 
part-time work ing, the bureaucratization of busi ness man-
agement. obstacles to self-e mployment and the creation of 
new fi rms, excessive administra tive rules and regula tions 
(particularly in the ervice sector), rigidities in the organiza-
IOI 
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tion of labour. These rigidities have generally added to the 
frictional/structural component of unemployment. Al-
though it is difficult to quantify their impact, it would be 
wrong to underestimate their role when considering macro-
economic policies. 
2.4. Employment policies 
The nature and scale of unemployment make it necessary 
to adopt a two-pronged strategy aimed, in the medium term, 
at eliminating disequilibria and, in the shorter term, at 
alleviating the unemployment burden. It is important to 
retain this conceptual distinction in order to ensure that 
certain provisional and limited measures are not misinter-
preted as being lasting responses to the unemployment prob-
lem. Whereas the main ingredients of the first part of the 
strategy are sustainable wage moderation and the pursuit of 
greater labour-market flexibility, the second part has several 
aspects, including specific measures for some of the long-
term unemployed and for unskilled young people, training 
programmes and programmes for placing people in employ-
ment. 
On the wage moderation front, most countries are already 
benefiting from the posi•:ve trend noted recently. This is the 
case, for example, in Denmark, ltaly and Belgium. Measures 
to reduce non-wage costs have also been adopted or are 
envisaged, for example in the United Kingdom and Den-
mark, but the acute financial position of social security 
systems is at the moment restricting the scope for action in 
this field. 
As wage trends are brought more tightly under control, 
greater flexibility in the wage-determination process also 
seems desirable. This would be facilitated if, for example. 
arrangements for remunerating workers which were better 
tailored to the situation of individual firms were devised, 
notably schemes for linking remuneration to a firm's results 
or profit-sharing schemes. Such models are not new in Eu-
rope but they centred on the ideas of worker participation 
in management (industrial democracy) and promotion of 
asset ownership for workers. Their scope has remained lim-
ited. While firms generally regarded them as a means of 
avoiding tax, workers did not show a particular interest in 
them. 
The idea of profit sharing would be revived in a quite 
different form. The model taken is the system in Japan. 
where workers receive two or three times a year a bonus 
that may make up a significant portion of their total earn-
ings. While being an important factor in wage bargaining. 
the bonus is still the most immediate and most effective way 
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of alleviating the pressure of wage costs when this proves 
necessary. At the beginning of the 1980s, profit-sharing 
schemes were introduced in the United States in industries 
particularly exposed to competition and these were even 
granted preferential tax treatment in some states. There is 
no denying that such institutional innovations call for a joint 
effort by the two sides of industry, and especially a consensus 
on the need for greater flexibility. 
Turning to another aspect of flexibility, the reorganization 
of working time, discussions between the two sides of indus-
try are already at an advanced stage, particularly in certain 
Member States such as France, the Netherlands and Ger-
many. The progress made in this connection should be 
emphasized. First, a growing number of workers are display-
ing a willingness to work shorter hours. even without any 
wage compensation or with only partial compensation. This 
is one of the initial findings of a survey carried out by 
the Commission departments.4 Second, the rather simplistic 
assumption that a reduction in working time and a rise in 
employment are two sides of the same coin is now increas-
ingly jettisoned in favour of a more rigorous approach that 
also looks at the period of capital utilization. The process 
of capital-deepening has brought about a fall in the pro-
ductivity of capital. Now a reduction in working time that 
further undermines capital productivity will clearly be dam-
aging to employment, investment and growth. It will provide 
a boost to employment only if the existing capital stock is 
used more intensively or its productivity increases. In other 
words, a reduction in working time must be accompanied 
by its reorganization. the aim being a longer period of 
utilization of plant and machinery. Consequently, over and 
above a national agreement. it is at the level of the individual 
firm that the two sides of industry must devise ways and 
means of ensuring that a reduction in working time has ~ 
beneficial impact on employment. 
In tandem with the efforts of the two sides of industry, 
government action is needed to enhance flexibility by ridding 
legislation of a number of anachronisms and constraints 
hampering job creation. Not only should rules and regu-
lations that discourage recruitment be revised, but steps 
should also be taken to encourage the formation of busi-
nesses. to streamline procedures and to reduce the adminis-
trative burden on firms. Several governments have already 
set about tackling these problems but results remain limited 
up to now. 
Since wage moderation, a more smoothly functioning labour 
market, institutional innovations and greater dynamism will 
probably make for a lasting recovery in employment only 
4 See Supplement B - No 10 of European Economy. October 1985. 
in the medi um term, Member States are faced with the 
immediate need to devise measures to help employment 
directly. Moreover, technological progress and lengthening 
periods of unemployment may exclude some older workers 
from the employment market once and for all. Most Member 
States have a lready shown themselves to be very active on 
thi s front , bringing into effect a whole array of measures . 
These include, in particular, early retirement schemes, which 
make for a tempora ry contraction in the supply of Jabour 
and one way of resolving the problem posed by the Jack of 
sk ill s on the part of older workers. They may, however, have 
to be refashioned in the future to take account of the 
constraints that an ageing population will impose on retire-
ment schemes. 
Second , in virtually all Member States, vocational training 
has attracted special attention . While not disregarding wor-
kers who need to be taught new skills, it has generally 
focused on school-leavers and on preparing them for an 
occupation . It transpired that the dif!iculties they encoun-
tered on entering the labour market also had to do with 
the mismatch between the education received by them and 
technological change and with the fact that a 'gap' of a sort 
needed to be filled between the classroom and the factory. 
A a result , a number of countries have rightly come up 
with combined study-at-school/ in-firm training schemes in 
which, in recognition of the part the private sector has to 
play in thi s field , they have asked firms to participate. Insofar 
a the task of vocational training is, at the moment, to rectify 
the mismatch between the supply of and the demand for 
different sk ills, a more thorough reform of education system 
i clearly needed, possibly extending down as far as primary 
eduction in some cases. 
Lastly, programmes to assist disadvantaged categories of 
unemployed people, especially the long-term unemployed, 
The labour market 
have been drawn up or are being studied in a number of 
Member States. They provide employment, in the form of 
community work , for a limited period. The work schemes 
are identified by intermediary agencies which, in . return 
for subsidies , take on unemployed individuals and remain 
responsible for the work to be carried out. Although the 
private sector has been asked to participate, most of the 
agencies are public-sector agencies. Programmes of this kind 
have already been launched in the United Kingdom (Com-
munity programmes), Germany ('Arbeitsbeschaffungsmal3-
nahmen'- ABM) and France ('Travail d 'utilite collective') 
and are being studied in Italy . 
These measures are of indisputable interest from several 
points of view : the target group can be clearly defined; the 
substitution effects can be limited provided the schemes 
involve work that would not otherwise be carried out; the 
range of goods and services available to the community 
can be diversified ; more generally, finding employment for 
people who have been out of work for a long time corre-
sponds to a fundamenta l social priority. It would though be 
a mistake to exaggerate the usefulness of such measures. 
This is because, by their very nature, the jobs created do not 
substantially improve the prospects of those concerned and 
are unlikely to make it easier for them to take up normal 
employment. The longer-term effect on unemployment may, 
therefore, be fair ly weak, not to mention the fact that, from 
a strictly economic viewpoint, the value of their output is 
probably lower than if those same individuals were employed 
in the private sector. It is important to stress the temporary 
nature of such measures, at least where the most ' usable' 
individuals, notably young people, are concerned. However, 
even with a less depressed employment market, these meas-
ures would still be important if they were confined to particu-
larly disadvantaged groups such as the handicapped and 
those in poor health . 
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3. Investment in the Community 
3.1. Investment trends 
The recovery in investment in the Community beginning in 1984 has continued through 1985 
and should result in capital formation attaining its 1980 level during 1986. The long-term 
trend in investment nevertheless, gives cause for concern, with investment as a proportion 
of GDP declining by some four to five percentage points over the period 1970-85. More 
particularly the considerable decline in capital formation during 1980-83 has led to a 
situation in 1985 where increased output has quickly resulted in capacity utilization returning 
to the level of its last peak of 1979. Although the share of profits in output has recovered 
and wage moderation has taken place in the last three years, the rate of return on invested 
capital still remains low. Jn addition policy measures towards investment have tended to 
encourage the process of capital-deepening. labour-saving investment and have accentuated 
the decline in profitability. There is also cause for concern at a sectoral level. The investment 
performance in industries which have experienced relatively strong demand over the 1970-
85 period ( and which are more teclmological/y orientated) has been particularly poor in 
the Community compared to the USA and Japan. 
The recovery in investment which started at a Community 
level in 1984 has continued through 1985 at a slightly faster 
rate. According to the investment survey carried out in 
the spring of 1985 (see Table 3.1), industrial investment is 
expected to increase in '985 in the Community as a whole 
by 16 % in current prices, corresponding to some 11 % in 
real terms. This is an improvement over the estimate for 
1984 which indicated a rise of 7 % in real terms ( 12 % 
nominally). The strongest performers in the industrial sur-
veys in 1984 were Denmark and the Netherlands and this 
has largely continued into 1985. Industrial investment was 
also consistently above the Community average in 1984 in 
the UK and to some extent Belgium while latterly, survey 
data indicate significant recoveries in Greece and Italy. Such 
Table 3.1 
Industrial investment survey - all branches 
(% change ,n \'a/ue in relation to preceding year J 
Year lo which data relate 1981 1982 198J 1984 1985 
Ma1Th, Oct March/ Oct' March Oct/ March, Oct/ March/ 
0Jte or ,ur ... C'y Apnl Nov Apnl No\· Apnl Nov April Nov April 
1981 1981 1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984 1985 
B(a) +8 +4 -3 + 10 -9 -2 + 15 + 13 12 
DK(a) +II +II + 18 +60 +54 +40 
D +2 0 0 -2 +2 +2 +5 +4 +14 
GR(a) +38 -6 -19 -35 -49 +23 -1 +82 
F +S -I +5 +4 +6 +6 +20 + 18 + 13 
IRL(a) -22 -16 +54 0 -18 -24 + 13 -31 +9 
I + 17 +14 +6 +8 +7 +3 +II +6 + 14 
L(b) -8 + 17 +24 +I -39 + 13 -22 +4 +4 
NL -2 -6 +6 -I +II +6 +29 +27 +24 
UK(a) -6 -11 +5 -4 +2 +2 + 16 + 16 + 15 
EUR IO(c) +3 -I +3 +I +4 +3 + 13 + 12 + 16 
(a) Excludmtt the cx1ra1.·t1vc mdu,1nc~. 
lh) Excludintt thc cxtracll\C. llh,:ludrntz, cncrlly and ~atcr. 
(c) Wc1t1htcd total of the .iho,c (not g1\cn when data .ire ~ubstantially mcomplctc). 
Sourc ,. Euror,c.m Community hu'irnc" \llr\C)'\ 
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a trend in investment would mean that gross fixed capital 
formation (for the whole economy) in the Community would 
return to its 1980 level during 1986 (see Graph 3. 1). 
Although investment is presently increasing, the consider-
able drop in capital formation in the period 1980-83 (see 
Graph 3. 1) has meant that capacity utilization is already, in 
the third quarter of 1985, back to the level of the last peak 
in 1979 (82,5 % in the Community), see Table 3.2. Evidence 
suggests that capacity utilization is particularly high relative 
to normal levels in Denmark a nd the Netherlands, and 
this despite fai rly substantial investment growth in these 
countries, of late . The poor investment performance in the 
early 1980s would not be quite so alarming particularly for 
employment prospects if it reflected the choice by firms of 
less capital intensive technology, a partial undoing of the 
earlier period of capital deepening. The fact that capacity 
utiliza tion levels have recently become quite high lends sup-
port to the hypothesis that not only has capital decumulation 
taken place but that there has been no real reversal of the 
capital-deepening process. Graph 3.1 shows, for example 
that despite the recovery in GDP from 1983 and investment 
from 1984 onwards, the number of employees in manufac-
Investment in the Community 
turing continues to decline and is only expected to stabilize 
in 1986. 
Table 3.2 
Capacity utilization 
Capacity utilization rates us % 1984/83 growth rates 
Last high Ind ustrial 
point Jui) output 
1979-80 1983 1984 1985 
B 79.1 75,7 76, 1 78,2 5.3 
D 86,0 77,0 80,3 85,0 3,0 
F 85,3 81.6 81,9 83. 1 3, 1 
IRL 68,1 58,1 61,5 72,7 13, 1 
I 77,3 70,1 71,9 74,3 3. 1 
L 83,0 70.7 77,7 82,6 
NL 83,0 79,5 82,4 84,0 5.2 
UK 87,6 76,7 82,4 87.4 0.9 
EUR 8 83 ,9 77.2 79,9 82,5 2,8 
Sourct' : Eurof'('"" Economy. Supplement B. No 8/9. August September I 985. and Commission 
departments . 
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A breakdown between investment in plant and machinery, 
and construction is given in Table 3.3. The decline in equip-
ment (- 1,6 % annual average) and construction (- 3,7 %) 
capital formation during the period I 980-83 has been fol-
lowed by respective recoveries of 4, I % and 0,9 % for I 983 
through 1985. The increase in equipment investment is par-
ticularly marked in Denmark ( + 15,0 %), Belgium ( + 9,5 %) 
and the Netherlands ( + 7,3 %) while substantial improve-
ments have taken place in the UK ( + 5,5 %) and Germany 
( + 5,2 %). With respect to the UK it is possible that meas-
ures announced in the March I 984 budget involving a grad-
ual decline in investment depreciation allowances (see sec-
tion 3.3) over a three-year period has led to a bringing 
forward of investment plans. UK survey data indicate that 
investment in the financial year I 984/85 was higher than 
expected from the April I 984 survey, but clearly this is not 
necessarily attributable to the budget measures. 
Both Denmark ( + 8,9 %) and the UK ( + 5,4 %) have also 
experienced substantial increases in construction while some 
countries have merely seen an ending of the considerable 
decline in this sector during the I 980-83 period. For example 
Belgium, as a result of fiscal incentives, has experienced a 
turnaround from - I 1,3 % (1980-83 annual average) to 
+ I ,0 % (I 983-85 annual average) while the decline in the 
Netherlands has similarly been arrested (from - 6, 7 % to 
0 %). 
Table 3.3 
Gross fixed capital formation by main component average annual 
growth rates 
1980/70 1983/80 1985/83 
PM' C' PM' C' PM' C' 
B +2,1 +2.1 -I.I -11,3 +9,5 + 1,0 
DK +2,2 -2,0 +3,0 -7,6 + 15,0 +8,9 
D +2,5 +1,1 -1,0 -2,7 +5,2 +0,2 
GR +4,2 + 1,3 -2,3 -4,8 +3,0 -2,4 
F +4,9 + 1,0 -0,1 -2,0 + 1,4 -3,9 
IRL +6,4 +5,3 + 1,8 -2.6 
I +3,8 -0,6 -4,6 -1.5 +4,0 + 1.5 
L +3,1 +2,8 +3,8 -2.1 
NL + 1,3 0 -1,5 -6,7 +7,3 0 
UK +2,2 -1,2 -1.6 + 1.6 + 5,5 +5,4 
EUR 10 +3,1 +0,4 -1,6 -3.7 +4,1 +0,9 
I PM • plan1 and machinery 
C • construction. 
Note: Shure in gross fhed capilul formDtion is us follows: 
1970 PM 36.5% C 61.2% 
1985 PM 44.3% C 50.2% 
Sourer: Eurostut + Commission services. 
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Despite the recent improved investment situation in the 
Community the performance over the last 15 years is rather 
depressing. For many Community countries investment as 
a proportion of GDP reached an historical low-point in 
1983, although for some (France, Ireland and Greece) this 
ratio still appears to be declining. Only in countries where 
the investment performance has been reasonably strong of 
late (e.g. Denmark, the UK, Germany) has this investment 
ratio remained on a par with that in I 980, and is even here 
still significantly below that of I 970. This apparent long-
term decline in the investment ratio (all economic sectors) 
for Community countries is demonstrated in Table 3.4 which 
shows that the Community average has dropped from 
24,0 % to I 9,5 %. In Japan the investment share has fallen 
from 34,5 % ( I 970) to an estimated 30,6 % in I 985. In the 
USA where the investment performance has been particu-
larly strong since I 983 the ratio for 1985 (20, 7 % ) stands 
above that for 1970 (19,5 %). Capital formation in the USA 
is estimated to have increased at an impressive I 2,2 % in 
annual terms over the period J 983-85 and while the generous 
depreciation allowances instituted in 1980 have contributed 
to this rise another major reason has been the sizeable 
growth in output. It is clearly not too easy to distinguish 
between the effect on investment due to investment incen-
tives and that due to output or accelerator effects (see 
also later for a discussion of profitability). The improved 
investment depreciation allowances instituted in the USA in 
1982 and rescinded slightly in 1983 lowered user cost by 
about I 'l.z percentage points for equipment and about two-
thirds of a point for structures. although if allowance is 
made for the reduction in inflation this lowering is more 
than offset by the increase in the real cost of debt. What is 
true is that the improved depreciation allowances compen-
sated for part of the increase in interest rates in the USA. 
Investment in both non-residential structures and equipment 
increased dramatically in 1984 ( 15,6 % and 2 I ,5 % annual 
real increases respectively) though the latter began to decline 
in the first quarter of I 985. It is not just over the last three 
years that the USA has out-performed the Community. 
Table 3.4 shows that while investment in the Community 
grew at 5, 7 % per annum during the period 1960-70, the 
rate dropped to I ,6 % during I 970-80 (below the USA and 
Japan), and declined significantly during 1980-83. - 2.0 % 
compared with +0,7 % for USA and + 1,9 % for Japan. 
The Jong-term trend in investment share for industry only 
is shown in Graph 3.2 for EUR 7. USA and Japan. Here 
the story is a similar one to that for the whole economy. 
The investment share has increased in the USA over the 
period 1970-85 while in the Community it has declined, and 
in Japan too, although from a much higher level. A more 
structural analysis of investment demonstrates that indus-
trial sectors have not been equally affected by this slowdown 
Table 3.4 
Investment trends by country 1 
Investment as •/o of GDP 
1970 1980 1985 
B 23,4 21,3 17,3 
DK 25,4 18,8 18,5 
D 25,7 22,8 21,1 
GR 29,2 24,2 19,6 
F 23,5 21,9 19,5 
IRL 25,8 28,7 23,6 
I 24,1 19,8 18,7 
L 27,0 26,2 21,4 
NL 26,9 21,0 18,8 
UK 21,0 18,0 18,7 
EUR 10 24,0 21,0 19,5 
USA 19,5 18,5 20,7 
Japan 34,5 32,0 30,6 
I Total economy. 
Source : ommission services. 
in investment. Graph 3.3 shows the evolution of investment 
in the Community for sectors which have globally (i .e. for 
the US, Japa nese and Community economies combined) 
experienced strong, medium and weak demand over the 
period 1973-82. 1 The first sectoral group includes electrical 
goods and electronics, data processing, pharmaceutical 
products a nd chemicals, the second , food industries, paper, 
tran port, rubber, plastic and industrial machines a nd the 
third tex tiles, steel, a nd building ma teri a ls. It is in the first 
sectoral group, where there is generally a high technological 
content in goods, tha t the poor performance of the Com-
munity i most ma rked . The annual growth of capital forma-
tion for the whole of industry was 4,5 % points below tha t 
of the U A a nd 3,7 points less than Japan but for the high 
demand sector the short fa ll was 6,6 points and 6 points 
respectively . 
The group of ectors that have experienced average demand 
have fo llowed a simi lar growth path o f investment to tha t 
of the and Japan except tha t the Community ha been 
more adver ely affected by the second oil shock. Finally for 
the weak demand ectors inve tment in the Community has 
declined continua ll y over the 1973-82 period in contras t to 
the U A and Japan where inve tment ha genera ll y been 
maintained. 
more detailed analysis is contained in Chapter 2 of E11ropt'tlll Economy 
o 2 . cptembcr 19 5. 
Investment in the Community 
Rate of change of investment 
1970;60 1980/70 1983/80 1985/83 
5,8 2,2 -8, 1 4,4 
7,0 - 0,7 -4,2 11 ,7 
4,5 1,6 -2,0 1,6 
9,3 2,8 -3,6 -2,9 
7,8 2,9 -1,2 - 1, 1 
9,8 5,6 -2,3 - 0,4 
5,1 1,1 -3,3 4,0 
3,5 2,8 -7,1 0,0 
6,8 0,4 - 4,9 2,9 
5, 1 0,4 0,6 5,2 
5,7 1,6 - 2,0 2,2 
4, 1 2,4 0,7 12,2 
15,5 4, 1 1,9 5,4 
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GRAPH 3.3: Trend In poa fixed capital formadoa for lndaltry (1975 prices) 
181) 
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The level of investment, therefore, in the Community seems 
not only insufficient but gives cause for concern at a sectoral 
level. The sectors benefiting from a fast growth of demand 
represent 40 % of value-added by industry in Japan and 
31 % in the USA, in contrast to only 26 % in the Com-
munity, and it is these sectors in particular in the Community 
which have experienced a high rate of import penetration 
during the period 1973-82. Insufficient investment has there-
fore created a situation where capacity has become inad-
equate to respond to internal and external demand. 
3.2. Investment, wages and profits 
There are a number of factors that affect aggregate invest-
ment performance, the most important being changes in 
demand or output and expectations about future demand, 
changes in profits or company liquidity and interest rates, 
and lastly tax changes in the corporate sector. These factors 
link together to influence expected future profitability and 
in turn investment affects output. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate the long-term decline in the 
rate of return on invested capital in the Community. The 
gross rate of return (see table for definition) averaged nearly 
11 % in the period 1960-73 but has subsequently declined 
to about 6 Y.z % . A sharp fall occurred between 1973 and 
1975 and although a recovery of profitability took place in 
the second half of the 1970s, the second oil shock precipi-
Table 3.5 
Gross rate of return on innsted capital enterprises excluding housing1 
- (capital stock at replacement cost) 
B I) 
1960-73 10,6 11.6 
1974 10,3 9,1 
1975 8,6 8,6 
1976 8,1 9,6 
1977 7,7 9,6 
1978 7,5 10,0 
1979 7,5 10,3 
1980 6,9 9.4 
1981 6,0 8,8 
1982 6,1 9,1 
1983 6.4 9,3 
1984 6.5 9.3 
Investment in the Community 
tated a further decline. A similar profile has occurred in the 
USA but there the decline has been less severe. 
Although the gross operating surplus of the business.sector 
fell sharply in relation to gross value-added in the mid-
I 970s, the steady subsequent recovery has resulted in the 
share of gross profit in value added returning to its 1960 
level. With the profit share remaining fairly stable but the 
rate of return falling, the implication is that the capital 
output ratio has increased and the efficiency of capital 
declined. There are clearly problems associated with working 
with capital stock and profitability data but evidence sug-
gests that capital intensity has increased much more in 
Europe than the USA and this is an important reason for 
the divergence of rates of return (see Graph I O of the report). 
While the return on capital tended to fall appreciably from 
1960 to 1985 in the Community. real wage costs (compen-
sation per employee deflated by the GDP deflator) increased 
on average by 4,4 % per year from 1960 to 1973 and by a 
further 2,3 % per year on average from 1974 to 1981. Since 
1982, the rate of increase has moderated somewhat to less 
than 1 % on average (see Table 3. 7 and Graph 11, 12 of the 
report). The variation between Member States in recent 
years has been quite strong; the rise in real wage costs 
between 1981 and 1985 ranged from - 0,4 % in the Nether-
lands to + 1.1 % in the United Kingdom, the latter being 
the only country where the average rate of increase for 1981 
to 1985 was higher than that for the period 1973 to 1981. 
F 1'L l'K El R JO' l S.·\ 
13,l 8.3 11.6 9,2 10,8 10,2 
11.4 6,5 10,1 5,9 8.6 8,6 
9,6 4.2 8,7 5,0 7.3 8.4 
9,0 4.9 10,l 6,3 7,8 8,8 
8.8 4.3 9.8 6,9 7,9 9,3 
8,7 4.5 9,6 7,1 8,0 9,1 
8.4 5,7 9.0 6,2 8.0 9,1 
7.3 6.2 8,6 5,3 7.3 8,3 
6.2 ·U 8,9 4,9 6,5 8,3 
6,1 4.0 8.7 5,0 6.5 7.4 
6.2 3.7 8.7 5.3 6.6 7.5 
6.3 3.8 9.3 5.0 6.6 7.8 
I Gr(''' l'IJ'('r~1lmi? ,urplu, .1, •, of ~rl,\\ 1.·.1ri1~1l ,;.tr~·l .• 1d_1u,11.'\I forth(' imputed l.11\\,ur m1.·l,mc: ,,f cmpl1..'~11."\.~ 
' 
\\'c1t?htcd "Hh GDP at llJ75 pun.·ha<iimp. rt'"1.:r p.m11c, 
Soun.'t: DI\\' ,,n hchalf 1.,f the Mm1str~ ,,f Fi:1.,n1.,m1\'.' Affairs (EC a,cragc and estimates for IQSJ .1.nJ l~S-l Comm1ss1on sc~ i1.-......_ ). 
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Table 3.6 
Net rate of return on the gross capital stock 1 
B D F NL UK EUR 62 USA 
1960-73 6,7 7.4 9,9 4,8 6,5 5,2 6,9 6,2 
1974 6,5 4.7 7,4 2,5 5,0 1,4 4,3 4,6 
1975 4,7 4,4 6,3 0,2 3,6 0,9 3,3 4,4 
1976 4,5 5,1 5,1 0,9 5,0 2,2 3,7 4,8 
1977 4,0 5,4 4,9 0,3 6,6 2,7 3,8 5,3 
1978 4,0 5.6 4.6 0,5 6,4 2,7 3,8 5,2 
1979 3,7 6.0 4,4 1,8 5,7 1,5 3,8 4,8 
1980 2,2 5.3 3,1 2,2 4,8 0,4 3,0 4,2 
1981 1.7 4.9 3,3 0,5 4,2 0.1 2,5 4,1 
1982 2,1 4.6 2,1 0,2 4.7 1.0 2,3 3,4 
1983 2,4 4.7 2,1 -0,I 4.8 I.I 2,4 3,6 
1984 2.4 4.8 2.2 0 5.4 1.0 2,4 3,7 
I Ncl operating surplus. tJ1.cluding n1ima1cd labour income or 1hc sclr-cmploycd as a pcrccn1agc of the gross capital stock. 
' 
Wc,ghtc:d with GDP at 1975 purchasing power pantlCS. 
Sour,,· OJW on behalf of the Mm1str) of Economic Affairs (EC avcrJgc and estimates for 1983 and 1984 Commission services). 
Furthermore. throughout the period 1960 to 1981. the rise 
in real per capita wage costs in the Community exceeded the 
increase in labour productivity adjusted for rationalization 
effects. 2 The differenc..: between the rise in wage costs and 
adjusted labour productivity was 0,9 percentage points on 
average for the period 1961-73 and I. I percentage points 
for the period 1974-81 (see Table _3.6). Only since 1982 has 
the increase in real wage costs (0.9 %) been slightly less than 
that of adjusted labour productivity (estimated to be 1.2 %). 
The divergence between wage costs and productivity during 
the period 1961-73 and the lack of adjustment after the first 
oil shock. which resulted in a worsening of the gap between 
wages and productivity. served to encourage the increase in 
the capital-labour ratio at a rate which was greater than its 
normal trend increase. This has meant that capital intensity 
has increased. that profitability has declined and that the 
lack of real wage adjustment has intensified the unemploy-
ment problem. 
Developments since 1981 with respect to wages represent a 
major change of trend, and one which is likely to have its 
first effects on employment in the Community from 1985 
(when total employment should increase. for the first time 
since 1980. and by 0,2 % ). As real wages have increased less 
rapidly than the estimated rate of increase in adjusted labour 
productivity, firms arc less compelled now to rationalize 
production and may allocate a greater proportion of invest-
Lahour productivity less the estimated impact or the increase in the 
capital stock per employee due to the rationalization of production. 
particularly through the elimination of the lcasl productive firms and 
johs. 
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ment to increase capacity (and employment), provided that 
demand expectations are also favourable. 
However, despite the rise in the share of profits in national 
income. the rate of return on invested capital is still low and 
Table 3.7 
Change in real wage costs and in labour producth-ity adjusted for the 
effects of rationalization 
European Community 
Real per capital compensation of 
employees 1 
Adjusted labour productivity2 
Wage costs/productivity gap' 
United States 
Real per capital compensation of 
employees• 
Adjusted labour productivity2 
Wage costs/productivity gap' 
1 lkllalcd h, GDP dcllator. 
1961-73 
4.4 
3.5 
0.9 
2,1 
1,8 
0.3 
1974-81 
2.3 
1.2 
I. I 
0,5 
0,5 
0.0 
(% change) 
1982-85 
0.9 
1.2 
-0.3 
1,6 
1,3 
0,3 
Change- m ~1u1pu1 ('K:r ('K:tson employed less impact of the change in per capita capital stock. 
' D1ffcn:m .. "I: hct\H·cn the grl1wth or real per capita compensation and the growth of adjusted 
l.1hour prodUL"ll\ ll}. SinL"I: under certain as~umptions the rise m per capita compensation 
nlil} C\L'\."l:d thi: gn.1" th of adJustOO la~ur productl\"ll), this ligurc should only be considered 
.I!\ .i hro.id md1Gllor or the trend. 
So11rn- Euro\t;ll and Comm1s~mn scrviL"CS. 
indeed, inadequate to bring about a satisfactory growth of 
employment in the Community. The problem of uncertainty 
over expected future profitability in Community economies 
is further exacerbated by the level of interest rates. Since 
1979, there has been a sharp rise in real interest rates affect-
ing not only the general changeover to more stability-orien-
tated monetary policies but also the impact of very high 
interest rate levels in the US. This has imposed a considerable 
burden on the structure of firms' balance sheets and may 
have led, in particular, to cuts in programmes to extend 
capacity, in order to restrict the use of borrowed capital -
net borrowing by enterprises has declined substantially since 
1980. Thus. despite the relatively marked increase in gross 
operating surplus in relation to the gross value added of 
companies in recent years, the level of investment in relation 
to value-added. even in 1985 will remain below that recorded 
during the last cyclical upturn in 1979-80. 
In conclusion, therefore. the outlook for investment and 
consequently output and employment is disquieting. Al-
though profitability has improved, wage moderation has 
occurred in a number of countries and capacity utilization 
has risen markedly, rates of return are still low, particularly 
relative to real interest rates. Other demand components 
have contributed to low aggregate demand and uncertainty 
about future growth. Private consumption has temporarily 
grown very modestly following the effects of wage moder-
ation and the growth of public consumption has been halted 
by budgetary consolidation policies. Finally, while exports 
have received a significant stimulus in the last two years 
from high US growth. uncertainty about the continuing 
strength of the dollar and the US recovery have made 
investors in Europe more cautious about expanding ca-
pacity. 
3.3. Policy towards investment 
All Member States have to varying extents in the past 
attempted to encourage investment. If anything. these at-
tempts have multiplied in the recent live to 10-ycar period, 
and certainly the means used to encourage investment have 
become more elaborate. Direct grants and subsidized loans 
have been increasingly supplemented with a mixture of loan 
guarantees. participation schemes. depreciation allowances 
and other tax measures. Some of the traditional types of 
investment incentive, such as support for research and devel-
opment or regional policy. have been justified in the past by 
externality considerations and by market imperfections 
(such as the immobility of labour). More recently. the desire 
to protect or to case the adjustment of industries (such as 
steel. coal. shipbuilding) which have been faced with low 
demand and/or increased competition from newly industrial-
Investment in the Community 
1smg countries has led to further subsidies both to these 
sectors and to ones which will hopefully provide future 
employment growth. 
Why is it, therefore, that the investment incentives used have 
not only failed substantially to create employment but have 
not even had t:1e desired effect on either the size or type of 
investment itself. Firstly, it is important to recall the factors 
which influence investment (mentioned already in section 
3.2) and which include both price and income (or output) 
effects. Investment incentives clearly, a priori, lower the price 
of capital (and therefore both encourage the formation of 
capital and its substitution for labour), but other factors 
also influence the expected user cost of capital. including 
expected interest and inflation rates and taxation. Further-
more, capital formation is strongly influenced by expected 
demand which has hardly been helped by two oil shocks, 
inflation and more recently policies to control the latter. 
While investment incentives may, therefore. have helped to 
offset the negative influences on capital formation caused 
by weak demand expectations and high interest rates, by 
reducing the cost of capital they have further aggravated 
the distortion in relative factor prices (between labour and 
capital) and contributed to the decline in profitability dis-
cussed in section 3.2. The implication, therefore. is that the 
capital-labour ratio has risen above its long-run evolutionary 
path with respect to output per employee. The fact that 
three European countries. the UK. France and the Nether-
lands, plus the USA are in the process of substituting lower 
corporate tax rates for accelerated depreciation allowances 
seems to be indicative of the desire to adopt a more neutral3 
-approach and reduce the subsidy to capital which has ex-
isted. In the UK, the accelerated depreciation allowances 
for equipment (100 % first year plus interest allowance) 
were reformed in the 1984 budget and replaced by a 25 % 
reducing balance method. introduced gradually so as to 
come into force in 1986/87, (see Table 3.9 for details). At 
the same time corporation tax is being reduced in stages 
from 52 % to 30 %. In France. where the tax allowance or 
credit (10 % of investment up to 1981 and 15 % in 1982) 
was replaced in 1983 by a special depreciation allowance, 
similar changes have recently been announced. After 1985, 
when the present system ends. the extra first year de-
preciation allowances (which have been up to 70 %) will be 
replaced by a corporate tax cut from 50 % to 45 %. Finally, 
in the USA. where ·accelerated cost recovery' was introduced 
1 Neutrality requires that the economic depreciation of fixed assets is tax 
deductihle. interest costs likewise (alternatively, there may be 100 % 
immediate depreciation and no allowance for interest payments). that 
capital gains arc taxed at the same rate as income and that allowance is 
made for inflation. 
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in 1981 by reducing writing-off times for assets. certain 
reforms have already been proposed. This package of pro-
posals includes the repeal of investment credit ( 5 or I O % 
of new investment can at present be set against tax). the 
reduction of the corporate tax rate from 46 % to 33 %, 
interest deductibility only for the ·real' part of interest costs 
and a change to a 'real recovery cost system· where de-
preciation periods correspond more closely to economic life-
times and where account is also taken of the inflation rate. 
Although a reassessment of special depreciation allowances 
is taking place. the process has not yet substantially begun 
for more direct fonns of investment incentive. Of the other 
two main types of incentive, interest rate subsidies and 
grants, the former appear to be much more widespread in 
France. Belgium and Italy, while the latter are more common 
in the UK. Ireland and to some extent Germany. In the 
Netherlands the situation is rather particular and is governed 
by the Investment Account Act (WI R) of 1978 which insti-
tuted a system of investment subsidies based on tax credits. 
and which may involve a negative tax if the credit is greater 
Table 3.8 
than the tax due (the latter is to be abolished according to 
the 1986 budget proposal). The subsidy is based on the value 
of investment beyond a certain floor and the allowable 
subsidy may be extended for small companies or for energy 
and environment projects. This type of discrimination is a 
trait which exists in many Member States. In Italy special 
funds are allocated to small companies. innovation and 
restructuring. while France gives interest subsidies for cer-
tain activities such as innovation, exports and energy pro-
jects. In Belgium there have been special tax measures for 
research and development and energy projects. while Ger-
many accords extra accelerated depreciation allowances for 
environment and energy. small companies and special re-
gions, particularly West Berlin. The UK has likewise given 
grants for a series of innovation fields and also for energy 
conversion. Small companies have been encouraged through 
tax measures. 
Table 3.8 lists some of the more important grant and interest 
rate subsidy measures in Community countries as well as 
the structure of corporate tax and depreciation measures. 
Corporate taxes, tax depreciation allo"ances and im·estment grants in Member States 
B 
DK 
112 
Corporate ta~ rates 
- standard rate = 45% 
- progressive rates of 31-
45% for profits up to 
BFR 14,4 million 
- double taxation of 
dividends reduced lo 
half the standard rate 
through tax credit 
standard rate = 40% 
moving to 50% in 
1986/87 
for cooperatives: 16% 
at present will be raised 
to20% 
- existing double tax-
ation of dividends will 
be abolished from 1990 
- tax-free investment re-
serves of up to 25% of 
annual taxable profits 
equivalent to an ad-
vance allowance for in-
vestment before pur-
chase 
Ta, depreciation allowance S}stcm 
F.qu1pmcnt and rlant 
straight-line or declin-
ing balance (multi-
plier = 2) 
1982 basic investment 
allowance 13% (25 or 
18% in some cases) 
30% of aggregate book 
value 
Buildings 
- straight line 5% p.a. 
industrial buildings: 
straight line rate 6% 
p.a. for I O years then 
2% p.a. 
- other buildings: 
straight line rate 4% 
p.a. for I O years then 
I 0/o p.a. 
no allowance ror office 
space and housing 
Carn-fon4·ard and 
earl) :back. of losses 
Carn·- Carr),-had. 
fon\~rd 
5 0 
5 0 
Other pnnciple financial 
mccnU\O to investment 
- interest-rate subsidies 
- guaranteed loans 
- grants 
temporary tax deduc-
tions for certain invest-
ment 
investment grants 
- soft loans 
- regional aid for pur-
chase of industrial land 
and building 
Table 3.8 ( continued) 
Corporate taxes, tax depreciation allowances and investment grants in Member States 
D 
F 
IRL 
Corporate tax. rates 
standard rate = 56% 
distributed profits = 
36% 
- standard rate 50%; no 
reduced rates for SM E 
- double taxation of 
dividends reduced to 
half the standard rate 
through lax credit 
carry back of losses in-
stituted in 1985 
tax credit for the take-
over of enterprises by 
employees 
standard rate = 50% 
reduced rate of I 0% 
for manufacturing. re-
placing former system 
of tax exemptions for 
export profits 
reduced rate of 40% to 
5p% for profits up to 
IRL35000 
double taxation of 
dividends reduced to 
less than half the stan-
dard rate through tax 
credit 
standard rates state 
36°10 + local 
16.2% = effective rate 
46%. lower rates for 
profits reim·ested in 
the Meuogiorno 
no reduced rates for 
SME. hut reductions 
for certain categories. 
eg conJ)(:ratives 
no douhll' taxatwn llf 
dividends 
Tax. dcprcc1atiun allowance ~)stem 
Equipment and plant 
straight-line or 
declining balance mul-
tiplier 3 with maximum 
rates of 30%. average 
life-times 4-10 years 
special allowances for 
small companies 
- up to 75% allow-
ance in first year for 
1984 and 1985 
this higher de-
preciation rate ( usually 
40%) will be abolished 
at end of 1985 and cor-
porate tax rate will be 
reduced to 45% 
free depreciation al-
lowance up lo 100% in 
the first year. since 
1972 
straight-line. but ad-
vance allowances of 
3 x 15° o in addition to 
normal rates 
Buildings 
old buildings, straight-
line 2% p.a. or declin-
ing balance 12 x 3.5%, 
20 x 2%. 18 x I% 
new buildings. 
straight-line 4% p.a. or 
declining balance 
4xIO%. 3x5%, 
18 X 2,5% 
- straight line 5% 
p.a. 
free depreciation al-
lowance up lo 100% in 
the first year since 1978 
no allowances for of-
fice space and dwell-
ings 
normal straight-line 
rates 3.8''.o p.a. 
same advance allow-
ances as for equipment 
Investment in the Community 
Carrv-fon.1,·ard and 
carry--back of losses 
CJrn:- Carr)-back 
forw:;rd 
5 2 
5 3 
0 
5 () 
Other principle financial 
mcentivcs to investment 
investment grants 
special depreciation al-
lowances for certain 
sectors and regions 
-·· subsidised loans 
grants 
- extra depreciation al-
lowances 
investment grants 
tax relief 
grants for product de-
velopment and feasi-
bility studies 
subsidized loans SME 
repayable grants and 
subsidized loans for 
innovation 
subsidies for restruc-
turing 
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Table 3.8 ( continued) 
Corporate taxes, tax depreciation allowances and im·estment grants in Member States 
Tax dcprcc1at1on allowance system Carry-forward and 
carry-back or losses 
Corporate tux rates 
Equipment and plant Buildings Carry- Carry-back 
forward 
Other principle financial 
incentives to investment 
L - standard rate = 40% - straight-line or - straight-line 3% p.a. 5 0 - investment grants 
- full double taxation of - declining balance mul-
dividends tiplier = 2 
NL - standard rate 43%, 
(42% in 1986) 
straight line or 
- declining balance mul-
tiplier (2-2.5). max. 
rate 25% 
- straight-line 2 to 4% 
p.a. 
8 2 - Investment grants and 
tax credits through In-
vestment Account Act 
1978 
- full double taxation of 
distributed profits 
1978 WI R scheme 
UK - standard rate progress-
ively reduced 1983/ 
84 = 50%. 1984/85 = 
45%, 1985/85 = 40%, 
1986/87 = 35% 
- first year allowances 
1984/85 75%, 1985/86 
50%. 1986/87 reverts 
to 25% declining bal-
ance 
- normal straight-line - investment grants, re-
gional, discretionary 
and for certain sectors 
- tax allowances for ex-
pansion of companies 
rate 4% p.a. first year 
allowance 1984/85 
50%. 1985/86 25%, 
1986/87 reverts to 4% 
- reduced rate of 30% 
for profits less than 
UKL IOOOOO(in 1983/ 
84) progressive rates 
for profits between 
UKL 100 OOO and 
UKL 500 OOO 
Corporate tax rates vary between 35 % (the UK from 1986/ 
87 onwards) and 56 % (for Germany, although distributed 
profits arc taxed at 36 % ). Several countries have reduced 
tax rates for small companies (Belgium, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the UK). Most countries have 
accelerated depreciation schemes for plant and equipment 
but only a few (Germany and Ireland) for buildings. There 
arc a mixture of carry-back, carry-forward arrangements for 
losses, with the most common being five years carry-forward 
and no carry-back.4 
Table 3.9 shows the evolution of central government invest-
ment grants in the Community, as defined by the European 
System of Accounts. Investment grants consist of unrequited 
transfers by general government for the purpose of finan-
cing, in whole or in part, specific items of gross fixed capital 
4 A proposition concerning the harmonization of Member State legislation 
regarding the carry-over of losses is being considered by the Council, 
COM(84) 405. It consists of a system of two years carry-back and 
unlimited carrying-forward of losses. 
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formation by other institutions. The definition includes all 
sectors of the economy. but does not include tax relief 
measures to encourage investment, nor does it include grants 
for interest relief. Statistics in the table, therefore, omit 
two of the important measures which are used to stimulate 
investment. 
This omission makes any inter-country comparison very 
difficult. For example France has a much lower level of 
investment grants relative to Germany or the UK because 
a much higher proportion of investment stimulation is ac-
corded via interest rate subsidies. Interpretation is also diffi-
cult because any change in balance between the three main 
policy measures effects the evolution of investment grants 
relative to GDP for any particular country. The significant 
fall in investment grants in the UK from 1972 onwards was 
in a large part due to the introduction and substitution of 
100 % first year depreciation allowances for other more 
direct policy measures. 
Nevertheless the table shows the significant subsidy that 
investment grants have made towards gross fixed capital 
formation. For Belgium. Germany, Italy and the UK, grants 
as a percentage of capital formation were in the range 5, 7 % 
to 6,9 % in 1982, but for Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg the proportion is much higher. Tentative esti-
mates for France, Germany and the UK indicate that the 
budgetary cost of grants, interest-rate subsidies and acceler-
ated depreciation allowances in the industry and service 
sector as a proportion of GDP was as high as 1,9 %, 1,4 % 
and 2,3 % respectively in 1983. 
Table 3.9 
General government investment grants to other resident sectors 
B DK I) 
1970 0,5 0,4 0,5 
1974 1,0 0,3 1,1 
1975 0,9 0,5 I.I 
1976 1,0 0,5 1,15 
1977 1.0 0,5 1,4 
1978 1, 1 0,5 1,3 
1979 1,1 0;4 1,4 
1980 1,2 0,5 1,4 
1981 1,4 0,6 i.4 
1982 I.I 1.4 
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In conclusion, therefore, investment incentives do not appear 
to have been particularly successful in offsetting, in aggre-
gate terms, the negative influences on capital formation 
caused by poor demand expectations. Furthermore,, they 
have contributed to the distortion of factor prices (and 
therefore artificially increased the capital intensity of net 
investment) with the result that profitability and employ-
ment creation has been poor. 
F IRL L NL UK 
as% of GDP 
0,6 2,5 1,4 2,0 0,8 1.5 
0,5 2,0 0,8 1.8 0,7 1,2 
0.7 2,0 1.0 2,6 0,8 1,2 
I. I 2,1 1.0 2,3 0,9 1.2 
0.5 2,1 1,2 2,0 0,8 1,1 
0.4 2,2 I.I 1.7 0,9 1.2 
0,4 2,4 1,0 2.3 1,5 1,0 
0.4 2,9 1,0 2.7 2,3 1,0 
0.4 2,7 I.I 4,2 2,6 1,0 
0.4 I.I 2,6 1,0 
as % of gross fixed capital formation 
1970 2,0 1,7 3,0 2,3 11,4 6,5 8,4 3,2 8,2 
1974 4,4 1,4 5,2 1.9 7,8 3,7 7,4 3,1 6,0 
1975 4,2 2,3 5,2 2,8 8,3 4,9 9,3 3,9 5,6 
1976 4,3 2,4 6,7 4,6 8,7 4,8 9,3 4,5 5,8 
1977 4,6 2,3 6,5 2,5 8,2 6,3 8,0 4,0 6,0 
1978 5,3 2,1 6,2 1.9 7,7 5,9 7,2 4,3 6,8 
1979 5,3 2,1 6,4 2.0 7,6 5,5 9,2 7,1 5,1 
1980 5,9 2,4 6.0 1.9 10,0 4,8 10,4 11,1 5,4 
1981 7,7 3,8 6.J 2,0 9.2 5,2 18.1 13,6 6,0 
1982 6,2 6.9 2,0 5,7 14,1 6,2 
Sourn·J · Eurostat, 'General go,crnmcnt Ul'\:Ounts ;.ind slatistics·. and national sources. 
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4. Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
In 1984, the monetary policies conducted in the Community contributed satisfactorily to 
convergence. This stabili=ed the European Monetary System. The stance adopted in /985 
is generally in line ll"ith last year's trends. Hmrel'er, financial inno\'ations are changing the 
conditions in ll"hich the authority of the central banks is exercised, and se\'eral of them have 
been led tu modify their instruments. The fall in nominal interest rates generally continued 
and in Europe ll"as more marked on long-term than on short-term rates. Among the EMS 
countries, the fall ,ras more marked in the countries ll"here rates remain relatil'ely high and 
ll"hich ll'cre able to take adl'antage of disinflation than in the countries ll"ith loll"er interest 
rates ll'hich su/kred substantial exports of capital to the United States. Holl"ever. in the 
latter countries the mol'ement of the dollar exchange rate on the foreign exchange market 
after March /985 opened up some scope for reducing interest rates, and this has already 
heen used. The 11pll'ard convergence of real interest rates is indicatil'e of the common stance 
of monetary policies against a background of substantial public sector deficits. The stability 
of exchange rate relationships ll'ithin the EMS prm·ided a contrast 1\'ith the wide swings in 
the exchange rate of the ECU against other currencies. The adjustment of the lira's official 
exchange rate 011 21 July /985 1rill not be fully 1·i11dicated unless the Italian economy 
conl'erges more rapidly ll"ith those of her partners. New i·igour iras given to the process of 
financial and monetary integration in the field of the freedom of capital movements. Basing 
themsefres 011 the progress made in this area and in the area of com·ergence, the competent 
Community authorities strengthened the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. 
4.1. Contribution of monetary policies to conver-
gence 
As demonstrated by the changes in a number of indicators 
analysed below. monetary policies generally made a substan-
tial contribution in 1984 to the convergence process. This 
stabilized the European Monetary System. The objective of 
creating an internal and external zone of monetary stability 
is now common ground. but. given the uneven results in the 
light against inflation. the stance to be taken by monetary 
policy is bound to vary from country to country. In the 
countries where the inflation rate is still high. the monetary 
authorities seek a progressive reduction of monetary growth. 
In the countries where the inflation rate is sufficiently low. 
monetary policy seeks to provide the liquidity necessary for 
real. lasting growth in line with the growth or potential 
output while preserving the stability already achieved. 
These policies were reflected in 1984 in a fresh deceleration 
of monetary growth both as an average for the Community 
countries and as an average for the countries participating 
in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. Further. the summary 
indicators of convergence. such as the average absolute 
difference between national rates of monetary growth and 
the Community average. or in between them and the lowest 
in the Community. stabilized at a level much closer to that 
of the 1960s, a period of internal and external monetary 
stability, than to the level which prevailed when the EMS 
was established. 
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A country-by-country analysis of two additional indicators 
of the stance of monetary policy confirms this general im-
pression. First. the development of the liquidity ratio. which 
measures the difference between the expansion of the broad 
measure of money supply and the growth of nominal GDP 
gives an initial impression of the degree of constraint exer-
cised by monetary policy. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany. the fall (-0.7 %) 
follows three consecutive years of increase at an average 
rate of 2.4 % a year. These trends remain in line with the 
Bundesbank's medium term strategy which gears monetary 
growth to the growth of potential output. In a period of 
cyclical catching-up such as characterized 1984. the liquidity 
ratio therefore tends to fall. in contrast to periods during 
which actual growth is lower than potential growth. 
In Italy. France and Ireland the fall in the liquidity ratio. 
which has been in progress for several years. corresponds to 
the need to bring inllation down towards the lowest rates in 
the Community and to reform financing structures. Den-
mark and the Netherlands have for some years recorded a 
marked rise in the liquidity ratio. The monetary authorities 
have indicated that they are watching these deYelopments 
carefully: these developments have not. howewr. affected 
their principal intermediate objectiw. the exchange rate par-
ity or their currencies within the EMS. 
In the United Kingdom the liquidity ratio. measured hy 
reference to the broad measure of money supply (sterling 
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Table 4.1 
Convergence and deceleration of growth rates of the money stock (yearly averages) 
1970:60 1975;70 1980!75 1980 
B M2H 8,3 14,4 10,8 7,4 
DK M2H 10,3 11,2 12,0 9.4 
D M3 10,1 10,8 8,8 5,3 
GR M3 17,7 20,8 22,9 19,8 
F M2R 12.7 16,8 13,4 11,0 
IRL M3 10,0 17,8 19,I 14,5 
I M2 13,2 18,5 22,8 19,9 
NL M2 9,1 14,0 8,8 8,0 
UK UKLM3 5,3 17,0 11,7 15,2 
EUR 10,0 15,3 13,4 11.9 
Weighted dispersion within the EC in relation to: 
(i) the mean 2,9 3,7 4.4 4,6 
(ii) th!! lowest 5,0 6,3 7,4 6,6 
EMS 11,3 14,7 13,6 10,8 
Weighted dispersion within the EMS in relation to: 
(i) the mean 1.9 3,4 4,5 4,4 
(ii) the lowest 4,4 5.7 6,9 5.5 
Sourt·,· :Commission departments. 
Table 4.2 
Monetary and credit targets 
1980 1981 1982 
Target Out-turn T+.1rgc1 Out-turn ·L,rgct Out-turn 
D MZ1 5-8 
F M:!2 11.0 
I TOCE' 17,5 
UK 5 UKL M3 7-11 
MO 
USAh Ml 4.5-6 
M2 6-9 
TOCE' 
1 Ccntrnl han._ nwnc, stod. 
for Jl.)~4 and ll.)K5:.M.:!R 1n .. ·s11.knts' M.:!). 
\ llX't (h.ll.tl Jomcstt( \'.rl-Jll C\fl.lllSl1.)1l). 
4.8 4-7 
9,8 10.0 
18,4 16.0 
18.6 6-10 
7,3 3.5-6 
8.4 6-9 
• Chi.rnt:c N't"1.."'C'n th11:c-month a,crng(', ... '\·ntrN on lkt.'l.·ml'C'r 
.U 4-7 6,0 
11.4 12.5-13.5 11.5 
18.2 15.5 20.8 
13.8 8-1 :! 10.8 
2.3 2.5-5.5 8,5 
9.2 6-9 9,9 
1981 1982 
7,8 9,7 
5,2 11,0 
6,3 6,5 
30.4 32,9 
10,7 11,2 
20,6 13,7 
17,1 16,2 
4,3 7,4 
16,9 11,5 
11,8 11,2 
4,8 2.9 
7.6 4,7 
10.1 10.5 
3.8 3.2 
5.8 4.0 
1983 
Target Out-turn 
4-7 7,0 
9.0 10.2 
18.2 20.6 
7-11 9,4 
4-8 9,6 
7-107 7.87 
8.5-11.5 10.6 
1983 1984 
5,4 8,8 
19,5 19,2 
6,6 3.8 
21,7 25.8 
9,3 8.5 
9,3 8,2 
15,4 12,5 
9,5 6,9 
10,9 9,7 
10,4 8,7 
2,9 2.8 
5,0 5.0 
9,9 8.1 
3.1 3.0 
4.6 4.3 
1984 
Target Out-turn Target 
4-6 4.6 3-5 
5.5-6.5 7,64 4-6 
17.4 19.3 16.8 
6-10 11.9 5-9 
4-8 5.7 3-7 
4-8 6.0 3-8 
6-9 8.0 6-9 
8-11 13.6 9-1::! 
1985 
6,0 
13,0 
5,2 
29,8 
7,3 
8,3 
12,0 
8,3 
11.4 
9,0 
3.0 
3.8 
7.9 
2.3 
2.7 
1985 
over 
I:! months 
4,3 (August) 
8.0 (July) 
18.3 (August) 
13.6 (August) 
4.5 (August) 
10,4 (August) 
9,6 (August) 
l:!.8 (July) 
Change 
1981-85 
-1,8 
+7,8 
-1,1 
-0,6 
-3,4 
-12,3 
-5,1 
+4,0 
- 5,5 
-2.8 
- 1.8 
-3.8 
-2.2 
-1.5 
-3.1 
m relation 
to the base 
Annualized 
rate season-
ally adj. 
4,7 
6.]N 
13.6 
4.5 
13,2 
9,3 
12,8 
~ T;.ug(ts were al!<oo ~, f1.1r MI ;mJ PSL2 tlh.iuidll~ hrn.iJI) 1..klinL"ltl ,n IQX2 ,md PnO. Up to J9S5: annual r;llcs for the period from Fchruar) to April llf the following )Car: from 1985· I~ month 
rutes 
fl The l'SA .il~,l ha, .i.n M~ t;trtz;ct 
F,,r the perulJ fhlm Fehruar) Mom:h JQS.' to the fourth t1U.lftL~r ,,f 19S.': oinnualm .. "d rat.:s 
11 F,,11,,"llltl the delinll11..,n 1..,f the t~tr)?Cl, the t.hffcren1."l.'.' hct"C'C" the 4uarterl) 01,crn)?C 1."l.'.'ntrcJ lln June ;mJ the 1..1uartcrl) a,cragc 1."l.'.'ntred on IX\.."1.'.'mhcr 
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M3), rose sharply in 1984 for the fourth year in succession. 
This development can however be partly explained by the 
greater role of certain time deposits as an investment asset. 
The United Kingdom authorities had indeed taken account 
of this element of uncertainty in setting their target for the 
growth of money supply (sterling M3), which was neverthe-
less overshot by 1,9 percentage points during the 1984-85 
budgetary year. 
Lastly in Greece, the rapid growth of the liquidity of the 
economy means there is no real hope of a significant slow-
down in the immediate future of the inflation rate which is 
now still close to 18 % . 
The development of the sources of money creation is another 
important indicator of the stance of monetary policies (see 
Table 4.4). First, a significant restoration of balance between 
internal and external counterparts took place in Denmark, 
France and Ireland, countries in which the destruction of 
Table 4.3 
Indicators of the liquidity of the economy 
ta) IJ4u1dll)' rauo 
(M. GDP) (annual',, changes) 
)970/60 1980/70 1981 1982 1983 1984 
B -0,2 1.9 3,7 1.3 -0,9 1,6 
DK -0.7 -0,5 -3,5 -3.1 8,5 8,5 
D 1.6 1.5 2,0 2,8 2,3 -0.7 
GR 6.0 2,3 9,7 6,8 u 2,2 
F 2,3 1.4 -1.5 -3,0 -1.4 -0,2 
IRL 0,1 -0.4 0,1 -3.2 -1,8 -2.7 
I 2,5 1.9 -1.2 - l.0 1.5 -0,9 
NL -1,3 0,5 -0,5 2,8 6,7 2,5 
UK - 1.7 -1.6 5,9 2,3 2,1 3,2 
EUR 0,9 0,8 1.3 0,5 1.4 0,7 
EMS 1.6 1.4 -0.1 -0,1 1.3 -0.0 
(<) rallo of mon<) supply to n,al GDP 
(annual•,. changes) 
B 3.2 9,2 9,2 8,5 5,0 7,0 
DK 5.6 9,0 6.2 7,8 17.3 14,7 
D 5,3 6,8 6,1 7,5 5,6 1,2 
GR 9,3 16.4 30.8 33,1 21,3 22,6 
F 6,7 11.0 10.4 9,1 8,3 6,8 
IRL 5,5 13.3 17.3 11.5 8,6 3,6 
I 7,1 16,9 16,9 16,7 16,8 9.7 
NL 3,8 8,2 5,0 9,0 8,5 5,1 
UK 2,4 12,2 18,3 9,5 7.4 7,8 
EUR 5,1 I I.I 12.1 10,6 9.3 6.4 
EMS 5,9 10,7 10,I 10.3 9.5 5,7 
Sounr: Commission dcrmrtmcnts. 
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liquidity by the external sector was still marked in 1983. 
This trend, which became apparent in 1984, should continue 
in 1985. It demonstrates that the monetary policy followed 
in these three countries supports the process of restoring 
balance to the external accounts by moderating money cre-
ation through the domestic sectors. In Belgium, a substantial 
improvement in the current account balance which started 
in 1983 did not suffice to prevent a substantial destruction 
of liquidity by the external sector, because of the persistence 
of net exports of capital by the non-bank private sector. In 
that country this situation nevertheless seems to have been 
reversed in the early months of 1985. 
With regard to the domestic counterparts. greater recourse 
to non-monetary resources by the Treasury or the banking 
system is evidence of the efforts made to reform financing 
structures. In their turn these efforts are largely the result 
of the movement of real interest rates (Table 4.5) and in 
certain cases were accompanied by the appearance of new 
(b) n,al money supply 
(M: GDP prices) (annual •,;, change) 
1985 1970:6() 1980'70 )98) 1982 1983 1984 1985 
-0.7 4,7 5,1 2.4 2.4 -0,5 3,3 1,3 
6.2 3,8 1.8 -4.4 -0,3 10,6 12.7 8,7 
0,7 6,3 4.4 2,1 1,8 3,2 1.9 3,0 
8,8 14,1 7.2 9,3 6,7 1,6 4,9 10,9 
0,3 8,0 5,1 -1,3 -1,1 -0,4 1.4 1,5 
-0.4 4.4 4,1 3,0 -1,3 -1,2 1,5 2,1 
0,9 8,3 5,1 -1,0 -1.5 0,3 1,6 3,6 
3,6 3,8 3.4 -1.2 1,3 7,7 4,2 5.8 
2.1 I.I 0,3 4,7 4,2 5,5 5,0 5,6 
1.3 5,5 3.8 I.I 1,0 2,4 2,8 3,7 
0,9 6,8 4,6 -0.0 0.1 1.7 2.2 3.0 
(d) money supply denatcd by unit labour costs 
(annual ~• changes) 
4,0 4,8 3,5 0,9 4.2 0,2 3,7 1.8 
10.4 3,2 1,7 -3,2 2,2 14,1 15,4 9,3 
2,9 5,9 4,2 1,9 3,1 5,6 3,1 3,6 
27.4 16.1 7,3 4,0 5,8 3,0 6,7 10,3 
6,0 8.1 4.4 -2.2 -0,6 0.1 3,0 3,6 
5,7 4,4 3,5 7,0 1,1 1.5 4,0 3,9 
9,1 8,6 4.4 -4.2 -I.I - 1.8 2,5 4.1 
6,0 2,6 3,3 1.5 2.9 9.2 8,6 8,6 
7,7 0,9 0,3 6,0 5,9 6,1 4,3 5,7 
6,5 5,6 3.4 0,5 2,0 3,0 3,9 4,6 
5,7 6,7 4,1 -0,9 1.0 2.3 3.7 4.1 
financial products, made attractive by a high level of both 
liquidity and yield. Greater recourse to these non-monetary 
resources does of course help to contain the inflationary 
impact of high public sector deficits; but it also involves 
substantial financial costs for public finances, seen in the 
increase in debt servicing costs, and it puts pressure: on the 
private sector whose share in domestic credit in Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands remains lower 
than or just about equal to the public sector share. In these 
countries, this development merely reinforces the need for a 
much quicker reduction of public sector deficits. 
In the light of the objectives set, where appropriate, for 
monetary aggregates and credit, the stance adopted in 1985 
for monetary policies is in line with last year's developments 
(see Table 4.2). In the Federal Republic of Germany the 
I percentage point reduction in the target range for the 
Table 4.4 
Counterparts of money creation 
(I) I2l 
Money creation Domestic money 
= rate of growth 1 
ofM2/3(1 =2+3+4) 
creation (2 = 5 = _6 + 7- 8) 
1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 
B 7,0 6,1 6,0 13,9 10,7 
DK 25,5 17,0 11,0 27,6 12,7 
D 5,3 4,7 5,0 5,1 3,2 
GR 20.3 29,4 29,3 23,6 33,0 
F 11.2 8,3 5,8 11,6 7,0 
IRL 5,6 10,I 16,6 9,5 15,2 
1 13,2 11,8 12,l 13,2 15,1 
NL 10.5 7,7 8,0 9,8 4,9 
UK 10,3 9,6 11,3 10,0 8,6 
(5) (6) 
Domc!illC money Lending to the 
creation (5 - 2 = 6 + 7 - 8) public sector 
B 13,9 10,7 9,7 17,7 14,0 
DK 27,6 12,7 9,5 17,4 0,8 
D 5,1 3,2 3,6 2,5 2,6 
GR 23,6 33.0 31,4 13,1 18,7 
F 11,6 7,0 5.2 3,5 1,0 
lRL 9,5 15.2 3,9 7,7 10,0 
I 13,2 15,I 16,3 8,4 8,6 
NL 9,8 4,9 2.8 4,8 5.3 
UK 10,0 8,6 8,0 0,0 -1.3 
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growth of central bank money stock (MZ 3 % to 5 % in 
1985) takes account of the fall in the inflation rate to a level 
close to 2 %. If MZ were to grow at a rate close to the 
upper limit of this range, as it did in the early months of 
1985, this would provide sufficient liquidity for reai'growth 
of over 2,5 %. 
In France and Italy, the targets set are well down on last 
year's out-turns. This is in line" ith the need for stabilization 
which still exists in the two countries. Developments at the 
start of the year in both cases indicate that the targets set 
have been overshot. This is chiefly due to public monetary 
financing requirements which were higher than forecast. In 
France, the Treasury expressed, at the end of June 1985, its 
intention of resorting to a greater extent to non-monetary 
resources while the Banque de France tightened its rules for 
controlling lending to the private sector; such lending was 
( as % of money supply at the end of the preceding period) 
(3) (4) 
External creation l +) Other 
or destruction ( - ) 
of liquidity 
1985 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985 
9,7 -5,9 -5,3 -3,1 -1,0 0,7 -0,5 
9,5 -4,1 0,8 0,0 2,0 3,5 1,5 
3,5 0,7 0,8 1,7 -0,5 0.7 -0,3 
31,4 -3,6 -4,6 -2,0 0,3 1,0 0,0 
5,2 -1,9 -0,1 0,1 1,5 1,4 0,5 
3,9 -3,9 -5,1 2,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 
16,3 0,9 0,1 -1,2 -0,9 -3,3 -2,9 
2,8 2,3 5,2 6,9 -1,7 -2,5 -1,8 
8,0 1,2 -2,4 0,6 -0,9 3,5 -2,7 
(7) (8) 
Lending to the Non-monetary 
private sector liabilities 
11,7 3,1 1,2 2.7 6,9 4,5 4,7 
0,7 17,2 14,3 11,5 7,0 2,4 2,7 
2,1 11,0 10,0 10,6 8,4 9,4 9,1 
17,8 11,9 14,0 12,5 1,4 -0,4 -1,l 
2,0 12,I 10,4 7,3 4,0 4,4 4,1 
3,3 6,3 5,7 2,4 4,5 0,5 1,8 
9,6 8,6 11,2 7,1 3,8 4.7 0,4 
2,8 6,9 7,3 8,1 1,9 7,6 8,0 
-2,7 13,9 16.2 16,9 3,9 6,3 6,2 
I Money surply hroadl~ dcfincJ. The fi~un:, for the countcrp.art~ arc difficuh to compan: hct..,..c,:n one coun111 and another. 
Sot1rn·. Comm1~Mon Jc('tlrtmcnts. 
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also tending to exceed a rate compatible with the target for 
the growth of the M2R money supply (4 %-6 %). In Italy. 
the targets set for total domestic credit. an aggregate which 
largely depends on the size or the budget deficit. and for the 
growth or the M2 money supply. which is more directly 
under the control of the central bank. were largely overshot 
in the early months or 1985. If this excessive money creation 
is to be offset in the next few months, the measures adopted 
to check and to reverse the tendency for the public deficit to 
increase must be effectively implemented and the monetary 
authorities must display great rigour. 
In the United Kingdom the target adopted was to keep the 
12-month growth rate during 1985-86 within the ranges 3-
7 % for MO and 5-9 % for sterling M3. In accordance 
with the government's medium-term financial strategy. these 
targets are I percentage point lower than in the preceding 
year. However. as a result of the difficulties associated with 
the interpretation of sterling M3. the growth of which has 
remained very strong. the United Kingdom authorities have 
gradually given special importance to the narrower aggre-
gate. MO. and greater attention has been gi\'en to the move-
ment of the sterling exchange rate as an indicator of the 
course of monetary policy. 
4.2. Financial innovations and the operation of 
monetary policies 
For some years monetary policies ha\'e been operated 
against the background of changing financial markets. It is 
still too soon to draw any final conclusions on the conse-
quences of the changes which arc taking place almost day 
by day on the money and capital markets. but some remarks 
must be made. There arc two reasons for the emergence of 
new financial products: the attempt to find protection 
against variations in interest rates and exchange rates. and 
greater competition in the collection of savings against a 
background of high real interest rates. There arc numerous 
examples. which include variable or indexed interest rates. 
zero coupon bonds which reduce taxation or at least defer 
it until the rcd•;mption date. interest rate and currency swaps. 
These new financial products come both from private 
debtors and financial intermediaries and from Treasuries. 
which seek in this way to reduce the financial cost or their 
indebtedness against a background of a policy of monetary 
stabilization. The result of the keener competition on the 
financial markets has been to widen the range of activities 
undertaken by intermediaries. within the limits set by present 
law. and to dccompartmcntalizc the money and capital mar-
kets both nationally and internationally. 
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The long run consequences of these developments on the 
stability of financial systems will depend on the speed of the 
innovation process. on the capacity of banks to act in a 
more turbulent situation and the appropriate reactions of 
the banking supervisory authorities. Further. problems will 
also result for the operation of monetary policy itself. 
The choice of an intermediate objective in the form of a 
monetary aggregate becomes more difficult. The difficulties 
arc associated more particularly with the appearance of new 
financial products which serve as substitutes for the assets 
traditionally included in the definition of the money supply. 
For example. in France. the creation of unit trusts holding 
of bonds close to maturity has provided the public with a 
high yield asset which can be easily realized and for which 
the variation in prices are not very sensitive to variations in 
interest rates. The funds collected for this type of investment 
have risen to 4.2 % of the money supply. In Italy. the issue 
of treasury bills at indexed interest rates. which combine the 
advantages of high yield and a high degree of liquidity. has 
also hciped in the last two years to moderate the growth of 
money supply. Conversely. in Denmark the extremely rapid 
expansion of the money stock in the last two years is attribu-
table to the greater competition between banks for time 
deposits (included in the definition of M2). the return on 
which is now close to the return on bonds maturing within 
a similar period. These examples call for three comments. 
First. it is probable that after an adjustment period the 
money demand function will gradually stabilize. It is there-
fore fundamentally no less rele\'ant to pursue a target for a 
monetary aggregate. e\'en though this policy becomes more 
complicated. 
Second. e\'cn though they offer significant ad\'antages in 
terms of liquidity. the new financial products are not without 
cost to the debtor. On the contrary their appearance has 
been accompanied by a rise in short-term real interest rates. 
This has the welcome effect of rationalizing the allocation 
of resources obtained from financial sa\'ings. 
Lastly, the fact that assets which are liquid but earn a high 
rate of interest occupy a position between the capital markets 
and the segment of the money market more directly under 
the control of the central bank weakens the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy: the actions of a central bank 
are primarily reflected in changes in the relati\'e le\'el of 
interest rates on short-term and liquid assets and only reach 
the capital market late and in a diluted form. This streng-
thens the arguments in fa\'our of a monetary policy which 
consistently aims for stability. By limiting inflationary expec-
tations. such a policy makes market forces more rational. 
and these in any event remain the chief determinant of long-
term rates. 
The greater role played by the markets in determining short-
term rates also has its consequences for the management 
of monetary policy. In recent months several Community 
central banks have thus had to modify their instruments to 
a greater or lesser extent so as to strengthen the role of 
interest rates in controlling the monetary aggregates and 
credit, or so as to be able to react more flexibly to changes 
in money market rates. Thus Belgium's Banque Nationale, 
stating that monetary policy had to face up to changes which 
were far more rapid and more intense than before, decided 
in May 1985 to amend the procedures for fixing official rates 
in order to make them more flexible. With effect from I 
June 1985 the Danish national bank replaced a quantitative 
ceiling on credit by compulsory reserves on bank deposits 
in order to have a control mechanism more oriented to the 
market, and with effect from I August modified its money 
market intervention instruments in order to achieve more 
flexible management of liquidity and short-term rates. In 
the first half of 1985, the Bundesbank strengthened the role 
played by open market operations thus enabling a more 
flexible management of the money market. There is also the 
problem of reforming the system of compulsory reserves in 
the Federal Republic. The present system's effectiveness 
is liable to be jeopardized by the growth of marketable 
instruments on both the asset and the liability side. In 
particular, the growth of certificates of deposit, which are 
negotiable short or medium-term securities, and are not 
subject to compulsory reserves, could call into question the 
significance of the intermediate objective, which is directly 
linked to conventional bank deposits. With effect from I 
January 1985, the Banque de France abolished the system 
of quantitative ceilings on credit and replaced it by arrange-
ments based on compulsory reserves on lending net of non-
monetary resources. The reserve ratio is progressive and can 
be modified every quarter. These arrangements should give 
the banks greater discretion in their operations and stimulate 
competition between institutions. They could mark a stage 
in a gradual development which will result in more room 
being given to the use of interest rates. 
4.3. Interest rates 
Between the end of 1983 and July 1985, both short and long-
term nominal interest rates have been on a downward trend. 
which was temporarily interrupted in the lirst quarter of 
1985 following a rise in the dollar exchange rate. Over the 
whole period the fall in the long-term nominal rate was 
sharper than the fall in the short-term rate: in terms of 
Community averages the long-term rate fell 1.7 percentage 
points between the end of December 1983 and July 1985. 
while the short-term rate fell 1.2 points. Among the countries 
participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism the fall 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
over the same period was 1.9 percentage points for long-
term rates and I, 7 percentage points for short-term rates. 
Three additional comments are called for. 
(i) European short-term interest rates did not fully match 
either the upward movement of the United States short-
term rate up to the middle of 1984 or its sharp fall in the 
following 12 months (see Graph 4.1). At the end of July 
1985 the level of United States short-term rates (three-month 
Treasury bills) was I. 7 percentage points down on the end 
of 1983 and 3,1 percentage points down on July 1984. For 
long-term rates, the decline was much steadier in Europe 
than in the United States and, in contrast to the performance 
of short-term rates, sharper. This relative change in the yield 
curves of the United States and Europe is indicative of the 
more favourable development of fundamentals. in particular 
budget and external deficits. on this side of the Atlantic and, 
probably, of the greater credibility of the economic policy 
mix here. 
(ii) Among the EMS countries, the decline in interest rates 
was generally more marked in the countries where they 
remain relatively high (France, Italy, Belgium and Denmark) 
than in the countries with lower interest rates (Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands). In the latter 
countries, and particularly in the Federal Republic. the 
external constraint on the financial markets remained severe. 
as was demonstrated by the large outflows of capital to 
the United States. However. expectations now seem more 
favourable to the mark on the dollar foreign exchange mar-
ket and the constraint represented by out!lows of capital 
had eased considerably by the middle of 1985; these develop-
ments could continue to favour a fall in both long and short-
term interest rates. In August 1985. nominal long-term rates 
in the Federal Republic were thus down to their lowest level 
since 1979 (6.4 % ). while in the same month the Bundesbank 
cut its key rates by half a percentage point. The German 
money market rate came down from 6.3 % in March 1985 
to 4,7 % in August. The extent of any further fall will. 
however, be constrained by the commitment to control mon-
etary growth, which so far has remained completely consist-
ent with the targets set. 
On the other hand. in the countries where inflation remains 
highest. nominal interest rates have been able to follow 
the sometimes appreciable slowdown in the rate of price 
increases. Yet it must be noted that the monetary authorities· 
management of short-term rates has remained very cautious. 
and this is desirable from the point of view of the external 
and internal stabilization of their currencies. The central 
banks have in general avoided reducing short-term rates 
more rapidly and more sharply than the fall in the inflation 
rate even though the external situation as revealed by con-
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GRAPH 4.1 : la1erelt rates In tbe Community ud la tbe USA 
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ditions within the EMS seemed to leave them some room 
for manoeuvre. 
In the United Kingdom the pressures on sterling at the start 
of this year meant that short-term interest rates had to be 
raised by some 4 percentage points, and this was reflected 
in a 5 percentage point rise in the banks' base rates. Although 
they have since fallen, short-term rates in the United King-
dom are still some 2,5 percentage points higher than at the 
end of 1984. Given some revival of inflation and the very 
rapid growth of money and credit in the last few months, 
this movement of rates is also justified by a domestic need 
for stabilization. 
(iii) In the Commmunity, in the last few years, 'real long-
term interest rates', measured as a first approximation by 
the difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate 
of increase of consumer prices, converged upwards (see 
Table 4.5). However. the rise of real interest rates on average 
in the Community (by 4,5 percentage points between 1981 
and 1984) remained well below the increase in the United 
States (9,9 percentage points between the same two years). 
In all the Community countries except Greece the difference 
between the nominal long-term interest rate and the inflation 
rate is now in the range 3,5 % to 6,5 %, whereas a far wider 
range still existed at the start of the 1980s. 
Methodological difficulties exist in measuring real interest 
rates. If disinflation is rapid or the inflation rate is histori-
Table 4.5 
Development and convergence of real long-term interest ratesl 
1971-80 1980 1981 
B 1.3 5,2 5,7 
DK 4.4 5,7 6,8 
D 2.7 2,8 4,2 
NL I. I 3,5 5,0 
F 1.0 0,1 2,6 
IRL -0.7 -2,5 -2,4 
I -2.1 -4,3 0,9 
GR - 5.3 -6,2 -5,5 
UK - 1.1 -3.5 2,6 
EUR average 1.4 0,6 3.2 
USA -0.5 -2.4 2,3 
Range 
EMS 6.5 10,0 9.2 
EUR 9,7 11.9 12.3 
I Ad1ustcd l,n the has1s fir the consumer rm."'C inJc, 
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cally low, the real interest rate, as measured by the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the actual rate of price 
increase can in certain cases be an overestimate as compared 
to a measure taking account of the inflation rate expected 
in the medium-term, which is probably higher than the 
current rate of inflation at such a time. Conversely, in 
countries where the inflation rate is still high but where the 
disinflation process has clearly begun and carries conviction, 
the real interest rate expected in the medium-term is higher 
than the rate measured with the current inflation rate. In-
flationary expectations play a key role in the formation 
of nominal interest rates. This fact certainly increases the 
importance that should be attributed to the pursuit of mon-
etary policies which aim at lasting price stability in a manner 
which carries conviction. Such policies help to bring the 
current and the expected inflation rates closer to one another 
and to stabilize them at the lowest level. This puts the 
formation of nominal interest rates on a more rational basis 
and creates a situation favourable to their progressive and 
lasting decline. 
Nevertheless, the persistence of a wide gap between the long-
term nominal interest rate and the current inflation rate may 
be seen as the expected consequence of a disinflation strategy 
which includes a tight monetary policy, especially since such 
policies are applied in most instances in situations character-
ized by large public sector deficits. This strategy has been 
applied in some Community countries and its effects in these 
countries have been accentuated by developments in the 
1982 1983 1984 Change Aug. 
1980-84 1985 
4,3 3,8 5,3 +0,1 5,6 
9,4 7,0 7,3 + 1,6 6,1 
3,5 4,2 5,2 +2,4 4,2 
4,3 5,9 5,3 + 1,8 4,9 
3,6 4,5 5,3 +5,2 6,0 
-0,3 3,1 5,5 +8,0 5,7 
3,8 2,9 3,7 +8,0 4,0 
-4,6 -1,9 0,1 +6,3 -3,2 
3,7 5,9 5,5 +9,0 4,0 
3,7 4.5 5,1 +4.5 4,7 
5. 7 7.4 7,5 +9,9 6,8 
9,7 4,1 3,6 -6,4 2,1 
14,0 8,9 7,2 -4,7 9,3 
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USA, where a combination of tight monetary policy has 
resulted in other countries being crowded out of the inter-
national capital markets. 
Almost all Community countries are now pursuing monetary 
policies based on the progressive reduction of the rates of 
growth of money and credit and on subsequently holding 
them to a path compatible with the objective of stability. In 
most cases these policies include participation in the Euro-
pean Monetary System. In these circumstances, the manage-
ment of short-term interest rates by the monetary authorities 
is subject to the constraints represented by the growth of 
money and credit and by the exchange rate discipline; and 
the room for manoeuvre in this area is limited. Market 
forces are becoming, perhaps for the first time, the chief 
determinant of interest rates. In particular, the monetary 
authorities are virtually unable to exercise direct control 
over long-term nominal (and, a fortiori. real) interest rates 
without a danger of coming into conflict with the other 
intermediate objectives of monetary policy. Further, full 
participation in the EMS stabilizes expectations about the 
Jong-term development of exchange rates and thus increases 
the degree of substitutability between financial assets de-
nominated in the different currencies. To that extent the 
links between the interest rates ruling on the different na-
tional capital markets are made stronger. 
The continuation of restrictions on capital movements does 
of course introduce distortions into the formation of interest 
rates within the EMS. Such restrictions can give the authori-
ties an enlarged room for manoeuvre in the execution of 
monetary policy. It may, however, be noted that the exist-
ence of very different systems regulating the movement of 
capital has not prevented an upward convergence of real 
Jong-term interest rates in the Community (see Table 4.5). 
That is to say, since the aims of stability and convergence are 
common ground. the room for manoeuvre made available by 
capital contrnls has been used only to a limited extent. 
While it may appc:ar that the persistence of high real long-
term interest rates may raise problems, notably for public 
finance, and may more generally have an impact on the 
growth process, the scope for individual, or even for con-
certed. action on Jong-term interest rates is very limited. A 
sustained reduction will be dependent essentially on the 
orderly continuation of the disinnation process in a manner 
which carries conviction, and on the elimination of financial 
disequilibria, in the first place those affecting the public 
finances. 
4.4. Exchange market developments 
The exchange rates of the principal non-Community curren-
cies have, as in other recent years, been subject to very wide 
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changes. Over the period from December 1983 to July 1985 
the gap between the highest monthly average value of the 
US dollar against the ECU. which occurred in March 1985, 
and the lowest, which occurred in March 1984, was 27 16 %. 
By July 1985 the monthly average value of the US dollar 
had fallen 12,4 % against the ECU since March I 985. The 
yen also underwent wide variations against the ECU: its 
range over the same period and on the same basis was 
11,4 % and it fell against the ECU by 7,3 % between March 
and July 1985. It should be remembered that the dollar's 
movements in both directions have been accompanied since 
July 1984 by a fall of short-term interest rates in the USA 
which has been much more rapid than that occurring in 
Europe, while the differential between long-term interest 
rates has been virtually unchanged (see 4.3). The relationship 
between interest rate differentials and exchange rates has 
been extremely unstable in this period, and is evidence of 
the uncertainty felt in the markets as to the future value of 
the US dollar. 
These developments must be seen in the context of the stance 
of monetary policy in Europe. In 1983 and 1984 monetary 
authorities in Europe could accept a rise in the exchange 
value of the US dollar without a substantial or prolonged 
tightening of policy. As a result of the substantial steps 
taken in other areas of economic policy, it was possible to 
make great progress towards domestic stabilization in spite 
of the fall in the external value of European currencies. 
The stabilization process was. however. interrupted. if not 
reversed. in the early months of 1985. to some extent pre-
cisely because of the sharp rise of the US dollar between 
November 1984 and March 1985. The fall of the US dollar 
which is occurring at present should certainly reduce the 
burden falling on monetary policy in the pursuit of the final 
objective of price stability. The stabilization which would be 
the mechanical result of a slow-down of the rise of import 
prices will of itself open up greater scope for real growth for 
any given rate of expansion of nominal quantities. Neverthe-
less, quite independently of the US dollar exchange rate, 
lasting success in the struggle against innation can only be 
obtained by the pursuit of the medium-term strategy cur-
rently being given effect. which aims at moderate money 
growth over the Jong term and which is dealing with the 
structural causes of innation. in particular by dismantling 
systems of income indexation. The stabilization of the inter-
national monetary system is desirable. but. pending substan-
tial progress in this field. monetary and financial discipline 
remains the option taken by Europe as a whole as a matter 
of domestic policy. 
The exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System has demonstrated a remarkable degree of stability 
since the realignment in March 1983. even if one takes 
account of the realignment of 20 July 1985 which resulted 
in a depreciation of7,8 % in the lira's central rate against the 
other currencies, but left all other bilateral rates unchanged. 
If one excludes the case of the lira, it would appear that the 
maintenance of the bilateral parities within the EMS since 
March 1983 has not required the monetary authorities to 
react with substantial and long lasting changes in interest 
rates. The one exception to be noted is the Belgian franc 
which came under pressure at the beginning of 1984. The 
increase in the rates decided at that time by the authorities 
has since then been reversed. 
The absence of significant pressures within the exchange 
rate mechanism is well illustrated by the relative position or 
currencies within their margins for fluctuations (see Graph 
4.3). The currencies or the countries having the lowest rates 
of inflation and in addition an external surplus retained a 
margin for appreciation within the existing constraints of 
Table 4.6 
Real exchange rates based on unit labour costs 1 
1%1-70 1971-76 1977 147S 1979 
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the system. However the stabilization programmes under-
taken by the least well balanced countries in the EMS were 
and will remain decisive; these efforts have already been 
crowned with a certain success and the external accounts 
have been brought back into balance. 
For all that, the convergence of policy has proven insufficient 
in itself and, given the continued disparities in performances, 
has necessitated the maintenance of large interest differen-
tials between the currencies of the EMS. By not fully exploit-
ing the margin of manoeuvre in the short term to reduce 
their interest rates whilst still maintaining a reasonable situ-
ation with the EMS. the central banks of the high-inflation 
countries have reinforced both the credibility of their policies 
aimed at internal stabilization and of the parity grid itself. 
The effect of the interest differentials on the stability of the 
EMS has also been reinforced by the burden carried by 
( annual me rages. 19 70 = /00) 
19SO 19SI 198~ 148.1 19S4 19852 
·Against EMS partners only 
B 105.3 105.3 120,8 120.6 118.5 113.8 111.5 99.9 97,7 99.6 102.6 
DK 98,6 101.4 105.4 104.6 102.6 96.4 96.7 94.4 93.5 93.5 95.8 
D 90.9 105,9 101.4 101.8 100.0 96.1 92.3 94.3 93.5 92,0 90.8 
F 115.3 95.0 93,7 93.4 95.3 100.4 103,0 99.8 96.5 96.9 99.1 
IRL 105.4 90.1 75.3 76.7 85.9 93.9 96.8 101.4 99.5 98.9 102.0 
I 103.1 89,2 81.9 81.5 82.9 87.8 95.2 99.6 109.7 114.9 113.8 
NL 92.0 107,6 115.4 116,0 115.0 111.7 106.4 110.2 107.2 102.5 99.4 
Against ( l) partners 
B 103,8 109.2 i::n.1 127.6 125.9 119.2 110.4 98.1 95.8 95.3 96.7 
DK 94.9 108,0 114.4 115,6 114.4 104.9 97,0 94.0 93.5 90,3 90,6 
D 90,9 109,1 107.5 108.6 108,3 103,8 92.8 92.7 91.8 87.6 85.2 
F 111,6 99.1 100,0 100,1 102,6 106.3 100.7 95.9 92.6 90.0 90,1 
IRL 99,I 99,3 88,8 91,3 100.3 103.6 97.9 101.4 100.0 96.4 97.3 
I 100,7 94,7 88,7 88.9 91.1 95,4 94.7 96.5 104.7 105.6 103.0 
NL 90.9 111.4 121.0 122.3 121.5 116.5 105,3 107.7 104.9 98.3 94.2 
EMS 96,2 109.2 112.2 113.9 116.I 113.7 98.5 95.4 94.6 89.1 86.3 
GR 112.1 82.1 83.5 83,l 87.2 78,3 81.1 87.1 79.9 78.3 77.8 
UK 108,0 93.0 82.0 84.6 95.6 116.9 119.2 111.1 103.0 100.3 102.2 
EUR 100,4 104.9 102.2 105.2 113.1 120.3 105.0 99.2 95.2 88.5 86.3 
USA 97.3 76,4 67.1 61.8 6U 61.8 68.6 78.2 82.3 88.5 93.6 
I Cakul.Hc,.l usm~ Jouhlc C\f"'.'rl wct~hts ,arrnhk from ~co1r h) ~car unul l'-»8.'\. 
' 
lktl,hcr IQNS .xt.,nom1c fonxasts of thl' (.\,mnu~s1on Jcrartnh:nb 
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Germany in fina ncing the external deficit of the USA , given 
the position of the mark as a reserve currency and the 
freedom of capita l movements in Germany . 
The stability of bilateral exchange rates within the EMS has 
led to certain divergences in rea l exchange rates (see Table 
4.6) . On the basis of unit labour costs in the whole economy 
as compared to their partners in the EMS, these divergences 
remain in all cases, except Italy, moderate and less than 
those experienced during the first of the prolonged periods 
of stability within the EMS ( 1979-81 ). These divergences 
remain in the spirit of an exchange rate mechanism with 
fixed but adjustable parities and provide support to the 
domestic stabili zation policy actions in the countries where 
inflation is still too high. For these countries the rise in the 
US dollar up to Ma rch 1985 has attenuated the impact of 
these divergences on their overall level of competitivity 
aga inst their industrialized partners. On the other hand the 
ga ins in competitivity made by the more stable countries 
should allow them , everything else being equal, to permit a 
fas ter rate o f rea l growth without prejudicing their external 
balance. 
The adjustment of the lira 's parity. carried out at the end of 
Jul y 1985, ca n be accounted for by fund amental and by 
circumstanti a l fact o rs. 
The rapidity with which thi s operation was conducted aft(;! r 
the di sorder in the lira exchange market on the previous day 
with the unanimity of the participants in the EMS -
bea rs witness to the orderly functioning of the exchange rate 
mechanism . Because of a growth ra te which was in excess 
of it s partner , Italy experienced a sha rp deterioration in its 
ex ternal balance a t the end o f 1984 and the beginn ing of 
1985. In spite of the progress already achieved , Italy retained 
a n inflatio n rat e some 4,5 percentage points abo ve it s EMS 
partners and co nsequently experienced a loss o f competiti v-
it y against them . The Trea ury deficit threatened in the first 
quarter o f 1985 to exceed 16 % o f GDP for the whole yea r 
I % mo re than in 1984 - whils t the sys tem o f a utoma tic 
wage indexa ti o n known as the sea/a 1110hile wo uld . in con-
trast to the previo us year. have it s full impact on wage a nd 
sa la ry develo pments. The burden placed on mo neta ry a nd 
exchange ra te po li cy in the s tabili zation process was made 
signifi ca ntl y hea vier. 
Followi ng the rea lignment o r Jul y 1985. the situa tio n within 
the M remai ned ca lm . The currencies o ther than the lira 
returned mo re or less to the same pos itio ns within their 
margins of fluctua tio n. Compared with the market rate o n 
the Thursday preceding the reali gnment. the effecti ve ra te 
of the lira. which a t present is the stro ngest currency in the 
1 . de precia ted by o nl y 3 °o . However. thi s currency 
adjustment \\ ill no t be full y vi nd ica ted unless. a soon as 
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possible, significant measures, some of which had already 
been decided on at the time of the July realignment. are put 
into effect so as to permit the Italian economy to return this 
year and next to the path of convergence. 
In recent months sterling has fluctuated sharply (see Graph 
4.3) . At the end of 1984, and even more in January 1985, this 
currency was under severe pressure on the foreign exchange 
markets . Between September 1984 and January 1985 it 
depreciated by 5,3 % against the ECU and 11 % against the 
dollar. Since then the rise in short-term interest rates which 
occurred at the end of January 1985 (see 4.3) has reversed 
and sterling has tended to rise both against the dollar (by 
13 ,5 % between January and June 1985) and against the 
ECU (by 8,7 % over the same period). The instability of the 
sterling exchange rate against the ECU and the size of the 
changes in interest rates necessary to stabilize the currency's 
external va lue have contrasted sharply in recent months with 
the more placid course taken by the currencies pa rticipating 
in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
In 1985 the drachma continued to depreciate against the 
ECU . This movement became more pronounced following 
the fall of the dollar after March 1985. However. the sharp 
deterioration of the Greek current account ba la nce in the 
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first nine months of 1985 led the Greek authorities to devalue 
the drachma by 15 % on 11 October 1985. This devaluation 
is part of an economic stabilization programme which led 
the Commission to put into effect the provisions of Article 
I 08 of the EEC Treaty. On this basis, the Commission 
addressed an economic policy recommendation to the Greek 
Government covering monetary policy as well as public 
finance and incomes. The Commission also authorized 
Greece to maintain temporarily certain protective measures 
affecting external trade and capital transactions undertaken 
hy Greek residents. At the same time Greece benefited from 
a Community balance of payments support loan of 175 
million ECU. 
4.5. European Monetary System and financial 
integration 
Several facts make it incontrovertibly clear that the monet-
ary and financial component of the Community's internal 
market has been strengthened, while remaining incomplete. 
and that some progress has been made towards the financial 
integration of the Community countries. 
First of all, the stability of exchange rates between the 
currencies of the ~ountries participating in the EMS ex-
change rate mechanism and the generally orderly way in 
which the necessary adjustments are made contrast sharply 
with the often erratic shifts which occurred in the past, 
and which still affect other currencies. This stability is also 
renected in the limited nature of exchange rate variations 
between the ECU and its chief component currencies. It 
answers to a need felt by certain private operators, as is 
evidenced by the development of the private ECU as an 
investment currency and a borrowing currency, and by its 
use within the framework of cori1mercial agreements (see 
box). 
It may be argued that it was the operation of certain factors 
outside the system that made possible the proper functioning 
of the exchange rate mechanism in the last few months. The 
integral cohesion of the EMS required however, in addition 
to a consensus on the priorities to be adopted and the 
methods to be employed in all areas of economic policy, a 
greater convergence of performance and a close coordi-
nation of monetary policies both internal and external. The 
convergence of inOation rates on the lowest in the Com-
munity and the restoration of balance to the external ac-
counts of the countries which had excessively high deficits 
in 1982 and 1983, were essential ·10 the stability of the EMS. 
However, it is necessary to enter upon a new and important 
stage if a satisfactory degree of convergence is to be attained. 
To reach this objective, fresh moves are necessary on budgets 
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and on wages. The size of these moves will determine the 
burden which monetary policies will have to bear in the 
convergence process in the months ahead. In any event. 
coherent monetary policies which contribute to convergence 
remain a factor of the utmost importance for the internal 
cohesion of the EMS and for its capacity to withstand 
external monetary shocks in an orderly fashion. 
If the stability of the Community currencies - both internal 
stability and. within the framework of the EMS. external 
stability - is an essential economic foundation for the 
greater strength of the European monetary area. the freedom 
of capital movements within the Community is another 
essential component of that area. The principle of this free-
dom is written into the Treaty of Rome and. by contributing 
to the creation of the internal market. its attainment would 
favour a better allocation of the resources represented by 
savings. 
Since the establishment of the EMS in March 1979. the 
objective of liberalizing capital movements has become even 
more important. For. to the extent that the restrictions 
on capital movements artificially increase the autonomy of 
monetary policies. they reduce the disciplinary effect of the 
exchange rate mechanism and are thus liable to hold back the 
convergence process. This argument is particularly relevant 
when external monetary shocks have a differential effect on 
the balances of payments as a result. partly of the varying 
degree of freedom enjoyed by capital movements. If the 
countries are to react smootr.ly to such shocks. the rules 
governing movements of capital must be brought closer 
together and their implementation must be properly coordi-
nated. Indeed. in 1972 the Council adopted a Directive. 
which is still in force, requiring the Member States to provide 
themselves with certain instruments by which they can pro-
tect themselves against capital nows from third countries 
and their effects on domestic liquidity. and to coordinate, 
where necessary, the use of these instruments. 
Since March 1979, some countries have maintained restric-
tions on capital movements which should otherwise have 
been freed under the Council Directive of 1960 implementing 
Article 67 of the EEC Treaty on the freedom of capital 
movements. In accordance with Article 108 of the EEC 
Treaty. these restrictions were authorized by the Com-
mission because of the balance of payments problems which 
the countries in question were experiencing at the time. In 
the early days of the EMS they could be justified by the 
scale of the differences then existing in the performances 
of the European economies. However, as these differences 
narrow and policies focus more resolutely on the common 
objective of stability, restrictions lose their point and it 
becomes more and more easy to do away with them. 
In the last few months. a new impetus has been given to the 
process of financial integration (see box). The Commission 
has repealed a decision which authorized Denmark to apply 
certain protective measures to capital movements. In ad-
dition, earlier decisions authorizing three other Member 
States ~ France, Ireland and Italy --- to maintain certain 
restrictions on capital movements were reviewed at the end 
of last year. They are now limited in time and have been 
made less restrictive in some respects. Some countries have 
also relaxed their exchange control regulations to an extent 
which goes beyond their strict obligations to the Com-
munity. In this area, much progress still needs to be made 
in France, Italy and Ireland. In Belgium the abolition of the 
dual foreign exchange market would serve to complete the 
full liberalization of the money and capital markets. 
The increased convergence of economic performances and 
the measures increasing somewhat the freedom of capital 
movements provide a basis on which the Committee of 
Central Bank Governors and the Council have been able to 
strengthen the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. The 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
yield of official ECU positions held by the central banks is 
now linked to the actual conditions prevailing on the money 
markets of the member countries. In addition. the rules 
governing recourse to official ECU holdings within the ex-
change rate mechanism have been made more flexible. and 
third country central banks and certain international finan-
cial institutions have been given the possibility of holding 
official ECU. The growing use of the ECU as a vehicle for 
financial and commercial transactions. and the development 
of a huge financial market. which is dynamic and attractive 
to international investors, are likely to reduce the cost to 
Europe of external monetary shocks (see box on the private 
ECU). 
Greater convergence of performance. an effective coordi-
nation of monetary policies. progress towards the freedom 
of capital movements, and the strengthening of the exchange 
rate mechanism together bear witness to a significant 
achievement over the last twelve months in the area of 
monetary and financial integration. 
129 
Annual Economic Review 1985-86 
Exchange control measure.1 
Cvmmissivn Decisions under Article /08 of the Treaty 
At its meeting on 19 December 1984 the Commission adopted 
four Decisions (OJ L 8 of 10 January I 985, pp. 29-37) concerning 
the application of the safeguard clause in Article 108 (3) of the 
Treaty. These Decisions were addressed to the four Member 
States (France, Italy, Ireland and Denmark) which had pre-
viously been authorized by the Commission to maintain restric-
tions on capital movements which would otherwise have been 
liberalized under the Council Directive of 11 May 1960 (First 
Directive for the implementation of Article 67 of the EEC 
Treaty), as amended by the Directive of 18 December 1962. 
In the case of Denmark. the Commission repealed its Decision 
of 22 December 1977. since the protective measures authorized 
by that Decision had bee·n withdrawn. 
The other Member States concerned are still authorized to 
continue to apply certain protective measures with regard to 
capital movements which would otherwise have been liberalized. 
In the case of Ireland. the authorized restrictions relate to the 
acquisition by residents of foreign securities dealt in on a stock 
exchange other than securities issued by Community institutions 
and the EIB. 
In the case of France and Italy. the Commission Decisions 
feature new measures which relax earlier restrictions: 
France 
The requirement that direct investments of more than FF 2 
million must be financed with foreign currency now applies only 
to 50 % of the operation (instead of 75 %). The requirement 
that residents acquiring foreign securities denominated in foreign 
currency must do so through the investment currency market 
no longer applies to the acquisition of securities denominated 
in ECU and issued by Community institutions and the EIB on 
the French market. 
The limit on the personal transfers which residents may make 
abroad without justification has been increased to FF I 500 a 
month per person. The construction or purchase of real property 
abroad by residents for second homes. gifts to non-residents and 
transfers abroad of the assets of French emigrants remain subject 
to authorization. 
Italy 
The relaxation affects the non-interest bearing deposit which 
residents wishing to effect certain investments abroad must lodge 
with the Bank of Italy: this has been reduced and the rules have 
been modified. 
For investments in real estate. the deposit has been cut from 
50 % to 40 % of the value of the property; 
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For investments m foreign securities dealt in on a stock ex-
change: 
the depo~it is reduced from 50 % to 40 % for the acqui-
sition of securities which the resident undertakes to hold 
for more than a year; 
it is cut to 30 % for the acquisition of securities issued by 
the Community institutions and the EIB, held for more 
than a year; 
collective investment undertakings for transferable securi-
ties may put up to JO % of their resources into foreign 
securities without making the deposit. 
The Commission has fixed a period after which the Decisions 
should in principle expire (after two years in the case of France 
and three years in the case of Italy and Ireland). Beyond those 
periods. the authorization to maintain all or part of the protec-
tive measures in force may be extended only if those countries' 
balances of payments are still in difficulties or are seriously 
threatened with difficulties. 
Main measures taken hy the Memher States 
Independently of the Community requirements laid down in the 
above mentioned 1960 Directive. a number of Member States 
have taken steps to relax their exchange controls. 
In Denmark. with effect from I Julv 1985. the authorities re-
duced from five years to one year the ~inimum period for which 
Danish enterprises other than financial institutions may contract 
loans abroad. The acquisition of unlisted foreign securities has 
also been authorized. 
In France. the declaration formalities relating to direct invest-
ment were relaxed in November 1984. In March 1985 French 
importers were authorized to make forward foreign exchange 
purchases for a maximum period of six months with a view to 
paying for goods invoiced in ECU. 
In Italy. the amount of loans which residents may contract 
abroad without prior authorization was increased in June 1985 
to LIT 500 million for loans not exceeding five years and to 
LIT 3 OOO million for loans of less than fin'. years but with an 
average maturity of more than two years. 
Tourism and other .fimns 11( tral'el 
The Commission has informed those Member States which 
maintain exchange controls of the conclusions it has drawn from 
the judgment delivered by the Court of Justice on 31 January 
1984 concerning transfers relating to tourism and other forms 
of travel (Joined Cases 286 '82 and 26 83. Luisi-Carbone). The 
Commission's position is. in brief. that residents of the Member 
States must be put in a position to cover expenditure incurred 
abroad. whether this inrnlvcs transfers through approved inter-
mediaries. the granting of flat-rate foreign currency allowances 
on departure (which may be exceeded subject to proof and 
possible post jiJCto justification). or the local use of appropriate 
means of payment. 
Major liberalizing measures were taken in this field in 1984 in 
France (permission to use credit cards and similar instruments 
The ECU market: de1•elopme11ts and characteristics 
The hc111ki11g market 
Using information provided by reporting European banks, the 
Bank for International Settlements now produces quarterly stat-
istics1 for the ECU banking market similar to those which it 
has compiled for a long time for the main currencies. After 
setting out below the ECU liabilities and assets of the banking 
system - in aggregate and broken down by activity sector -
this section examines a number of the market's salient features. 
Overall growth of ECU (in 'OOO million) 
l.1ah1h11c~ Asscb 
December 1982 5.68 6.72 
December 1983 12.09 14.38 
March 1984 17.09 20.70 
June 1984 20.52 25,99 
September 1984 25.44 32,34 
December 1984 31.45 39.49 
Breakdown between the two sectors of banking activity (in ·ooo 
million ECU) 
Liabilities ,·is··ii·r1s. Asscls ri.,-,i-\'iJ. 
Banking Non-hanlmg B,mling Non-h.:mkm~ 
St."\:IOT 1 '«..'1..'lllT Sl.'\:'IOT ~'\.:ltlf 
End December 1983 10,76 1.33 9.67 4.71 
End March 1984 15,35 1.74 14.19 6.51 
End June 1984 18.41 2.11 18.16 7.83 
End September 1984 23.41 2.03 23.27 9.07 
End December 1984 28.63 2.82 28.35 11.14 
1 The ligutc"s for the hanl..mg !-Cctnr .m: llhtamcJ h) JcJuctmg those recorded for non-
hanls from the totals 10 the first t.ihlc ahovc 
Sourn· l\,mm1sMt'O 1.,f the Europc,m Cl,mmumtics. hascJ on d1.,ll,1r figures from the BIS 
• md i:on,crtcd mhl FCl · using the 1.h,ll.1r LCl rat1.·, for the last Y.orlmg Ja~ tlf 
the m1..,nth con'-"t'rn1.'\I 
1 Quartcrl~ hulktm l,f the: 8Jnl. for lntcrn.tth,n.ll Sc:ttkmc:nh. ~h,nctar~ ;md E('onomi(' 
lXrurtmC'nt ·tntNnJth,n.il h..rnL.m~ ,t1.·t1,u~. fl,urth l.4Uartc:r of P~s.r. ,\pril IQX5 
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abroad was restored) and in Italy (increase in the flat-rate 
allowance. residents being able to take with them without justifi-
cation the equivalent of LIT 2 million per person and per trip: 
permission for credit cards and similar instruments to be used 
abroad). The Irish authorities have clarified their rules conc~rn-
ing the possibility of exceeding the flat-rate allowance and the 
use of credit cards beyond that limit. 
Four characteristics of the market emerge from these statistics. 
from the study devoted to the ECU in the BIS annual report2 
and from observation of banking activity in this field. 
The ECU is now well placed among the currencies used on the 
international banking market. Whereas European banks' assets 
and liabilities in other currencies are marking time or even 
falling, ECU business has been expanding considerably. particu-
larly since the beginning of 1984 - the year in which ECU 
liabilities and assets overtook those denominated in pounds 
sterling. guilders and French francs: if. as is probable. they 
overtake those denominated in yen during the course of 1985. 
the ECU will then rank after the dollar. the German mark and 
the Swiss franc. 
The breakdown between interbank operations and those with 
non-banks (depositors and borrowers) shows that the former 
take by far the larger share. with the interbank market account-
ing for more than 70 °/o of the total. This proportion - much 
greater. according to the BIS. than that recorded for other 
currencies except the yen - is due to the wide variety of 
operators on this market. The fact that borrowers are concen-
trated mainly in Italy and in France and depositors principally 
· in Belgium and that only a few banks are feeding the market 
by putting together ECUs from the component currencies has 
necessitated the setting-up of a major interbank transfer system 
between the different banking centres acti\·e in the field of ECU 
operations. 
The geographical enlargement of the ECU banking market 
beyond its present Belgian. Italian and French ·sanctuaries· 
which is regarded as one of the conditions of its further develop-
ment. now appears to be developing progressively. both on the 
deposit and on the lending side. Deposits by Belgian residents are 
now down to 25 °10 of the total. while in the field of svndicated 
medium-term credits. the summer of 1985 saw such o'perations 
in some 15 countries. including the USSR. Hungarv. India and 
Brazil. The formula increasingly proposed for syndicated bank 
loans is one in which the ECU is offered joint!) or alternately 
with the dollar and is thus promoted on the international monet-
ary scene . 
~ 55th JnnuJI rt:pl,rt l,fthc: 8.tnL. for lntc:rn;.1twn.1l Scttlc:mc:nt~ 1BISl tBa,lc:. JO June: 14S5J 
pp 14S1,, I)~ 
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The ECU banking market is a net borrower: deposits are not 
growing sufficiently fast (a total of less than 3 OOO million ECU 
at the end of 1984) to cover the rapid growth in lending (more 
than 11 OOO million ECU at the same time). The shortfall has 
had lo be made up by pulling together ECUs from liabilities 
denominated in component currencies. This gap. which is con-
tinually widening and which currently represents almost three 
quarters of the loans granted. is filled by a few banks (notabl) 
those participating in the present clearing arrangements. which 
thus maintain the balance of the system). 
Since it is always possible lo switch between the ECU and its 
component currencies. the short-term ECU interest rates paid to 
and hy major operators remain constantly close to the theoretical 
rates calculated on the basis of the rates for the component 
currencies. 
2. Bond issues 
From a total of 190 million ECU in five issues in 1981. ECU-
denominated bond issues increased to 722 million ECU in 1982. 
to I 935 million ECU in 1983. to 3 444.2 million ECU in 1984 
and to 6 568 million for the first nine months of this year 
(including 4 290 million ECU for the first six months). The 
amount placed during the first three quarters is already twice 
the amount issued during the whole of the previous year. On 
the Euro-issue market. the ECU ranks third after the dollar and 
the German mark. while on the international market generally 
(which also inclur.:s issues of non-residents on domestic mar-
kets) it ranks fifth after the two currencies previously mentioned 
- the Swiss franc and the yen. 
ECU bond issues on the international market 
(by issuer group. in millions of ECU) 
19SI 1~81 l~X) 
EEC 150 572 I 330 
Rest of Europe 85 285 
Rest of the world 40 65 320 
Total: 190 722 I 935 
19X4 l9X~ I 
::,, 004 2 833 
634 '.'.50 
806 I '.'.07 
3 444 4 290 
With regard to the structure of the market. the statistics show 
that. while Community issuers still account for the hulk of all 
operations. there has been a gradual widening of the circle 
of borrowers since 1984: issuers of ECU-denominated bonds 
number approximately I 00 from '.'.3 countries. The newcomers 
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to this market include operators from New Zealand and Korea 
and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
For the first nine months of 1985. Japanese issuers. either 
directly or through their subsidiaries. led the way in terms of 
nu·,, 'tr of issues. with 16 issues out of 80. Some of these issues 
were launched not on the international market but on the 
domestic financial markets in New York. Copenhagen, Amstcr-
da!T' 'hankbricvcn) and Tokyo (private EEC placement). 
Although no statistics arc available. it is estimated that since 
the beginning of 1985. 75 % of issues have been placed outside 
Belgium and that 50 % have been placed with institutional 
investors. mainly from Switzerland. Japan. Scandinavia and the 
United States. 
Interest rates fell to such an extent during the first half of the 
year (from just above 10 % to 8 % %) that they went below 
the short-term three-month rates. Since then. the situation has 
normalized: short-term rates have fallen. long-term rates have 
recovered and the most recent issues have been placed at rates 
which are more in line with the maturity profile. Although. at 
the long end. it is difficult to make any meaningful comparison 
between the actual yield and the theoretical yield computed 
from that of issues in each of the component currencies. certain 
statistics indicate that the premium which the observed rate has 
regularly shown over the calculated rate. narrowed in the early 
part of 1985. eventually giving way to a discount. This compari-
son between long-term market rates. observed short-term rates 
and long-term computed rates illustrates the actual autonomy 
of the rates at which ECU issues are floated. 
3. Conclusions 
Parallel with this growth in its market. the ECU has become 
more institutionalized since 1984: the ECU is now officially 
fixed on the foreign exchange markets of all the Member States 
(except for Germany) which have a fixing procedure. and also 
in Portugal. ECU issues. still very small in number. are quoted 
on all Community stock exchanges except for those in Germany. 
Ireland and Greece. The issues floated at the beginning of the 
year in the United States and the private placement made in 
Tokyo in June 1985 by the European Economic Community are 
probably forerunners of new developments on these markets. 
Both financial and commercial transactions can be carried out 
in almost all Member States. in many other European countries 
and in the United States. Canada. Japan and India. The fact 
that the ECU is beginning to be used for invoicing or paying 
for raw materials. for gas within the Community and for coal 
and paper pulp from the United States. demonstrates that the 
commercial use of the ECU is beginning to take ofT - a process 
whi·~h should be helped by the introduction of this currency unit 
on the financial futures markets. 
5. Budgetary policy 
/11 1985, 1/11: hudget deficit expressed as a proportion of GDP again fell slightly in the 
Community as a ll'hole, hecause of the strict control of budget volumes, ll'hich for the first 
time in a long period 11·as translated into a slight decrease in the weight of public expenditure 
in GDP. This trend, 1!f' irhich there 1rere signs a year ago, has therefore been confirmed. 
The stance of hudgetary policies has remained very cautious even (f the slight increase in 
activity and the slmnlmrn in i11/lation have slightly diminished their restrictive character. 
For the longer term, most lvlemher States today have a dual ambition: to continue to limit 
budget <il'./ICits and to hring do1rn, by stages, rates of taxation. In these circumstances we 
can expect, as a Co111111u11ity average, a gradual moderation in the increase in the weight of 
puhlic debt in GDP. Although some Member States are in a position to stabili=e fairly 
rapidly their puhlic debt as a proportion of GDP, others will probably require far more time 
and ejj11rt to do so; they would be greatly helped if interest rates go on falling. 
5.1. Budgetary trends and policies 
The main feature of 1985 is that it continues to follow the 
trends of earlier years as regards the control of budget 
volumes and balances rather than steering a new course. 
The restoration of balance to public accounts is a long-term 
endeavour. so that the national authorities have directed 
their efforts at keeping the implementation of budgets within 
the limits set by the finance laws for 1985 and have been 
fairly successful in doing so. given the huge scale of expendi-
ture resulting automatically from existing legislation. The 
maintenance of a strict control on public spending and 
budget deficits governs the success or implementation of 
plans to bring taxation down by stages. which are increas-
ingly becoming the objectives of medium-term budget strate-
gies in the Community. Reduction of the central govern-
ment's weight in the economy. and more precisely of the 
proportion of resources which it collects and redistributes. 
is an element in the impro\'ement of the Community's ca-
pacity for growth: but this is made more dirticult to achieve 
because of the persistence of moderate growth which. if 
policies remain unchanged. is unlikely to increase signifi-
cantly in 1986. 
The slowdown in the advance of budget revenue and expen-
diture continued in 1985 (see Table 5.1) in parallel with the 
reduction in the rate of inllation and nominal growth. On 
the whole. and except for income from direct taxes and 
public debt interest charges. revenue and expenditure in-
creased slightly less than the value of GDP. So. the pro-
portion of current revenue in GDP. which had again in-
creased in I 984. diminished slightly in 1985 as did the 
proportion of current expenditure and total expenditure (see 
Table 5 .. ,). The Community's net borrowing fell by two-
tenths of a percentage point of GDP in 1985 to stand at 
5.2 %. This general trend of budget rnlumes is likely to 
continue in 1986 and to give rise to a further reduction in 
the share of budget expenditure and revenue in activity and 
to a further fall in net borrowing as a proportion of GDP. 
The change. of which there were signs a year ago (see 
Chapter 6 of the 1984-85 Review. European Economy No 
22) in the trend of public finance as a proportion of activity 
in the Community. is therefore being confirmed. But the 
final out-turn for 1984 is slightly down on that suggested 
last year by the preliminary estimates: in comparison with 
1983. current revenue increased by a half a percentage point 
of GDP and total expenditure by three-tenths of a point, 
whereas a year ago these magnitudes were expected to re-
main virtually stable. However, average net borrowing did 
improve as forecast by one-tenth of a point in 1984. The fall 
in budget revenue and expenditure as a proportion of GDP. 
· which last year was expected for 1985. has taken place: 
three-tenths of a point of GDP for current revenue and 
expenditure and one half of a point for total expenditure; 
similarly the budget balance has improved by two-tenths of 
a point compared with the six-tenths expected a year ago. 
If we examine the same trends for each of the Member 
States. we see that the large majority of them in 1985 did 
indeed succeed in slightly reducing the share of public expen-
diture in GDP: only in Greece. Ireland and Italy did changes 
in the opposite direction occur. As regards receipts. however. 
the need to reduce structural deficits has caused six of the 
10 Member States to go on increasing the burden of taxation. 
On the other hand. France. the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom have purposely reduced the proportion of public 
revenue in GDP at the same time as that of public expendi-
ture. In Ireland. the reduction in the weight of public revenue 
as a proportion of GDP observed in 1985 resulted from a 
more substantial than expected slowdown in the rhythm of 
tax receipts while expenditure continued to grow. Germany 
stabilized the burden of taxation in 1985 at the same time 
reducing the weight of her budget expenditure. 
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Table 5.1 
General government revenue and expenditure, 1 EUR IO 
'(KKl o change 
m1lhon 
ECU 
1985' 1982 1983 1984 
Indirect taxes 409.6 I 1.9 10.8 9,3 
Direct taxes 391,7 14.2 JO.I 9,3 
Social security contributions re-
ceived 461.6 14.5 11.2 8.3 
Total taxes and social security con-
trihutions I 262.9 13.6 10.7 8.9 
Other current revenue 115,7 14.9 6.3 9.5 
Total current revenue I 378.6 13.7 10.3 9.0 
Current transfers paid 687,8 14.9 9.8 8.3 
Actual interest payments 152.3 22.8 I 5,4 14.5 
Government consumption 568.9 10.9 9,4 7.6 
Total current expenditure I 409,I 14,0 10.2 8,6 
Gross saving - 30.5 
Net capital transfers 32.5 13.2 22.6 22,9 
Gross capital formation 81.0 7.5 5.6 
Net lending ( + ) or borrowing ( - ) -144.0 
Memorandum: nominal GDP 10.7 8,9 
I National account, dcfimllon. nludmg loan'.\. ad\·anccs Jnd parucipauons 
l Es1imatcs. 
' 
Forecasts. 
' 
EUR JO. cxcludon~ Grecco and Ireland 
Sount". Comm1s!li1on scn.-u .. "C). 
With regard to budget balances. the two-tenths of a point 
GDP reduction in the level of Community countries· net 
borrowing. as compared with 1984. conceals an improve-
ment in the balance expressed as a percentage of GDP in 
six Member States and a deterioration in the other four 
(Greece. France. Ireland and Italy. sec Table 5.4. section 
(a)). If we compare the trend of budget balances in the 
Member States since 1982 we see that Denmark has managed 
to cut its net borrowing substantially. from 9.3 % of GDP 
in 1982 to 2.9 % in 1985. by stabilizing expenditure as a 
proportion of activity but chiefly' by raising the rate of tax 
and social security contributions. Germany. Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands have steadily improved their budget 
balarn.:c. Belgium did not really start to reduce its net bor-
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5.3 
8.0 
% of GDP 
19852 19861 1975' 1980' 1983 1984 198'.>' 19861 
6,0 6,7 12,3 13,4 13.8 13,9 13,7 13.7 
8,0 5,9 11,5 12,3 13.0 13,2 13,2 13.1 
6,7 7.0 13.5 14.5 15.5 15,6 15,5 15,5 
6,9 6.6 37.3 40.2 42.3 42.7 42,4 42.3 
8.5 4.1 3.0 3.5 3.7 3,8 3,8 3.7 
7,0 6,4 40.3 43,7 46.0 46,5 46,2 46.0 
6,6 5.1 20,0 21.0 23.2 23,3 23,1 22,7 
9,8 6.6 2.6 3,6 4,9 5,2 5,3 5,3 
6,5 5.5 18.2 18,5 19,4 19,3 19.1 18,9 
6,9 5,4 40,8 43.1 47.5 47,8 47,5 46.9 
-0.5 0.6 - 1.5 -1.3 -1.3 -0.9 
-4.4 2,8 0.9 I.I I.I 1.3 I.I 1,1 
5.2 6,7 4.0 3.2 2,9 2,8 2,8 2,8 
- 5.4 -3.7 -5.5 -5,4 -5.2 -4,8 
7.6 6.7 
rowing until 1984 and in Ireland, the underlying fall in the 
deficit was interrupted in 1985. France. like the United 
Kingdom. shows no falling trend over these years. while 
Greece and Italy are not succeeding in checking the growth 
in net borrowing as a proportion of GDP. The scale of 
the deficits also differs sharply from one Member State to 
another, with Luxembourg. Germany, Denmark. France 
and the United Kingdom in the most favourable positions 
in 1985. 
In order to refine slightly the assessment of budget trends. 
Table 5.4 also evaluates structural budget balances. using the 
. method described in the last Annual Review (see European 
Budgetary policy 
Table 5.2 
Member States' general government revenue and expenditure, I % change, 1984-86 
Total current Indirect taxes Direct taxes Social securit, Other current 
revenue contrihutwn~ revenue 
n .. "t."Cl\1,;d 
1984 19852 19861 1984 1985' 19861 1984 1985' 19863 1984 1 •1s,:! 19861 1984 1985' 19861 
8 9,6 9,0 6,9 3.4 5.1 5,3 10.7 9.4 6,6 13,9 12.3 10.8 9.4 4,9 -8.3 
DK 13,3 7.8 6,6 11.3 6,5 3,9 12,8 9,2 9,9 10,1 8,6 -7.3 22.0 5,4 5,8 
D 5,3 4.6 4,9 5.4 3,7 5.2 6,3 6,1 3,6 4,8 4,3 6,0 3,8 4,5 3.2 
GR 28,0 21.4 21,1 26.5 20,3 20,9 34.5 24.4 27,5 28.1 23.0 17,9 17.9 8,2 20.4 
F 10,5 5,0 5,9 11,5 5,3 6,1 11.2 3.1 5,5 9,4 5.9 5,5 11.0 2,6 8.1 
IRL 11,2 7,3 5,7 11.l 5,0 6.1 17.7 6.4 6,0 10,5 8,0 6.5 -4.7 17.7 2.7 
I 13,5 11,6 10.2 15,0 10,0 10.0 12,7 12,0 9,3 13,1 10,0 11.5 14.4 28,9 8,2 
L 6,5 6,2 5.5 7.9 8,0 5.4 5,0 5,7 4.6 5,8 5,2 5.5 9.0 5,2 8.0 
NL 3,0 3,2 1,1 6,5 3,6 2.8 -1.6 3.2 4.0 -0.4 1.6 - 1.0 14.3 6.1 -0,7 
UK 7,3 7,5 5,2 6,9 5.7 6.7 8.0 9.3 4.1 8.7 7.4 7.0 4.1 8.0 -0.6 
EUR 10 9,0 7.0 6.4 9.3 6.0 6,7 9.3 8,0 5,9 8.3 6,7 7,0 9.5 8.5 4.1 
Total expenditure Current Actual Uovcrnmcnt Net capital 
transfers paid interest payments consumption transfers and gross 
1984 1985' 1986' 1984 1985' 19861 1984 
8 5,8 6,2 4,6 4.9 3,9 3.6 14.2 
DK 8,0 4,7 2,5 6,1 4,2 3,3 30,8 
D 4.1 3,0 4.1 3,6 2.7 3,3 5.1 
GR 29,9 27,9 15,0 24,6 22,6 15,9 57.3 
F 9,8 5.9 5,9 10,8 6,8 5,9 16.2 
IRL 7,8 10.5 3,8 9,7 8.4 3.6 13.0 
I 15,8 11.7 8,5 11.9 13,5 7.4 21.3 
L 3,7 5.0 5,8 5,1 5,5 5.2 24.8 
NL 2.7 2.6 2,3 2,3 2.0 2.9 10.5 
UK 7,8 6.2 4,2 9,9 6.1 3,6 10.2 
EUR 10 8,8 6,6 5.4 8,3 6.6 5.1 14.5 
I National a1..'Counts definition, excluding loans, advances and participations. 
' 
Estimates. 
I Forecasts. 
Sourn- Commission servi1.."'Cs. 
Economy No 22. section 6.2). The cyclical component of 
the Community's budget deficit (Table 5.4. section (b)). 
calculated in relation to the average growth trend over 
the economic cycle. became slightly positive in 1985. thus 
indicating that the current recovery has spontaneously con-
tributed to an 0.2 point of GDP improvement in the budget 
deficit. Consequently. the autonomous component of the 
deficit (section (c)) was slightly magnified to 5.4 % of GDP 
for the Community as a whole in 1985 compared with 5.1 % 
in 1984. Over the same year. only Belgium. Denmark and 
Germany have. according to these calculations. cut their 
capital formation 
19852 1986' 1984 1985' 19863 1984 1985' 19863 
15.1 8,7 4.5 5.2 3.6 -2.1 2,7 4.5 
7.4 0.2 4,7 3.7 2,6 -7.0 8.8 2.3 
5.5 4,5 4.1 4.0 4,6 6.6 -2.0 5,0 
49.3 19.8 24.7 26.7 14,0 53.2 30.4 11.5 
8.1 8.7 9,1 5,3 5,9 0,0 -0.7 4.1 
21.7 3.4 7.5 7,0 3.4 -8.3 10,7 7.7 
10.9 9.5 14,6 11.0 7,5 26.6 8,5 13,5 
18.4 14.1 6.4 5.1 7.3 -7.3 1.3 3,2 
9,2 5.9 -0.9 1.6 0.3 11.l 1.9 0.9 
9,8 4.7 6.0 6.7 5,8 6.1 - 3.4 -7.1 
9.8 6.6 7.6 6,5 5.5 10,2 2.3 5.6 
autonomous deficit. Debt interest charges (section (d)) went 
on increasing in 1985 but markedly more slowly than in 
earlier years and represented 4.4 % of GDP compared with 
4.3 % the year before: Denmark and the United Kingdom 
did. however. register a fall in their interest charges as a 
proportion of activity. If we take account of the innation 
adjustment corresponding to the inllation tax to which hol-
ders of public-sector assets are subject (here calculated as 
the difference between the ·nominal debt interest charge 
(section (d)) and the real charge established on the basis of 
a real medium-term interest rate (section (e)). the budget 
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Table 5.3 
Member States' general government revenue and expenditure, 1 as% of GDP, 1984-86 
Total current Jndm .. "'Ct ta,c!> Direct taxc!> Socia) SCCUnt} Other current 
ft'\COUC contributions revenue 
fCCCl\'cd 
19K4 19k5' 19kh1 19K4 19k5' 19861 1984 19k5' 19861 19K4 1985' 19861 19K4 l9k5' 19863 
B 47.3 48,4 48,7 11,6 11.5 11.4 19.3 19.8 19,9 14,2 14.9 15.5 2,2 2.2 1.9 
DK 55,9 56,6 57,2 18,0 18,0 17.7 27.3 28,0 29,2 2,9 3,0 2.6 7,7 7,7 7,7 
D 46,4 46,5 46,2 13,0 12.9 12.8 12.2 12.4 12,2 17.5 17,5 17.6 3,7 3.7 3,6 
GR 33.2 33,7 35,0 15,5 15,7 16.2 6,0 6,2 6,8 10,3 10.7 10,8 1.3 1.2 1,2 
F 49,8 48,9 48,9 15.1 14.8 14.9 9.4 9,1 9,0 21.6 21,4 21.4 3,7 3.6 3.6 
IRL 42.5 41,9 41,2 17.6 17.0 16.8 14.8 14,5 14.2 5.7 5.7 5.6 4.4 4.7 4,5 
I 45.1 45.4 45,7 11.3 11,2 11.3 15.3 15.4 15,4 16,2 16,1 16.4 2,3 2,6 2,6 
L 56,6 56,7 -56,2 15,7 16.0 15.9 19.2 19,2 18,8 14,6 14.5 14,4 7,1 7,1 7,2 
NL 55,3 54,6 53,5 12,0 11,9 11.8 12.9 12.8 12.9 21.0 20.4 19.6 9,4 9.5 9,2 
UK 42.0 41.4 40.7 16.5 16.0 15.9 14.6 14,6 14.3 7.0 6.9 6.9 3.9 3.9 3,6 
EUR 10 46.5 46,2 46,0 13.9 13.7 13.7 13.2 13.2 13.1 15.6 15.5 15.5 3.8 3.8 3.7 
Total cx~ndllurc Current Actual mtcrc!>t payments Go\cmmcnt 1'icl capital 
transfen paid 
1984 1985' 19861 1984 1985' 19861 1984 
8 57.2 57.0 56.1 26.0 25.3 24.7 10.1 
DK 60.5 59,6 57.9 22.2 21.7 21.3 9.5 
D 48,3 47,7 47.0 21.2 20.8 20.4 3.0 
GR 43,1 46.2 45.5 15.2 15.7 15,5 4.3 
F 52,6 52.1 52.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 2.8 
IRL 52,6 53,4 51.6 19.9 19.8 19.1 9.5 
I 58,7 59,0 58.5 22,9 23.4 23,0 9.6 
L 55,2 54.6 54,3 29.8 29.6 29.3 I. I 
NL 61.6 60,5 60.1 33.5 32.7 32.6 6.1 
UK 45,9 44,7 43.5 16,5 16.0 15.5 4.9 
EUR 10 51.9 51.4 50,8 23.3 23.1 22.7 5.2 
I National a1.:counh Jefinu1on. e:u:JuJang louns. advances and pan,'-,pauons 
' 
E\llmate, 
I Fortc.1,1, 
Sour,,. Comml!I.SIOO !»CfVIC.'C!o. 
deficit adjusted both for the cycle and for innation (section 
(I)) increased slightly in 1985 to 2,3 % of GDP in 1985 
compared with 2,0 % in 1984. In contrast to this general 
trend, the structural deficit. measured similarly. fell in 
Belgium and Denmark and the structural surplus increased 
in Luxembourg. 
All in all. this evaluation of structural budget balances 
shows that the strengthening of thl! economic recovery in the 
Community and the slowdown of inOation have slightly 
relaxed the restrictiveness of budgetary policies and slightly 
improved their contribution to growth. 
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consumption transfers and gross 
capital formation 
1985' 19863 '984 1985' 19863 1984 1985' 19863 
10,9 I I.I 17.9 17.6 17.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 
9,6 9.1 25.9 25.3 24.6 2,8 2.9 2,8 
3,0 3.0 20.1 20.0 19.8 4.1 3.8 3.8 
5,4 5.5 19.0 20.2 19.7 4.6 5.0 4.8 
2,8 2.9 16.4 16.2 16,2 3.2 2.9 2,9 
10.7 10.3 18.9 18.6 17.9 4.1 4.3 4,3 
9,6 9,6 19.4 19.5 19.1 6.6 6.5 6,8 
1.2 1.3 16.1 16.0 16.1 8.2 7.9 7.7 
6.3 6.5 16.8 16.3 15,9 5.4 5.2 5.1 
4.9 4.8 21.8 21.3 21.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 
5.3 5.3 19.3 19.1 18.9 4.1 3.9 3.9 
The medium-term budget guidelines set by most of the 
Member States and which generally define the indicative 
framework for the desired trend of public finances have not 
bet:n greatly changed in comparison with 1984. even though 
the target dates are sometimes slightly longer. 
This is particularly the case for Belgium and Ireland. where 
the targets for the reduction of budget deficits set for 1987 
have been postponed or relaxed. Italy intends to eliminate 
the current Treasury deficit and to stabilize Treasury debt 
as a percentage of GDP by 1990. Denmark hopes to present 
a balanced central government account by the end of the 
Budgetary policy 
Table 5.4 
General government structural budget balances 
1°" olnGP 
(a) (b) (C) 
Net lending (+)or borrowing ( - ) C')chc,il impact on the budget Budget balance adjusted for 
balance elTects of the 9clc (c = a - b) 
1982 1983 1984 1985' 1986' 1982 198.1 1984 1985 1 1986' 1982 198.1 1984 1985 1 1986' 
8 - I I.I - 11.7 -9,9 -8,6 -7.4 0,3 -0.6 -0,2 O,l 0.4 - 10.8 - l I. I -9.7 -8.7 -7.8 
DK -9.3 -7.4 -4,6 -2.9 -0,7 -0,9 - t.0 0.0 0,5 t.O -8.4 -6.4 -4.6 -3.4 -1.7 
D -3,4 -2,5 -1,9 - l,2 -0,8 -0,7 - t.O -0,5 O,l 0,9 -2.7 -1.5 - 1.4 - 1.3 - 1.7 
GR -9.4 -8,9 -9,9 -12,5 - 10.5 -0.4 -0,7 -0.2 0,2 0,5 -9,0 -8.2 -9.7 - 12,7 -11,0 
F -2,5 -3.1 -2,8 -3.2 -3.3 0.1 -0.l 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -2,6 -3.0 -2.8 - 3.1 -- 3.4 
IRL -14,2 - l 1,8 - 10,l - l 1.5 -10.4 0,2 -0.6 -0.1 0,1 0,2 -14.4 -11,2 -10.0 - I l.6 - 10.6 
I -12,7 - 12.4 - 13.5 - 13,6 - 12,8 O,l - t.t -0.6 0,0 0,5 -12,8 -11.2 -13,0 -13.6 -13,3 
L -1,3 0,0 1.5 2.1 t.9 -0,3 - t.8 -0.5 0.2 1.0 -1.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 0,9 
NL -7,1 -6,5 -6,3 -5,9 -6,5 - 1.3 - 1.3 -0,5 0.4 1,2 -5,8 -5.2 -5.8 -6.3 -7,7 
UK -2,4 -3,6 -3,8 -3,3 -2,8 -1.3 -0.4 -0.4 0,6 l.0 - I.I -3,2 -3.4 -3.9 -3,8 
EUR 10 - 5,6 -5,5 - 5.4 - 5.2 -4,8 -0,5 -0.7 -0.3 0,2 0.7 -5.1 -4,8 -5.l -5.4 -5.5 
id) tc) (I) 
Net interest payments Theoretical real charge on public debt" Budget balance adjusted for c1T1..~ts 
(interest paid less interest rc1.:ci\·cJ)l 
1982 1983 1984 19851 1986' 1982 
B 9,3 9.4 10,l 10,9 l t.t 3,1 
DK 2,6 4.3 5,8 5.6 5.4 1,0 
D 2,0 2.3 2,3 2.3 2.4 0,6 
GR 2,6 3.4 4,3 5.4 5.5 1,2 
F 1.3 1,8 2,0 2.1 2,1 0,2 
IRL 9,1 9.4 9,5 10,7 10,3 3,2 
I 7,7 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.4 1,9 
L 0,9 0,9 t.t l.2 1,3 0,5 
NL 5.1 5.7 6,1 6.3 6.5 1.8 
UK 3,3 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.2 0,8 
EUR 10 3,7 4,0 4,3 4.4 4.5 1.0 
I Estimates. 
' 
Forccusts. 
\ B. (;R, IRL. L. NL: interest paid . 
• B. (;R, IRL. L. NL: real charge on gross deht: DK. D. I'. I. UK: real charge on net Jehl. 
St>urcrJ: Commission SCT\'i\."CS. 
decade. The United Kingdom. in its Medium-Term Finan-
cial Strategy, has adopted a target of around UKL 7 OOO 
million until 1988-89 for the public sector borrowing require-
ment. renecting a relative fall as a percentage of GDP. 
Germany and the Netherlands also wish to go on reducing 
their budget deficits as a percentage of GDP while France 
has kept its target of a deficit limited to 3 % of GDP. 
Greece has decided to reduce its total public sector delicit by 
4 percentage points of GDP in 1986 on the 1985 level. Lastly. 
Luxembourg intends to use her budget surplus to rebuild 
the budget reserves intended for investment. 
1983 
3.4 
1.6 
0.7 
1.3 
0.3 
3.4 
2.0 
0,6 
2.0 
t.O 
I. I 
of the cycle ~ind inllat1on (f = c + d - c) 
1984 1985 1 1986' 1982 198.1 1984 1985 1 1986' 
3,7 3,9 4,1 -4.6 -5.1 -3.3 -1,7 -0,8 
2,0 2,2 2.3 -6,8 -3.6 -0,9 0.0 1,4 
0.7 0,8 0,8 -1.3 0.1 0,2 0.2 -0,J 
1.4 1.7 1.9 -7.6 -6,1 -6.8 -9.0 -7.4 
0.3 0.4 0.5 -1.5 - 1.5 - l.2 - 1.4 - l.8 
3,8 4,1 4.3 -8.5 -5.2 -4,3 -5.0 -4.6 
2,0 2,5 2.7 -7,0 -4,8 -5,9 -6.9 -6.6 
0,6 0,6 0.7 -0,6 2,1 2.4 2.5 1,5 
2,2 2.4 2.5 -2.5 -1,5 -1,9 -2.4 -3,7 
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 - t.O - I.I - 1.7 - 1.8 
1.2 1.3 1.4 -2.4 - 1.9 -2.0 -2.3 -2.4 
This framework for the evolution of budget deficits over the 
next few years is strengthened by the desire to keep the rate 
of increase in public expenditure below the nominal growth 
rate. In Denmark and the United Kingdom. the aim is 
actually to keep public expenditure constant in volume 
terms. while in Germany the nominal growth of public 
expenditure is to be limited to a maximum of 3 %. 
Thus although 1985 overall confirms in general the change 
noted last year for the budget outturn and trends. certain 
new elements seem to be appearing on the horizon - cer-
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ta inly as regards intentions concerning, in particular, the 
taxation componen t of budgetary policies. The Com-
mission's an nua l economic report 1984-85, adopted by the 
ouncil in December 1984, recommended that the total 
public authority tax burden should fall by one percentage 
point of GDP a year from 1985 to 1987. The idea of the 
interest of tax-cutt ing plans is also gaining ground among 
the Member States. France, which in 1985 reduced taxation 
and social security contributions by the equivalent of 1 % 
of GDP, is preparing to cut the taxation of personal incomes 
in 1986. The draft Netherlands budget for 1986 provides for 
a one percentage point cut in the rate of company taxation. 
On I January 1986 Germany will apply the first part of her 
tax-cutting plan which was decided in 1984. Several other 
Member States have stated their intention of reducing taxes 
in the more or le s immediate future : Belgium adopted in 
summer 1985 a multiannual plan for reducing taxation over 
the period 1986-89; the Danish Government is proposing a 
major tax reform to take effect from January 1987 which 
would reduce the pressure of taxation on households but 
would increase it on companies. and Luxembourg is also 
planning to reduce taxation in 1987. The United Kingdom 
Government is also considering a tax-cutting programme 
spread over several years and tarting with the next budget. 
These proposals are in keeping with the strategies for coher-
ence in the medium term presented above : they therefore 
imply a package of '11easures on the expenditure side which 
has not yet been defined in great detail in every case. 
On 1 July 1985 the Commission adopted a communication 
to the Council on the budgetary policie of Member States I 
in which it examined the policie pursued and considered 
the possible role of budgetary policy in the implementation 
of a more employment-creating growth strategy. This would 
mean a shift in the structure of budget revenue and expendi-
ture and direct measures to promote employment, while 
respecting the particular situation of each country. Within 
the framework of an overall macroeconomic strategy. a 
policy of wage moderation coupled with a temporary 
budgetary policy con tribution to demand , where the margin 
exists. would enable the Community to increa e it growth 
potential. For it to bear fruit. this change in budgetary 
policies should be accompanied by a stability-oriented mon-
etary policy and backed by a constructive dialogue between 
the two sides of industry. 
5.2. T rends in public debt 
The outturn and gu idelines of budgetary policies mu t also 
be assessed in the light of the trends of stock variables. It 
1 The economic oullook for 1986 and lhc Member 1:11es· fiscal policies. 
COM(85) 336 final of I July 1985. 
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must be possi ble for economic systems to finance , in an 
orderly fashion, the repetition of budget deficits and there-
fore the constitution of public debt if they are not to suffer 
imbalances, particularly in the form of high interest rates 
which hamper growth. If the sca le of budget deficits is such 
that the constitution of new debt as a percentage of GDP is 
greater than the (inverse) influence of economic growth on 
the sha re of public debt in GDP, the result is an increase in 
public debt as a proportion of GDP. The danger is that this 
increase in the proportion of debt, if it applies to an already 
high level of debt, will require the mobilization of excessive 
resources for use by government, thus diverting finance 
from the productive sector of the economy, and will induce 
excessively high external indebtedness and real interest rates. 
Section 6.3 of the annual economic review 1984-85 (European 
Economy No 22, page 133) presented an appraisal of the 
extent to which budget deficits could be sustained in the 
light of the trend of public debt. The analysis showed that 
three Member States - Belgium, Ireland and Italy - were, 
on a 1985 horizon , the most inclined, given the high level 
of, and the increase in. their public debt, to experience 
financing imbalances which would harm their capacity for 
growth . 
Projections of the weight of public debt in 1986 presented 
in Graphs 5.1 and 5.2 have been established on the basis of 
GRAPH S.2: Tread in geaeral permaent net debt,as % of 
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budgetary forecasts . They confirm the extent of the problem 
in the three Member States mentioned above: their gross 
public debt2 could still grow as a proportion of GDP in 1986. 
The reduction expected in net borrowing as a percentage of 
GDP could still be insufficient, taking into account the 
nominal growth expected , to stabilize the weight of public 
debt. The Netherlands could also see an increase in public 
debt as a percentage of GDP and Greece has registered a 
substantial increase in public debt for several years and the 
1 Gross debt of general government except fo r GR a nd lRL (State) . B and 
NL (general government excluding social securit y). Source : Financial 
accounts. amounts outstanding D. f . I. UK: Central Bank for DK. 
public accounts for B. GR. IRL. L. L. 
Budgetary policy 
level could reach 60 % of GDP in 1986. The other Member 
States are in a relatively more favourable position : Den-
mark , Germany and Luxembourg could stabilize or even 
reduce their public debt burdens in 1986, which for Denmark 
represents a considerable turnaround from the trend· at the 
beginning of the 1980s. France could register an increase in 
the weight of public debt in 1986 which would bring this 
closer to that of Germany. In the United Kingdom the 
increase in the debt/GDP ratio should continue at the 
modest rate of previous years. Graph 5.2, which contains 
net public debt3 for the Member States publishing such 
series , shows similar trends to those in Graph 5.1. 
From this comparison of positions on public debt , it is the 
countries with the greatest proportion of debt which meet 
with the most difficulties in stabilizing it. These countries 
have for a long time tolerated budget deficits on a far larger 
scale than that which, given the economic growth rate to be 
expected, would, in the relatively near future , have stabilized 
the ratio of public debt to GDP. The effort to be made in 
respect of expend_iture, excluding interest payments , should 
be particularly vigorous given the scale of debt interest 
charges. The prospects for interest rates are at this level a 
strategic variable : if rates were to fall, the process of adjust-
ment towards the stabilization of the weight of debt could 
be accelerated . Several Member States have already been 
able to consolidate their debt at reduced interest rates as a 
result of the fall in Jong term rates which took place in the 
first half of 1985 : this has been the case in Belgium. Denmark 
and France, in particular as regards the foreign currency 
component of their public debt. If rates were to go on falling , 
the weight of debt interest charges could be reduced and at 
the same time the Community economies' capacity for 
growth would be reinforced . It is, however, evident that the 
principal condition to be fulfilled in order to arri ve at a 
more satisfactory situation lies in a substantial reduction in 
existing deficits. 
Net debt of general government : net debt is defined as the di fTcrencc 
be tween monetary and fina ncial li a bilities and asse ts of general govern-
ment. Source : Fina ncial accounts. amounts outstanding D. F. I. UK: 
Cent ra l Bank fo r DK. 
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6. The medium term: central projection and policy scenarios 
The world economy shows at present serious disequilibria in the main trading zones or 
countries: the EC has a 1-ery high unemployment rate, the US considerable internal and 
external deficits, Japan a 1•ery large trade balance surplus. This chapter sets out some 
scenarios starting from a haseline projection in which these disequilibria are not corrected. 
These scenarios are based on model simulations and as such are S(lmewhat stylized. They 
show, however, with all due qualifications that corrective actions taken in isolation by 
individual zones or countries require more effort and may have more undesirable external 
spillm·ers than cooperative scenarios where cooperation is assured between domestic econ-
omic agents (governments, employers, trade unions, etc.) as between countries or zones. 
6.1. Introduction 
Medium-term projections may be made along two different 
lines of approach. The first approach may be called ·norma-
tive' in the sense that it defines target values for some 
economic and/or social aggregates and describes explicitly 
those policy actions deemed essential for reaching the tar-
gets. Medium-term plans or programmes typically follow 
this approach. 
The second approach, to which the baseline projection in 
this chapter belon~.;. may be called 'descriptive· since it 
analyses a possible evolution of a given economic system, 
should the behaviour of economic agents and the stance of 
economic policy remain broadly the same in the future as 
in the recent past. Such projections are therefore sometimes 
called ·constant-policy' scenarios. 
Normative and descriptive projections are both surrounded 
with considerable uncertainty. In the former. the political 
will and social consensus needed to implement the required 
policy measures may in reality not be forthcoming. As to 
the latter, behaviour and policy stances may in fact change. 
Furthermore, both are subject to external. non-controllable 
conditions that may not turn out as expected. 
It is therefore hardly possible or at least extremely difficult 
to produce reliable forecasts for the medium term that could 
truly be considered as the most probable outcome. A more 
modest approach is to start from a baseline scenario which 
is not a forecast but a technical extrapolation of past trends 
and present economic policy settings. From the baseline may 
then be derived alternative scenarios showing the impli-
cations for a given country or zone of: 
(a) domestic policy adjustment; 
(b) changes in the international environment; 
(c) any combination of (a) and (b). 
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In the present chapter, the variants will specifically present 
some tentative measurements of the impacts of specified 
policy packages aimed at correcting or alleviating some of 
the severe imbalances shown by the baseline solution. 
For the EC. the objective should be to achieve a significant 
reduction of unemployment through a more Jabour intensive 
growth pattern. For the rest of the world, and most notably 
the United States and Japan, the variants will explore some 
of the ways and means of providing a reduction of excessive 
balance of payments surpluses or deficits. 
Both baseline and variants are based on macroeconometric 
model simulations. 1 Given space limitations. the analysis 
will present only aggregate EC results, completed by the 
most relevant US, Japan and rest of world macroeconomic 
indicators when and where needed. 
6.2. Baseline projection, 1986-90 
The main assumptions underlying the baseline projection 
may be summarized as follows: 
/11 the EC. fiscal policies remain restrictive in order to reduce 
or stabilize public budget deficits during the projection per-
iod. In real terms, public current and capital expenditures 
are therefore growing at about l % per year on average 
between 1986 and 1990. There is no reduction in average 
taxes and social contribution rates. Monetary policy stays 
on a stability-oriented path with no substantial reduction in 
interest rates and money supply growing at about the same 
rate as nominal GDP. Finally. the demographic projections 
show a significant reduction in the growth rate of population 
in working-age group from an average of 0,9 % 1985/80 to 
0, 15 % 1990/86. 
1 A short description of the model used is given in the appended box. 
For the US, the assumption is made that no strong corrective 
action is taken at the level of the Federal budget deficit, 
contributing to the maintenance of high nominal and real 
interest rates. Similarly, no loss of confidence in the dollar 
is assumed and exchange rates vary little, showing an average 
devaluation in the dollar effective exchange rate by about 
1,6 % per year 1990/86. 
For Japan, fiscal and monetary policies are also conservative 
and no significant increase in the degree of openness of the 
Japanese economy is expected. 
Table 6.1 
Scenario 6.0 - Baseline projection 1986-90 
EUR GDP 
Domestic demand 
Inflation 
Total employment 
Unemployment rate 
Current balance 
Budget balance 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Interest rate (long) 
USA GDP 
Domestic demand 
Inflation 
Unemployment rate 
Current balance 
Budget balance 
Exchange rate index 
Interest rate (long) 
Japan GDP 
Domestic demand 
Inflation 
Unemployment rate 
Current balance 
Budget balance 
Exchange rate (Yen/USO) 
Interest rate (long) 
Rutt of growth, C':\l.,."t'J'l interest rate. unemployment rntc ( 0 o Jc,·cll and ha lances (010 GDP). 
In the EC. the growth of real GDP stabilizes around its post-
1973 trend. i.e. 2.5 % per year 1990/86. Inflation remains 
under control at 4.3 % . The public sector borrowing require-
ment decreases regularly from 4,7 % of GDP in 1986 to 
3,8 % in 1990 and the current balance is kept in slight 
surplus. 
However. this leaves the major disequilibrium in the EC 
unchanged. Given the moderate average growth rate. and 
assuming no change in wage behaviour. labour demand 
The medium-term: central projection and policy scenarios 
In the rest of the world, the real price of oil (in dollar terms) 
is supposed to stabilize to zero growth after 1985. Similarly, 
no major debt crisis or protectionist upsurge is assumed, 
keeping the non-EC world import demand on a trend rate 
of growth of 5 % 1990/86. 
As might be expected, these assumptions lead to a world 
picture for 1986-90 which poses serious questions of its 
sustainability (see Table 6.1) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
2,3 2,3 2,5 2,6 2,6 2,7 
1,7 2,1 2,3 2,5 2,5 2,6 
4,5 4,4 4,3 4,2 4,2 4,3 
0,0 0.1 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,4 
18,8 11.0 11.0 10,9 10,7 10,4 
0,4 0.5 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,5 
-4,8 -4.7 -4,4 -4,1 -3,9 -3,8 
3,5 -1.6 -1.6 -1,5 - 1,5 - 1,5 
10,8 11.0 11,0 10,8 10.8 10.7 
3,0 2,5 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,1 
3,5 2,8 3,2 3,2 3.1 3,1 
5,2 5,1 5,3 5,4 5.5 5,6 
7,2 7,3 7,1 6,6 6.5 6,3 
-3,6 -3,7 -3,8 -4,0 -4,1 -4,0 
-5,1 -5,0 -5,0 -4,9 -4.9 -4,8 
-4,8 1.6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 
12,5 12,0 11,9 12,0 12,1 12,1 
4,6 4.2 4.2 4,4 4,3 4,4 
3,9 4,0 3,6 4,0 3,9 4,0 
3,0 2,7 3,2 3,1 3.0 3,1 
2,1 2,2 1,9 1,0 1.7 1,7 
2,7 3.0 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,2 
-3,5 -3.1 -3,1 -3,0 -2.9 -2,7 
4,6 - 3.5 - 3.5 -3.5 -3,5 -3,5 
6.9 6,7 6,7 6,8 6,8 6.9 
increases by only 0,4 % on annual average from 1986 to 
1990. The unemployment rate therefore stays above 10 % 
of the active population over the whole period. In fact, the 
slight decrease registered in 1990 ( I 0.4 % versus 11 % in 
1986) results mostly from the easing of demographic press-
ures in labour supply and might be wiped out by any unex-
pected increase in participation rate. 
For the US. GDP growth averages 3 % 1990/86 and the 
unemployment rate remains significantly lower than Europe 
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(6,3 % in 1990). However, in line with the assumptions, the 
Federal budget deficit is hardly reduced and the current 
account deficit continues to grow as a share of GDP from 
- 3, 7 % in 1986 to - 4,0 % in 1990, despite the fact that 
real exports are growing faster than real imports from 1986 
to 1990. The critical factor here is in the conversion of the 
net creditor position of the US into a net debtor: given the 
continuous accumulation of outstanding foreign liabilities 
in order to finance the current account deficits, the stock of 
external debt reaches USO I 200 OOO million in 1990 (i.e. 
21 % of GDP) and net external interest payments grow from 
negligible amounts in 1985-86 to more than JOO OOO million 
dollars in 1990, i.e. 20 % of nominal export receipts. 
Japan continues to register rates of growth larger than 4 % 
(4,3 % 1990/86) together with low inflation and unemploy-
ment rates. The current balance surplus, however, remains 
very large at + 3,2 % of GDP. 
Finally, the rest of the world also benefits from net interest 
outflows from the US and is able to convert its 1986 current 
Table 6.2 
Scenario 6.8 - World composite scenario 
EUR GDP 
Domestic demand 
lnnation 
Total employment 
Unemployment rate 
Current balance 
Budget balance 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Interest rate (long) 
USA GDP 
Domestic demand 
lnnation 
Unemployment rate 
Current balance 
Budget balance 
Exchange rate index 
Interest rate (long) 
Japan GDP 
Dcmestic demand 
tnnation 
Unemployment rate 
Current balance 
Budget balance 
Exchange rate (Yen/USD) 
1 ntercst rate (long) 
Rule of izrowth. c,ccpt mtcn:\t rate. unemployment rntc (0 0 lc,dl and haljncc, (0 o GDP). 
For rmhcy \Cllmg, ~cc M."\:t1on 6.5. 
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balance deficit into a slight surplus (0,4 % of GDP) at the 
end of the period. 
These current balance figures continue the present statistical 
discrepancy in the aggregated world current balance (about 
- USO JOO OOO million) which is left unallocated. Thus all 
regions together must in reality be in a better current account 
position than indicated but of course it is impossible to 
distribute these credits by country or region. 
6.3. US adjustment alone 
The scenarios proposed in this section present the impli-
cations of the US making adjustments in the absence of any 
explicit accompanying actions in the non-US world. For 
clarity, these policy shocks will first be presented in isolation 
and may seem somewhat unlikely. A more plausible com-
posite scenario will therefore be described later. In order to 
avoid a somewhat fastidious enumeration of figures, results 
are presented in graph form for the EC and the US, the text 
keeping to the main comments (see Graph 6.1). 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
2,3 3.1 3,6 3,9 3,4 3,4 
1,7 3.2 3,9 4,1 3,4 3,4 
4,5 4.1 3.6 3,7 3,7 3,5 
0,0 0.3 0.8 1,3 1,7 1,5 
10,8 10.8 10.4 9,5 8,3 7,0 
0.4 0.4 -0,2 -0,6 -1,0 -0,9 
-4,8 -4.9 -4.9 -4,9 -4.4 -4,0 
3,5 -9.5 -9.7 -9,6 -0,2 0,1 
10,8 9.5 9.1 8,3 7,7 7,0 
3,0 2.7 3.0 3,3 4,3 3,8 
3,5 2.4 2.6 3,9 3,9 3,8 
5,2 5.2 6.0 6,6 7,0 7,1 
7,2 7.4 7,1 6,5 5,8 5,0 
-3,6 -3.4 -2,6 -2,2 -1.4 -1,3 
-5,1 -4.5 -3.9 -3,2 -3.0 -2,9 
-4,8 8.9 8.8 8.8 1.3 1.3 
12,5 10.5 10,1 9,5 9.0 9,1 
4,6 4.9 4.9 5.3 4,5 4,0 
3,9 5.2 4.4 5.0 4,3 4,1 
3,0 2,6 3,0 3.3 3.3 3,3 
2,1 2.0 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,5 
2.7 2,5 2,4 I.I 0,8 0,8 
-3.5 -4.0 -4.8 -5.1 -4.9 -4.4 
4,6 -18.5 -18.4 - 18.6 -3.6 -3.7 
6.9 6.0 5.8 5.0 4.4 4,9 
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Scenario 6.1 contains a fiscal contraction in the US by I % 
of GDP ex ante (about USD 50 OOO million) per year 
cumulatively for three consecutive years. As could be ex-
pected, the large fiscal contraction cuts the US GDP rate of 
growth in 1986-87-88 by about I percentage point per year 
with some compensation afterwards due to the induced fall 
in interest rates, which are largely followed elsewhere, the 
exchange rate weakening only a little. Both the budget and 
the current balance deficits are reduced, but the latter still 
remains at 3,3 % of GDP. For the EC, the average rate of 
growth is cut by 0,2 percentage points per year, 1990/86 and 
the unemployment rate fails to fall as in the baseline solution. 
Scenario 6.2 assumes no fiscal correction but an exogenous 
loss of confidence in dollar assets sufficient to cause a drop 
of 20 % in the dollar effective rate (about 30 % against 
ECU and yen and 10 % against all other currencies). This 
time growth in the US becomes higher than in the basecase 
solution, but the final reduction in the current balance deficit 
is again somewhat limited, the deficit remaining larger than 
3 % of GDP. This is mostly due to J-curve effects in the short 
run and to the continuous build-up of interest payments. 
Although the need for foreign financing is lowered, the 
nominal interest rate becomes substantially larger due to 
the increased domestic inflation rate. These inflationary 
processes also act negatively on real net exports, hence the 
inability showed by a 'one-shot' devaluation to drastically 
correct the deficit m the medium-run. For the EC, the 
implications are more sc:vere than in Scenario 6.1, growth 
being cut by 0,4 percentage points per year on average and 
unemployment staying well above 11 %. 
The final scenario (6.3) may be viewed as a relatively attract-
ive policy package for the US. The fiscal contraction of 
scenario 6.1 is retained and goes together with a progressive 
fall of the effective dollar exchange rate by I O % per year 
for three years. Results are more favourable for the US 
with only a short-lived growth recession in 1986-87 and 
proportionally larger rc:ductions in both the budget and the 
current balance deficits. The latter, however, is still 2 % of 
GDP in 1990. For the EC, the implications are distinctly 
worse, with a fall of 0,7 percentage points in the average 
1990/86 growth rate and corresponding increases in the 
unemployment rate, which ends up in 1990 1,5 points larger 
than in the baseline projection. 
Despite the fact that they are highly stylized, scenarios 6.1 
to 6.3 already bring to light two important features of the 
present economic situation: 
(a) once the current balance deficit reaches considerable 
proportions and leads to mounting net foreign debt 
accumulation, the current deficit becomes very hard to 
suppress either by domestic contraction or pure ex-
change rate shocks; 
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(b) the modest EC recovery contained in the baseline projec-
tion is vulnerable to any strong and sustained US adjust-
ment if no compensatory measures are taken in the EC 
and its main trading partners (US excepted) at the same 
time. 
6.4. EC adjustment alone 
In accordance with the growth strategy outlined in the 
annual economic report, the focus of this section is on the 
reduction in unemployment that can be achieved through 
either fiscal policy actions, wage moderation or a combi-
nation of these two actions. It should, however, be kept in 
mind that many other elements should play in a growth and 
employment strategy, such as increased flexibility on the 
Jabour market, improvement in the working of the Com-
munity internal markets, new technology, etc., the impact 
of which is not taken into account in these stylized scenarios. 
These limitations should therefore be borne in mind in 
assessing the following scenario. 
In order to make results more comparable, the first three 
scenarios will take for illustrative purposes a target of an 
unemployment level of about 8,5 % in 1990, i.e. a reduction 
of 2,5 points with respect to 1986 (see Graph 6.2). 
Scenario 6.4 is straightforwardly 'Keynesian' since the only 
instrument is an increase in public investment. As a rule, the 
impact of expansionary fiscal policy measures is positive in 
the first two to three years, but negative effects tht"n build 
up with inflationary pressures and crowding-out phenom-
ena. The unemployment target postulated requires a very 
significant increase in the rate of growth of labour demand 
during the whole period. This means that in order to reach 
the target, and assuming a non-accommodating monetary 
policy to prevent inflation from accelerating completely out 
of control. the budgetary stimulus has to be repeated and 
cumulated over five consecutive years. This none the less 
would lead to a 5 point increase in the price level at the end 
of the period with respect to baseline and a public sector 
net borrowing requirement climbing from - 5.6 % to 
- 7,2 % of GDP between 1986 and 1990. The current bal-
ance also becomes negative during the whole period. Thus. 
in reality, this stylized reflation policy runs into serious 
problems of inflation and budgetary constraints which imply 
that it would have to be reversed.2 
Fiscal packages may be devised which are more oriented towards increases 
in labour demand than pure expenditure impulses and public investment 
programmes in particular. In this field. cuts in payroll taxes notably are 
highly efficient from a supply-side point of view since they immediately 
reduce unit wage-cost 1ri1/10111 cuts in effective wage earnings of em-
ployees. hence without negative demand effects. 
Scenario 6.5 proposes, on the other hand, a pure supply 
impulse in which the rates of increase in nominal wages in 
1987 and 1988 are changed to 3.5 % and 3,8 %, that is 
2 points below the baseline rates, the rate of growth of 
nomina l wages going back to its baseline level afterwards. 
As in similar exercises made with quite different models,3 
the effect on labour demand are positive in the medium-
run but are negative in the short-run due to the induced fall 
in final demand . The ultimate reduction of unemployment 
to 8,5 % in 1990 is therefore only achieved after a temporary 
increase in 1986-87 together with a growth recession during 
these two years (see Graph 6.2). 
cenario 6.6 test the po ibility of finding a more atisfac-
tory solution through a combined action on supply and 
demand . 
In effect . the combination of wage moderation with tempor-
ary fi ea! stimulus con titute a much more effective package 
since the fi scal stimulus at the beginning of the period helps 
1 Sl-C Ann un l Economic Review 1984-85. Chapter 9. E11rvpl'<111 Ecvnomy 
o 22: O\cmbcr 1984. 
The medium-term: central projection and policy scenarios 
to sustain fina l demand, and wage moderation helps to keep 
price innation and interest rates under control, improving 
considerably profitability and eliminating all crowding-out 
· effects. 
The scenario includes the following elements : 
(a) real wage increases are kept at a rate of 0,5 % per year 
during two years, wage growth returning progressively 
to productivity growth (1,9 % in 1990) once the lowering 
of unemployment begins to be apparent; 
(b) negative demand effects are alleviated through a sus-
tained 0,5 % increase in public investment in 1986, fol-
lowed by two successive cuts in payroll taxes in 1987 
and 1988 equivalent to 0,5 % of GDP each year paid 
from the government budget in order to reinforce the 
impact of wage moderation without affecting earnings. 
This di tributiu11 ,. fi ea! impulses over three years also 
help to keep the unavoida ble increases in budget deficits 
within more moderate limits. 
The result hown in scenario 6.6 i a steady increase in GDP 
and labour demand. together with a fall in the innation rate. 
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The current balance surplus is lowered but remains positive. 
Finally, the budget deficits remain more or less constant at 
- 5,2 % during the first three year and decrea e afterwards. 
In 1990, an unemployment rate of 8,5 % is achieved and 
thi should continue to diminish further in as much as the 
rate of growth of GDP (3 ,5 %) is ustainable. 
It is of course difficult to know what degree of wage moder-
ation might prove acceptable to the social partners, or under 
what conditions such policies might prove feasible. A fina l 
et of simulations tries therefore to illu trate some of the 
cen tral issues that are posed here . Two variables are tested 
together: first, the extent of wage moderation (a slower 
increase in wages of the order of I % or 2 % compared to 
the baseline for each of two years cumulatively), and sec-
ondly, the presence or absence of fiscal policy adjustmen ts 
(in the case of fiscal adjustments these are calculated to 
compensa te the effects of wage moderation on nomina l 
demand) . 
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The wage moderation policy, accompanied by the fiscal 
policy adjustment, produces much sharper reductions in 
unemployment, as Graph 6.3 shows. The 2 % wage moder-
ation case leads to a 7,2 % unemployment rate by 1990, 
compared to 8,9 % unemployment with the I % wage mod-
eration example. Budget deficits a re somewhat higher for 
the first few years, but by 1990 they fall felow the baseline 
level. In the case of inactive fiscal policy, the same wage 
modera tion policies lead to reductions in unemployment 
which are about three times weaker. 
6.5. Composite world scenario 
Scenario 6.3 showed clearly the negative implications of 
adjustment policies taken by the US when other zones react 
passively to the US action. More cooperative scenarios may, 
however. be envi aged: given international interdependence, 
coordinated expansion in the non-US world would make 
the US adjustment easier through increased demand for US 
exports, while the rest of the world would itself reduce its 
growth recession. 
A composite scenario 6.8 was therefore constructed in which 
the US fiscal adjustment is halved with respect to scenario 
6.3 (three times -0,5 % of GDP). Japan, on the other hand, 
applies a fiscal expansion equal to the former US contraction 
(three times I % of GDP). The rest of the world is also able 
to expand its overall import demand by I % per year 
through a combination of circumstances: improved balance 
of payments situations and domestic policies, lower interest 
payment on external debts and the beneficial impact of 
higher growth in the EC, US and Japan from 1986/87 on. 
In the EC, the policy package includes a wage moderation 
keeping the rate of growth of real wage-cost per capita· to 
0,5 % per year during three years ( 1986-88) with progressive 
return to a rate of growth equal to real labour productivity 
growth afterwards. The wage moderation goes together with 
fiscal expansion calculated so as to prevent the wage policy 
from depressing nominal GDP. The income and fiscal ac-
tions are completed by some relaxation of monetary policy 
targets leading to a fall of 2 percentage points in the short-
term interest rate. 
Besides these fiscal packages, exchange rate changes are also 
modulated with a 9 % revaluation of the ECU against the 
dollar in 1986, 1987 and 1988, a revaluation by 15 % of the 
yen and revaluation by 5 % on average of all other currencies 
during the same period, corresponding to about 7 ,5 % de-
valuations of the effective rate of the dollar during each of 
these three years, cumulatively. 
The results are more favourable for the EC than any of the 
preceding scenarios, GDP growth reaching 3,5 % on average 
between 1986 and 1990. Combined with wage moderation, 
this achieves a larger reduction of unemployment than in 
scenarios 6.4 to 6.6. The budget deficit is larger in 1986-88 
by 0.8 percentage points of GDP with respect to the baseline 
but falls back thereafter. The current balance becomes nega-
tive but remains on average below - I % of GDP. 
These good results come mostly from internal factors, helped 
by increased demand from the non-US world. A strong 
growth of private investment is induced by increased profita-
bility, supported by the fact that the sustained nominal GDP 
growth eliminates the usual negative demand side effects 
The medium-term: central projection and policy scenarios 
of wage cuts in the short run. In the medium term. the . 
corresponding expansion of productive capacity enables also 
the EC economy to avoid bottlenecks, or demand-induced 
inflationary pressures. Also the large fall in the number of 
unemployed leads to an increase in the total wage bill, 
despite the initial cuts in wages per capita. In short, the 
impressive increase in labour demand comes from the cumu-
lation of two positive factors: a 'Keynesian' effect linked to 
demand expansion and a classical effect linked to the fall in 
wage-cost and the expansion of productive capacity. 
For the US and Japan, the results are also better. Growth 
in both countries is stronger than in the baseline projection, 
and in addition, the balance of payments disequilibria are 
much reduced. The Japanese current account surplus is 
brought down to + 0.8 % of GDP and the US deficit re-
duced to -1,3 % ofGDP.4 
6.6. Conclusions 
Although model results should always be taken with caution. 
the various scenarios put forward in the former sections 
seem to show that it should be possible to spe.cify both 
international and domestic policy packages that give good 
or at least adequate results for all parties concerned. togethir 
with adjustment of the major disequilibria on the labour 
market or international trade and capital flows. These re-
sults. however, need strong and coordinated actions by all 
participants both on the domestic (governments. employers. 
employees) and the international (EC. US, Japan. rest of 
world) markets. 
4 The world scenario has been composed by retaining the hypotheses 
relative to the EC and assuming an unchanged international environment 
compared to the baseline in terms of policy. 
The results for the EC arc as follows: 
19S5 19S<, 19S7 19SS 1989 l'l'lO 
GDP 2.~ J.:' .1.8 .\o .:!.Q 2.7 
Domestic demand 1.7 3.0 3.8 4.0 3.1 3.0 
lnnation 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 
Total cmplo~mcnt 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.2 
Uncrnplo~mcnt r~1tc 10.8 10.8 10.3 9.6 8.5 7.4 
Current halancc 0.4 0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 
Budget halan,-.: -4.8 -5.0 - 5.~ -5.3 -4.9 -4.4 
bchangc rate ([CU USA\ 3.5 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 - 1.5 - 1.5 
Interest rate (long) 10.8 10.5 9.9 9.2 8.9 8.7 
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Briel description of the Compact mod£'! of the European Com-
munity in the 1mrld economy. 
The Compact model is a relatively small ·macro-econometric 
model. It has been developed within the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs for the purpose of analysing 
the effect of economic policy measures, taking account of inter-
actions between the main economic variables while keeping the 
overall structure relatively small. 
Leaving aside the trade and capital flow linkage part (the block 
which links the EC model to models for the US and Japan and 
for the rest of world) the Compact model includes 50 endogenous 
variables which are determined within the model by 28 behav-
ioural equations and 22 identities. The EC module is a com-
pletely new system based on EC-10 aggregated stock and flow 
yearly data in ECU as published and constructed by Eurostat 
and DG II services. It includes all the basic blocks of an oper-
ational macroeconomic model, i.e. final demand. production 
and factor supply and demands. wages and prices. public sector 
receipts and expenditures. monetary and financial relations, 
balance of payments and international trade linkages. 
The models for the US and Japan have been derived from a 
simplification of these components of the world model built by 
the Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese Government. 
The rest of the world module at present includes only inter-
national trade and capital movements variables plus an estimate 
of GDP. but will be t>xtended to endogenize commodity price 
movements (drawing here on IMF and OECD work). 
The main features of the Compact model. and notably as regards 
its EC module. are: 
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(a) the attention paid to both stock and flow equilibrium in 
the flow of funds matrix of transactions between economic 
agents, namely, households, enterprises, government and the 
foreign sector; 
(b) the inclusion of wealth effects in consumers' demand; 
(c) the disaggregation of total unemployment into classical, 
Keynesian and frictional shares using a labour market dis-
equilibrium approach; 
(d) the integration of the distinction between Keynesian and 
classical unemployment into the wage determination process 
and, via wages, into the inflation process; 
(e) the integration of the balance of payments item with the 
determination of public sector borrowing requirement and 
the money supply; 
(f) the exchange rate is determined by the outcome for the 
current and capital accounts and floats with exchange re-
serves held constant in relation to imports (alternative ex-
change rate policies can be envisaged). 
On the whole, the Compact model proves to be capable of 
simulating economic developments in the EC quite well over the 
period 1973 to 1982. The principal source of more serious 
deviations in the model simulations appears to originate in the 
difficulty in simulating exchange rate developments correctly. 
The directions of change in the ECU /USO rate are normally 
correctly indicated but their amplitude is under-represented at 
present. and this point is receiving further attention. A simula-
tion covering the period 1983-85 also gives a broadly satisfactory 
reproduction of the Commission's estimates and forecasts for 
this period. 
Technical annex 
Basic concepts and forecasting techniques 
Aggregation in Community data 
In general, national accounts variables in national currencies 
for the Member States are aggregated using purchasing 
power standards (PPS) for domestic variables and market 
exchange rates (ECU) for foreign trade variables. Volume 
series (constant price series) are aggregated on the basis 
of 1975 prices a nd 1975 PPS/exchange rates. Value series 
(current price series) are aggregated on the basis of current 
prices and current PPS/exchange rates. National accounts 
implicit price deOators are obtained by dividing curren t price 
se ries by the corresponding constant price series. 
Money supply indices for the Community are derived from 
harmonically-weighted indices for the Member States, the 
weights being the share of each country in total Community 
GDP at current prices and current PPS in the year in 
question. Long-term and short-term interest rates for the 
Community are imilarly derived as a harmonically-weighted 
average of rates in the Member States. the weights being the 
same as for the money supply calculations. 
Forecasting procedures 
Short-term forecasts are prepared by the Directorate-Gen-
eral for Economic and Financial Affairs twice a yea r, in 
May-June and September-October. The time horizon of 
these forecasts is to the end of the following year. The 
forecast contained in this review are those given by the 
September-October 1985 exercise. The forecasts are built 
up separa tely for each of the 10 member countries of the 
Community, but within a framework of common assump-
tions about the external environment. exchange rates and 
intere t rates. and subject to con trols and checks on the 
consistency of foreign trade forecasts. The forecasts are 
made on the basis of the assumption of uncha nged govern-
ment policies. 
The forecasts for each ommunity country cover the main 
components of gross domestic product in vo lume. price 
and value terms: the income and expenditure accou nts of 
households and of general government: the current account 
of the balance of payments: saving. investment and the 
financial balance of the main institutional sectors: employ-
ment and unemployment: and domestic money supply and 
its counterparts. Figures are main! compiled on an annual 
basis. but half- early c timatcs arc made for gross domestic 
product and it component in volume terms and for certain 
other key indicators such as industrial production , unem-
ployment, and the current account balance. Quarterly pro-
files for gross domestic product are also made for the whole 
forecast period . 
Although in principle the definitions used are those of the 
ESA, in practice national definitions and sources are used 
in some cases because the statistics become avai lable more 
quickly, and in order to facilitate discussion of the forecasts 
with national authorities. 
The forecasting round starts with the setting of assumptions 
about exchange rates , interest rates, and demand and prices 
in the rest of the world . These initial assumptions may 
be amended as the round progresses in the light of new 
information and of the emerging forecast for the Community 
countries. 
(i) Exchange rate forecasts are norma lly based on the rates 
implied by the forward exchange markets, modified to 
take account of the EMS and other considerations. In 
the present forecast the forecast rates took into account 
forward rates prevailing at the beginning of September 
1985. 
(ii) Short-term interest rate assumptions are set for the USA 
and for each of the Community countries taking account 
of exchange rate developments, domestic monetary poli-
cies, etc. 
(iii) Forecasts are made for the growth of real GDP and its 
components for the USA, Canada and Japan. and in a 
more summary form for each of the other non-EC mem-
ber countries of the OECD. In the light of output growth 
and other considerations, forecasts of the change in the 
volume of total import of goods are made for each of 
these countries, and for three other world zones- OPEC, 
non-oil developing countries, and other countries (con-
sisting principally of the centrally planned economies, 
South Africa, and Yugoslavia). An assumption is made, 
having regard to oil market conditions a nd recent OPEC 
decisions, about the export price of oil, and forecasts 
are a lso made for the world export prices of the main 
groups of non-oil primary commodities (based on UN 
indice ) a nd for the export prices of manufactured goods 
of the major non-EC developed countries. 
The forecasts of the cha nge in import volumes for the 
non-EC countries and zones. together with initial import 
forecasts for each of the Community countries. are weighted 
together according to the structure of exports to provide 
estimate of ·export market growt h' for each country. Simi-
larly. the forecasts of rest-of-the-world export prices for 
primary commodities and manufacture . together with in-
itial forecasts of total export prices of goods for each of the 
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Community countries and with the necessary exchange rate 
adjustments, are weighted together according to the struc-
ture of imports to provide estimates of 'import costs' for 
each country. On the basis of this and other information the 
country desks make their first forecasts of export volumes 
and import prices and, if necessary, revise their forecasts of 
import volumes and export prices, with in all cases a split 
between trade within the Community (intra-EC) and trade 
with non-EC countries (extra-EC). Particular attention is 
paid to ensuring that the changes in total intra-EC imports 
and exports should be close in both volume and price terms. 
Checks are also made at world level to make sure that world 
exports and imports are in line with each other. In order to 
reach this desired convergence and in response to the country 
desks' forecasts which are being developed at the same time, 
this procedure for achieving trade consistency is reiterated 
several times. 
Balance of payments and exchange rates 
Sources of balance of payments and related data 
Data on current balances (Table 1.4) are taken from the 
IMF publication Wor/r! Economic Outlook and from the 
forecasts of the services of the Commission. Current bal-
ances have been defined as inclusive of official transfers. 
Effective exchange rates 
Changes in the effective exchange rate of a currency i meas-
ure the average change in the exchange rates between cur-
rency i and a representative sample or 'basket' of other 
currencies between two points in time in order to express in 
a single figure the average direction and magnitude of change 
over the period in question. The model used in the Com-
mission to calculate these average exchange rate changes 
involves 20 countries~the members of the Community (with 
Belgium and Luxembourg treated as a single entity). the two 
candidates for membership (Spain and Portugal), and the 
nine other countries with the greatest importance in world 
trade. An effective exchange rate change for currency i is 
obtained by multiplying the percentage change against each 
of the other 19 currencies in the model by that currency's 
weight and summing the results. 
The weights attributed to each currency reflect the impor-
tance of the currency concerned. both as a bilateral trading 
partner for country i and as a competitor against exports 
from country i in third markets. For this reason the term 
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'trade-weighted exchange-rate changes' is sometimes used in 
place of the term 'effective exchange rate changes'. The 
weights used are based on trade data for the year in question 
up to and including 1980. For subsequent years, the weights 
are based on 1980 trade data. 
For certain purposes it may be useful to use a more restricted 
sample of currencies. For example, following a realignment 
within the EMS it is possible to calculate the effective ex-
change rate of each EMS currency against all other EMS 
currencies taken together using the same technique as de-
scribed above, but using a 'basket' composed of EMS curren-
cies only. 
The ECU and measures used in the European Monetary 
System 1 
The £CU 
The ECU is at the centre of the European Monetary System. 
Central rates are declared in terms of the ECU and bilateral 
central rates are derived from them. A proportion of member 
countries' reserves is held in ECU in the form of claims on 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund and settlement 
of certain debts arising thereunder may be made in ECU. 
The ECU is also central to the functioning of the Community 
institutions, being the unit in which all receipts and expendi-
tures are expressed, as well as having a growing role in the 
private markets. It is defined as a basket of the currencies 
of EC member countries. the quantity of each being based 
on fundamental economic criteria. Its composition had been 
determined before the inception of the EMS and was revised 
on 15 September 1984: 
BFR 
DKR 
OM 
DR 
FF 
IRL 
LIT 
LFR 
HFL 
UKL 
13 March 1979 
3,660 
0,217 
0,828 
1,150 
0,00759 
109 
0,140 
0.286 
0,0885 
15 September 1984 
3,710 
0,219 
0.719 
1,150 
1,310 
0.00871 
140 
0,140 
0,256 
0,0878 
1 For a detailed explanation of the EMS. see European Economy No 3. 
July 1979. 
Bilateral divergence between currencies of the European 
Monetary System ( EMS) 
The width of the EMS band depends on the positions of the 
two currencies that diverge most in relation to their bilateral 
central rate. The maximum divergence allowed between two 
currencies is 2,25%, although the lira may diverge by up to 
6%; sterling is not in the exchange mechanism. 
The average point in the band is determined by half the 
bilateral divergence of the two currencies with the widest 
divergence (not counting the lira). 
Divergence indicator 
The divergence indicator (DI) measures the degree of move-
ment of a specific currency against its maximum divergence 
spread (MOS}, which differs for each currency as a function 
of its weight in the ECU basket. The formula for the diver-
gence indicator is: 
± 2,25 x ( I - p;), where p1 is the weight of the currency in 
the ECU basket. 
For a given currency, the divergence indicator is obtained: 
(i} lirst by calculating the premium (P} or discount (D) 
shown by the market rate of the ECU in terms of that 
currency against its ECU central rate; 
(ii) and then by comparing the result obtained with the 
maximum divergence spread. 
In order to permit a comparison of movements in the diver-
gence indicators for each of the EMS currencies, the 
maximum divergence spread for each currency is assigned 
an index of 100. The indicator will therefore be expressed 
as a figure from Oto 100. A currency reaches its divergence 
threshold when the indicator stands at 75. 
Expressed as a formula, calculation of the indicator is as 
follows: 
P or D 
ECU market-ECU central 
DI 
ECU central 
P or D 
X 100 
MOS 
X 100 
The result is adjusted to ensure that the indicator for curren-
cies observing narrow margins of 2.25° o against one another 
is not distorted by exchange rate movements in the lira and 
the pound sterling outside those margins (which are not. of 
course. operationally compulsory for Italy and the UK). 
Technical annex 
Monetary concepts and definitions 
Money supply 
Each country uses several definitions of money supply, 
which do not coincide with those of other countries since 
financial structures and bdrnviour mean not only that some 
assets are regarded as money in one country but not in 
another, but also that definitions in the same country may 
change as structures and behaviour evolve. 
The basic elements for defining the money supply are: 
(a) the characteristics of monetary assets; 
(b) the holders of monetary assets; 
(c) the issuers of monetary assets. 
There are two main definitions of money supply: money 
supply narrowly defined (MI), comprising circulating coins 
and notes and current bank accounts; money supply broadly 
defined (M2 or M3), comprising MI and various assets with 
banks and other financial institutions in the form of deposit 
accounts, savings accounts or short-term notes. The princi-
pal components of money supply broadly defined (M2 or 
M3) for each country are described below. 
Belgium: Money supply broadly defined (M2). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank ac-
counts and all other assets with a maximum maturity of 
one year in national or foreign currency. 
. (b) Holders: Resident households and private firms. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries; the figures from 1982 onwards 
include monetary claims on the external sector. 
Denmark: Money supply broadly defined (M2: new defi-
nition from 1975). 
(a} Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank ac-
counts, deposit accounts, foreign currency deposits, 
Treasury bills. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, non-monetary 
financial institutions, local authorities. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, main savings 
banks, postal service. 
FR of Germany: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes. current bank ac-
counts except those of the authorities with the central 
bank, deposit accounts, banking liabilities up to four 
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years, savings accounts with a legal period of notice, 
foreign currency deposits. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, local authori-
ties. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, savings, co-
operative and mortgage banks. 
Greece: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, sight savings and time 
deposits. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, including pub-
lic authorities, sight accounts. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks and special 
credit institutions. · 
France: Residents' holdings of money broadly defined 
(M2R). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, sight deposits, current 
bank books, five year home-purchase saving plans, time 
deposits (all maturities), bank tap notes up to five years, 
foreign currency accounts. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, certain central 
government agencits, local authorities, social security 
funds. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks and, for sight 
deposits, postal cheque office, banques populaires. co-
operative banks, savings banks and Treasury. 
Ireland: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current and deposit 
accounts. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, including 
government and local authority deposits with licensed 
banks. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank and licensed banks. 
Italy: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current and deposit 
accounts, current accounts in foreign currency, savings 
accounts, postal savings certificates, Treasury bills up to 
12 months, foreign currency deposits. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, local authori-
ties, social security funds. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, savings banks, 
Treasury postal service. 
152 
The Netherlands: Money supply broadly defined (M2). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank and 
post office accounts, bank and post office time deposits 
up to two years, foreign currency deposits, savings ac-
counts with high velocity of circulation, Treasury liabili-
ties in the form of bonds, certificates and loans or de-
posits, and liabilities up to two years of the Bank voor 
Nederlandse Gemeenten and the Nederlandse Water-
schapbank. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, local authori-
ties. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, Treasury, local authorities, com-
mercial banks, giro services and savings banks. 
United Kingdom: Money supply in national currency broadly 
defined (sterling M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, all types of sterling 
bank deposits including certificates of deposit. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and private firms. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, discount 
houses. 
Monetary targets 
At present, monetary targets are set in Germany. France, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece. 
The aggregates used are as follows: 
FR of Germany: Centrai bank money (MZ), compnsmg 
notes in circulation and compulsory reserves of banks 
calculated as a constant fraction of residents' claims on 
banks: 16.6% on current accounts, 12,4% on deposit 
accounts, 8, I% on savings accounts. 
Greece: Private sector bank credit (PSCE), notes in circu-
lation (MO) and M3. 
France: Residents' holdings of money broadly defined 
(M2R). 
Ireland: Private sector credit (PSCE): lending by licensed 
banks in Irish pounds and foreign currency to house-
holds, private firms and State-sponsored bodies. 
Italy: Total domestic credit (TOCE). including bank loans 
and loans from special credit institutions. bonds issued 
by firms and local authorities, and the public sector 
borrowing requirement (Treasury, Cassa Depositi e Pre-
stiti, Cassa del Mezzogiorno and public utilities, except 
Treasury financing of financial intermediaries). 
United Kingdom: Broadly defined money supply, in national 
currency (£ M3) and, from March 1984, MO, i.e. notes 
and coin plus the small working balances maintained by 
the commercial banks with the Bank of England. 
Counterparts of the money supply 
The money supply and its counterparts are analysed on 
the basis of a consolidation of the transactions of money-
creating financial institutions which are analysed into: 
(a) public sector credit; 
(b) private sector credit; 
(c) miscellaneous items, covering residual items which vary 
from country to country; 
(d) external co11trib11tio11. the balance of financial insti-
tutions' external liabilities and claims; 
(e) non-monetary liabilities. covering medium-term and long-
term liabilities and. for some countries, proprietors' 
funds. 
Domestic money creation is the sum of aggregates (a), (b), 
(c) minus the amount of aggregate (e). 
In countries where the Treasury and other public institutions 
have monetary liabilities (coinage, short-term Treasury 
bonds, etc.), these arc included as liabilities in the consolidate 
account of financial institutions. an equivalent amount being 
included under the heading for public sector credit. 
National monetary analyses also differ according to the 
definitions of the three sectors: public sector, private sector. 
foreign sector. For example. loans to public corporations 
may be included either in public sector or in private sector 
credit. For some countries, the external counterpart is dis-
torted by valuation changes. 
In the following descriptions. the financial institutions are 
those described as issuers of the money supply in the Section 
'Money supply'. 
Belgium: 
(a) P11hlic sector credit: Net claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on general government 
(except social security funds) and net foreign borrowing 
by general government. 
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(b) Private sector credit: Claims of financial institutions on 
households and firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Capital and own resources, items in tran-
sit, statistical residuals, social security debt. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions plus net foreign borrowing by general 
government. 
(e) Non-monetary commitments: Claims, with maturities of 
more than one year by firms and households on the 
financial institutions. 
Denmark: 
(a) Public sector credit: Net claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on central government 
(including public borrowing abroad sterilized in the cen-
tral bank). 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims of financial institutions on 
households and firms, local authorities, public sector 
undertakings and non-money-creating financial insti-
tutions. 
(c) Miscella11eo11s: Capital and own resources, items in tran-
sit, statistical residuals. 
(d) External contrib11tio11: Surplus on current external pay-
ments, net borrowing abroad by business. local govern-
ment authorities. etc. and net sales of krone-denominated 
bonds to non-residents. 
(e) No11-111011etary liabilities: Some categories of time de-
posits of over one year. 
FR of Germany: 
(a) Public sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities at issue) of financial institutions on general 
government. 
(b) Pril'ate sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on household and 
firms. the railways. federal postal services. State corpor-
ations and home-savings institutions. 
(c) Miscella11eo11s: Items in transit. statistical residuals. 
authorities· deposits with the central bank. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions. including balance on financial institutions' 
dealings in foreign securities. 
(e) No11-111011etary liabilities: Liabilities of financial insti-
tutions other than M3 held by households. firms and 
authorities. 
153 
Technical annex 
Greece: 
(a) Public sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on central govern-
ment, local authorities, social security and public corpor-
ations. 
(b) Prii'ate sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on households and 
private firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: None. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Private blocked deposits, de-
posits, other than sight deposits, of authorities, securities 
issued by financial institutions, items in transit, capital 
and reserves. 
France: 
(a) Public sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
Treasury bonds) of financial institutions on the Treasury; 
State financing through postal cheque deposits and de-
posits with Treasury hranches. 
(b) Private sector credit: Loans to households, private firms 
and public corporations, excluding loans to non-resident 
households and firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Items in transit. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of money 
creating banks. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: The balance between certain 
liabilities of financial institutions (capital, reserves. se-
curities issued) and certain assets (buildings and securities 
portfolio); net liabilities towards other financial interme-
diaries. 
Ireland: 
(a) Public sector credit: Loans by financial institutions to 
central government, local authorities and State-spon-
sored bodies (net of central government deposits with 
the central bank), plus government bond issues to finance 
the purchase of agricultural products on behalf of the 
EEC. 
(b) Pri1•ate sector credit: Loans by financial institutions to 
households and private firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: None. 
IS4 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of licensed 
banks, official external reserves. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Items in transit, capital and 
reserves. 
Italy: Balance sheet of financial institutions consolidated 
with supply and demand in the securities market. 
(a) Public sector credit: Borrowing requirement of Treasury 
and other government agencies, excluding public finan-
cing of the private sector and foreign borrowing. 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims of financial institutions and 
special credit institutions on households, firms, local 
authorities and social security funds; net issue of private 
bonds not held by financial institutions. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Capital and own resources, items m 
transit. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Assets of households and firms 
consisting of: deposits with special credit institutions 
(ICS), bank acceptances, bonds issued by firms and ICS, 
public securities and shares. 
The Netherlands: 
(a) Public sector credit: Loans by financial institutions to 
central government and local authorities. 
(b) Private sector credit: Loans to households, firms in the 
private and public sectors and institutional investors, as 
well as investments on the capital market. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Items in transit and statistical adjust-
ment. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions and Treasury. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Liabilities of financial insti-
tutions other than M2 held by households, firms, insti-
tutional investors and the authorities, and the capital 
and own resources of financial institutions. 
United Kingdom: 
(a) Pubhc sector credit: Net claims of commercial banks. 
the Banking and Issue Departments of the Bank of 
England and the Exchange Equalization Account on 
general government and public corporations. 
(b) Private sector credit: Loans by banks to the private 
sector and commercial bills held by the Issue Department 
of the Bank of England. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Net cla ims by banks on residents in 
foreign currency. 
(d) Ex ternal contribution: Net short-term external position 
of commercial banks; official reserves net of liabilities to 
!MF. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities : Liabilities of financial insti-
tutions other than sterling M3 including capital and 
reserves; includes some external items. 
Labour market definitions 
Labour force, employment, unemployment and 
hours worked definitions 
The civilian labour force in the Community and Member 
States comprises all persons employed (including self-em-
ployed and fam il y workers but excluding the armed forces) 
plus the unemployed . The national concept is used: all 
employed or unemployed persons resident in the territory 
of the country in question are included. 
Technical annex 
Total employment in the Community and Member States 
includes all persons in employment or self-employment, as 
well as family workers. The domestic concept is used : all 
persons employed or self-employed within the territory of 
the country in question whether or not they are residt;nt, are 
included. 
The unemployment rate in the Community and Member 
States is defined as the number unemployed as a percentage 
of the civilian labour force; data for numbers unemployed 
and the labour force relate to the same year, i.e. the 1981 
unemployment rate is the average number unemployed in 
1981 as a percentage of the 1981 labour force. Rates for 
1970-84 are historical data supplied by Eurostat; 1985-86 
rates are estimates using Eurostat definitions based on fore-
casts, prepared by the Commission departments, for num-
bers unemployed and the labour force. Data for unemployed 
persons are derived from statistics of registered unemployed 
supplied to Eurostat by national agencies in accordance 
with standardized procedures : in principle, the definition of 
unemployed persons covers persons without a job, seeking 
employment as an employee and immediately available for 
work. For more specific detail on the individual series for 
Member States, see Employment and Unemployment (Euro-
stat, 1984). 
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Statistical annex 
Notes on the statistical annex 
General remarks 
This year's November edition of European Economy again gives in its statistical annex 
updated time series of annual data. 
Unless otherwise specified, aggregates up to I 983 are defined for member countries as 
in the ESA (European System of Economic Accounts), and for the USA and Japan as 
in the SNA (UN-OECD System of National Accounts). National accounts figures for 
1984, 1985 and 1986 are estimates and forecasts made by Commission staff using the 
definitions and latest figures available from national sources, and so they are not fully 
comparable with the corresponding figures for earlier years. However, in Tables I. 2. 4 
to 8, 10 to 15, 17 to 27. 30 and 31 discontinuities have been eliminated. 
Community totals are for EUR 10 unless otherwise stated. Community totals for national 
accounts data are aggregated using purchasing power parities, except in Tables 6, 28. 29. 
3- to 36 and 45 to 47, where current exchange rates have been used. 
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Table 5 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
( national currtncy. annwl peruntagr changt• 
B DK D GR F IRL L :,JL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1961 6,4 11.0 9,6 12,8 9,1 7,7 11,2 4,8 5,6 6,7 8.7 3,6 23,6 
1962 7,0 12.7 8,8 6,2 11,7 8,3 12,4 0.4 7,7 4.7 8,8 7,7 10,9 
1963 7,5 6,4 6,0 11,7 12,1 7,5 14.5 7.7 8,5 6,2 9,0 5,6 15,5 
1964 11,9 14,3 9,9 12,3 10,9 13,8 9,5 13,3 17,7 9.1 10,4 6.9 18,2 
1965 8,8 12,3 9,3 13,8 7,6 6,5 7,6 5,2 11,7 7,4 8.4 8.4 10,5 
1966 7,5 9,8 6,3 11,2 8,3 5,4 8,4 4,7 8,9 6,5 7.4 9,5 16,1 
1967 7,1 9,9 1,3 8,1 8,0 9,2 10,2 2,6 9,7 5,8 6,2 5,8 17,2 
1968 7,0 11,3 7,9 8,5 8,7 12,8 8,4 9,5 10,9 8,5 8,5 9,2 18,6 
1969 10,9 13,7 11,9 13,6 14,0 15,5 10,4 15,0 13,3 6,8 11,0 8,1 17,6 
1970 11,3 10,5 13,1 12,2 11,7 12,6 12,5 13,6 12,6 9,7 11,8 5,1 17.9 
1961-70 8,5 11,2 8,4 11,0 10,2 9,9 10,5 7,6 10,6 7,1 9,0 7,0 16,6 
1971 9,5 10,5 11,1 10,5 11,5 14,4 8,9 3,6 13,2 12,3 11,1 8,6 10.0 
1972 11,8 15,0 9,8 14,4 12,5 20,7 9,7 11,5 13,2 10,7 I I.I 10,0 14.5 
1973 13,6 14,7 11,4 28,2 13,6 20,7 19,5 22,4 14,6 15,6 14,9 11,5 21,8 
1974 17,2 12,0 7,3 16,5 14,7 10,6 23,4 22,0 13,2 13,7 14,1 8,1 19,3 
1975 10,4 11,7 4,3 19,1 13,6 26,8 13,2 - ,I 10,1 26,3 13,6 8,3 10,3 
1976 13,2 16,2 9,1 22,7 15,5 22.0 24,9 14.9 14,7 19,3 16.4 10,9 12,0 
1977 7,9 11,2 6,8 16,8 12,3 22,1 21,3 2,4 8,8 15,0 12,9 11,6 11,2 
1978 7,4 11,5 7.4 20,5 13,6 18,5 16,9 10,0 8,0 15,2 12,5 12,5 9.9 
1979 6,7 11,4 8,4 23,0 14,1 16,4 21,6 10,0 6,4 17,0 14,0 I 1.3 7,9 
1980 7,5 7,8 6,4 19,7 13,4 17,9 25.4 9,6 6,6 17,2 14,0 9,1 7,9 
1971-80 10,5 12,2 8,2 19,1 13,5 18,9 18,3 9,6 10,8 16,2 13.4 10.2 12,4 
1981 3,9 9.1 4,2 18,9 12,4 20,5 18,5 5,9 4,8 10.4 10,4 12,6 7,1 
1982 8,3 14,6 3,6 24,4 14,7 17.5 17,4 7,4 4,5 9,1 10.6 3,8 4,8 
1983 6,4 10,3 4,2 20,l 10,9 11,3 13,7 6,2 2,6 8,6 8,8 7,6 3,7 
1984 7,0 9,8 4,5 23,0 8,7 I 1.3 13,6 9,2 4,4 6,3 8.0 I I.I 6,4 
1985 6,7 6,4 4,4 19,3 7,0 8,7 11,0 6,0 4,5 9,0 7,6 6,2 6,1 
1986 6,2 5,4 5.4 16,8 5,8 7,5 9,5 6,4 3,0 7,0 6,7 6.8 5.4 
Table 6 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
1 '(I()(/ million £CU, 
----
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1960 10.5 5,6 68,2 3,3 56,9 1.7 35.2 0,5 11,0 68,2 261,4 478,5 41,7 
1961 11,1 6,2 77,0 3,7 61.4 1.8 38,7 0,5 11,9 72,0 284,7 490.4 51,0 
1962 11,8 7,0 84,3 3,9 68,4 1.9 43.4 0,5 12.9 75,3 309,8 526,9 56,4 
1963 12,7 7,4 89,4 4,4 76,7 2,1 49,7 0,6 14,0 80,0 337.3 556,1 65,1 
1964 14,3 8,5 98,2 4,9 85.0 2.4 54.4 0.6 16,5 87.2 372,4 594,3 77.0 
1965 15,5 9,5 107,3 5,6 91,5 25 58,5 0,7 18,4 93.7 403,7 644,0 85,0 
1966 16,7 10,4 114,I 6,2 99,1 2,6 63,4 0,7 20,1 99,8 433.6 705,0 98,7 
1967 17,9 11,4 116,I 6,8 107,5 2,8 70,2 0,7 22,1 104,1 460,1 749,3 116,3 
1968 19,9 12,2 129,6 7,6 121,0 2,9 78,7 0,8 25,4 102,2 500,6 846,6 142,7 
1969 22,2 14,0 148,3 8,7 132,4 3,4 87,5 0,9 28,9 109,8 556.5 920,9 169.0 
1970 24,7 15,5 180,5 9,7 137,8 1,8 98.4 1,1 32,6 120,5 625,1 968,0 199.1 
1971 27.2 16,9 205,9 10,5 151.1 4,3 105,8 1,1 37,3 134.5 695.1 1 025,2 221.6 
1972 31,3 19,4 2J0,3 11,2 173,4 5,0 114.8 u 42,9 142.2 772,2 1 053,0 271.7 
1973 36,7 21,3 280,0 13,1 203,8 5,4 125,3 1,6 51,6 146,9 888,0 I 069,3 337.4 
1974 44,J 26,7 319,3 15,8 222,9 5,9 142,7 2.0 62,5 164.6 1 007.0 1 193,4 386,1 
1975 49,8 30,4 336,6 16,8 273,0 6,8 154,9 1,9 70,3 189,2 1 130.0 1 242,9 402,6 
1976 59,6 37,2 397,7 20,2 313.9 7.4 168.4 2.3 85,5 203,4 1 295,8 I 529,4 500, 
1977 67,9 40,7 451,7 22,9 336.2 8,6 188,8 2.5 98,2 222,5 I 439,9 I 671.6 603,2 
1978 74,4 44,4 502,8 24,8 373,0 10,1 20'i, 7 2,8 107,8 252,3 1 598,1 l 684,1 758,7 
19N 79,2 48,1 554,6 28.1 419,0 11,6 237,3 3,1 115.0 303,1 I 799,0 I 742,5 727,6 
1980 84,2 47,8 586,9 28.8 471.9 13,6 284,8 3,3 122,0 383,6 2 026,9 I 872,1 748,8 
1981 86,1 'i I. 5 614,2 11.0 'il'i,I 16.0 117,9 1,5 127,1 4's8,2 2 222.7 2 628.8 l 029.2 
19 2 86,1 57,3 073,5 38,7 S:SS,O 18., 156,l 3,4 141,1 493,2 2 423.4 3 108,3 1 086,9 
1981 90.1 63.4 734.4 38,9 584.4 20,2 397,0 3,6 14'1,2 511,4 2 592,7 3 679, 7 1 299,1 
1984 96.4 69.5 778.4 42.3 625.6 22.1 440.4 3,9 156.5 540,0 2 775,2 4 621.5 I 562.4 
1985 104,2 75.0 81 \1 443 675.0 24.4 463,4 4.2 161,8 595,8 2 965,1 5 170,2 I 710,3 
1986 111,4 78,8 874.1 43,4 711.6 26,1 475.7 4.5 171,9 640,4 3 140,0 4 845.2 1 710.0 
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Table 9 
Industrial production 
tannua/ ~rCffltag, chang,) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR JO us JA 
1960 6,8 8,7 11,7 8,9 6,9 15,7 9,0 10,0 6,8 10,6 2.2 24,4 
1961 6,2 5,1 6,1 5,5 8,6 10,8 2,9 3,6 0,0 5,5 0,7 19,4 
1962 5,7 8,9 9,2 5,1 7.1 9,6 -4,2 3,5 I, I 5,1 8.3 7,9 
1963 7,4 1,3 3,5 10,4 7,1 5.8 8,9 1,0 5,1 4,0 5,7 6,0 11,4 
1964 6,5 11,7 7,7 10,9 6,1 7,7 1,2 9,2 9,7 7,9 6,2 6,7 15,6 
1965 2,5 6,6 5,3 8,5 1,9 4,2 4,6 0,8 4,4 3,3 4,0 10,0 4,0 
1966 2,0 2,9 1,3 16,0 5,4 3,0 11,4 -3,2 4,2 1,4 4,4 8,8 13,0 
1967 1,8 3,9 -2,5 4,6 2,5 8,1 8,3 -0,6 2,7 0,2 1,8 2,3 19,2 
1968 5,5 7,4 9,7 7,8 3,5 10,4 6,4 6,0 9,2 6,7 7,0 6,4 15,2 
1969 9,7 12,4 12,7 11,8 10,4 7,1 3,7 12,8 10,8 3,3 8,3 4,5 15,9 
1970 3,1 2,5 6,1 10,5 5,3 4,4 6,5 0,5 8,7 0,5 4,9 -3,0 13,7 
1961-70 5,0 6,2 5,8 5,3 6,6 7,1 2,4 6,2 2,8 5,3 5,0 13,4 
1971 1,7 2,4 1,4 11,3 4,8 3,7 -0,6 -1,1 5,5 -0,2 1,7 1,8 2,7 
1972 7,5 4,4 4,2 14,1 6,7 4,3 4,9 4,2 5,1 2,2 4,7 9,2 7,3 
1973 6.2 3,4 7,2 15,3 6,7 9,8 9,7 11,9 7,7 8,7 8,0 8,4 14,9 
1974 4,0 -0,8 -1,1 -1,5 2,3 3,0 4,0 3,5 4,7 -2,4 0,8 -0,4 -3,9 
1975 -9,8 -6,0 -6,2 4,3 -7,4 -6,1 -8,9 -21,9 -5,l -4,7 -6,6 -8,9 -10,5 
1976 7,8 9,6 7,4 10,6 8,6 8,7 11,6 3,8 7,7 2,7 7,6 10,8 11,0 
1977 0,5 0.8 2,1 1,5 1,9 8,0 0,0 0,5 0,5 4,7 2,0 5,9 4,1 
1978 2,4 2,3 3,0 7,5 2,3 7,9 2,1 3,2 0,8 3,9 2,8 5,8 6,1 
1979 4,5 3.6 5,1 6,0 4,0 7,7 6,7 3,4 3,1 3,8 4,8 4,4 7,1 
1980 -1,3 0,2 0,2 0,9 -0,5 -0,8 5,0 -3,3 -0,1 -6,7 -0,5 -3,6 4.6 
1971-80 2,2 1,9 2,3 6,9 2,8 4,5 3,3 0,0 2,9 1,1 2,4 3,2 4,1 
1981 -2,7 0,0 -1,9 -0,6 -2,3 2,2 -2,2 -5,7 -2,2 -3,5 -2,3 2,7 1,0 
1982 0,0 2,7 -2,9 -4.2 -1,2 0,3 -3,1 0,9 -3.7 2,1 -1,5 -8.2 0,4 
1983 2,0 3,2 0,6 -0,7 1,1 6,5 · 2,4 5,4 2,1 3,4 0,8 6,5 3,6 
1984 2,6 9,7 3,0 3,5 2,4 12,9 3,0 13,3 5,0 1,0 2,8 10,7 10,9 
1985 3,3 4,3 4,5 0,5 1,5 5,5 3,1 3,0 3,5 4,6 3,4 
1986 3,6 5,0 4,0 0,5 2,4 5,0 3,3 2,3 4,0 2,6 3,2 
Table 10 
Private consumption at current prices 
(as perunt of GDP at currenl market prices) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EURIO us JA 
1960 69,2 62,0 59,4 80,3 {i 1,9 76,6 62.7 55,2 58,2 66,3 62,9 63,8 58,9 
1961 67,9 62,I 59,5 76,8 62,l 75,0 61,7 55,5 59,4 65,3 62,5 63,6 54,5 
1962 66,6 61,9 59,5 76,4 62,1 · 74.7 62,0 58,4 60,1 66,1 62,7 62,7 57,2 
1963 67,1 61,4 59,6 74,3 62,6 74,1 63.3 58,3 61.5 66,1 63,1 62,7 58,0 
1964 64,1 60,3 58,4 73,6 61,6 72,6 62,7 57,5 59,1 64.7 61,9 62,8 57,2 
1965 64.3 58,9 59,2 72.8 61,1 71,7 62,3 58,6 59,2 64,2 61,7 62,2 58,4 
1966 63,9 59.6 59.7 72,3 61,0 71,8 63,4 58,8 59,1 63,7 61.9 61,4 57,9 
1967 62.9 59,9 60,8 72,4 61,2 70,l · 63.7 58,3 58,5 63.3 62.1 61.3 56,6 
1968 63,7 58.8 60,1 71.9 61.4 71,0 62.8 56,9 57,7 62,7 61,7 61,6 54,6 
1969 62.2 57,5 59,1 69,2 61.2 69.8 62,3 52.9 58,3 62,3 61,l 61,8 53,5 
1970 59.8 57.4 58.4 69,2 60,0 68,9 62,6 51.3 58,1 61,7 60,4 62,8 52,2 
1961-70 64.3 59,8 59,4 72,9 61,4 72.0 62.7 56,6 59,l 64,0 61,9 62.3 56,0 
197 l 60.3 55.8 58,7 68.0 60,5 68,0 62,4 54.9 57,3 61,5 60,5 62,8 53.5 
1972 60,2 53,4 59.3 65,7 60,4 65,0 62,6 54,0 56,9 62.8 60.8 62,6 54,0 
1973 60,6 54.5 58.8 63.4 60,0 64,4 62.5 48.8 56.4 61,9 60,3 61,9 5},6 
1974 59,8 54.3 59.6 67,7 61.1 68.4 62,8 46,2 56,3 62.9 61.l 62,6 54,3 
1975 61,2 55,5 63,2 67.5 61.9 64.2 64,3 57.5 58,5 61,1 62.3 63,5 57,1 
1976 61,0 56.ti 62.8 65.8 62,1 64,3 62,8 56,5 58.8 59,4 61,6 63,8 57,4 
1977 61,9 56,9 63.0 65.9 62,2 63.8 62.1 59,8 59,8 59,0 61,5 63,5 57 4 
1978 61.o 56.2 62.5 65.2 62.0 63.2 61.6 57.9 60,3 59,0 61,3 62,9 57.2 
1979 62,6 56.4 62.0 63,3 62,1 64.8 61.1 57.7 60,9 59.8 61.3 63.2 58,1 
1980 63,5 55.9 62.6 64.0 63.0 65,2 61,5 58.5 61.1 59,2 61,7 64,3 58,3 
1971-80 61,1 5\5 61.J 65.6 61.5 65,1 62,4 55,2 58.6 60,7 61,2 63,1 56,1 
19, 1 65.5 56.0 63,4 67,0 64,6 66,1 62,3 60,5 60,4 59,6 62.6 63,5 57,5 
19,'_ 65.4 55,I 63.3 66,6 64,6 62,1 62,3 61.0 60.1 59.8 62,5 65,6 58,7 
1983 65,2 54.S 63.2 66,6 64,2 59.0 62,5 61.4 60,5 60,3 62,5 66,2 59,4 
19 4 65.0 54.3 62,1 65, 1 63,S 57.3 62.3 59,2 59,2 60,6 62.1 64,7 58.5 
1985 63,9 54.2 61.7 65.7 64,1 )6,3 62.3 59,1 59,0 59,9 61,8 65.3 57,9 
1986 62,4 5.1,6 61.5 65,4 64,2 55,9 61,9 58.6 59.3 60.6 61.8 65.1 57,9 
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Table 13 
Public consumption at constant prices 
( national currency; annwl perc:tntage changt J 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1961 1,9 5,3 6,7 4,4 4,8 2,9 4,4 1,3 2,8 3,5 4,5 6,1 6,1 
1962 8,6 9,9 10,4 6,7 4,7 2,9 3,9 2,4 3,3 3,1 5,5 5.3 8,4 
1963 11,6 2,9 6,3 4,2 3,4 4,2 4,3 5,8 4,7 1,8 4,1 1,5 8,7 
1964 4,2 7,3 0,6 9,3 4,2 3,0 4,2 -0,8 1,7 1,6 2,6 2,5 6,0 
1965 5,5 3,4 4,0 9,0 3,2 3,6 4,0 2,5 1.5 2,6 3,4 2,8 6,3 
1966 4,7 5,8 1,0 6,3 2,7 1,1 4,0 5,8 1,7 2,7 2,6 10,2 5,8 
1967 5,7 7,6 2,9 8,5 4,3 5,3 4,4 4,2 2,4 5,7 4,5 8,0 4,7 
1968 3,5 4,7 ·- 1,4 1,3 5,6 4,9 5,2 5,6 2,2 0,4 2,2 3,0 5,7 
1969 6,3 6,8 4,6 7,7 4,1 6,7 2,8 3,3 4,5 -1,9 2,6 0,5 5,1 
1970 3,1 6,9 4,4 5,9 4,2 7.5 2,6 4,1 6,0 1,6 3,4 -1,2 5,7 
1961-70 5,5 6,0 3,9 6,3 4,1 4,2 4,0 3,4 3,1 2,1 3,5 3,8 6,2 
1971 5,5 5,5 3,9 4,9 3,5 8,7 5,7 3,8 3,3 3,1 4,0 -2,1 5,4. 
1972 5,9 5,7 2,3 5,7 2,7 7,5 5,3 4,0 1,8 4,2 3,7 2,5 5,2 
1973 5,3 4,0 3,7 6,8 3,2 6,8 2,4 3,3 0,7 4,9 3,6 0.6· 5,0 
1974 3,4 3,5 2,5 12,1 1,2 7,6 2,8 4,8 2,0 1,5 2,3 3,3 3,5 
1975 4,5 2,0 1,1 11,9 4,7 6,5 3,2 6,6 3,9 5,5 3,9 2.2 6,8 
1976 3,7 4,5 0,0 5,1 6,2 2,6 2,2 1,9 4,0 1,3 2,5 1,9 4,1 
1977 2,3 2,4 1,2 6,5 1,4 2,1 2,8 3,0 3,2 -1,6 1,1 1,9 3,9 
1978 6,0 6,2 3,8 3,5 4,3 8,2 2,3 2,0 3,9 2,3 3,4 2.1 5,0 
1979 2,5 5,9 3,8 5,8 1,8 6,8 1,6 4,7 2,8 2,1 2,6 2,5 4,3 
1980 1,5 4,3 2,2 0,2 1,8 7,0 2,1 4,6 0,6 1,5 1,9 2,6 2,9 
1971-80 4,1 4,4 2,4 6,2 3,1 6,4 3,0 3,8 2,6 2,5 2,9 1,7 4,6 
1981 1,2 2,6 0,8 6,8 2,3 2,0 3,3 2,1 2,0 0,0 1,6 2,4 5,2 
1982 -1.2 2,8 -0,9 1,9 2,5 4,0 2,3 0,3 0,7 0,9 1,1 2,8 2,3 
1983 0,3 -0,0 -0,2 2,4 1,9 0,1 2,7 0,0 1,5 2,6 1,6 0,6 2,4 
1984 -0,2 -o.o 2,4 3,9 0,3 -1,2 2,7 -1,3 -1,6 1,0 1,2 2,9 2,3 
1985 0,4 0,2 1,5 4,3 1.0 0,5 1,9 0,7 0,5 1,0 1,2 4,1 2,5 
1986 -0,0 0,0 2,0 0,7 0,9 -0,5 1,5 0,0 0,3 0,8 1.1 1.5 1,9 
Table 14 
Gross fixed investment at current prices; total economy 
(as percent of GDP at currc.'nt market prin:s) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1960 19,3 21,6 24,3 19,0 20,1 14,4 22,6 21,0 24,1 16,4 20,8 17,9 29,5 
1961 20,7 23,2 25,2 18,2 21,2 16.3 23,2 23,2 24,8 17,3 21,7 17,4 32,6 
1962 21,3 23,1 25,7 20,1 21,4 17,9 23,7 26,1 24,5 17,0 22.0 17,6 32,9 
1963 20,7 22,0 25,6 19,2 22,1 19,5 24,0 29,9 23,8 16.8 22.0 17.9 31,5 
1964 22,4 24,5 26,6 21,0 22,9 20,5 22,2 33,5 25,5 18,4 22,8 18,1 31,7 
1965 22,4 24,1 26,1 21,6 23,3 21,4 19,3 28,0 25,1 18,5 22,3 18.7 29,9 
1966 22,9 24,1 25,4 21,7 23,7 19,8 18,8 26.6 26,2 18,5 22,1 18,5 30,4 
1967 22,9 · 24,2 23,l 20,3 23,8 20.1 19,5 23,3 26,3 19,1 21.8 17,9 32,l 
1968 21,5 23,4 22,4 23,2 23,3 20,9 20,3 21,4 26,9 19,4 21,7 18,1 33,2 
1969 21,3 24,6 23,3 24,6 23,4 23,3 21.0 21,7 24,6 18,9 22.0 18,2 34,5 
1970 22,7 24,7 25,5 23,6 23.4 22,7 21,4 23,5 25,8 19,0 22,7 17,6 35,5 
1961-70 21,9 23,8 24,9 21,4 22,9 20,2 21.3 25,7 25,3 18,3 22,1 18,0 32,4 
1971 22,1 24,2 26,1 25,2 23,6 23,6 20,4 28,4 25,9 18,9 22,8 18,1 34,3 
1972 21.3 24,6 25,4 27,8 23.7 23.7 19,8 28,2 23,7 18,7 22.4 18,7 34,2 
1973 21,4 24,8 23,9 28,0 23,8 25.3 20,8 27.4 23,1 20,1 22,5 19,1 36,4 
1974 22,7 24,0 21,6 22,2 24.3 24,6 22.4 24.7 21,8 20,6 22,3 18.4 34,8 
1975 22,5 21,1 20,4 20,8 23,3 22,6 20,6 27,8 20,9 20,1 21.2 17,0 32.4 
1976 22,1 23,0 20,2 21,2 23,3 25.2 20.0 24,5 19,3 19,5 20,9 17,1 31,3 
1977 21,7 22,1 20,3 23,0 22.3 25,0 19,6 25,3 21,1 18,6 20,5 18.3 '.l0,5 
1978 21,7 21,7 20,8 23,9 21.4 28.0 18,7 23,9 21,3 18,6 20,3 19,5 30,8 
1979 20,8 20,9 21,9 25.8 21,5 31.l 18,8 24,6 21,0 18,8 20.7 19,8 32,1 
1980 21,3 18,8 22,8 24,2 21.9 28.7 19,8 26,2 21,0 18,1 21,0 18.5 32,0 
1971-80 21,8 22,5 22,3 24,2 22,9 25,8 20,1 26,1 21.9 19,2 21,4 18.4 32.9 
1981 18.1 15,6 21,9 22.3 21,4 29,5 20,2 23,3 19.2 16,5 20,1 17,8 31,0 
1982 17,5 16,1 20,7 20,2 20,5 25,8 19,0 24,1 18,2 16.6 19,2 16,5 29,9 
1983 16.l 16,3 20,8 20.5 19,6 22.6 18,0 23,1 18,1 16,5 18.8 16,8 28.4 
1984 16,2 17,6 20,5 18,8 18,7 21.0 17,9 22,2 18.4 17,5 18,7 17.8 27,9 
1985 16.6 19,0 19,7 19,0 18.4 21,0 18,2 21.8 18,4 17,5 18,5 18,1 27,5 
1986 16,7 19,9 19,9 19,2 18,2 20,9 18.4 21,3 18,6 17,5 18.6 18,7 27,2 
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Table 17 
Price deflator GDP at market prices 
/national currtncy. Cllflfual pucentage rhangt) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR lO us JA 
1961 1,3 4,3 4,2 1,5 3.4 2.8 2,8 0,4 2.4 3,3 3,3 1,0 7.9 
1962 1,7 6,6 4,1 4,6 4,7 4,4 5,8 -1.0 3,5 3,7 4,3 1,9 3,6 
1963 3,0 5,8 2,7 1.4 6,4 2,6 8,5 5,0 4.7 2,0 4.4 1.5 4,5 
1964 4,6 4,6 3,0 3,7 4.1 9,2 6,5 5,4 8,7 3,7 4.4 1.7 4.4 
1965 5,1 7.4 3,6 4,0 2,7 4.4 4,2 3,4 6,1 5,1 4,2 2,0 5.1 
1966 4,2 6,8 3,5 4,9 2.9 4,3 2,2 3,0 6.0 4,6 3.7 3,5 5,0 
1967 3,1 6,0 1.2 2.4 3,2 3,9 2,8 1,0 4,2 3,0 2,7 2.9 5,8 
1968 2,7 7,2 2,0 1,7 4,2 4,4 1.7 5, l 4,2 4,1 3.2 5,0 5,2 
1969 4,0 6,8 4,2 3,4 6,6 8,9 4,1 5,5 6,4 5.4 5,1 5,1 4,8 
1970 4,6 8,1 7,5 3,9 5.6 8,9 6,9 11,1 5.6 7,3 6,7 5,3 7,3 
1961-70 3,4 6,4 3,6 3,1 4.4 5.4 4,5 3,8 5,2 4,2 4,2 3,0 5,3 
1971 5.6 7,9 7,6 3,2 5,8 10,6 7,2 -0,7 8,5 9,4 7,4 5,3 5,2 
1972 6.2 9,0 5,4 5,0 6,2 13,5 6,3 5,0 9,4 8,3 6,7 4.4 5,2 
1973 7,2 10,5 6,6 19.4 7,8 15,3 11,6 10,5 8.4 7,1 8.4 5,5. 11,9 
1974 12,6 12,8 6.6 20,9 11,1 6.1 18,5 17,8 9,3 14,9 12,3 9,0 20,6 
1975 12,1 12,8 5,9 12,3 13,4 22,3 17,5 -!,I 11,2 27,2 14,9 9,2 7,8 
1976 7,6 9,0 3.5 15.4 9,9 20,3 18.0 12,7 8,9 14,9 10,8 5,9 6,4 
1977 7.4 8,7 3,6 13,0 9,0 12,9 19,1 1,7 6,3 13,9 10,3 5,7 5,7 
1978 4,3 9,5 4,2 12,9 9,5 10,5 13,9 5,3 5,4 11,l 8,9 7.4 4,6 
!979 4.6 7,6 4,1 18,6 10,4 13,2 15,9 5,8 3,9 14,5 10,2 8,5 2,6 
1980 3,9 8.2 4,3 17,7 12,2 14,2 20,6 7,8 5,7 19,8 12,6 9,6 2,8 
1971-80 7,1 9.6 5.2 13,7 9,5 13,8 14,8 6,3 7,7 14,0 10,2 7,0 7,2 
1981 5,3 10,I 4,1 19,3 12,1 17,1 18,3 7,9 5,5 11,7 10,6 8,9 2,7 
1982 7.1 11,3 4,6 24,6 12.5 15,2 17,9 8,5 6,0 7,1 10,1 6,9 1,7 
1983 5,9 8,1 3.2 19,8 9,8 10,6 15.0 8,8 1,6 5, l 7,8 4,5 0,7 
1984 5,3 5,8 1.9 19,9 7,0 ,6 10,7 5,8 2,6 4,4 5,8 3,8 0,6 
1985 4,7 3,9 2,1 17,1 5,7 6,1 8,1 4,3 2,3 5,5 5,1 3,8 1,3 
1986 4.4 2,2 1,9 15,7 3,9 5.0 6,6 5,0 1,0 4,8 4,1 4,2 1,3 
Table 18 
Price deflator private consumption 
( national currency; annual percentaRt change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1961 2,7 3,5 3,6 1,1 3,3 2.6 1,7 0,5 2,4 2,9 2,9 1,1 5,6 
1962 1,1 6,2 3,2 1,3 4,4 4,0 5,3 0,9 2,6 3,7 3.8 1,7 6,1 
1963 3,7 5.6 3.1 3.4 5,7 2.5 7,0 2,9 3.8 1,7 4,0 1,6 6,9 
1964 4,2 4.0 2.3 2,2 3,4 6,9 4,9 3,1 6,8 3,6 3,7 1.4 4.4 
1965 4.6 6,1 3.4 4,6 2,6 4,8 3,6 3,2 4,0 4,9 3,8 1,7 6,8 
1966 4,1 6.5 3.5 3,5 3,2 3,8 2,9 3,5 5.4 4,0 3.6 2.8 4,8 
1967 2,5 6,8 1.6 1,9 3,0 3,1 3,2 2,3 3,0 2.6 2.6 2.4 4,8 
1968 2,9 7.7 1,7 0,7 5.0 5,i 1,5 2.5 2,6 4,6 3.2 4,1 5,5 
1969 2.8 4,7 2.5 3,0 7,1 7,4 2,9 1,8 6,1 5,5 4,4 4.5 4.7 
1970 2,5 7,1 3,9 3.1 5.0 8,1 5.0 4,0 4,4 5,9 4,8 4,5 7,6 
1961-70 3.1 5.8 2,9 2,5 4,3 4,8 3,8 2,5 4,1 3,9 3,7 2,6 5,7 
1971 5,3 8,2 5,9 2,9 5,5 9,4 5.5 4,7 8,3 8,6 6,5 4,6 6.5 
1972 5.4 8,2 5,6 3,3 5,8 9,7 6.4 5,2 8.8 6,6 6,2 3,8 5,4 
1973 6,1 10.8 7,1 15,0 6.8 11,6 12.5 5,0 9,3 8,3 8,6 5,9 10,6 
1974 12.7 14,5 7.6 23.5 13.5 15.7 20,9 9.9 10,l 17,1 14,1 10.1 21,8 
1975 12.3 10.0 6.0 12,7 I 1.3 22.3 I 7,7 10,2 10.7 23,7 13,8 7,7 11.6 
1Q76 7. 9.8 4,2 13,4 9,8 18,8 18,1 9,5 8.8 15,7 11,0 5.4 8,9 
1977 7.1 9.6 3,7 11.9 9,0 13.3 18,2 5,8 6.0 14,9 10,3 5.9 7,1 
JQ78 4,1 9,0 2.9 12.8 8.7 7,8 12,9 3.5 4,5 9.0 7,7 6,9 4,6 
JQ79 4.0 10.4 4,2 16,4 10.4 14.4 15.1 5,8 4,3 13,6 9.9 9.0 3,5 
1<)80 (,,6 10.7 5.5 21,4 13,2 17,0 20,2 7,7 6.9 16,4 12,8 10,3 6,8 
1971-80 7.1 10.1 5,3 13.2 9,4 13,9 14.6 6.7 7,8 13.3 10.1 6,9 8,6 
19 I ,5 12.0 6,0 23,3 12,8 19,5 19.2 7,7 6,3 11.2 11,7 9,0 4,8 
1982 7,5 11.0 4.8 20,9 11.2 16,0 17,0 10,0 5.3 8.3 9,8 5,9 2.7 
1983 7.0 7,2 2,9 IQ,5 9.4 9.7 14.9 8.2 2,8 5.1 7,6 3,8 1,5 
1984 6,2 6,6 2.5 18,1 7,3 8,5 I 1,1 6,7 2.6 5,1 6.2 3.2 2,1 
19 5 4,9 4.2 2.1 18,0 .s 5,7 8,6 3.8 2.3 5,3 5,2 3,2 1.8 
19,6 u 1.7 1,5 16,0 4.0 5.3 6,5 3.4 I.I 4.3 3.9 4.4 2,2 
- .. ·-·---
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Table 21 
Terms of trade, goods and services; including intra-Community trade 
(1980 = JOO) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK us JA 
1960 106,0 109,2 101,1 108,8 105,7 106,5 120,l 113,1 103,8 100,4 139,5 194,4 
1961 103,9 107,8 104,0 110,9 i05,9 105,5 121,8 108,4 104,l 101,7 142,3 189,2 
1962 104,1 110,5 104,9 112,9 104,2 106,6 122,4 105,7 104,9 102,7 145,0 191,8 
1963 102,2 111,5 103,3 118,4 105,9 106,8 124,5 104,7 106,1 101,2 143,1 190,0 
1964 103,2 113.8 104,1 116,0 109,6 110,6 125,3 106,0 106,2 100,9 140,8 191,4 
1965 104.4 114,5 103,8 114,4 109,2 109,8 124,5 105,9 108,0 101.7 144,1 196,5 
1966 105,0 t 16,0 104,5 115,0 107,9 111,6 122,5 105,2 108,0 103,1 145,2 194,6 
1967 105,0 116,0 106,4 115,4 109,0 112,7 123,0 106.4 108,9 104,3 147,0 199,8 
1968 104,5 113,3 105,8 113,6 109,7 111.2 122,5 107,7 111,5 101,6 148,4 197,4 
1969 106,0 117,5 107,7 114,2 109,6 113,2 124,1 111,7 110,3 101,3 149,3 195,0 
1970 106,6 118,1 112,9 113,1 107,6 113,2 126,9 113,5 108,8 102,9 147,2 196,1 
1971 105,3 116,0 115,8 111,7 108,7 115,2 125,7 105,0 107,4 104,1 145,8 201,7 
1972 106,7 120,9 116,2 109,6 111,4 121,5 124,4 106,0 109,3 105,7 139,9 206,9 
1973 107.5 118,5 114,2 113,4 112,0 127.7 113,6 111.7 108,6 96,4 134,5 187,5 
1974 104,9 106,9 105,9 105,4 96,8 108,8 98,1 113,6 103,0 85,0 113,9 151,8 
1975 103,8 110,2 108,5 101,3 101,6 107,2 1(}2,7 101,3 103,6 90,0 115,3 139,8 
1976 103,2 109,9 106,3 100,3 100,8 110,8 99,6 103,3 103,7 88,4 116,2 132,3 
1977 103,8 108,2 106,2 104,2 99,3 108,9 101,4 99,7 104.1 89,6 109,4 133,0 
1978 103,8 111,5 109,8 102,7 104,2 110,9 104,8 101,1 104,4 93,6 111,8 148,0 
1979 104,0 106,2 105,9 99.9 104,0 106,8 103,1 103,1 101,9 95,9 108,2 125,8 
1980 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 
1981 96,2 95,7 96,2 105,0 98,1 98,9 94,9 97,8 99,7 101,3 107,4 99,6 
1982 96,3 95,3 98,1 101,9 102,I 101,9 98,4 97,9 102,3 100,2 116,2 99.3 
1983 96,5 97,2 100,2 97,8 104,6 105,5 101,5 97.7 101,2 100.1 123,4 97,8 
1984 96,0 97,0 98,9 96,6 104J 103,7 100,8 97,2 101,7 98,6 130,9 98,9 
1985 96,0 97,0 98,9 95,5 103,9 103,9 99,9 98,2 102,2 98,9 138,8 100,8 
1986 97,4 97,6 99,9 96,2 104,9 104,3 102,5 99,7 102,7 100,3 141.7 103,8 
Table 22 
Compensation per employee; total economy 
tnational currenc_r, annual ~rcentage rhan.~t~J 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1961 3,2 12,9 10,2 6,5 10,6 9,5 8,2 2,8 7,4 6,8 8.5 3.2 13.4 
1962 7,2 11,1 9,1 6,9 11,6 9,3 13,5 4,8 6,8 4,7 8,7 4,4 14,0 
1963 8,0 4,6 6.1 7,5 11,4 6,1 19,7 8,1 9,3 5,0 9,1 4,0 14,2 
1964 9,7 10,7 8,2 13,1 9,2 14,2 12,3 13,3 16.S 7,1 9,4 5,1 11,9 
1965 9,5 13,8 9,5 12,6 6,5 3,2 7,7 4,2 11,7 6,8 8,0 3,7 11,5 
1966 8,6 10.2 7,6 12,7 6,0 8,5 7,9 5,0 11,1 6.4 7,3 5.1 9,9 
1967 7,4 10,9 3,3 9,2 6,9 8.0 8,4 2,8 9,3 6,2 6,2 4.3 12,2 
1968 6,3 9,6 6,7 9,6 11.2 10,6 7,4 5.9 8,6 7,8 8,1 7,4 15.0 
1969 8.4 11,4 9,5 10,2 11,1 13,9 7,6 5,6 13,2 7,1 9.1 7.4 14,l 
1970 9,4 11,0 16,0 9.6 9,8 16,8 15,7 14,8 12,6 13.0 13,4 7,6 18,l 
1961-70 7,8 10,6 8,6 9.8 9,4 9,9 10.8 6,7 10,6 7,1 8,8 5.2 13.4 
1971 11,7 11.7 12,6 9,2 11,5 14.0 13.1 9,3 13,4 11.4 12.1 7,2 15,1 
1972 14,0 7,9 9,1 12,4 10,3 16,9 I I. I 8,8 12,9 13,2 11,0 7,4 14.2 
197'.I 13,0 13,l 12,1 17,6 12,8 19,8 19,6 12,8 15.1 13,2 14.2 7,0 21,3 
1974 18,2 18,4 11,5 18,7 17.6 18.6 22.1 21,3 15.8 18.9 17.2 8.1 25,7 
1975 16,5 14,0 7,2 19,7 18.6 26,8 21,0 11,3 13.3 31,3 18.2 9.2 16.1 
1976 16,0 11.7 7,9 23,9 14,7 19,3 20.9 13,2 10,9 14,9 14,l 8.0 11.3 
1977 8,7 9,7 6,6 22,3 12,6 13.8 21.4 9,4 8,1 10,6 11,8 7.5 10.0 
1978 7,5 9,2 5,6 23,1 12,5 15,3 16,2 5,6 7,2 13,5 11,2 7.6 7,0 
1979 5,6 9,4 5,9 22.0 LU 19.2 17,9 6,0 6,0 14,9 11,9 8,5 6,0 
1980 8,7 10,0 6,8 14,4 14,9 21,5 22,5 7,8 5.4 19.1 14,3 9.9 6,4 
1971-80 11,9 11.5 8,5 18,2 13,Q 18,5 18,5 10,5 10.7 16.0 13,6 8,0 13,2 
1981 7,6 9,2 5,2 24,8 14,2 17,0 21,9 7,8 3,b 13.5 12.6 9,5 6,5 
1982 7,9 11,5 4,3 27,2 14,1 14.4 17.0 6,9 5,6 8,8 10.6 8.0 4,4 
1983 6,7 6.4 3,7 19,7 10,9 10.5 16.0 6,6 3.3 8.8 9,1 6,0 2.9 
1984 6,2 4,9 3,2 21.3 8,1 9,6 12.1 4.2 0,6 5.5 6,7 5.2 4,9 
19 5,7 3,7 1.2 19.0 5.9 7,0 10.2 4.8 1,4 7,7 6.3 4,4 4,9 
4,2 2,4 3.8 12.6 4,5 5.7 7,6 5,7 2,5 7,1 5.4 4,2 5,4 
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Table 25 
Relative unit labour costs; manufacturing industry (calculated in a common currency: US dollars against 19 countries) 
( /971 = JOO) 
BL DK D GR F IRL NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1960 110,5 93,6 76,4 119,7 125,0 75,8 85,9 74,8 107,0 85,8 133,3 85,2 
1961 106,3 94,6 81,5 122,l 124,9 75,6 82,6 80,6 111, I 90,8 129,8 82,8 
1962 104,8 95,0 83,9 124,9 126,2 79,4 84,4 81,0 110,8 93,1 125,8 88,7 
1963 104,7 98,1 83,0 118,7 128,0 81,8 96,7 85,0 107,6 95,9 117,5 92,1 
1964 106,3 97,0 81,4 122,5 127,3 86,5 100,4 90,3 105,7 96,I 116,1 91,0 
1965 109,8 99,5 81,4 123,7 124,l 82,6 94,0 94,3 llO,l 97,0 110,5 97,0 
1966 109,3 104,1 82,7 120,5 117,3 85,2 88,6 97,6 111,6 96,0 111,3 93,6 
1967 109,5 103,2 79,7 128,6 115,0 83,8 90,4 102,6 107,4 93,1 115,2 88,4 
1968 106,6 99,6 79,7 129,4 119,9 81,7 89,7 104,2 93,1 88,3 120,9 91,3 
1969 103,1 103,9 81,6 129,2 113,6 88,1 91,6 100,4 95,7 88,4 124,0 90,2 
1970 94,4 101,9 94,6 118,9 101,8 91,8 95,2 95,2 99,5 93,7 122,4 83,9 
1971 95,9 101,5 98,0 112,4 98,4 95,3 99,0 96,4 103,0 97,6 111,4 89,1 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 100,8 110,3 110,l 89,5 102,0 96,6 95,5 103,4 87,9 102,8 87,1 111,8 
1974 106,0 113,1 110,0 103,9 90,0 98,9 90,3 106,9 87,2 97,6 86,1 117,2 
1975 107,5 106,9 99,7 94,l 106,4 97,4 10 4 108,9 94,9 105,4 78,7 111,5 
1976 109,8 110,6 99,7 102,8 104,7 91,1 88,6 106,4 85,9 97,0 81,4 108,3 
1977 111,6 111,3 105,3 113,8 100,4 89,4 89,9 109,2 84,3 99,8 79,8 114,6 
1978 109,4 118,6 109,4 115,4 100,6 92,4 88,0 107,0 90,5 104,3 73,8 127,5 
1979 104,2 116,7 110,5 120,2 102,0 97,7 88,3 106,2 106,0 112,4 74,4 107,5 
1980 102,2 101,6 107,7 119,1 106,9 109,4 87,0 100,5 129,2 120,l 76,0 90,6 
1981 92,8 91,5 98,7 126,0 101,0 103,0 84,0 90,0 130,4 104,3 84,4 97,3 
1982 81,0 90,6 99,6 148,9 99,3 105,1 85,1 92,0 121,4 100,5 94,2 83,0 
1983 79,6 89,4 99,0 140,0 95,1 98,3 93,3 91,0 112,2 96,8 96,7 90,1 
1984 80,1 87,2 95,0 146,3 91,1 89,2 90,9 84,2 108,9 88,8 107,0 90,9 
1985 81,7 87,9 92,3 148,0 90,7 86,5 88,4 81,1 112,4 86,8 112,3 90,2 
1986 83,4 87,5 96,4 145,0 90,9 87,6 86,4 83,l 121,4 92,3 101,4 90,5 
Table 26 
Exports of goods and services at current prices 
(as perc,nt o/GDP at cwrtnt marktt prices) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1960 38,4 32,2 18,8 9,1 15,0 31,8 14,I 85,1 48,1 21,1 20,5 5,1 10,8 
1961 39,6 29,9 17,9 9,3 14,5 34,6 14,4 81,2 45,8 20,6 20,0 5,0 9,2 
1962 41,2 28,5 17,3 9,7 13,4 ·32,3 14,2 78,0 45,2 20,2 19,4 4,9 9,5 
1963 42,4 30,3 17,7 10,0 13,1 33,6 13,7 74,9 45,2 20,1 19,4 4,9 9,0 
1964 43,2 29,7 17,9 9,2 13,2 33,4 14,4 76,8 43,8 19,5 19,4 5,2 9,4 
1965 42,6 29,2 17,9 9,0 13,8 34,8 16,1 78,6 43,2 19,4 19,7 5,1 10,5 
1966 44,3 28,4 19,0 11,3 13,8 37,2 16,5 75,3 42,0 19,5 20,1 5,1 10,6 
1967 43,4 27,2 20,3 10,7 13,7 37,8 16,3 75,l 40,8 19,2 20,2 5,2 9,7 
1968 45,5 27,5 21,2 9,6 13,7 38,8 17,1 76,9 41,3 21,5 21,2 5,2 10,1 
1969 49,5 27,4 21,6 9,7 14,6 37,3 17,8 81,2 42,8 22,5 22,0 5,2 10,5 
1970 51,9 27,9 21,0 10,0 16,3 37,0 17,8 86,9 44,9 23,4 22,7 5,7 10,8 
1961-70 44,4 28,6 19,2 9,8 14,0 35.7 15,8 78,5 43,5 20,6 20,4 5,2 9,9 
1971 50,6 27,6 20,9 10,3 17,1 36,1 18,2 84,2 45,4 23,3 22,8 5,5 11,7 
1972 51.1 27,1 20,8 11.7 17,2 34,6 18,9 79,5 45,0 22,I 22,7 5,7 10,6 
1973 55,6 28,5 22,0 14,2 18,2 38,0 18,8 85,9 47,2 24,0 24,0 6,9 10,0 
1974 61,3 31,8 26,0 16,1 21,5 42,6 22,3 99,3 53,7 28,2 28,0 8,4 13,6 
1975 53,7 30,1 24,5 16,9 19,5 42,7 22,8 88,3 49,7 26,2 26,3 8,5 12,8 
1976 57,0 28,8 25,9 17,6 20,2 46,6 24,6 84,2 50,9 28,5 27,8 8,3 13,6 
1977 55,9 28,8 25,7 16,8 21,3 49,9 26,3 82,4 47,6 30,4 28,4 7,9 13,2 
1978 54,0 27,8 25,2 17,6 21,3 50,5 26,8 79,1 44,9 28,9 27,8 8,2 11,2 
1979 59,5 29,2 25,4 17,5 21,9 50,6 27,9 85,4 49.1 28,5 28,5 9,1 11,7 
1980 62,9 32,7 26,7 20,9 22,2 50,5 25,1 81,4 52,5 27,8 28,8 10,2 13,9 
1971-80 56,2 29,2 24,3 16,0 20,1 44.2 23.2 85,0 48,6 26,8 26,5 7,9 12,2 
1981 68,5 36,5 29.4 20,4 23.6 49.8 26,7 79,4 58,0 27,1 30,5 9,7 15,0 
1982 73,7 36,2 30,9 18,2 23,1 49,5 26,5 85,6 57,6 26,7 30,7 8,6 14,9 
1983 74,4 36,3 29,7 19,4 23.5 53,4 26,2 83,7 58,0 26,8 30,5 7,7 14,0 
1984 78.2 36,8 31.6 21,1 25,2 60,3 27,2 92,7 63,1 28,9 32,5 7,5 15,1 
1985 78,6 37,6 33,9 21.8 25,4 63,8 28.1 93,1 64,6 30,1 33,7 6,9 15,2 
19, 6 77.4 37.4 33.9 22.6 25,2 65,9 28,5 89,0 63,2 28,6 33,4 7,4 16,3 
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Table 29 
Extra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
(as ~runl o/GDP at current market prices} 
BL DK D GR F IRL NL UK EUR 10 
1960 13,8 11,4 10,2 3,5 7,6 3,2 6,2 14,9 11,9 9.8 
1961 12,9 11,2 9,8 3,7 7.0 3,4 6,2 14,3 11,3 9,3 
1962 12,1 11,0 9,0 3,4 6.1 3.5 5,8 13.2 10,8 8,6 
1963 L!, 1 11,9 8,9 3,9 5,8 3,7 5,6 12,2 10.7 8,3 
1964 11,0 11,8 9,0 3,4 5,6 3,1 5,7 11.4 10,5 8,2 
1965 11,9 11,9 9,3 3,2 5.7 2,9 6,2 11,5 10,7 8,5 
1966 11,7 11.7 9,8 3,8 5,6 3,9 6,3 11,5 10,8 8,6 
1967 11,2 11,4 10,3 4,0 5,4 5,9 6,5 11,3 10,0 8,5 
1968 11,4 11,5 10,4 3.0 5,3 6,3 6,7 10,5 10,9 8,6 
i969 11,3 11,8 10,2 3,2 5,2 6,6 6,8 9,8 11,3 8,6 
1970 11,5 12,1 9,9 3.1 5,8 6,4 6,7 9,9 11,2 8,7 
1961-70 11,6 11,6 9,6 3,5 5,8 4,6 6,3 11,6 10,8 8,6 
1971 11,1 11,5 9,9 2.8 5,7 6,0 6,6 9,1 11, 1 8,6 
1972 11,1 11,3 9,3 3,3 5.7 5,4 6,8 8,5 10,5 8.3 
1973 12,2 11,6 10,0 4,0 6,1 7,3 6,8 9,7 11,2 8,9 
1974 14,8 13,6 12,6 5,4 7,9 9,3 9,2 11,9 12,9 11, I 
1975 12,5 12,6 11,9 5,5 7,7 7,3 9,5 10,6 12,5 10,5 
1976 11,9 11,8 12,1 5,7 7,7 9,1 9,8 10,7 12,9 10,7 
1977 12,8 12,0 12,3 5,5 8,1 9,8 10,7 10,4 14,1 11,1 
1978 12,4 10,7 11,7 5,2 7,5 9,4 10,5 9,7 13,6 10,6 
1979 13,0 11,3 11,3 5,1 7,9 9.4 10,6 10,1 12,5 10,5 
1980 14,6 12,6 11,9 6,9 8,1 10.8 9,8 11,2 12,2 10.8 
1971-80 12,6 11,9 11,3 4,9 7,2 8.4 9,0 10,2 12,3 10,1 
1981 16,2 15,0 13,5 6,6 9.2 12,6 11.9 12,8 12,2 12,0 
1982 17,0 14,2 13,8 6,1 8,7 12,3 11,1 12,4 12,2 11,8 
1983 18,2 14,9 13,4 6,1 8,9 14,2 10,9 12,9 11,5 11,7 
1984 19,9 16,7 14,5 6,6 9,6 16,6 11,3 14,2 12,4 12,6 
Table 30 
Imports of goods and services at current prices 
(al perr:ent a/GDP at current marlctt pri~SJ 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1960 39.3 33,4 16,3 16,7 12,9 37.3 14,3 72,1 46,2 22,4 19,9 4.4 10,4 
1961 40,6 31,5 15,6 16,4 12,6 39,8 14,3 74,8 45,7 20,9 19,3 4,2 10.7 
1962 41,4 31,6 16,0 16,9 12,4 · 38,9 14,6 77,4 44,8 20,3 19.2 4,3 9,3 
1963 43,5 30,0 16,1 18,0 12,8 40,8 15,9 75,2 45,9 20,4 19.6 4,2 9,9 
1964 43,7 31,8 16,3 19,0 13,4 41.0 14,1 76,7 45,9 21.2 19,8 4,3 9,6 
1965 42,9 30,7 17.6 20,3 12,9 43,9 13,4 77,2 43,9 20,l 19,5 4,4 9,1 
1966 45,2 30,0 17,3 18,8 13,6 43,2 14.4 72,8 43.4 19,6 19.6 4.8 9,0 
1967 43,1 29.2 16,6 18,0 13,4 40,9 . 15.0 66,9 41.7 20,1 19,4 4,8 9,4 
1968 45,3 28,9 17,6 18.4 13,8 45.2 14,7 66,8 41,3 22.2 20,2 5,2 9,0 
1969 48,6 29,6 18,8 18,7 15,2 46,3 16,1 66,5 43,0 21,9 21,2 5,2 9,0 
1970 49.4 30,9 19,0 18,4 15.8 45,0 17,2 74,5 46,6 22,4 21.0 5,5 9,5 
1961-70 44,4 30.4 17.1 18,3 13,6 42,5 15,0 72,9 44,2 20,9 20,0 4,7 9,5 
1971 48,4 29,4 19,1 18,4 16.1 43,4 17.1 81,8 45.7 21.8 21,8 5.7 9,0 
1972 47,6 26,5 18,8 20,0 16,3 39,9 18.0 74,9 42,2 22.1 21.7 6,1 8,3 
1973 53,4 30,4 19,1 25,2 17,6 44,8 20,9 74,3 44.0 26,3 24,0 6,8 10.0 
1974 60.7 34,7 21.7 25,6 23,0 57.2 26,8 79,6 51.0 33.2 29,2 8,8 14,4 
1975 53.3 31.0 21,9 26,9 18.8 48.8 22,7 85,3 46,4 27,8 25,8 7,8 12.8 
1976 56,7 33,5 23,6 25,8 21.3 54,6 25,9 79,9 47,5 29,5 28,0 8.6 12,8 
1977 56,7 32,5 23,4 25,2 21,6 59,1 25,0 80,3 46,3 29.S 27,7 9,3 11, 
1978 54.9 29.9 22,7 24,6 20,3 60,5 24,2 79.8 44.9 27.4 26,5 9,6 9,5 
1979 61.2 32,1 24,8 25,3 21,8 67,3 26,5 83.4 49,6 28,1 28,5 10,3 12.6 
1980 65,7 33.8 27.2 26,4 24.0 64.3 28.0 84,4 53.0 25.2 29,7 11,0 14,9 
1971-80 55,9 31,4 22.2 24,4 20,1 54,0 23,5 80.4 47.1 27.1 26.3 8.4 11.6 
1981 70,8 35,8 28,5 26,5 25,2 64,4 28.6 84.4 54,5 23,8 30.4 10.4 14,2 
19 2 74,7 35,7 28,4 28,2 25,5 57,1 27,6 89,8 53.4 24.4 30.4 9.5 14,1 
1983 73,1 34,2 27,6 29,3 24,1 55.9 25,6 87,5 54,1 25,6 29,7 9.4 12,1 
1984 76,8 35,8 29.2 29.4 24,8 60,1 27.4 93,3 58,0 28.7 31,7 10.4 12,3 
19 5 76.4 36,7 10,4 30,8 25,0 61.0 29,1 93,1 59,0 28,8 32,4 10,2 11,7 
1986 73,6 .l6,l 30,5 30,6 24.7 61.5 2 ,7 88,1 57,5 27,7 31.9 10.8 12,0 
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Table 33 
Extra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
fas perunl of GDP at t1lTrt71t market priurJ 
BL DK D GR F IRL 1'/L UK EUR 10 
1960 15,9 14,9 9,2 11.7 7,3 12.6 8,7 20,2 14,8 11,1 
1991 15,0 14,0 8,6 9,7 6,9 13,0 8,6 19,2 13,3 10,3 
1962 14,9 14,8 8,7 7,8 6,7 12,l 8,5 18,1 12.9 10,0 
1963 14,9 14,2 8,6 8,9 6,5 12,3 9,0 18,0 13,0 10,0 
1964 15,3 15,7 8,5 8,3 6,7 12,5 8,0 17.9 14,1 10,2 
1965 14,6 15,1 8,9 9,8 6,2 12,7 7,9 16,6 13,1 9,9 
1966 14,8 14,8 8,6 9,4 6,4 12,5 8.3 16,4 12.4 9,7 
1967 13,9 14,6 8,0 7,9 5,8 12,4 8,3 15.4 12.4 9,3 
1968 14,8 14,1 8,1 8.4 5.4 12,6 7.5 14,7 13,7 9.3 
1969 15,0 14,3 8.4 8.8 5,7 12,6 7,9 13,8 13.4 9.4 
1970 15,2 15,0 8,2 10,1 6,3 11.6 8.2 15,3 13,1 9,6 
1961-70 14,8 14,7 8,5 8,9 6,3 12.4 8,2 16,6 13,1 9,8 
1971 13,0 14,0 7,9 9,3 6,0 12,2 7,6 15,2 11,9 9,0 
1972 12,1 12,6 7,1 8.4 6,0 10,8 7,5 13,5 11.9 8,5 
1973 13,6 14,7 7,4 10,6 6,5 11,3 9,1 14,9 14.4 9,6 
1974 18,2 17,0 9,3 13,3 9,9 16,5 13,8 18,9 18.8 12,9 
1975 15,6 14,9 8,9 14,7 8,1 13,3 11,3 17,3 14,9 11,1 
1976 16.5 15,7 10,1 16,2 9.2 14,8 13,1 18,7 16,1 12.4 
1977 16,2 14,9 9,8 15,0 9,2 16,6 12,6 18,2 15,0 12.0 
1978 15,2 12,9 9,3 14,1 8,3 15,9 11,8 16,3 15.l 11,2 
1979 19,0 14,1 10.4 14,1 8,8 16,9 13,2 18.4 14,5 12,2 
1980 23,2 15,0 12,0 16,0 10,5 14,7 14,0 21,0 13,7 13.4 
1971-80 16,3 14,6 9,2 13,2 8.2 14,3 11.4 17,2 14,6 11,2 
1981 25.3 16,1 12.4 12,1 10,9 14,7 15,3 22,2 12,6 13,7 
1982 25,7 15,6 12,0 14,1 10.4 13,4 14,3 20,9 12.7 13,3 
1983 23,8 15,0 11,6 14,5 9.5 14,0 13,0 21,7 12,7 12,7 
1984 25.2 16,1 12.4 15,3 9.7 16,3 13,7 24,9 14.4 13,7 
Table 34 
Current account of balance of payments 
(as percent of GDP at current market pr,ces1 
81. DK D GR F IRL NL UK EUR 10 us JA 
1960 0,7 -1,6 1,6 -2.9 1,5 -0,1 0,8 3,0 -1,0 0,7 0,6 0,3 
1961 0,3 2,0 1,0 -2,2 1,1 0,2 1,2 1.4 0,0 0,7 0,7 1,8 
1962 0,7 -3,4 -0.1 -1,6 1,0 - 1,8 0,6 1.0 0.4 0.4 0,6 -0,1 
1963 -0.4 0,1 0,2 _.,., 0,3 -2.8 -1,4 0,7 0,3 -0,0 0,7 1,1 
-.-
1964 0,2 -2.4 0,2 -4,3 -0,3 -3,5 1,1 -1,1 -1.3 -0,3 I, I -0,6 
1965 0,6 1.8 --1,3 -5,8 0,8 -4.4 3,6 0,1 -0.2 0,2 0,8 1,1 
1966 -0,1 -1.9 0,2 -2.0 0,1 1.6 3,2 1,0 0,1 0.4 0,4 1,3 
1967 1,2 -2,4 2.2 _.,., 0.0 1.4 2,2 0,3 -0,9 0,7 0,3 -0,1 
1968 1,4 - 1,7 2,3 -3,6 -0.5 · -1.3 3,3 0,3 -0.8 0,8 0,1 0,8 
1969 1.8 2,8 1.4 4,0 I. I -4,8 2,7 0.3 0,7 0,6 0,0 1,3 
1970 3.2 - .:1,9 0.6 3.1 0,1 4,0 1.2 - 1.4 1,3 0.5 0.2 1,0 
1961-70 0,9 --2.2 0.7 -3.1 0.2 -2,3 1.8 0,0 -0,0 0.4 0,5 0,8 
1971 2,3 2.4 0.4 1.5 0,6 3,8 1,8 ·-0,3 1.8 0.8 -0,1 2,5 
1972 3,9 -OJ 0.4 - 1.2 0,5 2,2 1,6 2.8 0.2 0.8 -0,5 2,2 
1973 2,8 -1,7 u -3.8 -0.2 3,5 1,7 3,8 - 1,9 0.0 0,5 0,0 
1974 I. 7 3.1 2.7 -3.3 -2.3 -9,9 - 4,6 3.0 -4,6 -1.0 0,3 -1,0 
1975 0,7 1.5 1.0 -4,2 -o.o -1,5 -0.2 2.4 -2,0 0,0 1.2 -OJ 
1976 I. I -4.9 0,9 - 2,6 1.5 5,3 1.5 3.0 1,6 0,5 0,3 0,7 
1977 - 0.3 -4.0 0,8 - 1,9 -0,7 -5,5 1,2 0,7 0.0 0,1 -0,7 1,6 
1978 0,5 2,7 1.4 -1,3 0,6 -6,9 2,4 -0,8 0,6 0.8 -0,7 1,? 
1979 1.6 4.7 0,8 1.9 - 0,0 -13.6 1.7 - 1,1 0,1 -0.4 -0.1 -0,9 
1980 -\5 3,7 1.8 0.3 1.4 12,0 -2.5 -1,5 1,8 -1,3 0,2 I, I 
1971-80 0,6 -2.9 0,6 ~ ") 0,4 o.4 -0.2 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0,0 0,6 
-·-
1981 3.2 J,O 0,8 0,2 - 1.4 15,1 -2.3 2.1 2,7 -0,5 0.2 0,5 
1982 -2,0 .. i_: 0,6 3,9 3,0 10,9 -1,6 2,8 1.7 -0,6 0,2 0,7 
1983 0,5 0, 7 4,7 1.7 6,3 0,2 2,9 1,1 0,1 -1,0 1,9 
1984 I.I 3.2 1,0 4,0 -0,7 5.1 0,9 4,1 0,3 0,1 ~2.8 2,8 
1985 1.9 3.4 2,1 5.2 o., 3,3 - 1.7 4.5 I.I 0,5 - 3.4 3,5 
1986 1,2 - 2,7 2,0 4,1 o. -2.0 ·-I, I 4,5 0,9 0,6 3,8 3,8 
~-~-
---- ---
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Table 37 
Money supply (M2/M3) 
1annud r>tr<ffltag< .IL:ng 
BL DK D GR F IRL 11,L UK ElR 10 l'S JAP 
1960 4,3 8,0 11,1 20,2 16,7 5,5 19.6 7,0 0,9 10,5 4,9 20,1 
1961 9,9 9,8 12,9 17,0 17,2 7,3 14,9 5,4 2.3 10,7 7,4 20,2 
1962 7,4 8,5 10,4 21,5 18,7 9,6 17,0 6,6 2,6 10,9 8,1 20,3 
1963 10,3 12,5 9,9 21,4 14,1 5,8 13,5 9,8 7,8 11,0 8,4 24,0 
1964 7,6 11,1 9,4 16,1 9,8 9,4 8,8 10.4 5,8 8.6 8.1 18,7 
1965 9,6 9,7 10,6 12,9 10,9 6,7 15,4 6,2 7,6 10,4 8,1 18.0 
1966 8,2 12,8 8,3 18.2 10,6 10,6 13,8 5,9 3,4 8,6 4,5 16,3 
1967 7,1 9,8 12,0 16,1 13,1 12,7 13,3 10,9 9.6 1 I.6 9,1 15,5 
1968 8,6 14,5 11,8 17,8 11,6 16,9 11,6 14,8 7,3 10,9 7,9 14.8 
1969 7,0 10,2 9,4 16,2 6.1 11.2 11.4 10,2 2,0 7,5 4,0 18,5 
1970 10,0 3,3 9,1 19,3 15,4 14,0 13,6 11,0 9.6 11,5 6,2 16,9 
1961-70 8,6 10,2 10,4 17,6 12,7 10,4 13,3 9,1 5,7 10,2 7,2 17.9 
1971 12.9 8,5 13,5 · 22,4 17,8 12.9 17,1 9,0 14.l 14,9 13,4 24,3 
1972 17,0 15,0 14,4 23,6 18,5 14,2 18,3 11,9 24,6 18,3 13.0 24.7 
1973 15,4 12,6 10,1 14,5 15,0 26,0 23,2 21,9 27,0 18,1 7,0 16,8 
1974 14,0 8,9 8,5 20,9 15,9 20,6 1 ,5 20,0 10,7 13.0 5,5 11.5 
1975 15,1 25,1 8,6 26,5 18,2 18.9 23.5 5.7 6,3 13,7 12,6 16.5 
1976 14,3 10,9 8.4 26,7 12,8 14,5 22,8 22,7 9,7 13,7 13,7 15,4 
1977 10,3 9,9 11,2 22,7 13,9 17,1 23,8 3,6 9,4 13.4 10,6 13,4 
1978 10,2 8.7 11,0 26,0 12.2 29.0 24,2 4.2 15,3 14,5 8,0 14,0 
1979 8,2 10,8 6.0 18,4 14,0 18.7 23,2 6,9 13,2 12,9 7,9 10,8 
1980 6,5 8,1 6,2 24,7 8,4 17,7 17,3 4,4 18,5 11,6 8,9 9,5 
1971-80 12,4 11, 7 9,8 22.6 14.7 18,9 20,8 10,8 14,7 14,4 10,0 15,6 
1981 10,0 9,1 5,0 34,7 10.4 17,4 15,9 5,3 13,7 10.9 10,0 11,2 
1982 7,5 11,4 7,1 29,0 10,8 13,0 17,2 7,6 8,9 10,7 9,0 9,1 
1983 7,1 25,4 5,3 20,3 11,2 5,6 14,7 10.4 10,4 10,4 12,0 8,3 
1984 5,7 17,8 4,7 29.4 8,3 10,1 13,9 7,7 10,0 9,2 8.3 8,1 
Table 38 
Short-term interest rates 
·- --·-·~~---~------·----
BL DK D GR F IRL NL UK El'R to l'S JA 
1960 5,1 8,0 4,1 3,5 2,1 
1961 4,6 6,3 3,6 8,0 3,7 6,2 3,5 1,1 5,2 3,9 2,4 8,5 
1962 3,4 6,5 3.4 8,0 3,6 5.0 3,5 1,9 4,1 3.o 2,8 9,0 
1963 3,6 6,1 4,0 7.9 4,0 4,3 3,5 2.0 3,7 3.7 3.2 7,4 
1964 4,9 6,2 4,1 7,8 4.7 5,5 3,5 3,5 5.0 4,4 3,6 10,0 
1965 5,0 6,5 5,1 7,8 4,2 6,8 3.5 4,0 6.8 5.0 4,0 7.0 
1966 5,6 6.5 6.6 8,0 4.8 7.0 3,5 4,9 7,0 5,6 4,9 5,6 
1967 5,5 6,6 4,3 8,5 4,8 6,3 3,5 4,7 6.3 4.9 4,3 6,2 
1968 4,5 6,6 .\8 8,3 6,2 7,9 3.5 4.6 7,9 5,3 5.4 7,6 
1969 7,3 8,2 5,8 8.0 9,3 9,2 ,7 5,7 9,2 7.1 6.7 7,6 
1970 8,1 9.0 9,4 8.0 8,6 7.0 S,1 6,2 ,I 7,9 6,1 8,0 
1961-70 5,2 6,8 5.0 .o 5.3 6.5 3, 3, 6,6 5,1 4,3 7,7 
1971 5,4 7,6 7,1 ',0 6,0 6,6 5.7 4.5 6.2 6.1 4,1 6.4 
1972 4,2 6.3 5.7 8,0 5.3 7,1 S.2 2,7 6.8 5,4 4.2 4,7 
19n 6,6 8,1 12,2 9.0 9,1 12,2 7.0 7,5 11,8 9,7 7,2 7.2 
1974 10.6 11.3 9,8 11,8 13.0 14,5 14,Q 10,4 13.4 12,0 7,Q 12,5 
1975 7,0 65 4,9 11,9 7.6 10.9 10.4 5.4 10,6 7,5 5,8 10,7 
1976 10,1 10.3 4,3 11.5 8,7 11.7 16,0 7,4 11.6 8,6 5,0 7,0 
1977 7,1 14 . .'i 4.J 12.0 9,1 ,4 14,0 4,8 8,0 7.5 S,3 5,7 
1978 7,1 15,4 .1,7 13,5 7, Q,I.) 11.5 7,0 Q,4 7,1 7,4 4.4 
1')79 10,9 12,5 6,9 16,7 Q,7 16,0 12.0 9,6 13,9 9,8 10.1 6,.\ 
1980 14 • .:! 16,9 9,5 21,0 12,0 16,2 16,9 10,6 16,8 12.6 11,6 10,9 
1971-80 8,' I I. I 6 12.3 IU 11,3 6,9 10,8 8,6 6,8 7,5 
1981 15,o 14,9 12,4 21,0 15,3 16.7 19,3 11.8 14,I 14.1 14,0 7,4 
198.:! 14,1 16,4 20,0 14,6 17,5 19.9 . ., 12.~ 11,9 10,6 6.9 
'•' ·-19 1 10.5 12,0 5.8 20.0 12.4 14.0 18,1 <i,7 10.1 9.1 8,7 6,4 
1984 11,<i 11,5 6.0 20,0 11.6 13,2 17,3 6.1 10,0 9.2 9.5 6,1 
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Table 47 
Net lending or net borrowing of general government 
(as ~rctnl of GDP at cu"ent n,ark~t prices I 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK ELR8 
1960 2,8 3,1 3,0 0,9 -2,4 -0,9 3,1 0,8 -1,0 0,6 
1961 -1,3 0,1 2,8 1.0 -3,2 -0,8 4,8 0,1 -0,7 0,6 
1962 -1,3 0,6 1,4 -0,1 -3,6 -1,0 2,3 -0,6 -0,0 0,1 
1963 -2,l 1,9 0,9 -0,1 -3,6 -1,2 2,6 -1.3 -2,8 -0,8 
1964 -0,8 1,8 0,7 0.7 -4,l -0,8 2,2 -1,5 -1,1 -0,1 
1965 1,6 1.8 0,6 0.7 -4,3 -3,8 2,9 -0,8 -2.0 - 1,2 
1966 -1,0 2,3 -0,2 0,6 -2.8 -3,8 1,9 -0,9 -0,0 -0,6 
1967 -1.3 0,4 -1.4 0.0 -3,3 -2,2 -0,7 -1,3 -1,0 -1,1 
1968 -2,5 1,1 -0.8 -0,8 -3,3 -2,8 -1.7 -0,9 -0,5 -1,1 
1969 1,8 1,4 1,1 0,9 -4,2 -3,1 1,2 -0,5 -0.6 -0,3 
1970 1,3 2.1 0,2 0,9 -3,7 -3,5 2,8 -0,8 2,5 0,1 
1961-70 -1,5 1,3 0,4 0,4 3,6 -2,3 1,8 -0,8 -0,6 -0,5 
1970 2.2 4,1 0,2 0,9 -3,S 2,7 0,1 2.9 0,3 
1971 -3,2 3,9 -0,2 0.7 -5.2 2,2 0,2 1,4 -0,6 
1972 -3,7 3,9 0,5 0,8 -7,5 2,0 0,7 -1,3 -1,6 
1973 -3,3 5,2 1.2 0,9 -7,0 3,3 1.7 -2,7 -1,3 
1974 -2,6 3,1 -1,3 0,6 -8,2 -7,0 4,7 0,9 -3,8 -2,3 
1975 -4.4 1,4 -5,7 _.,., -12,5 -I ,7 1,1 -2,2 -4,6 -5,4 -,-
1976 -5,5 -0.2 3.5 -0,5 -8,6 -9,0 1,6 2,4 -4,9 -4,1 
1977 -5.5 -0,5 2.4 -0,8 -7,6 -8,0 3,1 1,5 -3,3 -3,3 
1978 6.0 -0,3 -2,5 -1,9 -9,7 -9,7 4,6 -3,7 -4,4 -4,2 
1979 7,1 1.7 -2.7 -0,7 11,4 -9,5 0,6 -4,6 -3,3 -3,9 
1980 -9,0 - 3,3 3,1 0,2 -12,7 -8,0 ·-1,6 -4,2 -3,7 - 3,7 
1971-80 -5,0 0,9 -2,1 - 0,3 -8.3. 2.2 1,5 -3,1 -3,0 
1981 -12,8 6,9 -3,9 - 11.9 -1,8 -13,2 -11,9 -2.3 -5.4 -3,l 5,3 
1982 -11,l · 9,3 . 3.4 -9.7 -2.7 -13,8 -12,6 - 1,4 -7,0 -2,3 - 5.4 
1983 -11,7 -7,4 2,5 - 8,9 -3,1 -11,8 -12,4 0,1 -6,4 -3,6 -5,4 
1984 9,9 -4,6 -1,9 -9,9 2,8 -10,1 -13,5 1,4 6,3 -3,9 -5,3 
1985 8,6 - 2,9 -1.2 -12,5 3,2 11.5 -13,6 2,1 5,9 --3,2 -5,0 
1986 -7,4 0,6 0.8 -10,5 -3.3 -10,4 12,8 1,9 -o,5 2,8 4,6 
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